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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION
This thesis examines the utilization and management of labour in the
British coalmining industry in the period between 1900 and 1940. The period
was one in which the British coal industry experienced a dramatic reversal
of fortunes. Over the nineteenth century and up until the First World War,
output and employment increased rapidly. Expansion had been assisted by the
opening-up of large export markets in Europe and by 1913, the British coal
industry shipped abroad a third of its output of 287 million tons,
Dominating the world trade in coal in the very early twentieth century,
the British industry slipped from its position of international pre-
eminence in the years after 1913. In the interwar period, it was beset by
shrinking export markets, high levels of unemployment, and bitter
industrial conflict. In spite of the experience of intensifying
international competition, it failed to reconstruct. There was a failure to
concentrate production on large-scale, more productive mines, while the
British industry also lagged behind European and North American competitors
in the application of new extractive technologies. It achieved a rate of
productivity growth that compared most unfavourably with that of its
international rivals.
In this study, the British coal industry's changing performance is
examined in the context of its changing social and economic structure. The
thesis is principally concerned with the changing pattern of industrial
relations. But it is emphasized that the industry's uneven development
cannot be understood in terms of labour relations alone. It is necessary to
consider the structure of mine ownership and the competitive relations
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between firms, and a]so the evolving relationship between landowners and
mineowners. Landowners in Britain retained the ownership and control of
coal royalties up until 1938, and the influence of landed property on the
coal industry's development has been examined by Fine et al. (1985). Their
work is summarized in chapter two, because it shows that the trajectory of
capital-labour relations in British coalmining was in part the product of
the increasingly antagonistic relationship between land and capital.
The thesis is not an institutional account of trade union and employer
organization in the coal industry, and it makes no pretence to document at
length the history of the industry-wide disputes, lockouts and strikes of
the period under examination. Much of the detail on the latter has in fact
been reported in the extensive literature on industrial relations in
interwar British coalmining. Rather, the study places a central emphasis on
work. It looks at working methods and practices which were remarkably
varied in the period before 1913, and even more so in the interwar years
when mechanization was introduced gradually and unevenly across the
Industry.
Throughout the period, the British coal industry was fragmented and
diverse. The thesis relates inter- and intra-regional variations in the
organization of work to the interplay of geological and market conditions,
economic and social relations. It explores the linkages between work
organization and labour organization. Miners were not automatically united
by a common experience of work and indeed, unity was initially difficult to
establish because there were complex divisions of interest. Uniform,
industry-wide changes - as, for example, in working hours - impinged on
local working practices in different ways, and local adjustments could
affect particular groups and grades of underground workers differentially.
-2-
Nevertheless, the miners did achieve a growing unity from the early
twentieth century around the demands for shorter working hours, better
safety provision, and a national wage structure.
The coal industry was geographically fragmented and diverse, and the
mineowners were also divided in terms of their economic interests. The
policies of their national association - the Mining Association of Great
Britain - continued to reflect this fragmentation. Production was organized
under different geological conditions and oriented towards different
product markets, while mineowners controlled different work processes.
Since uniform restrictions on labour utilization and national wage
agreements would affect profitability unevenly, the mineowners could not
agree to make broad concessions to the miners. They insisted on retaining
maximum individual discretion in the areas of wage and employment
regulation, and the flexibility to respond to changing economic conditions
by reducing wage rates. The thesis shows that this had an adverse effect on
the industry's long-term development. It reinforced other conditions that
were inhibiting the reorganization and re-equipment of production.
Conflict was endemic in the coal industry and reached its height in the
General Strike of 1926. The defeat of the miners ensured the defeat of the
forces acting to promote reorganization and renewal. State intervention to
assist reconstruction was postponed. The mineowners secured wage cuts,
district wage settlements, and an extension of working hours. Profitability
was maintained in the short-term while the British coal industry staggered
on without the changes required to restore its competitive position
Internationally.
The analytical framework employed in the thesis can be distinguished from
alternative theoretical perspectives informing accounts of the difficulties
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encountered by British industries in the interwar years, and of the coal
industry's particular circumstances. It is clearly distanced from orthodox
neoclassical economic theory, which draws its propositions from an
abstract, ahistorical model of an atomistic market economy. It is closer
to, but nevertheless distinct from, the 'institutional perspective' on
British economic decline elaborated by Elbaum and Lazonick (1982, 1986) as
a critique of orthodox economic theory.
Elbaum and Lazonick suggest that the relative decline of the British
economy in the twentieth century has been a more or less continuous process
that can be traced back to, and explained in terms of, 'structural
rigidities' in its economic institutions that developed in the nineteenth
century heyday of British laissez-faire capitalism. They argue that while
these institutions had been conducive to economic expansion in the
nineteenth century world economy 'characterized by competitive capitalism',
they presented a formidable - 'if not insurmountable' - obstacle to
economic development in the twentieth century world economy 'characterized
by corporate capitalism' (1982:1).
Elbaum and Lazonick suggest that the transition from competitive to
corporate modes of economic organization was achieved elsewhere - in the
United States, Germany, and Japan - from the end of the nineteenth century,
although they do not enter into the details as to how this transformation
was effected abroad. Their model of 'successful' capitalist economic
development is elaborated at a fairly abstract level. It is informed by two
rather different perspectives on the nature of the firm and dynamics of
change in the capitalist economy. It draws upon the work of the 'new'
business historians and, in particular, Alfred Chandler's analysis of the
structural transformation of business enterprise (1962, 1977), and also
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upon labour process studies. Both sets of literature place a central
emphasis upon management, and identify the firm as an agency of economic
development. But in its treatment of the management function and the
determinants of 'business strategy', the 'new' business history ignores the
conflict between capital and labour, while labour process studies place an
overwhelming (sometimes exclusive) emphasis on the capital-labour relation
(for a more detailed review and critique, see Hyman, 1987).
Combining insights from these two sets of literatures, Elbaum and
Lazonick argue that from the end of the nineteenth century the atomistic
structures of 'competitive capitalism' gave way to 'corporate capitalism'
as the dominant mode of capitalist economic organization in the world
economy. They suggest that while British industries required transformation
of their structures of industrial relations, industrial organization and
enterprise management to compete with the corporate mass production methods
being developed abroad, 'vested interests' in the old structures proved to
be formidable obstacles to change (Elbaum and Lazonick, 1982:6).
The highly fragmented structures of industrial organization that had
developed during the nineteenth century, when Britain dominated
international markets, had nurtured highly competitive, specialized, and
'individualistic' managers. For the want of will and vision, such managers
were powerless to alter their industrial environment from one dominated by
small, traditional enterprises to one dominated by large oligopolistic
corporations which internalized functions formerly performed by the market.
Horizontal amalgamations did take place, but were unable to develop the
centralized decision-making structures essential for the rationalization
and re-equipment of production because the directors of participating firms
insisted on retaining operational control of their family enterprises.
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Structures of worplace industrial relations are identified as a further
impediment to change and the establishment of mass-manufacturing systems.
According to Elbaum and Lazonick, British workers with 'their powerful
trade unions' successfully resisted management attempts to undermine the
positions of craft control on the shopfloor that they had established
during the 'long boom' of the late nineteenth century (1982: 7).
Britain's industries were unable to restructure autonomously, while
leadership in the development of 'modern corporate structures' was not
forthcoming from other sectors of the economy. By virtue of its early
domination of international financial markets, British finance capital was
able to eschew direct involvement in domestic industry, and 'the City'
consequently failed to use its power to effect the 'concentration,
integration, and technological transformation of British industry'
(Lazonick, 1982:67). Elbaum and Lazonick argue that while governments in
the 1930s and 1940s intervened to redress the problem of horizontally
fragmented industry, the British state failed to provide the leadership
required to transform existing institutions and lay the basis for the post-
war development of a corporate mass production economy (1982:11).
As a critique of orthodox economic theory, Elbaum and Lazonick's
'institutional perspective' on British economic decline makes a valuable
contribution. Neoclassical theory simply ignores the role of institutional
structure in economic development and, indeed, offers little purchase on
the dynamic processes of economic change, positing instead a 'timeless
account of the conditions of "general equilibrium"' (Nolan and Marginson,
1988:3). But there are problems with Elbaum and Lazonick's analytical
approach, and they could be criticized for establishing a model that is as
static as the one that it is intended to displace. For they suggest that
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British economic decline can be attributed to a set of sclerotic
institutions, inherited from the past, and that have survived intact to the
present day, acting as a brake on economic change. This seems unlikely,
and the problem with Elbaum and Lazonick's 'institutional perspective' is
that it treats institutions in isolation from the social forces impacting
upon them. It is surely in the dynamic, complex and contradictory interplay
of economic and social relations that institutions are fashioned, and at
times displaced by new structures.
Thus, in this thesis, the British coalmining industry's changing
performance is analysed in the context of its changing social and economic
structure. Special attention is paid to the evolving pattern of industrial
relations. It is recognized, however, that a more rounded and complete
account would look at the interaction of relations between landowners,
mineowners, and mineworkers, and set their interaction against the
background of broader economic and political developments including the
contours of government policy.
KETHODS AND SOURCES *
The thesis combines a variety of primary and secondary source materials to
explore its major preoccupations and themes. Data have been gathered from
the coal industry's well-stocked archives, and employed in conjunction with
a re-working of secondary sources, in an attempt to establish and explain
the utilization and management of labour in British coalmining in the
period under examination.
The coal industry played a pivotal role in Britain's rise to economic
supremacy in the nineteenth century, and exhibited to a special degree the
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difficulties confronting British industrial capitalism in the years after
1913. It formed the site of the most acute struggles of the British labour
movement, culminating in the General Strike in 1926, and the defeat of the
miners was of the utmost significance in Britain's economic and political
history. It is not surprising, therefore, that the industry has attracted
so much attention from historians focusing on economic, social, and
political developments. To review comprehensively the great volume of
secondary literature on the industry in the period between 1900 and 1940
would be an impossible task, and consequently no attempt has been made to
undertake such an exercise. Some indication, however, can be given of the
ways in which the secondary source material has been employed in the
thesis.
One of the ways in which economic historians have discussed the
industry's changing performance is in terms of entrepreneurial failure or
success. The principal theoretical perspectives informing the debate are
located and discussed in chapter two, which examines critically a number
of empirical studies of the interwar industry's difficulties. Economic
historians, by and large, have been concerned with the technology, but not
the social relations of production. Labour historians, on the other hand,
until relatively recently had been preoccupied with the formal institutions
of industrial relations, documenting the emergence and growth of district
and national miners' trade unions often without delving too deeply into the
organization of work below ground. This approach has been challenged by the
'new' labour historians, who have placed a central emphasis on the nature
of work and very valuable studies of the influence of work relationships
and working practices and conditions on the character of mining trade
unionism have been completed by Daunton (1981), Harrison (ed., 1978), and
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Goffee (1981). The thesis draws upon and augments such work. It also
discusses the sociological studies of workplace relationships in British
coalmining completed in the 1950s and 1960s by, for example, the Tavistock
Institute (Trist and Bamforth, 1951; Trist et al., 1963), Goldthorpe
(1959), Dennis, Henriques, and Slaughter (1956), and locates the different
analytical perspectives informing these accounts.
The thesis has been informed by a wide reading of the secondary source
material and has drawn upon a diverse range of primary and official primary
sources. One of the most valuable sources of information has been the
Colliery Guardian - the industry's trade Journal, which was established by
the Mining Association of Great Britain and commenced publication in 1858.
Copies of this weekly publication are kept at the library at Hobart House -
British Coal's London headquarters - and a lengthy period of research there
allowed perusal of the issues from the late nineteenth century. While the
editorial column of the Journal often acted as the mouthpiece for the
mineowners' association, the Colliery Guardian reported on a wide range of
issues - the state of the coal trade; parliamentary debates on the coal
industry and legislation pertaining to it; industrial stoppages and
disputes at national, district, and pit levels; company histories, profits
and performance. It also published or reproduced articles by engineers,
managers and owners on mining systems, technology, working practices,
payment systems, and 'human relations' management. The Iron and Coal Trades
Review (1866-1961), also formed a useful source, particularly on what
contributors referred to as 'technical progress' in coalmining.
Other fertile sources of information on labour utilization and management
include the Transactions of the National Association of Colliery *onagers
(dating from 1889), again kept at Hobart House and reproducing the papers
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presented at meetings of the regional associations of mine Managers, and
the Transactions of the Institute of Mining Engineers (which also dates
from 1889 and was continued as the Xining Engineer after 1960) and which
again reproduced papers and discussions from the various regional
Institutes of Mining Engineers. Archival research was also completed at the
Leicestershire Record Office and at the rational Library of Wales,
Aberystwyth - where the records of the respective regional mineowners'
associations are housed - and contributed detail on the diversity of
working practices and systems in the industry.
The thesis has also relied heavily upon the evidence presented to and
reports of the various Royal Commissions and numerous official enquiries
Into the coal industry's affairs in the period under examination. For
evidence on working conditions and practices it has drawn, in particular,
on the Reports, Minutes of Evidence and Appendices of the Departmental
Committee appointed to Enquire into the Probable Economic Effects of a
Limit of 8 Hours to the Working Day of Coal Miners (1907-8); Reports and
Minutes of Evidence of the Royal Commission on Mines (1907-11); Report of
the Royal Commission on the Housing of the Industrial Population of
Scotland (1917-8); Reports of the Royal Commission on the Coal Industry
(1919) (Sankey); Reports, Minutes of Evidence, and Appendices of the Royal
Commission on the Coal Industry (1925) (Samuel); Report to the Secretary
for Mines of the Committee Appointed by him to Inquire into the
Qualifications and Recruitment of Officials of Mines (1929) (Holland);
Reports and Minutes of Evidence of the Royal Commission on Safety in Coal
Mines (1938-9); and the Report of the Technical Advisory Committee on Coal
Mining appointed by the Ministry of Fuel and Power (1944-5) (Reid).
Parliamentary and British government publications employed principally as
a source of statistical information (on employment, output, exports,
productivity, accidents, wages, industry structure, and so on) include the
General Reports and Statistics of Mines and Quarries, published as command
papers between 1897 and 1920; Annual Reports of the Secretary for Mines
(Mines Department, Board of Trade, 1922-38); Ministry of Fuel and Power,
Statistical Digest from 1938 (1943-4); and the annual List of Mines in
Great Britain (Mines Department). Using the last of these publications, a
considerable amount of effort was devoted to adding up the number of mines,
and colliery companies in operation in the industry in Just one year. This
work was made redundant with the publication of the fourth volume of
British Coal's official History of the British Coal Industry (Supple,
1987), covering the period 1913-46 and including a similar exercise but for
the three years 1913, 1924 and 1938 and therefore providing a more detailed
overview of the industry's structure.
In addition to the sources cited above, information on the internal
organization and policy statements of the Mining Association of Great
Britain was gathered from the Association's Annual Reports (copies of which
are held at Hobart House). It is worthwhile to note, however, that the
Gainford Papers (kept at Nuffield College) are a more rewarding source of
detail on the debates within the owners' associations.
OUTLINE OF THE THESIS
The thesis examines labour utilization and labour management in the British
coal industry in the years between 1900 and 1940. It straddles two periods
of contrasting fortunes in the industry's history; a period of vigorous
expansion and international pre-eminence in the years before 1913, and a
period of relative decline in the 1920s and 1930s. In spite of intensifying
international competition, the British industry failed to reconstruct.
Production remained highly fragmented throughout the interwar years, while
the British industry also fell behind its European and North American
rivals in the application of new technologies of coal extraction. Clearly,
any attempt to pursue a strict chronological account, periodizing stages in
the development of the labour process, would be inappropriate. Rather, the
thesis explores and attempts to explain the industry's unevenness and its
technological backwardness in the interwar years.
Chapter two provides a broad overview of the industry's changing economic
performance. Of course the coal industry was by no means the only great
export-oriented sector of the nineteenth century British economy to
experience a loss of overseas markets and acute economic difficulties in
the years after the First World War. Economic historians have discussed the
relative decline of Britain's staple industries in terms of the efficiency
of management decision-making - the failure or success of the nation's
entrepreneurs. Entrepreneurial performance has been assessed by different
criteria.	 Neoclassical
	 economic	 historians	 have
	 conceptualized
entrepreneurial success in terms of 'constrained optimization', or the
minimization of costs subject to given technical and market constraints,
while institutionalists have attributed British economic decline to the
failure of the nation's industrialists to alter prevailing constraints on
profitability.
	 Three studies of the interwar British coal industry's
difficulties which are informed by these different theoretical perspectives
are examined critically in chapter two. The chapter concludes by
delineating the analytical framework informing the thesis. The broad
outlines of this framework have been noted already.
Chapter three looks at work organization and also at wage regulation in
the British coal industry in the period before the First World War. The
industry's expansion hitherto had been based on the extension and
intensification of working hours, rather than the transformation of
production techniques. Coal production remained a labour intensive process
and wages formed the largest element in the industry's working costs.
Profitability was highly dependent upon the relationship between wages and
selling prices. Over the second half of the nineteenth century,
negotiations over wages had been conducted increasingly at a district (or
county) level. Sliding scales were displaced by conciliation board
agreements from the 1880s, but conflicts between mineowners and mineworkers
continued to centre on the rate at which wages should fluctuate with
selling prices.
The British coal industry of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries
was intensely regional, and in certain respects appeared more akin to a
collection of different industries.
	 Hand coal-getting remained the
predominant method of coal extraction in all coalfields. At the coalface,
the collier (or coalface work group) performed the complete operation of
winning the coal and retained immediate control over the pace of work. Paid
on a piece-rate system, colliers were subject to limited direct managerial
supervision. The experiences of other grades of underground and surface
labour were often quite different, while the degree of autonomy enjoyed by
piecework coal-getters varied between coalfields and over time. Across the
British coalfields, structures of work organization were remarkably
diverse. Chapter three explores some dimensions of this regional diversity
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and, in accounting for variegated patterns of work organization, considers
the influence of geological conditions, relations between workers, and
conflicts between mineowners and mineworkers.
Chapter three goes on to consider the influence of work and regional
diversity in working practices on labour organization, and also on employer
policies and practices at the level of organized collective action. It
notes that while the miners were not united by a common experience of work,
they did achieve a growing unity in their struggles for better wages, and
conditions. Mineowners, on the other hand, remained fragmented and could
not agree to make broad concessions. Any common employer policy had to
accommodate regional diversity and therefore the owners could organize
their collective strength only in opposition to the miners demands for
national wage bargaining and industry-wide reductions in working hours.
Thus, the mineowners were unable to intervene in their struggles with the
miners in a way that would have promoted the progressive development of
capitalist production.
Chapter four continues the exploration of regional (and intra-regional)
variations in work organization, shifting the focusof analysis to contract
work and internal subcontract systems. Three distinctive arrangements are
identified: (i) the big butty system, whereby mineowners sub-let the
working of an entire pit, or group of pits, to a contractor or partnership
of contractors; (ii) the little butty system, where stallmen or contracting
colliers undertook to work a section of coalface (or stall) at a piece-rate
for which they were obliged to hire, or at least pay and supervise, a group
of mineworkers; and (iii) arrangements in which the piecework coal-getter
worked with a daywage assistant or apprentice.
The big butty system, which was only employed in certain coalfields in
the nineteenth century, was on the decline from the 1860s. But the little
butty system persisted in some districts and localities into the 1920s and
1930s, alongside hand-hewing at the face. Since the system could actually
embrace a variety of different arrangements, and was employed in districts
which were dissimilar in many other respects, care needs to be exercised in
attempting to make any generalized statements on its operation and the
reasons for its persistence.
The system could divide workers, although not necessarily into two
clearly-defined camps, since relations between butty-men and management,
and between butties and their co-workers or subordinates, were likely to
vary even within the confines of a single mine. The abolition of the
system, which in most districts had been made official union policy by the
early twentieth century, could form the focus of intra-union conflicts, the
resolution of which would be influenced by broader economic conditions and
employer practices. And in analysing the reasons why unmechanized pits and
ostensibly archaic forms of work organization could survive, it is
necessary to consider the nature of competition in the interwar British
coal industry.
Chapter five examines the system of 'machine mining' that was introduced
In the interwar period. Only the process of undercutting the coal was
mechanized. Other operations at the face and underground maintenance work
continued to be performed manually, while the transformation of labour-
intensive underground haulage techniques was limited to a very small
proportion of mines. But the partially-mechanized mining system involved a
radical reorganization of work. At the coalface, an extreme horizontal
division of labour was imposed. The work was sub-divided into narrowly-
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defined tasks, arranged in rigid sequence over three separate shifts in a
twenty-four hour cycle of coal-getting operations. The introduction of
machinery and reorganization of work effectively deskilled the colliers and
eroded their immediate control over the pace of work, created the need for
greater managerial resources to be devoted to the coordination of the
production process and coercion of workers, and introduced new health and
safety hazards.
Mechanization was a protracted and uneven process in the British coal
industry. Geological conditions and structures of work organization
combined in different ways to influence the suitability of different
districts for mechanization, while conflicts between landowners and
mineowners over the conditions for change developed unevenly and were
resolved in different ways. Chapter five explores some particular examples.
Because mechanization was an uneven process, the heterogeneity of work
organization in the industry was heightened in the interwar period. The
mineowners were unable to agree upon, or concede to proposals for the
reorganization of the industry, and they were unable to agree upon a common
employer policy other than one of resistance to national wage bargaining.
The chapter draws out the implications for the industry's development of
the defeat of the miners in the struggles of 1921 and 1926.
Chapter six looks at the recruitment and training of colliery officials
and, in particular, at the changing role in the mines of deputies and
overmen - the lowest ranks in the managerial hierarchy. Legislation passed
from the final quarter of the nineteenth century and relating primarily to
health and safety, made obligatory the appointment of certain grades of pit
officials and specified a minimum level of training and qualification.
Under the Coal Mines Act of 1911, deputies - drawn from the ranks of the
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miners - were confined nominally to the performance of work relating to
safety, although the legislation made provision for certain exemptions. The
Act was framed in the era of hand coal-getting, but remained in force
largely unamended throughout the interwar period.
The introduction of machinery and use of electricity below ground added
to health and safety hazards. At the sane time, the partially-mechanized
mining system created new problems of labour management for employers, the
need for greater coordination of the production process and more intensive
supervision at the face, and this implied a rising overhead expenditure on
supervisory staff. Chapter six considers the ways in which these pressures
were met by firms - in some instances by breaching the sentiments of the
1911 Act, and elsewhere by subordinating deputies to the authority of
overmen whose role was not prescribed in the various safety Acts. The
chapter relates the hiatus in the progress of safety legislation in the
interwar period to the industry's unevenness and the diversity in its
production methods, and examines the implications for the health and safety
of mineworkers.
CHAPTER TWO: THE BRITISH COALNINING INDUSTRY, 1900-1940
INTRODUCTION
The years between 1900 and 1940 straddle two periods of contrasting
fortunes for the British coalnining industry. Over the nineteenth century
and up until the First World War, the industry enjoyed a period of
sustained expansion. Output increased more than ninefold between 1830 and
1913, from 30 million to 287 million tons. Employment rose from 110,000 to
1.1 million, and with the exception of the heterogeneous category of metal
manufacture, machinery, vehicles, and metal products, coalminers formed the
largest group of male industrial workers in early twentieth century
Britain.
The industry's rapid and consistent expansion had been facilitated by the
growth of manufacturing and commerce in Britain and, from the final quarter
of the nineteenth century, by the opening-up of large export markets on the
Continent. Representing 12 per cent of annual production in 1870, coal
exports increased at a rate of at least 4 per cent per annum in the years
to 1913 when Britain shipped abroad 97 million tons (34 per cent of
aggregate output) of coal, coke, and patent fuel as direct exports and as
foreign 'bunkers', or coal for shipping engaged in overseas trade. Over 70
per cent of British coal exports cane from just two mining regions - South
Wales and the North East - and over 70 per cent of the total was shipped to
Europe. Coal constituted 10 per cent of the total value of Britain's export
trade on the eve of the First World War, and 55 per cent of all coal
entering world trade was mined in this country (Supple, 1987:7; Church et
al., 1986: ch. 1).
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The pre-war era of expansion and international pre-eminence, however, was
eclipsed in the years after 1913. In the 1920s and 1930s, the British
coalmining industry was characterized by collapsed export markets, high
levels of unemployment and bitter industrial strife. The twentieth century
brought a new and challenging set of economic conditions. International
competition intensified as European economies improved their coal
Industries, concentrating output on large-scale, more productive mines. The
rate of growth of demand in home and overseas markets stagnated in the
interwar period, in the context of a world-wide economic crisis. Yet, in
spite of these coercive pressures for change, the British industry failed
to rationalize, restructure and re-equip itself internally.
The number of mines in operation in the British industry fell by about 30
per cent over the interwar years, from approximately 2,600 pits in 1913 to
1,900 in 1938 (Supple, 1987: 361, calculated from the List of Nines). An
apparently drastic decline, therefore, still left the industry with an
exceptionally large number of productive units and at the end of the period
nearly 50 per cent of the industry's output was raised from its 1500
smallest mines, each employing less than 1,000 miners (see table 2.1).
Within the British industry there were certainly marked regional variations
in average mine size, pace and extent of concentration (see table 2.2). In
the 'inland' coalfields of the East Midlands and South Yorkshire, for
example, large-scale pits, sunk in the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries, accounted for an increasing proportion of regional output over
the 1920s, while the great bulk of Scotland's coal output continued to be
raised from a plethora of small-scale mines. The British industry contained
some large-scale modern mines, and production in a few districts was more
concentrated by the end of the interwar period. But in comparison with
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Table 2,1 Size Distribution of British Coalmines, By Output, 1924 and 1942
1924
Size of Mines
(labour	 force)
Mines
No,
Labour Force
No,
Output
Tons,
Under 50 818 33,0 13,508 1,1 2,394,533 0,9
50-499 848 34,2 199,300 16,5 43,454,587 16,4
500-999 422 17,0 305,532 25,2 66,356,643 24,9
1,000-1,499 198 8,0 242,264 20,2 51,729,260 19,4
1,500-1,999 77 3,1 134,198 11,1 30,043,541 11,2
2,000-2,499 61 2,5 134,588 11,1 29,486,767 11,0
2,500-2,999 31 1,2 84,380 7,0 19,734,479 7,4
3,000 and over 26 1,0 96,972 8,0 23,520,541 8,8
Total 2,481 1,210,742 266,720,351
Average no, of miners per mine - 488
Average output per mine - 107,497 tons
1942
Mines
No,
Labour Force
No,
Output
Tons,
Under 50 691 39,8 11,036 1,6 2,532,035 1,2
50-499 513 29,5 122,815 17,3 33,832,577 16,6
500-999 300 17,3 212,551 29,9 59,411,650 29,2
1,000-1,499 127 7,3 152,058 21,4 46,413,431 22,8
1,500-1,999 68 3,9 113,754 16,0 32,592,621 16,0
2,000-2,499 24 1,4 52,805 7,4 15,683,946 7,7
2,500-2,999 10 0,6 27,324 3,9 8,121,556 4,0
3,000 and over 5 0,3 17,375 2,5 5,045,622 2,5
Total 1,738 709,718 203,633,438
Average no, of miners per mine - 408
Average output per mine - 117,146 tons
Sources: Royal Commission on the Coal Industry (Samuel), 1926, Report, Vol,III,
Appendix 18, p,177, Ministry of Fuel & Power, Statistical Digest from
1938 (Cmd, 6538),11,
Table 2,2 Size Distribution of Coalmines, By Output, Selected Districts, 1924
Size of Mines	 Mines	 Labour Force	 Output	 Mines	 Labour Force	 Output
(Labour Force)	 No,	 %	 No,	 %	 Tons,	 %	 No,	 %	 No,	 %	 Tons,
Scotland	 South Vales i Monmouthshire
Under 50 102 23 1,915 1 395,760 2 204 34 3,521 1 565,556 1
50-499 235 53 56,619 40 14,576,189 40 225 38 46,308 19 9,554,545 19
500-999 84 19 58,411 41 14,565,221 40 89 15 63,455 26 13,246,312 26
1,000-1,499 15 3 17,468 12 4,595,937 13 39 7 46,986 19 9,498,241 19
1,500-1,999 4 1 7,772 6 2,027,270 6 14 2 23,928 10 4,954,310 10
2,000-2,499 20 3 44,230 18 8,849,759 17
2,500 and over 7 1 20,017 8 4,289,711 8
Total 440 142,185 36,160,377 598 248,445 50,958,434
Average no, of miners per mine - 323	 Average no, of miners per mine - 416
Average output per mine - 82,183 tons 	 Average output per mine - 85,215 tons
Northumberland Durham
Under 50 39 33 608 1 109,303 1 87 31 1,496 1 254,625 1
50-499 33 28 7,226 11 1,376,848 10 73 26 18,423 11 3,768,480 10
500-999 20 17 15,339 24 2,939,920 22 59 21 46,008 26 9,601,645 26
1,000-1,499 17 14 21,525 33 4,700,326 34 28 10 33,945 19 6,943,223 19
1,500-1,999 5 4 8,338 13 1,804,619 13 11 4 19,102 11 4,187,174 11
2,000-2,499 4 3 12,275 19 2,728,959 20 8 3 17,044 10 3,726,975 10
2,500-2,999 8 3 21,935 13 4,552,759 12
3,000 and over 5 2 17,312 10 3,638,688 10
Total 118 65,311 13,659,875 279 175,265 36,673,569
Average no, of miners per mine - 554
Average output per mine - 115,762 tons,
Average no, of miners per mine - 628
Average output per mine - 131,446 tons
South Yorkshire Nottinghamshire h Derbyshire
Under 50 32 31 426 0,3 81,384 0,3 45 29 780 0,6 153,326 0,5
50-499 11 11 2,557 2 583,448 2 26 17 6,998 6 1,471,461 5
500-999 13 13 9,441 8 2,286,273 7 35 23 26,943 22 6,347,389 20
1,000-1,499 9 8 11,554 10 2,636,616 9 20 13 24,750 20 5,898,709 19
1,500-1,999 7 7 12,111 10 2,855,815 9 14 9 25,656 21 6,745,141 22
2,000-2,499 14 14 30,539 25 7,569,779 25 5 3 11,136 9 2,981,781 10
2,500-2,999 8 8 21,596 18 5,283,398 17 5 3 13,962 11 4,129,178 13
3,000 and over 9 9 33,975 28 9,517,584 31 4 3 13,935 11 3,404,630 11
Total 103 122,199 30,844,297 154 124,160 31,131,615
Average no, of miners per mine - 1,186	 Average no, of miners per mine - 806
Average output per mine - 299,459 tons
	
Average output per mine - 202,153
Source: Royal Commission on the Coal Industry (Samuel), 1926, Report, Vol.!!!, Appendix 18, pp 177-9
developments on the Continent, the pace and extent of change in the British
industry as a whole was slow and limited in the extreme. On the eve of the
Second World War, the average annual output of mines in the German Ruhr was
780,000 tons, and in the Polish coal industry it was 750,000 tons. The
average annual output of British mines, in contrast, was a mere 122,000
tons (statistics cited in Reid Report, 1945).
The British industry also lagged behind in the application of new
extractive technologies. Again there were regional variations within the
British industry in the pace of mechanization. But in 1935, only 55 per
cent of British output was undercut mechanically, whereas mechanized coal-
getting accounted for 97 per cent of output in the German coal industry, 98
per cent in Belgium, 88 per cent in France, and 79 per cent in the United
States (ILO, 1938: 196). Moreover, by the end of the interwar period it was
recognized that the British industry had fallen behind Continental and
North American competitors not only in the application of machinery at the
coalface, but also in the improvement of underground haulage and winding
techniques (Reid Report, 1945).
The British coal industry achieved only a modest rate of growth of labour
productivity over the interwar years. Output per manshift in Britain
increased by only 13 per cent between 1913 and 1938. This compared with
increases of 64, 40, 59, and 36 per cent in the German Ruhr, Belgium,
Poland, and the United States, respectively (Supple, 1987:387). British
coal became increasingly uncompetitive in international markets, and at the
end of the interwar period the British industry shipped abroad only 20 per
cent of a reduced output of 227 million tons. Unemployment in coalmining
rarely fell below 20 per cent during the late 1920s and early 1930s, and by
the end of the interwar period employment had declined to 781,000.
Of course the coal industry was by no means the only great export-
oriented sector of the nineteenth century British economy to experience a
loss of overseas markets and acute economic difficulties in the interwar
period of the twentieth century. The relative decline of Britain's staple
industries has fuelled an ongoing debate on the efficiency of the nation's
entrepreneurs. Schooled in different theoretical traditions, economic
historians have assessed entrepreneurship by different criteria and have
reached different Judgements on the performance of Britain's
industrialists. The principal positions in this debate are outlined in the
next section of this chapter. The subsequent section examines critically a
number of concrete studies of the interwar British coal industry that
broadly parallel these divergent theoretical perspectives. The final
section outlines an alternative analytical approach; one in which the
uneven development of the coalmining industry . and, specifically, its
relative decline in the interwar period, are examined in the context of
the industry's changing economic and social structure.
THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES ON DECLINE
One of the ways in which economists and economic historians have discussed
Britain's industrial performance since the late nineteenth century is in
terns of entrepreneurial failure or success. Armed with different
theoretical perspectives on the nature of the firm, and of the capitalist
economy, scholars have assessed entrepreneurship by different yardsticks
and have reached different verdicts on the performance of Britain's
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industries and its industrialists. In recent years the debate has polarized
into two opposing interpretations.
The 'new' economic historians, whose work has been publicized by Donald
McCloskey and Lars Sandberg (1981), have combined neoclassical economic
theory and quantitative methods to reinterpret British economic history.
They have assessed the performance of Britain's industries by judging the
economic rationality of decision-making at the level of the individual
firm, and have conceptualized entrepreneurial success in terms of
'constrained optimization' - the minimization of costs subject to given
technical and market constraints. The organizing framework is competitive
general equilibrium theory which is a theory about the operation of an
atomistic market economy.
McCloskey et al. argue that their quantitative work shows that market
forces worked well throughout the nineteenth and into the twentieth
century. That is to say, it is their view that 'rational' cost-price
calculations underlay the decision-making of Britain's industrialists and
that Britain's entrepreneurs maximized profits and economic efficiency by
adopting production techniques most appropriate to the market environments
in which they found themselves. According to the 'new' economic historians,
therefore, if Britain's industries failed to match the achievements of US
and European rivals this must have been due to exogeneous factors beyond
the control of the nation's entrepreneurs.
The methodology and conclusions of the 'new' economic historians have
been criticized by 'institutionalist' economists influenced by the work of
Alfred Chandler and the 'new' business historians, and also by neo-marxist
analyses of the capitalist labour process. Indeed, Bernard Elbaum and
William Lazonick (1982, 1986) have developed their 'institutional
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perspective' on the relative decline of the British economy explicitly as a
critique of orthodox economic theory and its application to the study of
British economic history by McCloskey and Sandberg. Elbaum and Lazonick
argue that from the late nineteenth century onwards, the performance of the
British economy lagged behind that of other industrialized economies, and
in this experience they identify a clear case of entrepreneurial failure.
In their view, the 'captains' of British industry performed admirably as
neoclassical managers, taking the constraints that faced them as given and
attempting to do the best that they could subject to these constraints. But
as entrepreneurs they failed because they were unable to create new
profitable opportunities by transforming their socio-economic environment
in response to structural changes in the international economy.
More specifically, Elbaum and Lazonick argue that Britain's
industrialists failed to reform the atomistic structures of industrial
organization and structures of workplace labour relations that they had
inherited from the nineteenth century heyday of British competitive
capitalism. They failed to supersede the market mechanism by adopting the
'corporate forms of managerial coordination' developed abroad, and as a
result were unable to develop the 'corporate mass production methods' of
twentieth century international competition (1986:2). According to Elbaum
and Lazonick, moreover, Britain's industrialists were unsuccessful
entrepreneurs 'precisely because as individualistic managers in highly
competitive and highly specialized structures they were powerless to alter
the organizational constraints that determined feasible technological
choices and profitable opportunities' (1982:12).
These divergent perspectives are broadly paralleled by studies focusing
specifically on the interwar British coalmining industry. Sharing the
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theoretical framework and sentiments of the 'new' economic historians, if
not their exact methodology, Neil Buxton (1970, 1978) has mounted a
vigorous defence of entrepreneurship in British coalmining. He argues that
the problems that beset the industry in the 1920s and 1930s - falling
overseas sales, excess capacity, turbulent labour relations - owed 'little
to entrepreneurial failings' (1970:477). According to Buxton, Britain's
mineowners reached decisions regarding mine size and choice of extractive
technology that were 'rational and justified', and exploited all available
commercial economies of scale through the unified financial control of
small-scale mines. He contends that the origins of the industry's
difficulties were located externally to it - in adverse demand conditions
brought about by recession in end-user sectors.
Michael Kirby, in contrast, emphasizes the inability of mineowners to
reorganize their industry by means of colliery amalgamation, or the 'fusing
together to provide unified units of management of individual colliery
undertakings' (1972:655). For Kirby, the amalgamation of colliery companies
represented a means to achieve through 'cooperative activity' the
structural adjustment that market forces had failed to secure - that is,
the concentration of output on large-scale, mechanized mines, and
elimination of marginal capacity. Elbaum and Lazonick cite Kirby's work as
empirical support for their 'institutional perspective' on the decline of
the British economy. But while they argue that the 'visible hand of
coordinated control' had to be extended to Britain's staple industries by
the state in the 1930s, Kirby suggests that state intervention in the coal
industry formed part of the problem and impeded the process of
rationalization and restructuring.
A third, and more idiosyncratic interpretation of entrepreneurial
performance in the interwar British coal industry has recently been
contributed by Michael Dintenf ass (1988). He argues that mineowners
successfully transformed the fragmented structure of capital ownership in
their industry over the 1920s and 1930s, but failed to exploit fully cost-
reducing and price-enhancing innovations in the technology of coal
extraction, organizational practice and marketing. Dintenfass suggests that
it was the 'inefficiency of corporate producers, not their absence, that
accounts for the performance of the interwar British coal industry'
(1988;3).
These contrasting accounts of entrepreneurial performance in the interwar
British coal industry are considered in greater detail in the following
section of this chapter. An alternative analytical approach will then be
outlined; one in which the industry's deteriorating performance is
discussed in the context of the changing relations between landowners and
mineowners, the competitive relations between colliery firms, the evolving
pattern of industrial relations, and the nature of the state's
interventions over which the three classes of -land, capital and labour
struggled.
DEBATES ON ENTREPRENEURIAL PERFORMANCE IN THE INTERVAR COAL INDUSTRY
Entrepreneurial Success: A Failure of Demand
Neil Buxton has applied the laissez-faire theory of the entrepreneur to
conclude that Britain's mineowners in the interwar period made rational and
efficient business decisions. His favourable assessment owes much to his
redefinition of available production possibilities and sources of
productivity growth in interwar coalmining. In the interwar period, many
commentators believed that there were economies of scale in coal
extraction. Consequently, they viewed the existing, fragmented structure of
production as a principal weakness of the British industry, and urged that
there should be extensive amalgamations of mines to improve the industry's
productivity performance and strengthen its position in international
markets (see, for example, Lubin and Everett, 1927; PEP, 1936).
The case was expressed most forcefully by the reports of successive Royal
Commissions and official enquiries into the industry's difficulties. These
analyses and, in particular, that of the Samuel Commission of 1925-6,
informed interwar debates and have been influential in subsequent accounts
of the industry's difficulties. The Samuel Commission urged that the
reorganization of production should be achieved through the restructuring
of mine ownership - or through the amalgamation of colliery companies - and
that reform should be a voluntary process, with the 'initiative for change'
at least in the first instance left to 'the industry itself' (Report,
1926). Mineowners, for their part, rejected the amalgamation of mines. In
their evidence to the Samuel Commission they argued that there were no
significant scale economies as yet unrealized. Throughout the 1920s they
insisted that the fortunes of the British coal industry could be restored
only through the reduction of miners' wages, an extension of working hours,
and the substitution of district-level for national wage settlements - or a
return to the structures of wage regulation in operation before government
control of the industry during the First World War. Pressing for these
revisions from the time that the industry was returned to private control
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in March 1921, the owners precipitated a three month lockout in that year
and a seven month lockout of miners and nine-day general strike in 1926.
Buxton's analysis of the interwar industry in many respects reads as an
attempt to vindicate the policies and practices of the mineowners. He
contends that the evidence presented in the interwar years on the existence
of scale economies in the production of coal was unconvincing, and that the
case for the amalgamation of mines was based more on conviction than
rigorous analysis of the facts. He suggests that his own statistical
analysis provides a more objective review of the matter. This comprises two
sorts of correlation, based on various types of statistical data. The first
assesses the relationship between mine size and productivity, using mining
districts (as opposed to individual mines) as the unit for comparative
analysis. This shows no significant relationship between increasing mine
size and productivity, and Buxton uses the result to conclude that
economies of scale were not of major significance in interwar British
coalmining, and therefore that mineowners were rational to resist the
amalgamation of pits.
The second exercise tests the relationship between mechanization and
productivity, using the percentage of output undercut mechanically as a
proxy for the level of face-mechanization in the sample districts. A
positive relationship is attained and on the basis of this result Buxton
concludes that it was mechanization, rather than mine size, that was the
'key to efficient production' and reason why small pits could be as
productive as larger ones (1970:462). He goes on to explain inter-district
variations in the level of mechanization in terms of divergent geological
conditions. Thus, while he acknowledges that the British industry fell
behind international competitors in the application of new extractive
- 29 -
technologies, he suggests that this was primarily due to the low level of
mechanization in two districts - South Wales and Durham - contributing a
high proportion of aggregate British coal output. And here, he contends,
the ease of non-mechanized coal extraction and difficulties of
mechanization respectively could justify the retention of hand coal-getting
on the basis of relative factor prices and productivities.
While Buxton argues that the concentration of production on a smaller
number of larger mines would not have benefitted the interwar British coal
industry, he suggests that economies could be derived through the
'commerical integration' of colliery companies. He contends that such
'commercial' economies of scale - or economies derived through bulk buying,
transport, and distribution - could be realized by small mines under
'unified financial control', and he suggests that such economies were
fully-exploited by mineowners in the interwar years (1970:488). As evidence
he cites the example of Scotland where 'there were over 400 pits in
operation in 1930' but where 'no less than three-quarters of the total
output of the district came from a mere 20 colliery companies', and
proposes that a similar degree of 'unified financial control' in other
districts shows that owners had organized themselves into commercial units
of the appropriate size to attain the benefits of bulk marketing and
distribution (Ibid).
In short, Buxton suggests that there is little evidence of
entrepreneurial inefficiency in the British coal industry and that the
difficulties of the interwar years are largely to be explained as the
'deleterious effects of demand-side forces' (1970:477). He absolves the
mineowners from any responsibility for industrial unrest in the interwar
industry, arguing that they were caught between the pressures of falling
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demand and selling prices on the one hand, and 'relatively high wage rates'
on the other (1970:495). In what remained a labour-intensive industry,
wages necessarily formed the largest single element in working costs. After
the lockout of 1921, wages were settled on a district basis but under a
uniform national formula with minimum wage provisions. The latter,
according to Buxton, imposed an 'intolerable burden' on profitability for
all but those districts favourably endowed with the types of coal for which
demand remained buoyant (1970:494). He suggests that minimum wage
provisions continued to depress profitability after the 1926 stoppage, when
the national formula was abandoned and owners revised minimum wage
agreements on a district basis:
There are a number of problems with Buxton's analysis, however, and not
least with the procedure he employs to dismiss the importance of economies
of scale in production (on this, see Fine, 1978; and Evans and Fine, 1980,
1980a). Firstly, Buxton takes the structure of production as it was in the
Interwar period as representative of its potential. Unable to observe a
relationship between mine size and productivity, he assumes that no such
relationship could exist. But i as Fine (1978) has., pointed out, this line of
reasoning is seriously flawed. Indeed, Buxton's statistical observations
are quite consistent with the existence of a positive relationship between
mine size and productivity. For if competition eliminated small pits, the
condition for the survival of small-scale mines would be the possession of
some advantage other than size - for example, favourable geological
conditions. To compare small nines operating under favourable natural
conditions with larger mines operating under less favourable conditions,
really does not say very much about the way small-scale pits might have
performed if reorganized into larger units of production.
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Secondly, Buxton makes the error of testing the relationship between nine
size and productivity, and between mechanization and productivity,
separately. For if size and mechanization jointly determined productivity,
and large mines were less mechanized than smaller ones, then the
relationship between size and productivity would be obscured automatically.
Ironically, as Fine has observed (1978:11), Buxton draws attention to this
point by arguing that small-scale Scottish mines operating under
unfavourable geological conditions survived because of their early and high
level of mechanization (1970:484). In an admittedly fairly crude
statistical exercise, Evans and Fine (1980a) run a multiple regression of
productivity against mine size and mechanization taken together. They find
that both are significant in explaining the levels of productivity attained
in different mining districts; in other words, that economies of scale did
indeed exist in the interwar British coal industry. This conclusion is
confirmed in their more sophisticated econometric analysis of the
industry's production function.
Thirdly, Buxton's statistical analysis is based on the assumption that
factor inputs were fully-employed in production. Clearly such an assumption
Is untenable for the interwar coal industry which, as Buxton admits, was
beset by surplus productive capacity. The great weight of evidence
indicates that in many mining districts, many mines were operating below
capacity in the late 1920s and in the 1930s. Hence they would have been
unable to fully-realize scale economies because plant and machinery were
underutilized. In their analysis, Evans and Fine find that excess capacity
was an important factor in reducing productivity levels, and disguising the
significance of returns to scale in most mining districts.
Buxton's explanation for the survival of small-scale Scottish pits also
undermines his argument that 'the level of mechanization in the majority of
coalfields in this country compared not unfavourably with that achieved
abroad' (1970:491). Within the British industry, the Scottish coalfields
did indeed attain an early lead in the application of coal-cutting
machinery. In 1927, for example, 55 per cent of Scottish output was
undercut mechanically, compared with 42 per cent in Northumberland, 22 per
cent in Nottinghamshire and Derbyshire, 11 per cent in South Yorkshire, and
23 per cent for the British industry as a whole (Supple, 1987:380-1). In
other words, hand coal-getting remained the predominant method of coal
extraction in all but the Scottish coalfields. The position was rather
different on the Continent. In the Ruhr, which accounted for the great bulk
of Germany's coal output, 66 per cent of production was won mechanically in
1926. By the end of the 1920s, the proportion had risen to over 90 per cent
and in the Belgian industry had reached 89 per cent (PEP, 1936: 154).
By the late 1930s, the Scottish lead within the British industry in the
application of coal-cutting machinery had been eroded. Eighty-eight per
cent of output in Northumberland, and 91 per cent in North Staffordshire,
was undercut mechanically in 1936, compared with 79 per cent in Scotland.
Nevertheless, nearly half (45 per cent) of aggregate British coal output
was hand-got in 1936, whereas hand-hewing had virtually disappeared on the
Continent. In Germany and in Belgium, the proportion of output won with
machinery was 97 and 99 per cent respectively. Certainly the low levels of
mechanization in South Wales and Durham dragged down the British industry's
performance in the application of new extractive technologies, in
comparison with Continental rivals. In these two districts, only 21 and 39
per cent of output respectively was undercut mechanically in 1936. But less
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than 50 per cent of Yorkshire's output was cut mechanically, • and by this
time Yorkshire accounted for a larger share of aggregate British output
than the South Wales coalfield. Buxton calculates that with the omission of
the South Wales and Durham coalfields, the proportion of output won
mechanically in the remaining (or truncated) British industry would rise to
75 per cent in 1938 (1970:490). Whether or not he is Justified in excluding
two of the British industry's principal exporting districts is a separate
issue. Even with their omission, however, the 'British industry' hardly
compared favourably with major Continental producers; the proportion of
output won mechanically in 1938 being some 23 per cent less than that
attained in the German industry two years earlier, and 25 per cent below
that reached in Belgium by 1936.
Finally, Buxton's discussion of technical innovation in the coal industry
deals only with the introduction of mechanical coal-cutters and face-
conveyors, or what he terns 'minor innovations' (1970: 492). By the end of
the interwar period, as demand conditions improved, commentators were
increasingly inclined to attribute the problems of falling output and
relatively low productivity to the British industry's antiquated capital
stock, and to the fact that only minor innovations had been made in
Britain's mines.
For example, the Reid Committee, appointed by the government in 1944 to
Investigate the technical condition of the British coal industry, compared
the industry's organization and technology most unfavourably with its
international and, in particular, its Continental rivals. The Committee
noted that the rate of growth of productivity in this country had still
lagged behind in the 1930s, in spite of the more widespread application of
coal-face machinery, and attributed this in no small part to the retention
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of ineffective and labour-intensive methods of transporting the coal from
the face to the shaft-bottom, and to the constraints on output and
productivity posed by inadequately-equipped shafts. And for the members of
the Reid Committee, the re-equipment of the British industry had
necessarily to involve the reform of the existing, fragmented structure of
production. There were too many small pits with poor underground layouts,
prohibiting the introduction of improved haulage techniques, while the
productivity potential of face mechanization and improved haulage methods
could be reaped only through the concentration of output on large-scale
mines (Reid Report, 1945).
Management Success, Entrepreneurial Failure
In his analysis of the interwar British coalmining industry, Michael Kirby
(1972, 1973, 1977) emphasizes the inability of mineowners to reorganize
their industry by means of the amalgamation of colliery companies. Kirby
acknowledges that there were company amalgamations in the interwar years,
and that large firms became relatively more important. For example, he
cites evidence furnished by government agencies in the 1930s which
indicated the while over a thousand firms remained in competition in the
industry, a third of British coal output was controlled by the industry's
25 largest companies, each producing in excess of 2 million tons annually
(Mines Department, 1936, cited in Kirby, 1977:205-6). He also draws upon
data presented in Buxton's work to show that there was a 'steadily
increasing degree of ownership concentration in the major coalfields', and
to the extent that, in 1930, 'seven undertakings in South Vales and under
twenty in the Scottish coalfields controlled three-quarters of the output
in those areas, while in Northumberland four undertakings and in Durham,
seven, were responsible for Just over half the production' (1977:112). But
Kirby disagrees with Buxton's argument that the industry was 'sufficiently
integrated' and had realized all available scale economies (Buxton,
1970:488).
Following the contours of public policy debate in the interwar years,
Kirby concludes that the amalgamation of firms into a smaller number of
large units of 'unified management' would have benefitted the industry in
two ways. Firstly, large undertakings would have been in a position to plan
the working of a particular area and thereby realize the technical and
commercial economies of large-scale production. Secondly, amalgamation
would have facilitated the 'elimination of surplus productive capacity by
the closure of redundant mines and concentration of output in the hands of
the most efficient productive units' (1972: 655). Government reports in the
1930s suggested that while the British industry contained some impressively
large undertakings, there was a 'lack of integration among middle-sized
concerns' - or those producing between 100,000 and 1,000,000 tons annually
- and indicated that over 40 per cent of industry output in 1935 came from
240 firms in this size range. Large numbers of very small undertakings
remained in competition, and Britain's coal output continued to be raised
from an exceptionally large number of mines. On the basis of this data,
Kirby rightly concludes that the industry failed to reorganize itself 'on
the lines advocated by official opinion' (1973:273). He suggests, however,
that the failure of the interwar industry to restructure owed much to
'state interference'. He argues that there was a 'fundamental
inconsistency' in the policy pursued by successive interwar British
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governments in relation to the coal industry (and to Britain's staple
industries more generally), that this 'inconsistency' was 'typified by the
divergent objectives of the 1930 Coal Mines Act' (1973:273).
Part I of the 1930 Coal Mines Act established statutory marketing schemes
- or sales cartels - at the level of individual mining districts. The aim
was to restrict output and competition in order to maintain selling prices.
A Central Council (composed of representatives of the mineowners from each
of the districts) established industry output targets and allocated output
quotas to each of the 17 districts. At district level, an Executive Board
(composed of mineowners) distributed the district quota allocation among
all the mines in the district, in accordance with 'standard tonnages'.
Mines exceeding their output quota could be fined, while those which did
not produce their full quota could sell part of it to other mines.
Executive Boards were empowered to fix minimum sales prices for different
classes of coal, but there was no central (industry) coordination of
district pricing policies.
The statutory marketing schemes were closely identified with pre-existing
voluntary schemes which mineowners had attempted to operate in the various
mining districts in the late 1920s, in the wake of the 1926 lockout. For
temporary periods, these voluntary schemes had embraced up to 80 per cent
of owners in the respective districts. But they were unstable, because the
forces of competition over markets were difficult to quell. Owners outside
the schemes engaged in price-cutting, while those within them tended to
break ranks at the sign of any upturn in trading conditions. The 1930 Act
did not immediately circumvent these difficulties. Districts were slow to
fix minimum prices, or fixed deliberately low pit-head prices, and there
was dumping between districts with exporting districts 'invading' the more
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stable inland markets. By 1936, however, the statutory schemes had been
tightened-up.
Part II of the 1930 Act built upon the Samuel Commission's
recommendations for the reorganization of the industry. It established the
Coal Mines Reorganization Commission (CMRC) - a body charged with the
responsibility for bringing about the amalgamation of colliery companies,
with the aim of securing the concentration and modernization of production.
The CMRC was ostensibly given powers of compulsion, subject to the
judgement of the Court of the Railway and Canal Commission on whether the
amalgamations would lower the costs of producing coal, be in the public
interest, and accord with the financial interest of those directly
Involved. It encountered vehement opposition from the mineowners and, in
1935, when attempting to use its powers of compulsion in a test case, found
that these were really non-existent. Thereafter, the activities of the CMRC
were virtually suspended.
Kirby attributes the failure of compulsory amalgamation to the CMRC's
mishandling of its relations with the mineowners; to the owners' resistance
to amalgamations - 'whether voluntary or compulsory'; to their passionate
belief in the virtues of laissez-faire and vigorous opposition to 'the
policy of state compulsion' (1973:281). He argues, however, that the owners
were able to resist amalgamations - whether voluntary or compulsory -
because of the operation and relative success of the cartel schemes under
Part I of the 1930 Act. On the basis of somewhat flimsy (and controversial)
evidence, he contends that the rate of structural adjustment in the coal
industry - amalgamation of firms and concentration of output - 'slowed down
perceptibly' in the 1930s, in comparison with the preceding decade (cf
Heinemann, 1944; and Boyns, 1987). He argues that this was because the
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cartel schemes under Part I of the 1930 Act dulled competitive forces
within the industry and therefore lessened the incentive for firms to
pursue cost reductions through amalgamations, concentration of production
and closure of inefficient mines. He concludes that the failure of
rationalization in coalmining can therefore be attributed in large measure
to inconsistencies in government policy.
Kirby's analysis, however, is founded on the assumption that cartels
necessarily prohibit reorganization because they sustain the profitability
of existing capacity and outdated production techniques. But this is a
questionable assumption. Even if output and prices are fixed, increased
profit can still be pursued through cost reductions - resulting, for
example, from the concentration of output on fewer and better mines, and
the development of large-scale pits was certainly permissable under the
1930 Act which allowed for the transfer of quotas between mines and the
revision of standard tonnages. As Kirby documents eloquently,
cartellization and reorganization were considered by many interwar
observers to be complementary - the control of 'cut-throat' competition
(through wage reductions) being viewed as -(potentially) a means of
promoting reorganization and the development of competition through
productivity-enhancing innovations in production. This was not least
because observers were aware of developments in the German coal industry,
where cartellization had formed the prelude to the restructuring of capital
ownership, reorganization and re-equipment of production (see Neuman, 1934;
Lubin and Everett, 1927).
Kirby's analysis therefore fails to explain the apparent inconsistency in
the mineowners' collective behaviour. They were moderately successful in
organizing voluntary sales cartels, and accepted state support for price-
-39-
fixing schemes. But they failed to organize output at minimum cost, and
rejected attempts to foster amalgamations under Part II of the 1930 Act.
Kirby suggests that the policies pursued by the owners' national
association - the Mining Association of Great Britain - were conditioned by
the desire of owners' individually to retain operational control of their
separate undertakings (1973:284; 1977:163). The Mining Association
supported Part I of the 1930 Act in order to thwart compulsory amalgamation
and preserve the managerial skills of individual colliery proprietors. This
interpretation, however, falls back upon an explanation in terns of
individual entrepreneurial irrationality - owners placed a greater premium
on the experience of management than profit-maximization. It is not
entirely convincing, moreover, since as Heinemann pointed out, while the
Mining Association 'loudly pleaded the sufferings of the "small man" who
would be gobbled up in a compulsory amalgamation, the agitation was also
backed by the big combines, who had themselves gobbled up hundreds of small
owners without shedding a tear' (1944:116). Nevertheless, irrationality is
also a strong theme in an alternative, and more recent account, of
entrepreneurial performance in interwar coalmining.
Entrepreneurial Failure
Michael Dintenfass (1988) presents his account of entrepreneurial
performance in the interwar British coalmining industry as a critique of
both Buxton and Kirby's work. Against Buxton's favourable assessment of
entrepreneurship, Dintenfass argues that 'production and commercial
strategies existed by means of which individual firms could prosper amid
the depression and decline of the coal industry generally' and that these
strategies were not widely employed. He suggests that the failure to adopt
these 'cost-reducing and price-enhancing' strategies cannot be attributed
to exogeneous factors - matters of geology or economics - 'beyond the
coalowners' control (
 (1988:33). But he also rejects Kirby's analysis which
he treats as if it faithfully reflected Elbaum and Lazonick's
'institutionalist perspective' on British economic decline. He argues that
the production of coal was increasingly concentrated on 'large-scale
producers' during the 1920s and 1930s, although he also contends that
economies of large-scale production were of minor significance in interwar
British coalmining.
Acknowledging the productivity-enhancing potential of mechanized
techniques of coal extraction, Dintenfass rejects Buxton's contention that
the interwar British coal industry made the best possible use of these new
extractive technologies. The failure to keep pace with the levels of
mechanization attained abroad, he suggests, cannot be attributed to
prevailing geological conditions, financial constraints or, for that
matter, to workplace labour relations. From the results of his research
into the circumstances of individual colliery companies, he finds no
evidence of worker resistance to the introduction of mechanical coal-
cutters and face conveyors.
But Dintenfass accepts uncritically Buxton's argument that 'technical'
economies of scale were relatively unimportant, which is to say that he
rejects Kirby's view that the concentration of production on fewer and
better mines would have benefitted the interwar British coal industry.
Insofar as he accepts that large firms might attain any advantage over
their smaller competitors - and on this point, Dintenfass seems to be
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unsure - he suggests that this was because they ' could attain
'organizational economies', or economies in the non-labour costs of
production 'accounting for 30 to 35 per cent of the total costs of mining a
ton of coal' (1988:15). Without clearly specifying the nature of these
'organizational economies', or how they might have been secured, he
suggests that they were distinct from the 'commercial economies of scale'
emphasized in Buxton's account and which Buxton defines in terms of bulk
purchasing, marketing and distribution. Nevertheless, Dintenfass argues
that 'astute commercial behaviour' could benefit individual firms. He
suggests that pre-sale coal treatment techniques were available and which
would allow firms with poor natural resources to secure better selling
prices through the cleaning, grading, and blending of their coals
(1988:24). He concludes, however, that Britain's mineowners failed to take
advantage of these new sales practices and also failed to fully-exploit
available internal 'organizational economies'.
In short, Dintenfass argues that there was a 'substantial measure of
entrepreneurial inefficiency in the British coal industry of the 1920s and
1930s', and that Elbaum and Lazonick's 'institutionalist' explanation of
British economic decline - 'with its emphasis on the persistence of
atonistic industrial structures and "entrepreneurial" forms of business
enterprise' - cannot account for this 'picture of colliery mismanagement'
(1988:33). Dintenfass contends that mineowners had 'overcome the fragmented
structure of the industry by the 1930s', that 'large-scale producers were
raising the bulk of the country's tonnage', and that it was the
'inefficiency of corporate producers, not their absence' that accounts for
the industry's deteriorating performance (1988:3,33). Since he rejects the
existence of economies of large-scale production and questions the benefits
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of 'corporate forms' of internal company management, however, at least two
of his propositions are at odds with the case that he is trying to present
and are certainly not supported by the available evidence. In any event,
and as Dintenfass admits (1988:34), his analysis leaves a number of
unresolved problems; for example, how can this apparently widespread
mismanagement of collieries be explained, and why did so many inefficient
producers survive the forces of competition?
Certainly the interwar British coal industry embraced some impressively
large colliery companies. On this point all commentators are agreed. Even
in 1913 there were a few firms with an annual output capacity in excess of
2 million tons (see Kirby, 1977:8), and many of the industry's largest
undertakings grew considerably larger over the interwar years by merging
with or acquiring other companies (which may have owned one, or several
mines). Large firms became relatively more important, although in the
Interwar years commentators offered different interpretations of the extent
of ownership concentration in coalmining.
Government surveys - on which both Kirby and Dintenf ass draw - lend
support to Kirby's view that capital ownership remained relatively
fragmented at the end of the interwar period. They confirm Dintenfass's
claim that, by the mid-1930s, 76 per cent of British coal output was
produced by the industry's 146 largest companies, but not his contention
that 'large-scale companies.. .dominated the coal trade' (1988:33). That is
to say, 85 of these firms fell within the Mines Department's category of
'medium-sized' companies, producing anywhere between 100,000 and 1 million
tons of coal annually (PRO,POVE 22/85, Mines Department, 1936). The 61
undertakings that fell within Dintenfass's definition of 'large-scale
enterprise' - producing in excess of 1 million tons annually - together
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controlled 55 per cent of British coal output. But 40 per centof output
cane from 240 'middling-sized' firms, and over a thousand firms remained in
competition although admittedly many of these were very small and accounted
for a negligible proportion of industry output.
Table 2.3. Size Distribution of British Colliery Companies, By Output
1935
Size (output in 000 tons)	 No.of companies % of total saleable output
Under 10
	 522	 0.5
10-100	 149	 2.6
100-250	 90	 6.8
250-500
	 82	 13.3
500-750
	 38	 10.1
750-1,000
	 30	 11.7
1,000-2,000
	 40	 24.3
2,000-3,000
	 12	 13.0
Over 3,000
	 9	 17.7
Source: POVE 22/85, Mines Department 1936, cited in Kirby, 1977:205-6 and
in the above form in Supple, 1987: 362
With some notable exceptions, most of the company amalgamations of the
1920s and 1930s were confined within coalfield, or regional boundaries and
a slightly different picture does emerge from official estimates of
ownership structures at this more disaggregated level. Government surveys
indicated that in most of the principal mining districts, a small group of
firms controlled a significant proportion of regional output by the mid-
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1930s, although they also emphasized the general significance of medium-
sized undertakings (a category in turn embracing firms with vastly
different output capacities). For example, in South Wales in 1935, five
firms - each with an annual output in excess of 2 million tons - controlled
60 per cent of the coalfield's output. But approximately 200 firms remained
in competition and while a very high proportion of these were tiny (134
Welsh coal companies, or 67 per cent of the total, each produced under
10,000 tons and together accounted for less than 1 per cent of the
coalfield's output), about 30 per cent of output cane from 40 firms each
producing between 50,000 and 1 million tons annually. In Northumberland and
Durham, 6 firms each producing . over 2 million tons controlled 38 per cent
of regional output in 1935. But nearly a third (31 per cent) of the North
East's output came from 29 middling-sized undertakings.
Of course there is no reason to assume that the industry's largest
undertakings were actually engaged in large-scale production. Government
surveys are unhelpful here since they do not indicate whether individual
firms were raising their output from large numbers of small-scale pits or
from a few, large-scale mines. All that they reveal is that in each of the
principal mining districts a very large number of pits remained in
operation and that in the majority of districts the bulk of these pits were
small-scale productive units. On the other hand, government surveys do not
provide a comprehensive view of the changing structure of mine ownership.
For example, coal was not an homogeneous product and the production of
certain types of coal was dominated by one or two large companies by the
end of the interwar period. The principal example was the production of
anthracite. By the mid-1930s one firm - Amalgamated Anthracite - controlled
80 per cent of the output of this type of coal, the production of which was
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geographically concentrated in the western part of the South Wales
coalfield (Supple, 1987:307). Vertical combination - or diversification -
was also relatively well-developed. Thus, the mining of coking coal was
rarely undertaken by specialist colliery companies. Rather it was organized
by firms which, at the very least, combined coalmining with the ownership
of coke ovens and, quite often, iron and steel production. In 1924,
D.J.Williams argued that, via the process of vertical combination, the coal
industry was becoming 'to an increasing extent, an auxiliary of the iron
and steel industry' (p.97), and certainly in a number of districts in the
1930s, a significant proportion of regional output was controlled by a
small group of 'great mixed' coal-iron-and-steel combines (Heinemann, 1944;
111-4; see also Supple, 1987: ch.9).
Diversification could take a variety of forms, and in South Wales the
largest coal-producing companies (most of which were closely allied with
Iron and steel producers), established or acquired subsidiary coal-
preparation firms, export and selling agencies (et Dintenfass, 1988:24; and
see D.J.Williams,	 1924;	 Heinemann,	 1944;	 Boyns,	 1987).	 In the
Nottinghamshire-Derbyshire-Yorkshire area groups of colliery companies,
closely-linked through interlocking shareholdings, established subsidiary
sales agencies to undertake their marketing and the purchase of their
supplies. The principal examples are the Doncaster Collieries Association,
the Carlton Collieries Association, and the Rotherham and District
Collieries Association (Neuman, 1934; Heinemann, 1944).
Over and beyond the more formal (and readily identifiable) ownership
connections between colliery companies, and between colliery firms and
companies in other industrial sectors, extensive interlocking directorates
and shareholdings linked nominally independent firms. These linkages were
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not taken into account in official surveys of the distribution of output in
the interwar coal industry, but their extent and complexity was stressed in
other commentaries; for example, in the PEP's report on the coal industry,
published in 1936, and in the publications of the Labour Research
Department (Fox, 1935, 1935a; W.H.Villiams, 1937, 1938, 1939; Heinemann,
1944). Indeed, including the financial interlinking between formally
separate companies in her calculations, Heinemann estimated that in the
early 1940s approximately 50 per cent of British coal output was controlled
by just 25 coal combines (each with an output capacity in excess of 2
million tons). According to Heinemann, the two largest groupings -
Staveley-Sheepbridge in the South Yorkshire-East Midlands area, and the
Powell Duffryn Associated Collieries in South Wales - together controlled
18 per cent of industry output (1944:108). But she also noted that
'alongside these big groups there exist a number of "family" concerns' and
a very great number of small colliery firms (Ibid:109).
Dintenfass does not cite Heinemann's work, although clearly it would give
some substance to his claim that 'large-scale enterprises...accounted for a
large and growing share of Coal production in interwar Britain' (1988:17).
On the other hand, Dintenfass is influenced by the PEP's report and refers
to it as support for his thesis that 'organizational economies' were
available to colliery companies but were not widely exploited by the coal
industry's largest undertakings. His reading of this report, however, is
highly selective. The report actually concluded that mechanization and the
concentration of output offered the greatest scope for reducing unit costs
In coalmining, and emphasized that mechanization 'nay not.. .be wholly
successful unless accompanied by concentration of output' on fewer and
better mines (1936:33). It was from this perspective that the PEP's review
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commented critically that the coal industry was 'still remarkable for the
prevalence in many districts...of a great number of small producing units',
and that 'the impetus' behind company amalgamations and financial
interlinking in very many cases did not appear to have come 'from a desire
to secure economies by managing a group of collieries as a group'. The
report concluded that coalmining in Britain 'has come to have the
appearance of an industry where financial unification and linking have
proceeded further than technical and economic concentration' (1936:42-3).
In fact, since the PEP report placed great emphasis on internal company
organization and argued that the 'success of (company) amalgamation' was
critically dependent on the evolution of a 'suitable form of administrative
machinery' (1936;64), it more closely corresponds with the
'institutionalist perspective' developed by Elbaum and Lazonick than with
Dintenfass's interpretation of the coal industry's difficulties. For the
former, a centralized, hierarchical managerial bureaucracy is the key
distinguishing feature of the modern business corporation, and the
'successful' reorganization of production along mass production lines is
argued to have been critically dependent- upon such organizational
innovation - the supersession of the market mechanism by the 'visible hand'
of 'coordinated managerial control' within the modern capitalist
corporation (Elbaum and Lazonick, 1982; see also Lazonick, 1980, 1981,
1982). Dintenfass simply reverses these propositions, arguing that
'traditional' forms of enterprise management were sufficient because in his
view coalmining was a 'comparatively simple business' - one in which
production remained small-scale and labour-intensive (1988:33).
The interwar British coal industry embraced some large undertakings which
had rationalized their internal management structures along the lines of
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the 'modern' business corporation; for example, Powell Duff ryn, the Fife
Coal Company, Manchester Collieries, and the Ashington Coal Company in
Yorthumberland (see Supple, 1987:403-4; Boyns, 1987). But the internal
organization of colliery companies was as varied as the size of firms
operating in the industry, and the scale and organization of the production
processes controlled by these companies. Certainly many coal combines
appeared to be little more than holding companies, which brought formally
independent firms under unified financial control whilst leaving the
inherited management structures of the subsidiaries in tact. Elbaum and
Lazonick suggest that the persistence of the holding company - or H-form of
internal enterprise organization - in interwar British industry reflected
the 'individualism' and insularity of British managers who resisted
centralization in order to retain operational control of their family firms
(1982). The Labour Research Department's work on the coal industry and, in
particular, Heinemann's research completed in the early 1940s, presents a
different interpretation.
Heinemann argued that the 'process of amalgamation and trustification'
had gone a long way without 'bringing any solution' to the coal industry's
difficulties because there had been comparatively little centralization and
modernization of production. She noted that while mineowners had engaged in
concerted action to resist state intervention and compulsory planned
amalgamation, they had 'proceeded to carry out (company) amalgamations of
their own on the lines promising the greatest immediate profit (1944:115).
Horizontal combines not infrequently comprised large numbers of small pits,
geographically dispersed across a particular coalfield. Amalgamated
Anthracite was a noteworthy example, 'with its huge galaxy of small,
Inefficient pits concentrated in one over-capitalised trust' (Heinemann,
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1947:66). For Heinemann, such systems of amalgamation and financial
interlinking represented attempts to secure the 'financial advantages of
monopoly' rather than to lower unit costs through improved productive
efficiency, while vertical integration - or diversification - had been
pursued as a means of making and appropriating profits outside the coal
industry. She emphasized the influence of wage agreements in coalmining on
the investment policies of colliery companies. From 1921, wages were
related to the profit on the sale of coal at the pithead, and there was
therefore an incentive for firms to diversify - into by-product and coal
treatment works, selling agencies, coke ovens and steelworks - or to
transfer profits to related non-mining concerns through a low internal
price (Heinemann, 1944:111). Thus, 'astute commercial behaviour' could
greatly benefit colliery companies, although not necessarily for the
reasons suggested by Dintenfass (1988:24).
From this perspective, therefore, it is possible to begin to see how
apparently inefficient companies survived the 'discipline of market forces'
(Dintenfass, 1988:33). Competition through increased productivity resulting
from the development of 'large-scale, mechanized mines was not highly
developed in the interwar British coalmining industry. The industry was not
dominated by large-scale producers, even though it embraced large firms
which in many districts controlled a significant proportion of output.
There were various 'strategies' through which firms could maintain
profitability in the short-term. Through organized collective activity
mineowners had been able to depress wages in the early 1920s, and they had
a measure of success in maintaining prices through cartellization from the
late 1920s - the owners' voluntary schemes predating the 1930 Act. This
hardly explains the policies and practices of the nineowners, however, and
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does not provide an adequate account of the industry's inability to
restructure and develop in the interwar period.
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF DECLINE
This thesis looks for an explanation for the British coal industry's
changing performance and, specifically, its relative decline in the
interwar period of the twentieth century, in its changing economic and
social structure. Subsequent chapters explore the evolving pattern of
labour relations. This chapter concludes, however, by summarizing the work
of Fine et al (1985; and see also Evans and Fine, 1980, 1980a) on the
changing relationship between landowners and mineowners. In Britain until
the eve of the Second World War, landowners were in effect the coalowners
since they owned and controlled the mineral rights - or rights to the coal
underlying their properties. Fine et al show that the relationship between
landowners and mineowners was conducive to the coal industry's expansion in
the nineteenth century, but from the end of the century increasingly became
an impediment to reorganization and modernization.
Fine et al's work is discussed at some length because it identifies the
private ownership of coal royalties as a major factor contributing to
diversity in the organization of production - and hence in capital-labour
relations - in the industry. Thus, their analysis is not presented as an
alternative explanation to one focusing upon the trajectory of labour
relations. Rather, in examining the industry's failure to develop it is
necessary to consider the character and interplay of relations between
landowners, mineowners, and labour, and to interpret their interaction
against the background of broader economic and political developments
including the contours of government policy.
Relations Between Landowners and Mineowners
In the literature on the British coalmining industry, the terns mineowner
and coalowner are often used as if they were synonymous. But mineowners
generally did not own the coal that they mined. Rather, they worked it
under the terms of a mineral lease (or several different leases) negotiated
with the mineral owner(s) - generally the owners of the surface property -
to whom the mineowner, or colliery company, made a royalty payment.
The payment of royalties to private individuals was established by the
'great case of the nines' (Queen v. Duke of Northumberland) of 1568. This
court case Judged that all minerals, apart from gold and silver, belonged
to the landowner in accordance with surface boundaries. The Judgement was
made absolute by the statutes of 1689 and 1693 (Nef, 1966:318), and with
only minor amendments the legal framework laid down in the sixteenth and
seventeenth centuries continued to govern the coal industry in Britain up
until 1938 when the coal royalties were nationalized. On the Continent, in
contrast, coal royalties were nationalized at the beginning of the
nineteenth century, and while in the United States the sane law applied as
in Britain, the ownership of large landed estates and mines on those
estates normally coincided (Fine et al, 1985:290; see also Samuel Report,
1926, Vol.1.:77)
Until recently, the influence of the private ownership of coal royalties
had been relatively neglected in economic histories of the British coal
industry. But the royalty system became and remained a contentious issue
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throughout the interwar years of the twentieth century. Indeed, that the
system was giving rise to tensions and difficulties was officially
acknowledged in the late nineteenth century by the appointment of the Royal
Commission on Mining Royalties of 1890-3. The Commissioners concluded,
however, that there were only transient problems which could be resolved
through negotiation and minor amendments to the law, and put forward
arguments to support the continuation of private mineral ownership. These
were basically the propostions of Ricadarian rent theory, suggesting that
the predominant effect of royalties was to compensate for differences in
natural mining conditions and thus ensure the optimal allocation of
resources between mines.
Official enquiries in the interwar years, in contrast, were far more
critical of the prevailing system of royalty ownership. All government-
appointed bodies investigating the royalty system in this period
recommended drastic legislative change, and for most of these bodies the
appropriate change was to state ownership of the coal royalties - a
situation that was eventually brought about by legislation passed by a
Conservative government in 1938. The private ownership of mineral royalties
was identified as an impediment to the planning and layout of mines, and
hence to the rational development of the coal industry. But the official
enquiries of the interwar years did not analyse the operation of the
royalty system at a theoretical level. Rather, they noted the nationalized
minerals of Europe and assumed that in Britain the private ownership of
mineral rights formed a practical impediment to the coal industry's
progress, giving rise to legal and informational complications for
mineowners in having to negotiate multiple leases for expanding nines (eg
Samuel Report, 1926, Vol. 1:76-7).
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Fine et al, however, have argued convincingly that the royalties acted as
an economic obstacle to the mechanization and amalgamation of mines because
the increase in profitability associated with these changes could accrue to
the royalty - or landowner rather than to the mineowner. Their analysis
emphasizes the dynamic character of developments, the erosion of the
formerly cooperative relationship between landowners and mineowners by
capital accumulation towards the end of the nineteenth century, and the
influence of the increasing antagonism between capital and land on the
planning and layout of mines and diffusion of new production techniques. To
follow their account, it is necessary to begin with some basic details of
the operation of the private royalty system.
Where landowners developed the mines an their estates themselves (see
below), there was obviously no need for a royalty payment. In other
circumstances, some payment for extracting the coal had to be arranged and
a mineral lease was drawn up between the landowner and prospective colliery
capitalist. The mineral lease was a legally binding contract, and specified
the terms of the royalty payments and conditions governing the mineowner's
access to and removal of the coal from the landowner's property. Thus,
while royalty payments are generally reported in official statistics as a
payment on the tonnage of coal extracted, in practice mineral leases were
far more complicated agreements (see, for example, Flinn and Stoker,
1984:43-9). Royalty payments were formally calculated in a wide variety of
ways (although particular conventions tended to be observed within
individual mining districts). Quite often leases were based on acreage,
taking into account factors such as seam thickness. Royalty payments could
vary on a sliding scale with the price of coal, and some combination of a
fixed and proportional payment was common. Fixed or dead rents meant that a
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lump sum charge was levied by the landowner irrespective of the quantity of
coal extracted by the colliery company.
Leases were generally negotiated to cover a fairly long period of time;
usually between 20 and 40 years, although sometimes extending to 99 years
or more. But as Fine et al. have pointed out, this did not mean that the
conditions governing the mineowner's access to the coal were fixed for some
time in advance.
Because of the varying conditions of the seams, there was
frequent need for renegotiation and settlement between the
two parties. Almost any major development in the running of
the mine would have implications for the surface and be
subject to the veto of the landowner. Neither the lease nor
the law could anticipate and make provision for all these
exigencies so that there remained an area of unnegotiated
indeterminancy. In short, the negotiation and settlement of
royalties was a complex affair, one in which each party was
in a position to pursue an economic interest subject to the
general and particular individual conditions that had already
been laid down. (1982:6)
Such circumstances affected the mineowner's ability to engage in long-term
planning, and incentive to make improvements to existing facilities. While
the landowner could veto the tenant's proposed developments, equally the
conditions for granting approval might deter the latter from embarking on
new investment; for example, if the additional profits generated were
likely to be appropriated by the landowner through higher royalty charges.
In other words, where mineral and mine ownership remained separate, 'the
pattern of colliery development - specifically the rate of mechanisation,
layout, amalgamation and output growth - were strongly influenced by the
terms of the agreements and compromises reached between the landowners and
mineowners' (Fine et al, 1985:289).
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Fine et al, give substance to these broad statements by examining the
evolving relations between landowners and mineowners. On the Continent, as
suggested, coal royalties were nationalized in the early nineteenth
century. This was because the prevailing pattern of mineral ownership was
highly fragmented, and the small size of landholdings relative to mining
requirements presented an obstacle to the development of the coal industry
(see also Nef, 1966:285). In Britain, in contrast, landownership was
relatively concentrated and correspondingly the ownership of coal royalties
was more concentrated within the various estates that contained coal
measures (Ibid: 318). Initially this fostered cooperative relations between
landowners and mineowners; a relationship that was conducive to the British
industry's expansion in the early nineteenth century, even though within it
the 'mineowner was subordinated to the landowner in a similar way to that
of a tenant farmer to a large landlord' (Fine et al., 1982:7).
When the coal reserves of an estate were initially developed, a shallow
pit or drift mine was usually sufficient to gain access to the seams lying
near, or outcropping on the surface. The low cost of such operations and
fact that even the deepest pits of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth
centuries could generally be confined within the boundaries of a single
estate, encouraged some landowners to develop the mines on their property
themselves. Of course coalmining was often just one of several economic
activities carried out on the landowner's property. Management of the
estate was generally entrusted to a steward, bailiff, or land agent who in
turn might engage a specialist mineral agent to organize coal production
and sales on the landowner's behalf, while labour recruiment and management
were often subcontracted to a charter-master or butty, who was usually a
working miner or ex-miner (see chapter 4 below).
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From the ranks of the land and mineral agents of the eighteenth century
there emerged in the North East, and also in Scotland, the 'viewers' - or
professional mining engineers of the nineteenth century. Like the land and
mineral agents, viewers combined a wide range of managerial functions, but
unlike the former - who were the servants of the estate owners - the elite
'consulting' or 'general viewers' were generally employed on a freelance,
consultancy, or commission basis, and at any one time might be contracted
to work for several mineowners and landed colliery proprietors. The
emergence of the viewer network in the northern coalfield from the end of
the eighteenth century has generally been attributed to the expansion of
mining onto progressively deeper seams, increased complexity of mine
development and working, and need to employ 'educated' and 'scientific' men
to supervise colliery development in place of 'ill-educated' butty-men (see
for example, Church et al.,1986:409-21). But the need to sink costly shafts
to gain access to the coal seams and increased risks of mining investment
also marked the diminishing involvement of landowners in financing the
development of mines on their estates. More frequently, they sought to
share the risks of mining ventures by encouraging capitalists to invest on
their land, and here the viewers had an important - and, for individual
consultants, lucrative - role to play. Thus, the landowner would commission
the services of a viewer to 'view' - or survey and value - their property,
and, possibly, to act on their behalf in negotiations with the prospective
mineowner over the terms of the mineral lease.
Church et al (1986:122-3) estimate that less than 15 per cent of British
coal output cane from landed colliery proprietors by the 1830s, although
they also note the regional variations in the pace of the landowners'
retreat to a rentier status. Nevertheless, landowners continued to engage
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their own surveyors and experts to evaluate the conditions and potential of
their mineral rights, and in the early-to-mid nineteenth century not
infrequently financed improvements to their estates - providing, for
example, facilities such as transport and housing - to encourage the
development of their coal reserves. Thus, while the mines were worked on
lease, the mineowners and landowners entered into a 'relationship of
mututal benefit and co-operation' (Fine et al, 1985:290); the former
gaining access to the coal and the latter a share in the profits of mining.
This cooperative relationship, which encouraged the rapid extraction of
coal, was preserved in the early-to-mid nineteenth century because the
scale of mining was such that pits could be confined within the boundaries
of a single estate and mineowners had thus to negotiate with only a single
lessor. But as pits became deeper they expanded in size, representing the
search for scale economies. And as mines began to expand across property
boundaries, the cooperative relationship between landowners and mineowners
began to break down. Fine et al argue that tensions and conflicts became
common from the end of the nineteenth century as mineowners were required
to negotiate conditions of access and royalty payments with several
landowners. In other words, the development of the British coal industy was
bringing into play problems with the private ownership of coal royalties
that had plagued the establishment of the industry on the Continent at the
beginning of the nineteenth century.
This much is confirmed by the appointment of the Royal Commission on
Mineral Royalties in 1890, and the evidence reviewed by the Commissioners
lends support to Fine et al's thesis that there were obstacles to the
expansion of mines across property boundaries. For example, the Commission
noted the widespread use of fixed or dead rents which meant that mineowners
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had to make royalty payments even when they did not extract any coal. The
effect may have been to encourage the rapid extraction of coal, although
fixed rents could also tie a mineowner to a single landowner. That is to
say, that instead of planning the extraction of coal on the basis of
technical and geological criteria, 'mineowners would concentrate production
within a single property in order to spread the overhead costs of royalty
payments' (Fine et al, 1985:291). The Commissioners identified other
difficulties of which the most important concerned wayleaves - a charge
levied by the landowner on coal that was transported either above or below
ground across their property. Where the coal had been exhausted on one
property, the surface and shaft facilities of that mine may still have been
essential for the extraction of coal from a neighbouring property. But the
owner of the exhausted land could levy a wayleave royalty payment
reflecting the value of the neighbouring estate.
As suggested, the Royal Commission of 1890-3 did not consider these and
other difficutlies to be of major significance. Pointing to the British
coal industry's hitherto successful record, the Commissioners could see no
reason for changing the system of private mineral ownership and suggested
that any difficulties could be resolved through minor amendments to the
law. But their optimism does not appear to have been well-founded. In the
interwar years, official enquiries emphasized the multiplicity of leases
that had to be negotiated by each mineowner and viewed this as a practical
impediment to the industry's development. But as Fine et al suggest, the
royalty system was liable to present not simply practical, but also
economic obstacles to the industry's progress. Mineowners faced the
possibility that landowners would attempt to increase royalty charges as
the profitability of the mines was improved. The precondition for any
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investment - be it amalgamation or mechanization - was the negotiation of
multiple leases, and the possibility that the additional profitability
would be lost would act as a disincentive to investment. Fine et al note
that in these circumstances mineowners would be encouraged to pursue other
expedients guaranteeing production and profitability in the short run; for
example, imposing reductions in miners' wages, forming cartels to raise the
selling price of coal, and diversification into other industries where
profits could not be so easily appropriated by royalty owners.
Fine et al stress that the difficulties between landowners and mineowners
did not develop in a regular and uniform way, and they analyse the diverse
effects of the royalty system in different mining districts.
Not only did the timing and nature of the conflict vary,
but the way in which disagreements were resolved differed
widely across and within coalfields. The impact of the
royalty system upon the development of a particular mine
depended upon the local pattern of land ownership and the
scope for renegotiation and compromise between landowners
and mineowners as determined by general and individual
economic and legal conditions. (1985:293)
They show that, contrary to the reasoning of the Royal Commission of 1890-
3, levels of royalty payment did not correspond in any straightforward way
to geological conditions. In the mid-1920s, South Wales and Scotland
yielded the highest royalties per ton although these two districts were at
the opposite ends of the spectrum in terns of mining conditions. In South
Vales, mining conditions were good, but there was a low level of
mechanization.	 In Scotland, geological conditions were poor, but
mechanization was highly developed. Given the competitive conditions in its
major export markets, mechanization was the condition for the survival of
the industry in Scotland. But the highly concentrated ownership of land in
- 60-
Scotland gave landowners the upper hand in their relations with the
mineowners, and enabled them to extract a high royalty payment whilst at
the same time tying mines to single estates so that they remained extremely
small (Fine et al, 1985:293-7).
Equally, however, Fine et al emphasize that the impact of the private
ownership of coal royalties on the overall development of the British
industry cannot be assessed by simply comparing different mines, or
different mining districts (cf Dintenfass, 1988:32). By weakening the
incentive to invest in specific regions, 'the royalty system tended to
erode the coercive forces of competition throughout the industry and hence
had a constraining and negative impact on its long-term development' (Ibid:
298).
Similarly, any assessment of entrepreneurial rationality in the coal
industry should focus on the mineowners' collective behaviour. In the years
immediately after the First World War, the mineowners' national association
- the Mining Association of Great Britain (MAGB) - displayed a remarkable
ambivalence in its position on the private ownership of royalties. Together
with all other parties represented on the Coal Industry Commission (the
Sankey Commission) of 1919, the mineowners concluded in favour of the
nationalization of coal royalties. By 1920, however, the MAGB was actively
campaigning against state acquisition of the royalties, and proposing
legislative changes that would leave royalties in private hands but
increase the rights of access of mineowners to the land (Colliery Guardian,
30.4.1920:1223; see also Coal Association, 1920).
	 The MAGB's change of
heart may well have been conditioned by the political climate of the times.
A majority on the Sankey Commission had concluded in favour of the
nationalization of the mines - the Chairman siding with the mineworkers'
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representatives against the mineowners. The MAGB's principal spokesmen
thereafter urged that state acquisition of the mineral royalties should be
resisted because it could undermine objections to state acquisition of the
mines (Lord Gainford, cited in Colliery Guardian, 5.3.1920:664; see also
MAGB:1924). By the 1930s, however, there was increasing support for
nationalization of the royalties, and this was accomplished in 1938 with
the only opposition coming from the royalty owners whose own association
(the Mineral Owners' Association of Great Britain) would appear to have
been holding out for more favourable terns of compensation (Fine et al,
1985:287).
Labour Relations
The British coal industry's changing performance cannot be understood
simply in terms of the growing antagonism between landowners and
mineowners. This thesis explores the trajectory of capital-labour
relations. It is not an institutional account of trade union and employer
organization, and makes no pretence to document at length the history of
the industry-wide disputes, lockouts and strikes of the period under
examination. Much of the detail on the latter is to be found in the
extensive literature on the industry and industrial relations in British
coalmining in the interwar period (see, for example, Kirby, 1977; Supple,
1987; Arnot, 1949, 1953, 1961), while histories of the district and county
miners' trade unions have already been completed. The thesis attempts to
establish the basis of the capital-labour struggles of the period by
placing a central emphasis on the conditions of work, and considers the
implications of the outcomes of industrial conflict for the industry's
development.
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It looks firstly at labour utilization in the period before the First
World War. Hand coal-getting remained the dominant technology of coal
extraction, but across the British coalfields structures of work
organization were remarkably diverse. Miners were not automatically united
by a common experience of work, and the regional variations in work
organization combined with divergent terms and conditions within individual
mines, to present obstacles to the achievement of solidarity. From the
early twentieth century, the mineworkers did achieve a growing unity around
the demands for a national wage structure, better safety provision, and
reductions in the length of the working day. But mineowners could not agree
to make broad concessions. Divergent geological and market conditions, and
different structures of work, meant that the effects of uniform
restrictions on labour utilization would be borne unevenly by different
sections of the industry, while national wage bargaining would curtail the
owners' ability to respond - as in the past - to changing conditions
locally by lowering wage rates. The deepening conflict within the industry
brought the state more closely into its affairs. Government controls during
the period of the First World War made possible the concession of industry-
wide wage advances, and the miners pressed for the extension of these
controls, or for the nationalization of the industry.
The mineowners strengthened their own national federation, conceding
powers to the MAGB in order to ward-off nationalization and external
attempts to orchestrate restructuring. Often interpreted as an expression
of their 'individualism' or commitment to the virtues of laissez-faire, the
owners' inability to form a policy for the reorganization of the industry
has to be related to variations in market conditions and to the divergent
conditions under which production was organized.
	 Mechanization in the
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interwar period, discussed in chapter five, was a protracted and uneven
process. Systems of hand coal-getting and partially-mechanized mining
coexisted in the same mining districts and often in a single mine.
Mineowners could not agree to uniform provisions as, for example, in the
areas of health and safety, and the implications of this for the costs of
reproducing labour power are discussed in chapter six. The owners'
'individualism' in their business affairs and 'solidarity' in their
dealings with labour and with government may be 'far from paradoxical'
(Supple, 1987:410), the latter sustained to preserve maximum individual
discretion. But the inability to construct a common, long-term approach
towards wage and employment regulation in turn served to dampen the forces
for change, modernization and restructuring.
CHAPTER THREE: WORK ORGANIZATION IN THE BRITISH COALNINING INDUSTRY
BEFORE THE FIRST WORLD VAR
INTRODUCTION
This chapter looks at work organization in the British coalmining industry,
and is principally concerned with the period before the First World War.
Coal production in Britain in the early twentieth century remained a
labour-intensive process. The industry's expansion over the nineteenth
century had been dependent upon the extension and intensification of
working hours, rather than the transformation of production methods. Some
mechanization had taken place by the beginning of the twentieth century.
But this had largely been confined to surface operations and the
construction of mine shafts, leaving the process of coal extraction largely
unchanged. So 'lavish of the effort of muscle and tendon' (Court, 1945:6),
the industry's development had necessarily been dependent upon a huge
supply of labour. Between 1840 and 1913, there had been a ten-fold increase
in the numbers employed in coalmining, and on the eve of the First World
War approximately 1.1 million men and boys were employed in the British
coal industry.
Economic and social historians of the nineteenth and early twentieth
century British coalmining industry have emphasized the difficulties in
regarding it as a single, or homogeneous, industry. It was geographically
fragmented, and geological conditions varied markedly between and also
within the industry's constituent coalfields. The coal that was mined
varied in its physical and chemical properties. Colliery companies raised
different types of coal for different economic uses and markets, so that
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those 'who run the mines think of themselves as supplying their customers
with gas-coal or coking coal or household coal or large steam coal or some
other variety which is in demand' (Court, 1945:6). Divergent geological and
market conditions have been identified as the source of the 'widely
divergent and sometimes as a consequence opposed' economic interests of
mineowners (Ibid:2), with a principal line of cleavage often perceived to
lie between coalfields oriented towards the export trade and those
producing for inland or domestic markets. Daunton's (1981) analysis of work
in the great Northern and South Wales coalfields - the British industry's
leading export districts - has shown, however, that a potent source of
division also lay in patternd of work organization which varied between
districts with an ostensible economic similarity.
Thus, while this chapter begins with a basic typology of the different
grades of underground labour in coalmining, it must be emphasized that this
gives little indication as to the actual working methods and practices in
the different coalfields. Hand coal-getting at the face predominated in
1913, with only 8 per cent of British coal output undercut by machinery in
that year. Colliers performed the complete operation of winning the coal
and retained immediate control over the pace of work. They were subject to
limited direct managerial supervision. Their relative autonomy in
production was buttressed by the piece-rate system of payment which, for
employers, provided an indirect control on the intensity of work effort.
Colliers retained immediate control of the labour process, but employers
were concerned with the way in which work was organized and intervened in
various ways in their attempts to maintain effort and discipline in
production. In other words, variegated structures of work organization were
only in part a function of geological conditions. They also reflected the
outcome of struggles between mineowners and mineworkers.
The chapter explores some of the ways in which work organization and
working practices varied between mining districts. It shows that
variegated conditions of work created a diversity of interests amongst
mineworkers. Far from representing an occupationally homogeneous workforce,
the coalmining proletariat of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries
was divided in complex ways and the chapter examines the influence of
working conditions on the development of labour organization. Mineowners
were also divided by geological and market conditions, and by the
variegated structures of work in the industry, and these divisions had
major ramifications for the formation of a common employer policy. This is
illustrated by a discussion of the mineowners' response to the growing
unity achieved by the miners from the early twentieth century around the
demands for a uniform, industry-wide limitation on the length of the
working day and a national wage structure.
THE WORK PROCESS AND UNDERGROUND EMPLOYMENT STRUCTURES
The operations involved in the extraction of coal and its preparation for
the market can be divided into distinct categories; hewing, putting at the
face, the conveyance of coal along primary haulage routes, winding to the
surface, and preparation at the surface. In addition, there were certain
essential maintenance tasks; 'deadwork' at the face, advancing the face,
driving and maintaining the underground roads. These functions were cannon
to the industry in all regions, but the allocation of these tasks between
different grades of workers varied in the different mining regions.
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In his evidence to the Sankey Commission of 1919, Finlay Gibson on behalf
of the nineowners' national association (the Mining Association of Great
Britain) identified six distinct classes of underground labour in the
British coal industry which roughly accord with the operations listed
above. It is useful to consider Gibson's classification (cited in Rowe,
1923:55-6) in order to gain a basic grasp of the various grades of workmen.
It must be emphasized, however, that there was no uniformity in the social
organization of production across the coalfields. The allocation of tasks -
as, for example, between colliers and other specialist grades - varied
between mining districts, as did the forms of remuneration (piece- or time-
rates) for different grades, length of shift worked by colliers and other
grades, internal patterns of promotion to the face and other specialist
piece-work occupations. These variations, as Daunton (1981) has shown, gave
rise to distinctive social relationships in the different coalfields and
hence to divergent labour responses to changes initiated by employers or
imposed on the industry as a whole through legislation.
Gibson's first two classes - (1) piecework coal-getters and (2) coal-
getters on a day wage - embraced the men who won the coal at the face. Both
groups were classed as skilled workers and in most districts pieceworkers
easily outnumbered day-wage men. Their actual Job titles varied. They were
'hewers' in Northumberland and Durham, in Cumberland as in Lanarkshire;
'colliers' in South Vales and in Lancashire; and 'stallmen' or 'contracting
colliers' in certain coalfields in the East and West Midlands. In the
latter, the butty system persisted - in various guises - well into the
twentieth century. Under this system, faceworkers were employed by a
contractor who was in turn employed on a piece-rate system by the mineowner
or manager. The contractor or 'butty' paid his men a day-wage and,
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possibly, a bonus from the contract earnings. This system was by no means
confined to the Midlands. Through the nineteenth century it was
periodically re-introduced in some districts, and it was adopted in the
interwar period of this century in the newly-developing Kent coalfield
(Goffee, 1981). It is examined in detail in chapter four.
Gibson's third class comprised putters, fillers, hauliers and tramners.
It was further sub-divided between (a) semi-skilled men qualifying as coal-
getters and involved in the filling of coal into tubs and/or pushing the
tubs out to the secondary haulage system, and (b) semi-skilled men who
drove the ponies or horses which pulled the tubs from the face to the
primary haulage sytem in the main roads. Methods of payment varied for both
groups, which is to say that in some districts they were paid piece-wages
and in others day- or tine-rates. Subcategory (a) was in practice in some
coalfields subsumed within class (1) where colliers worked with an
assistant or learner to whom they paid a day-wage from their piecework
earnings.
Class (4) embraced timbermen, stonemen, brushers or rippers; men who were
classed as skilled workers and who were variously employed on piece or day-
wages in the different coalfields. Timbermen erected the props to support
the underground roads and also the face where this work was not performed
by the colliers or, as in the North East, by the coalface deputy. Stonemen
(or roadsmen) drove the roads giving access to the face, while brushers and
rippers raised the roof and floor to advance the face where this was not
part of the collier's work. The numbers employed on this work depended to
an extent on whether or not colliers performed much of the 'deadwork' at
the face.
Class (5) comprised deputies, firemen or examiners - ten responsible
under the Mines Acts for the general safety of the pit. Since these men
were generally also charged to act as under-foremen, they were properly
classified as officials of the colliery company. They were paid a day-wage
and sometimes a standard weekly wage. Their changing role in the mine -
from safety officer to production foreman - over the interwar period of the
twentieth century is discussed in detail in chapter six. Gibson's final
class (6) - other underground labour - included men working on the primary
haulage system; assistants to the stonemen and timberers; pumpmen and
enginemen; and general labourers. They were nearly all paid day-rates and
sometimes a standard weekly wage. To reiterate, however, this typology
provides only the roughest of guides to the composition and work of the
underground labour-force since, 'the methods of labour and systems of
payment vary so much between coalfields that in each coalfield one finds
peculiarities within this nominal classification' (Rowe, 1923:57).
With the increase in the scale of mining enterprise over the nineteenth
century, certain changes had taken place in the organization of production.
The pace of these developments was uneven as between coalfields and mines
operating within them. At the surface, increasing attention had been paid
to the grading of coal and its preparation for the market. Surface workers
- employed in the movement and preparation of coal, as well as the
maintenance and repair of colliery equipment and care of livestock - formed
20 per cent of the total British mining labour force in the early 1870s,
and about the same proportion in 1913. But the proportion varied between
and within coalfields, from 25-27 per cent in South Staffordshire to 14-16
per cent in South Wales (Church et al, 1986:209). The apparent overall
stability in surface employment in a period when more tasks were being
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performed at the surface is possibly to be explained as the result of
technical innovation. Mechanical screens and washing plant were
increasingly adopted from the 1880s (John, 1984:69-96; Louis, 1924:204-218)
and the partial automation of weighing, screening, washing and tippling
offered employers the opportunity to intensify the work of surface hands.
Improvements in boring, shaft construction and sinking techniques, and
the application of steam-power to winding and pumping from the 1830s (and
some time earlier in the North East), facilitated the working of
progressively deeper seams. Continuous refinements to access technology
were made over the nineteenth century (see Church et al, 1986: ch.4). From
the 1840s, there had also been improvements in underground ventilation
systems, and changes in the methods of transporting coal from the face to
the shaft for winding to the surface. Improvements in underground haulage
techniques had to some extent been stimulated by the Mines Act of 1842,
which prohibited the employment of women and young children underground
(see chapter 4), but the sinking of deeper and more costly shafts was also
an important stimulus since such fixed capital outlays had to be recouped
over a larger (and more regUlar) output. At the face, wheeled trams, tubs
or wagons running on light rails displaced hand-pushed sledges. Where the
height of seams allowed, ponies were used for putting at the face. On
main-road, or primary haulage routes, horses were increasingly used in
place of (or in conjunction with) human effort, and rope haulage systems
were employed at some nines from the mid-nineteenth century. The use of
'endless chain', 'endless rope' and 'main and tail rope' haulage systems,
powered by stationary engines, increased from the 1870s. But the use of
horses for main-road haulage systems continued at many pits into the
twentieth century, as did hand-tramming and pony-putting at the face.
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It is difficult to ascertain the proportion of undergrOund employment
formed by 'oncost' workers, employed on work other than coal-getting at the
face. This is not least because official statistics do not differentiate
between colliers (regarded by owners and managers as the 'productive'
labour force) and other grades, and also because of the regional variations
In the division of labour. The best estimates are given by Church et al
(1986:211-5) who suggest that in 1905, the proportion of underground
workers employed on hewing at the face varied from 47 per cent in the North
East to 56 per cent in South Vales, and 60 per cent in Scotland (see also
Daunton, 1981).
COAL-GETTERS: TRAINING AND PROMOTION TO THE FACE
As a 'workable mechanical novelty', the coal-cutter had been in existence
since before the 1880s (Taylor, 1961:58). But as late as 1913, only 8.5 per
cent of British coal was undercut mechanically, with 22 per cent of this
total accounted for by the Scottish coalfields (Rowe, 1923:9). Hand coal-
getting therefore remained the predominant method of coal extraction on the
eve of the First World War, and colliers continued to perform the complete
operation of winning the coal at the face. This comprised three principal
processes - undercutting (holing or kirving), ripping (or getting the coal
down), and filling the coal into the tubs brought to the face by haulage
workers.
Undercutting was the most arduous and dangerous part of the collier's
work. With the aid of an iron pick or, from the 1880s, a 'patent pick' or
'mandril', he had to cut a deep groove at the bottom of the coal seam,
placing timber 'chocks' to support the weight of the overhanging coal in
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the process. The coal was then 'got down' either by allowing it to fall
under its own weight, or by driving in wedges at the top, or with the aid
of explosives. The collier (or his helper or learner) then had to fill the
coal, with the aid of a shovel, into the tubs. Certain 'deadwork' tasks
also had to be completed in preparation for further operations. The face
had to be cleared of dirt or rubble; the roof had to be raised above the
face; and timber props had to be set to support it. These 'deadwork' tasks
might all be performed by the collier working with a day-wage assistant, by
two colliers working together in a stall and sharing their earnings
equally, by particular members of the coalface work group on longwall
faces, or by other specialist grades of underground workers. Variations in
the allocation of 'deadwork' tasks had a bearing on the nature of
supervisor-worker relations at the face, and are discussed in greater
detail later in this chapter.
The collier had a complete set of operations to perform - cutting,
ripping and filling - and upon his skill, physical strength and dexterity
were dependent his daily or weekly piecework earnings. He enjoyed an
earnings differential above 'other grades of underground workers. By virtue
of the nature of his work and the piece-rate system, he enjoyed an autonomy
in production which other grades of underground workers - and notably
haulage workers - did not possess. Certainly the degree of independence
which colliers enjoyed varied between coalfields and over tine, which is to
say that their autonomy was not inviolate. Nevertheless, prior to the
introduction of mechanical coal-cutters, the deputy had little role to play
in coordinating the various operations at the face and the collier decided
how best to win the coal, in which sequence to perform the various tasks
and, within the constraints of the piece-rate system, determined his own
pace of work.
Commentators in the interwar period of the twentieth century, witnessing
the transition to the unit or intensive system of machine-mining, looked
back upon the pre-war, pre-machinery years as the halcyon era of the
collier as 'master craftsman'.
He toiled with his assistant, usually a young lad, in a "place"
of his own, where he was practically his own master
	 He was
a skilled craftsman on a piece rate, so there was no need of an
overseer directing his activities. No one knew better than he
did how to blast the coal to best advantage or how to secure
the roof so that it . would not cave in upon him. The work was
unhurried, so that the workman had plenty of time to instruct
his assistant. He taught him how to wield a pick, how to guage
the quantity of explosive necessary, how to detect inflammable
and poisonous gases, how to recognize a dangerous roof and
support it 	 So by this method of training, the miner's
assistant of pre-war days became a skilled craftsman - in his
isolated working place he was a master craftsman, in the sane
position, in many respects, as the small tradesman owning his
own business. He could organize the work to suit himself - work
as hard as he liked, and, to a great extent, as long as he
liked. (Mitchell, 1933:140-1)
This picture of the 'old-timer miner at work' rather misinterprets the
nature of the piecework system. Colliers were not paced by machinery, or
subject to close managerial supervision, but they nevertheless had a
'stint' of work to complete to attain their average earnings, and would be
forced to intensify their work-load when wages were depressed. Colliers
were free from close supervision, but not all faceworkers enjoyed a similar
autonomy and piecework coal-getters exercised a hierarchical control over
their day-wage assistants (see chapter 4). The less glamorous aspects of
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the collier's work and working conditions are also ignored. Hewing was a
physically strenuous and dangerous Job. It required skill to be peformed
effectively and also safely. Colliers worked long hours - over ten hours
bank-to-bank in South Wales before the legislation of 1872 - in dark,
sometimes very hot, sometimes flooded, often cramped and invariably
hazardous conditions.
On the grounds of safety alone, mineworkers had ample cause to take an
interest in their employer's recruitment practices, since the introduction
of 'strangers' or inexperienced workmen represented a potential safety
hazard for all underground employees. But the collier's skills, acquired
through some form of apprenticeship, and experience of underground work
might alone be insufficient to ensure his personal safety. On average in
the years between 1880 and 1910, four miners were killed every day in the
British coalfields (Arnot, 1953:23).
Colliers resented the introduction of 'strangers', viewing this as a
threat to their safety, to their earnings and to their status at the top of
the underground employment hierarchy. In all coalfields in the nineteenth
century, some form of aiprenticeship system operated, with access to
piecework employment at the face and to specialist underground Jobs
governed by 'age-linked milestones' (Humphries, 1981:10). But the details
varied between different coalfields, in terns of the length of
apprenticeship required before promotion to piecework employment at the
face, the route to employment at the face, and extent to which these
systems were regulated through the family or kinship network, local custom
or local union organization. For the industry as a whole, therefore, and
even for individual mining districts, there was no formally recognized
apprenticeship system guarded in the union rule books although in some
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coalfields the unions attempted to formalize 'entry to the trade' in the
mid-to-late nineteenth century (Reid, 1978).
The length of apprenticeship required before promotion to the face varied
in the different coalfields; to some extent reflecting geological
conditions. And the skills acquired through a training in one coalfield
might be insufficient to guarantee a man work in another.
	 among the colliers themselves, I am informed, so
great is the value of a particular training and aptitude,
that there are distinct classes of "thick-bed men" and
"thin-bed men", of whom the "thick-bed men" cannot gain a
living at the work of the "thin-bed men", while surpassing
the latter in their field of employment. And beyond the
physical labour, there is required a familiarity with the
peculiar dangers of the occupation, and a caution in
guarding against them, which nothing but long experience
can supply. (Trades Societies and Strikes, 1860:13-4)
In the North East, where the coal was hard and difficult to work, a lengthy
formal apprenticeship was considered - by owners and men - to be essential.
Likewise in South Staffordshire where the 'thick coal' seam was worked by a
distinctive method, only adopted in this coalfield (Eight Hours Day
Committee, Final Report, 1907). According to Campbell and Reid, however,
the thickness of the newly-opened seams in Lanarkshire in the mid-
nineteenth century allowed the coal and iron companies to recruit
relatively inexperienced labour from Ireland and elsewhere (1978:59).
The path of promotion to the face varied in the different coalfields. In
the North East, adolescents entered the pits as 'drivers', employed in
driving the horses on the main underground roads. They advanced to putting
at the face between the age of 16 and 18; graduated to become a 'putter-
hewer' after a year or so; subsequently moving up into the 'hewer-putter'
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class before becoming a hewer proper with their own 'stall' and, in this
coalfield, marra partnership with another skilled worker (Daunton, 1981:
591). In South Wales, in contrast, there was no line of promotion from
haulage work to coal-getting at the face. While coalmining in Britain in
the nineteenth century was popularly regarded as an 'hereditary closed
shop' (Hair, 1955:49-50), with entrance to the industry being restricted to
juveniles from mining families (see chapter 4 below), in South Wales the
'different grades (were) as much as an hereditary occupation as mining in
general' (Rowe, 1923:67). Colliers worked in their 'place' with a learner,
or day-wage assistant, who was usually under the age of 21 and often a son
or relative. In this way, the sons of colliers would learn their trade and
follow in their father's occupation, graduating to a 'place' of their own
in their early twenties. The sons of hauliers and of timberers were likely
to follow in their father's occupation, although possibly starting work as
a collier's assistant.
Thus, while there was a tension between coal-getters and haulage workers,
with the latter in all coalfields an 'inferior' grade, the nature of this
tension assumed a different character in different areas. In South Vales,
'adults were divided on a line between face and haulage work, which in the
North East was a division of age' (Daunton,1981:591). In the North East,
haulage workers had the possibility of promotion to the face, but in the
interim had to work a much longer shift than hewers. In South Vales,
haulage workers remained in this grade all their adult working lives, but
worked the sane length of shift as coal-getters (see below, pp 121-3).
While coal-getters resented the introduction of 'strangers', or breach of
the apprenticeship system, it was by no means unknown for mineowners to
recruit from outside the established mining proletariat, or to recruit
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relatively inexperienced workers to the face when (a) skilled labour was in
short supply and geological conditions permitted; (b) owners encountered
opposition from the men to their stated terns and conditions of employment;
and (c) owners encountered resistance to their attempts to intensify work.
In the Royden Harrison collection (1978), the heavy recruitment of labour
to the industry from the 1860s is argued to have been perceived by colliers
as a threat to their earnings and artisanal status, and to have initially
provoked a more concerted effort on their part to formalize apprenticeship
regulations. But these attempts to control the labour supply along the
lines of 'classic' craft societies were unsuccessful in the face of the
employers' ability to draw-in 'poverty-stricken' migrant labour and workers
from other occupations - albeit at the expense of safety and efficiency.
Taylor also argues that the expansion of the industry from the 1880s
sucked in a 'large body of inexperienced workers' - 'green' labour, or raw
recruits (1968:50-1).
There is some disagreement as to the extent of this 'dilution', however,
and obviously regional variations would be important. .Taylor does not
differentiate between recruitment to the -face and other types of
underground work. Walters' figures for the South Wales area (one of the
most rapidly expanding coalfields in the late nineteenth century) give a
more detailed breakdown. They suggest that in the 1890s, unskilled labour -
with less than two years experience of minework - accounted for 5 per cent
of the labour force in the collieries of the Merthyr and Aberdare areas,
but that only 1 per cent of these new recruits were coal-getters at the
face (1975:294-5).
While the recruitment of relatively inexperienced workers did not alter
the nature of operations at the face or, necessarily, facilitate the
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imposition of a tighter work discipline, there is some evidence of
mineowners turning to alternative sources of labour in an attempt to
undermine established job controls and/or to force striking miners back to
work. In such circumstances, owners would generally attempt to recruit from
similar occupational groups as in the North East, in the 1830s, when they
hired workers from the (depressed) neighbouring lead nines to crush the
hewers' strike over the conditions of binding.
Indeed the masters soon persuaded themselves that it was
a positive charity to give these distressed lead miners
work, and the objections of the pitmen to this course
was a 'heartless combination against their industrious
but starving fellow creatures'. (Hammond and Hammond, 1919:37-8)
In the North East in the 1880s, owners at a number of pits recruited
putter-hewers onto coalgetting at the face. Putter-hewers worked a longer
shift than adult hewers and did not enjoy the latter's privileges in terns
of rent-free accommodation and a coal allowance. Thus, while there was a
continuing tension between the hewers and the younger men awaiting
promotion and who were 'convinced that they were fit to hew' (Velbourne,
1923:232), antagonism was increasingly directed towards the owners who were
willing to employ the younger men but not to grant them the sane conditions
as hewers. Following a series of local disputes, the lodges (or workplace
union organization) succeeded in ensuring that the 'obnoxious system of
Infringement of the hewers' work (was) abandoned' (Ibid:252).
In certain districts in Scotland in the early twentieth century,
mineowners recruited immigrant Polish mineworkers in place of the
indigeneous mining population, arguing that they found the Polish workmen
to be 'good workmen, and they would undertake work which other men would
not do' (Mining Association, Executive Council Minutes, 6.5.1903:12-13).
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The owners' particular grievance was that Scottish hewers had imposed
output controls, or rather were refusing to work the length of 'stint'
defined by the masters. The Editor of the Colliery Guardian, the industry's
trade Journal, commented with some satisfaction that:
It certainly looks as though the worm was turning at last,
and that colliery owners, sick and tired of the attempts
of the men to become their masters and to control their
businesses for them, have resolved to make a clean sweep
and seek for more amenable labour elsewhere. Perhaps this
will prove a solution to the trade union question, and,
although it would cause an infinity of misery to the
workmen of this country, it must be admitted that they
have brought it upon themselves. Perhaps when the
unofficial members of the trade unions see the danger
which is looming before them they will take a more
reasonable course while there is yet tine.
(Colliery Guardian, 18.1.1901)
The regulation of output, practised on an informal and local basis,
represented one tactic through which colliers attempted to prevent the
intensification of work or extension of the working day under the piece-
rate system. It was, however, also closely associated with the outlook and
policies of the district and county miners' associations of the 1870s and
1880s. Wages (percentage increases or decreases to basis rates - or
piecework earnings) were regulated at a district level under selling price
sliding scales (discussed in the final section of this chapter). The
restriction of output - practised on a national scale - was viewed as a
means of maintaining selling prices and, with this, wage rates.
THE PIECE-RATE PAYMENT SYSTEX
The piece-wage was the dominant form of wage for coal-getters at the face.
Piecework price lists stipulated the prices paid for particular jobs; for
example, so many pence per ton for getting the coal and loading it into
tubs. This rate might include an allowance for so many yards of putting at
the face, as in Cumberland where the hewer was responsible for this work,
and possibly for the day-wages of his assistant or learner. Separate rates
would be stipulated for timbering at the face, ripping the roof and so on.
Piecework price lists were determined locally, at the level of individual
pits (or seams within them), usually through a process of bargaining
between the management and men. Price lists were not fixed once and for
all, however, and occasions did arise fairly frequently when either the
employer or the men would press for a revision. For example, if geological
conditions changed, the colliers night be forced to work more intensively
at existing rates, while falling coal prices might be the occasion for the
employer to attempt to cut existing rates, thereby forcing employees to
work more intensively to secure their average earnings. New price lists had
also to be established when new faces were opened-up, and changes in
working practices would also precipitate attempts to alter prevailing
piece-rates.
The situation in coalmining can therefore be contrasted with that in the
cotton industry, where formal price lists covered large sections of the
industry and provided for 'changes in process, machinery, or character of
product, and no bargaining takes place after the list has once been drawn
up' (Rowe, 1923:50). In coalmining, there were no formal, or fixed, price
lists applicable to whole districts and, with the exception of the northern
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coalfields, before the 1890s the external (district or county) union had no
recognized role in the negotiation of rates at the level of individual
pits. While there were no formally recognized standard, or minimum rates,
however, there was usually a 'customary day-wage for face-workers by which
a man could assess the 'fairness' of a particular rate' (Clegg, Fox, and
Thompson, 1964:110), and colliers would expect the price lists to yield the
'normal earnings per shift' for their grade in a particular locality.
It is important to emphasize that piecework price lists were not related
to the selling price of coal. The piecewage was simply a converted form of
time wage, and the determination of piece-rates involved the division of
two principals; the customary, or average wage, and the 'amount of work
which an operative of average capacity, working with such degree of
exertion as the average workman is willing to exercise, is able to produce
within a given period' - within the length of the working day or shift
(Schloss, 1892:22). The piece-rate established, the actual wages of the
operative would depend on the amount of work actually performed - number of
pieces produced, tonnage of coal cut and filled, yardage of roadway
timbered - multiplied by the job rate. Providing a measure of the intensity
of labour, the piece-wage rendered the 'superintendance of labour....to a
great extent superfluous' (Marx, 1976:694). In his analysis of the
bituminous coal industry in the United States in the 1920s, Goodrich noted
that the miner's freedom from direct supervision was buttressed by the
piecework payment system which relieved the foreman of the 'necessity of
driving the men' (1925:30).
Piecework payment systems were widespread in British industry in the late
nineteenth century; in factory employment and in domestic manufacture or
outworking trades. They were associated with various forms of
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subcontracting, inside contracting, piece-rate foremanship and, in some
occupations, 'sweating'. For Marx, the piece-wage was the form of wage
'most appropriate to the capitalist mode of production' and specifically to
the 'period of manufacture properly so-called' (1976:698). The piece-wage,
he argued, served as a 'lever for the lengthening of the working day and
lowering of wages'. It tended to develop the 'worker's sense of liberty,
independence and self-control' and with this encouraged employees to
intensify their work-load or prolong their working day in order to increase
their piecework earnings. The knock-on effect, however, was to raise the
intensity of work for all employees in a shop or workplace, or to extend
their working day and force them into over-exertion. For employers would
'keep an eye on the men's earnings and, if (they) think that they are
making too much money, will lower their piece-wage by "nibbling", i.e. by
an insidious process of continual petty reductions' (Schloss, 1892:45).
In practice, however, this process owed much to employer initiatives.
Thus, Melling argues that piece-rate payment systems in the late nineteenth
century were most prevalent in 'those occupations possessing little claim
to craft expertise, or where the existence of job control excluded the
possibility of intensive management supervision'.
In such situations the expense of supervisory labour
could be reduced by ensuring that piece or job rates
stimulated the employees to greater exertions, and by
cutting the rates so that a progressive increase in
productivity was secured. (1980:191-2)
Employers might, of course, encounter worker resistance to such
intensification of labour exploitation. This might take a number of forms,
from output restriction to an insistence upon a base rate, with 'one of the
most	 effective	 means	 of	 protecting standard rates and job
controls... .obviously in trade unionism' (Melling, 1980:192).
In coalmining, the problems (and expense) of intensive management
supervision were increased by the physical conditions of underground
working; the great variety of circumstances under which the coal had to be
got; and worker resistance to oppressive surveillance by underground
officials at the coalface. In these conditions, piecework had obvious
attractions for mineowners and managers.
	 such supervision as is possible and is generally
practised in surface employments is impracticable. The
piece rate may not be a perfect method of wage
remuneration; but while it automatically punishes the
lazy and indifferent workman, it at the same time
automatically rewards the capable and industrious
workman. (Evans, 1911:219)
The problem for mineowners in the early-to-mid nineteenth century, however,
was to create the 'industrious workman' in the first instance; that is, to
habituate labour to a capitalist work regime demanding regular hours of
work and regular attendance. The piece-rate system did not obviate employer
labour-management problems, and was alone insufficient to secure and retain
a supply of workers 'possessing habits of regularity' (Church et al,
1986:259). In attempts to meet their labour requirements, 'many coalowners
sought to modify customs and contracts and to impose greater control and
regulation of workers', and in this process 'law and government, as well as
the labour policies of colliery managers, played their part' (Ibid).
Contracts of Employment and York Discipline
Up until the mid-nineteenth century in Northumberland and Durham, hewers
and putters were hired under the terms and conditions of 'the bond'.
Setting out in detail the work to be done, rates of payments, penalties for
transgressions relating, for example, to the quality of coal got, absence
from work, and other 'unacceptable' behaviour, the bond was renewed
annually and was enforceable by law (Griffin, 1978; Church et al, 1986:260-
1). For mining employers, the bond represented a means of recruiting and
retaining for a period of a year the 'best', most disciplined or regular
workmen. Recruitment in the first instance was therefore often dependent
upon the personal recommendation of a former employer, or current employee,
although competition between employers for such workers could (according to
the state of trade) force up the 'binding money' (paid in cash or beer),
and the time of the annual hirings was frequently the occasion for strikes
over the terms and conditions of employment (see also Sweezy, 1938).
Breaches of the bond constituted a civil and criminal offence, and hence
the practice of binding was also a means of maintaining discipline.
Absconding miners could be imprisoned or fined; and fines could be imposed
for absenteeism, or other failures to comply with the mineowner's stated
terms and conditions.
Binding in the North Bast was closely related to the northern mineowners'
organized 'limitation of the vend', or attempts to regulate competition and
restrict output and in this way maintain selling prices. Up until the early
nineteenth century, the northern coalmasters dominated the sea-borne trade
of coal to London - then representing the principal market for a coal trade
largely oriented towards domestic, or household consumption. Attempts to
regulate output and prices had only ever had a measure of success for short
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periods of time and, from the 1840s, the 'limitation of the vend'
collapsed. The extension of rail transport facilitated the development of
other coalfields and evoked an era of intensifying inter-district
competition over domestic and industrial markets (Sweezy, 1938). The
periodic over-supply of coal and intense competition for markets in turn
made the northern mineowners anxious to secure cost flexibility, which in
this labour-intensive industry meant wage flexibility, and certain elements
of the bond became increasingly irksome to them; in particular, the minimum
wage and regular employment guarantees that had formerly been attached to
annual hirings. Since these guarantees were about the only aspects of the
bond favourable to mineworkers, the owners' determination to rescind them
provoked a series of stoppages at annual hirings, culminating in a
seventeen week strike in 1844. This ended with the miners returning to work
on the employers' terms which included the substitution of monthly for
annual contracts, the abolition of minimum wage and employment guarantees,
but the retention of the various disciplinary elements of the bond which
could still be enforced at law (Church et al, 1986:261).
The traditional view of the bond, as a system which rendered the northern
miners 'only a degree less unfree' than the Scottish miner serfs of the
eighteenth century (Pollard, 1978:136), perhaps misses some of the
contradictions of its operation. Elements of the bond could operate to the
miners' advantage, and it was the loss of the minimum wage and employment
guarantees - a burden to employers in the epoch of competitive market
capitalism - that lay behind the northern miners' attempts to secure the
reintroduction of binding in the 1840s and 1850s. Failing this, the miners
attempted to protect earnings and employment through other means, and a
principal platform of the 'national' miners' unions of the 1860s became the
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regulation of output (see Harrison ed, 1978). Divided by competition,
employers were in no position to entertain such schemes. On the other hand,
competition for labour in the context of rising coal prices prompted
mineowners in the North East to attempt to reintroduce annual hirings in
the early 1860s. Buoyed by the conditions of the coal trade, however, the
miners' organizations were sufficiently strong to resist the reimposition
of the bond, now unambiguously regarded by the mineworkers as a system of
slavery (Church et al, 1986:678).
The use of the law, and paralegal structures of punishment, to enforce
discipline was not confined to the North East. Prosecution for the breach
of a bond 'had its more widely applicable counterpart in the Master and
Servant Act of 1823, which made it a criminal offence for a worker to break
his contract (by verbal or written agreement) and was punishable by fine,
or a maximum period of three months' imprisonment with hard labour' (Ibid:
261). The use of this law, or threat of prosecution, was not uncommon in
the coal industry of the mid-nineteenth century, although employers in some
districts relied upon it more heavily than others. Another crude method of
retaining labour was the long pay, which forced workers into indebtedness
at company owned or controlled stores. The discharge note also offered
employers a means of restricting labour mobility, and enforcing discipline
In production. Effective use of the discharge note, however, required a
level of cooperation between employers that was not always easy to sustain,
especially at times of peak demand for coal and, with this, for labour
(Morris and Williams, 1958:286).
The decline in the use of long pays, payment in truck, and of corporal
punishment to maintain discipline in production (often associated with the
big butty system, but by no means confined to it) from the mid-nineteenth
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century is often attributed to the passage of mining safety legislation
(for example, Taylor, 1960; Griffin, 1978). Women and very young children
were excluded from underground employment by the Mines Act of 1842, and
this no doubt reduced the scope for the exercise of crude physical
discipline in production, whilst also to an extent curtailing the
conditions in which the big butty system had thrived (see chapter 4).
Legislation in 1850 established the Mines Inspectorate, and empowered the
inspectors to conduct underground inspections of mines. Drawn from the
ranks of the . 'viewers' (professional mining engineers), the inspectors were
highly critical of many employer labour-management practices. These were
often criticized for failing to promote discipline and efficiency in labour
utilization, rather than simply for their consequences in terms of the
miners' health and safety, although of course the two elements were closely
related. But since there were only 4 inspectors in 1850 (and only 12,
covering the whole industry in 1855), it is doubtful whether their limited
powers of surveillance constituted a major force for change. More powerful,
perhaps, was the surge in the demand for labour from the early 1860s which
limited the efficacy of earlier methods of retaining and disciplining
underground workers.
The insertion of rules and regulations in workers' contracts, and use of
fines and penalties to maintain discipline, did not die out from the mid-
nineteenth century, however, and indeed such practices were to an extent
encouraged by the passage of safety legislation. The Mines Inspection Act
of 1855 introduced 7 General Rules governing coal (and metalliferous)
mines. Mineowners found to be in breach of the safety regulations were
liable to be fined; workers were liable to be prosecuted and/or fined. The
Act required all collieries to adopt by-laws in accordance with the general
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safety code, and also a set of Special Rules tailored to meet local
conditions. The Special Rules were drawn up by mineowners, and some
employers took advantage of this opportunity to impose stringent
regulations relating to hours of work, attendance, the quality and quantity
of coal got out (Arnot, 1953; and see also chapter 6 below).
The piecework payment system gave rise to what Marx described as 'frauds
committed by the capitalists' (1976:694). In the coal industry, the
collier's output was weighed at the pit bank and employers might refuse to
pay the correct wage on the grounds that tubs were under-weight or filled
with 'dirty' coal, containing too much stone or rubble.
Occassionally your tub was tipped up on the pit top and
examined for dirt. It had to be coal in those days that
you filled. If the dirt was over a percentage you'd be
called out of the mine 	 You'd have to cone out, with
no pay for it. That was the punishment, and that amount
of dirt could be deducted from whatever you filled in
other boxes.
(Miner from Parr, born in 1893, cited in Forman, 1979:41)
Up until the 1860s, colliers had no formal role in the process of weighing
the coal at the surface, and there are various accounts of employers
defrauding their workmen by adding dirt to filled tubs, under-weighing
tubs, or changing the basis of measurement (see, for example, Hammond and
Hammond, 1919). It is hardly surprising, therefore, that the institution of
the checkweighman system formed a priority for the early miners' unions.
With the Act of 1860, colliers won the right to elect their own
representative to check the weighing of coal, and the checkweighman system
formed the basis for more permanent labour organization at pit level.
Initially, however, checkweighers were liable to be victimized by
management, while employers devised various means for evading the
provisions of the 1860 Act (Arnot, 1949: 46,50).
Company Housing
A discussion of the terms and conditions attached to employment contracts
is incomplete without some consideration of welfarism in the coal industry
and, more specifically, employer provision of accommodation for workers. In
the North East, and to a lesser extent in Scotland, colliery housing formed
part of the hewer's contract or annual bond. 'Rent-free' accommodation
remained part of the northern hewer's remuneration package throughout the
nineteenth century. Elsewhere, and especially in more geographically remote
mining districts, employers (or, sometimes, landowners) were forced to
provide accommodation for workers in order to meet their labour supply
requirements. Outside, the North East, however, the rent more often than
not was paid out of the collier's weekly or fortnightly earnings.
Considerations of labour supply formed the principal motive for house
building, most especially in rapidly developing mining districts which were
remote from urban centres. While the provision of accommodation added to
the initial fixed capital outlay incurred by the mining company, mineowners
were generally persuaded of the benefits where the alternative would have
involved employees walking long distances to work. Long-distance commuting
was viewed by mining employers as the route to high levels of absenteeism
at the pits.
It is felt to be an advantage from the employers' point
of view that they can count more steadily on the work of
men who live in the colliery houses, especially where the
pits are removed from centres of population.
(Royal Commission on Housing in Scotland, Report, 1917-8:148)
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The provision of colliery housing has also been interpreted as an employer
policy designed to attract a 'good staff of men', or 'core' labour force of
well-disciplined operatives (Church et al, 1986: 279; Melling, 1981). In
this way, hierarchical employment structures and divisions between grades
may have been nurtured and reinforced, since colliery housing (or the best
of the company's housing stock) might be reserved for principal operatives
- hewers and/or underground supervisory grades. But established practices
could become a constraint on employers, restricting their ability to
respond to new circumstances and developments. The example of the North
East has already been mentioned. Employers tried to substitute putter-
hewers for hewers at the face, but the former demanded the latter's
privilege of 'rent-free' accommodation before they would comply and the
dispute served (to an extent) to unite the interests of the two groups of
faceworkers.
Company-owned housing also offered employers a weapon that could be used
against recalcitrant employees. Mineowners could threaten to evict striking
miners, or individual mineworkers who failed to comply with the company's
rules and regulations in pi-oduction. Equally, the threat of eviction could
be used to inhibit the growth of union organization and to victimize
individual activists. There are numerous examples, especially in the period
before the 1880s, of mineowners using their position as landlords to coerce
striking miners back to work, or to penalize workers for 'poor' performance
and insubordination. The scope for mass evictions, however, as Church et al
suggest (1986:280), was probably more limited in some coalfields by the
late nineteenth century. Alternative forms of housing provision developed
with the expansion of centres of mining, while crude coercion ran the risk
of simply escalating conflicts with the growth of more permanent trade
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unions. The use of the sanction of eviction, moreover, was likely to
produce further problems of labour-management for employers, and to
conflict with their attempts to nurture a 'good staff' of willing and
cooperative workmen.
While company housing probably peaked before the 1870s, as late as 1925
colliery companies owned between a quarter and a third of the housing in
the principal mining communities (Samuel, 1926, Report, Vo1.1: 200). There
were quite marked regional (and intra-regional) variations, however, in
the extent of company-owned housing, the conditions of the housing stock,
and the terms under which the accommodation was let. In the mid-1920s,
about 40 per cent of all colliery owned housing was in the North Bast,
where some of it was still provided 'rent free' (that is, as part and
parcel of the miner's wage). Across the coafields, much of the company-
owned housing had been built in the nineteenth century, and in some
districts - notably Durham and also mining regions in Scotland - much of
the housing (which was often inadequate in the first instance) had
deteriorated beyond the point of squalor for the want of any subsequent
maintenance. In the East'Midlands and South Yorkshire, on the other hand,
which were two of the most rapidly expanding districts in the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, some firms had constructed 'model
villages' and, according to the official enquiries of the 1920s, made
'model' accommodation - 'equal to any in Great Britain' - available to
their employees (Ibid:199).
Company housing formed an important element in employer attempts to
secure their labour requirements in the nineteenth century. In the Bast
Midlands and South Yorkshire, large joint stock companies continued to
invest in the provision of worker accommodation and into the twentieth
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century provided (or organized the provision of) amenities'such as schools,
churches, shops, sports grounds and clubs. More generally, however,
employer involvement in house building and welfare provision was on the
decline from the late nineteenth century. Church et al attribute this in
part to the growth of trade unionism which 'helped to impose constraints
upon the effectiveness of a policy of housing provision as one form of
labour regulation' (1986:281). They suggest that employers increasingly
turned from private initiatives to combined action in their efforts to
limit the growing strength of trade unions. But other factors were
operating to make employers reluctant to provide - or maintain - worker
accommodation, while miners' housing was in turn becoming a major source of
industrial unrest in some areas as is suggested by the appointment of the
Royal Commission in Scotland of 1911-17.
The Commissioners condemned the deplorable state of much company-awned
housing in Scottish mining districts, noting that the poor physical quality
of the accommodation was often compounded by severe overcrowding. They
Identified the private ownership of coal royalties as one of the factors
'inducing the (mine) owners to provide houses of inadequate structure'
(Report, 1917-8: 127, 150). The location of mines, layout of underground
and surface works - including workers' housing - were influenced by the
terms and conditions of the mineral lease negotiated between the landowner
and mineowner (see chapter 2). While this in itself might mean that houses
were constructed on unsuitable and overcrowed sites, the mineowner's
incentive to improve the accommodation would be diminished since the
Investment could be appropriated by the landowner at the termination of the
lease.
Certainly poor quality housing was not specific to the Scottish
coalfields. Critical of many aspects of the coal industry, which seemed
unable to restructure and modernize in the face of intensifying
international competition, the Coal Industry Commission of 1919, chaired by
Sir John Sankey, also roundly condemned the state of colliery housing in a
number of British coalfields as 'a reproach to our civilisation' (Interim
Report, 1919:7). Thus, the mineowners were increasingly criticized for
their failure to provide adequate welfare facilities and evidence of the
deplorable living conditions of many mining families was an influence on
Sir John Sankey's decision to support the miners' demand for the
nationalization of the mines in 1919. But the Government rejected
nationalization, after the threat of a national strike had passed, and
proposed an alternative package in an attempt to appease the miners whilst
maintaining the system of private ownership. This included the subsidised
improvement of colliery dwellings and creation of a Kiners' Welfare Fund to
be financed by a levy on coal output and applied to 'purposes connected
with the social well-being, recreation and conditions of living' of
coalminers.
DIRECTION AID DELEGATION IN THE LABOUR PROCESS
Hand coal-getting remained the predominant method of coal extraction in the
British coalmining industry in the period before the First World Var. At
the coalface, the collier (or work group) performed the complete operation
of winning the coal which comprised the different processes of
undercutting, ripping and filling. Colliers retained immediate control over
the pace of work. Skilled workers, they required little instruction as to
how best to win the coal, and the coalface deputy - the front-line
supervisor - had little role to play in coordinating the different
operations involved in coal-getting. Close supervision of the collier's
work was difficult for employers to impose - because of the nature of the
work, the physical conditions under which it was performed, and because
faceworkers resented interference and imposed various controls to limit the
deputy's ability to intervene. The piece-rate system provided employers
with an indirect control on the intensity of work effort, or a means to
circumvent both the difficulties and expense of close supervision at the
face. The insertion of rules and penalties in employment contracts
represented early - and somewhat crude - employer attempts to influence the
regularity of attendance and quality of the coal got out, and such
practices were actually retained well beyond the early nineteenth century.
Colliers had an autonomy in their work which other grades of underground
labour might not possess. Within the coal-getting class, however, there
were variations across the coalfields (and over time) in terms of the
degree of control exercised over work and working conditions, while the
potential for friction between the pit officials and faceworkers also
varied. The experiences of other grades of underground labour were also
different. Skilled specialist grades Such as timbermen and stonemen, were
next in line to the colliers in terms of the degree of direct managerial
supervision to which they were subject. In the different coalfields, these
grades were sometimes paid piece- and sometimes day-rates. In either case,
however, they would generally have a well defined 'stint' of work to
complete in their shift; a certain yardage of roadway to timber or to
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drive. Their contact with the underground officials would generally be
limited to the process of measuring-up the work performed, and bargaining
over any 'excess' (or under) payment.
Haulage workers were in a different position. They faced much greater
discipline, both from the colliers whose own payment depended on the number
of tubs filled and raised to the surface, and from the underground pit
officials who would be anxious to ensure that the colliers were properly
'serviced' with a steady flow of tubs to and from the face (see Goldthorpe,
1959). But the relationship between the colliers and haulage workers could
vary with, for example, economic conditions. Thus, Manley describes how in
South Yorkshire when wages were low, and when colliers were anxious to fill
as much coal as possible to make up their earnings, they might be forced to
'bribe poney drivers to "slip 'em a couple (of tubs) in" out of turn', with
tobacco being the usual medium of payment (1947).
In Durham, putters on face haulage were paid a piece-rate, or according
to the 'number of full tubs they "put"', with a price per score of tubs
fixed for so many yards of 'putting'. This meant that the distance between
the putter's 'flat' to their working place at the face had to be constantly
measured to avoid disputes over payment (Bulman and Redmayne, 1951:100). In
South Wales, haulage workers were on day-rates, as in many other districts.
The distinction is significant insofar as workers an piece-rates had a
greater opportunity to make up their earnings when wage-rates were low by
intensifying their work-load (often at the expense of their own safety)
than daywage workers. The latter would also be forced to work harder, in
order to keep pieceworkers at the face supplied with tubs, although without
the compensation of at least maintaining their income.
Nethod of Extraction
While hand coal-getting remained the predominant method of winning the coal
in the period before the First World War, different systems of laying out
the mine and working the coal - or of coal extraction - were employed in
the different coalfields. These divide into two principal types - bord and
pillar and longwall mining - although numerous modifications and hybrid
versions of these methods were practiced, and different systems were often
employed within a single mine (for a detailed account, see Bulman and
Redmayne, 1951). Bard and pillar was the older of the two methods and in
1830 the bulk of British coal output was won under one or other version of
this particular system. But longwall mining was extended from this period,
with the pace of the transition to the longwall system accelerating in the
years after 1860 (Church et al, 1986:336). The extension of longwall mining
through the different coalfields over the nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries has been interpreted in some accounts as an employer assault on
the autonomy of the coal-getters, facilitating a greater degree of direct
managerial supervision at the face (see, for example, Wellisz, 1953). This
argument may be considered in greater detail:
Originally employed in the northern coalfields of Northumberland and
Durham, the defining characteristic of bord and pillar mining was that only
part of the coal was removed in the initial operation. A series of parallel
roads were driven into the coal and connected at intervals by roads driven
at right angles. This part of the operation was known as 'working the
whole', as the roads were driven to the boundary of the colliery area.
Later, the isolated pillars that had been left to support the roof were cut
away, which was known as 'working the broken'. A variant of bord and pillar
working which retained the distinction of the two separate extractions was
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the 'pillar and stall' method. Here, the second . working followed
immediately on the first. A 'stall' or working place - generally for one or
two hewers - was driven off the heading, and when this was completed the
pillar was worked back towards the starting place (see figures 3.1 and 3.2
below, from Daunton, 1981: 581).
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Longwall working was radically different in that the whole of the face
was worked simultaneously; either outwards from the pit bottom, known as
'longwall advancing', or backwards from the boundary, known as 'longwall
retreating'. Although the whole of the face was worked, it was divided into
sections or stalls either side of the roadways. The length of these stalls
varied in different districts, as did the number of workers employed in a
single stall, but they usually formed a more or less self-contained unit.
This was the working place of the collier or coalface work group.
Figure 3.3 Longwall Advancing
Goal roads
Permanent
shaft pillar
(Source: Church et al, 1986: 339)
Longwall mining originated in Shropshire in the seventeenth century, and
was adopted thereafter in other mining districts in the Midlands. Ashton
and Sykes (1929) noted the different methods of coal extraction in the
/forth East and in the Midlands, and the different systems of work
organization employed in the eighteenth century. In the former, colliers
were 'bound' under individual contracts to a particular employer for a
period of a year. In the Midlands, where the stalls under longwall mining
were much larger than the stalls of bord and pillar working in the North
East, employers hired labour under a gang system, or collective contract.
Ashton and Sykes concluded that these different employment and work
arrangements were a function of different methods of coal extraction, with
the latter in turn determined by geological conditions.
For it is obvious that in the narrow bards or stalls of
the northern coalfields the individual must usually work
alone - or at the best be assisted by a single marrow -
whereas a considerable degree of cooperation and division
of labour is required by the Shropshire method of longwall
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working. The collective contract and the individual bond
thus reflect peculiarities of technique which are
themselves ultimately determined by geological conditions.
(1929:111-112)
In a similar vein, other commentators have identified in the transition to
longwall mining over the nineteenth century an assault on the craft status
and autonomy of the coal-getter. Thus, the introduction of longwall mining
has been held to have facilitated a greater concentration of labour along a
continous length of face, a greater sub-division of labour or fragmentation
of the collier's complete task, and consequently the closer surveillance
and direction of faceworkers by underground officials (eg Wellisz, 1953).
Certainly Bulman and Redmayne - professional mining engineers of the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries - favoured such a reorganization
of work with the introduction of longwall mining. They pointed out that in
the North East, with bord and pillar working, the hewer performed the
complete operation of cutting, ripping and filling, and worked alone in a
single stall which he shared with his i marra l
 who worked on the second, or
back shift. They went on to argue that:
This system is probably not the best adapted to longwall
working, to get the full benefits of which it is sometimes
important that the face should be carried forward as
regularly as possible, and that kirving should be
continuous along a good length of face, before coal is
allowed to fall. Recognising this truth, some managers
have adopted the division of labour which is common in
Derbyshire and elsewhere - namely, that of holers, getters
and fillers - thus dividing the hewers' work into three
classes of labour. (1951:227)
Bulman and Redmayne were forced to conclude, however, that in the late
nineteenth century where longwall mining was employed, a variety of work
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arrangements were adopted: one man working alone and responsible for all
the work in a certain length of face; three or four men in a stall sharing
the work and their earnings equally; three or four men working together and
each specializing in a particular task.
TABLE 3.1. METHOD OF COAL EXTRACTION, GREAT BRITAIN, circa 1905
Somerset	 Longwall
Warwickshire	 Longwall
South Derbyshire 	 Longwall
Yorkshire and Lancashire 	 Mostly Longwall
Cumberland	 Mixture: seams under 4 ft - longwall
seams over 4 ft - bord and pillar
Scotland	 Mixture
Central coalfields
	 Stoop and room and Longwall
Eastern coalfields
	
Pillar and Stall
South Vales	 Mixture
Western/Anthracite
	
Longwall
Steam coalfield
	
Mixture, with pillar and stall dominant
South Staffordshire
	
Mixture, pillar and stall in 'solid' coal seam
Northumberland & Durham 	 Bord and Pillar and Longwall, the latter
especially in thin seams
(Digest of Evidence Given Before the Royal Commission on Coal Supplies
(1901-05) Vol 1: 192-220, reprinted by Colliery Guardian, 1905)
Church et al (1986:337) estimate that three-quarters of UK output was got
from longwall faces advancing from the shaft by 1900, with bard and pillar
working retained to any extent only in the North East, Cumberland, North
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Wales, South Staffordshire and certain thick coal seams elsewhere. Other
commentators, however, whilst acknowledging the steady transition to
longwall mining over the late nineteenth century, have suggested that it
accounted for no more than 50 to 60 per cent of aggregate British coal
output in 1913 (eg Supple, 1987:27-9). Evidence presented to the Royal
Commission on Coal Supplies (1901-05) suggests that the position at the
beginning of the twentieth century was as depicted above in table 3.1.
Evidently, geological conditions partly explain the transition to the
longwall system. With bord and pillar working, headings were driven in
solid coal, but they also had to act as haulage routes. Hence, with the
working of thinner seams at a greater depth from the surface over the late
nineteenth century, much stonework and ripping was required to ensure that
the roads were of sufficient height to allow trams or tubs to pass. This
meant more 'deadwork' and rising costs, with a smaller proportion of the
underground workforce actually engaged on coal-getting.
The longwall method might offset rising 'oncost' expenditure, and raise
the overall productivity of the underground workforce, by reducing the
amount of road-building necessary. In similar geological conditions,
longwall mining would normally yield the largest extraction of coal from a
given area and a higher percentage of 'round' or 'large' coal which, for
some types of coal and markets, commanded a higher sales price. The weight
of coal above the face might assist the process of coal-getting, insofar as
it reduced the amount of drilling necessary. But the danger of subsidence
would also be increased and it was necessary to pack the 'goe s - or space
left behind the advancing face - and employ improved techniques of roof
control. It was the method of longwall advancing that was employed in the
British coal industry, and with this technique the tramroads to the face
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could be kept short, while profitable coal-getting could begin with the
minimum of delay after capital had been committed to the opening-up of a
pit. Nevertheless, the tramroads to the face had to be constructed in the
goaf and this work, together with the excavation of material for packing,
could absorb a considerable amount of 'indirect' or 'oncost' labour.
Longwall mining gradually displaced the bard and pillar method as the
dominant method of extraction in the British coal industry, and many
commentators in the interwar period of the twentieth century considered it
to be a prerequisite for the introduction of machinery at the face (see
chapter 5). Prior to the introduction of mechanical cutters and conveyors,
however, various factors might combine to favour the retention of the bard
and pillar method. Some witnesses were inclined to emphasize labour
relations. One contributor to the Colliery Guardian, for example, argued
that the efforts of the hewers to 'maintain under the new conditions the
rights, customs and traditions which had grown up under the old conditions,
but which were singularly inapplicable to the new ones' had impeded the
transition to longwall mining in the North East (Vol. CXXIX,
5.6.1925:1381). But geological conditions and improvements to the bard and
pillar technique had favoured the retention of that method at many pits in
the northern coalfield. In any event, it is evident that in many other
mining districts, the persistence of 'old' working practices did not
inhibit the transition to the longwall method.
Available evidence suggests that where the coal continued to be undercut
by hand, the introduction of longwall mining left the collier's work
essentially unchanged. Rowe (1923:60-1), for example, noted that exactly
the sane work arrangements prevailed under both longwall mining and bord
and pillar working in Cumberland in the early 1920s,
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The "Main Band" seam is worked almost exclusively by the
bord and pillar method, but it is gradually becoming
exhausted. The other seams are mainly worked longwall, and
hence the last thirty years has seen a relative increase
in this latter method. But the existing system of longwall
working still bears many of the signs of the older method.
The stalls are, as a rule, opened out 6 yards either side
of the gateway, and there are only two men to a stall. In
the bard and pillar working there are two men to a place,
and they share equally and do all the work in the place...
	  Exactly the sane conditions prevail in longwall
working.
Similarly, in Lanarkshire (Campbell and Reid, 1978) and in South Wales
(Daunton, 1981), the introduction of longwall mining did not institute a
new division of labour at the coalface, or radically transform existing
arrangements - which differed in various respects in each of these
coalfields.
In the Midlands, arrangements were again distinctive. Throughout the
nineteenth century, longwall mining had been the method of working in the
Midlands coalfields and the stalls were much larger than in most other
coalfields adopting this technique. In Cannock Chase, Nottinghamshire and
Leicestershire, six to eight men would be employed in a 'place' and there
would be some specialization of task between the members of the work group.
Thus, in Cannock Chase, where the imprint of the butty system remained in
the early twentieth century, the stalls were let to two stallmen or
'contracting colliers', who contracted to get the coal and deliver it into
tubs, set the timber, build stone packing, and lay the tram rails. They
engaged holers and fillers on a day-wage basis, the former having a
definite 'stint' - or length of face to undercut - before they could leave
the working place (Bulman and Redmayne, 1951). But, as Daunton has pointed
out, while there might be some specialization within the work group as to
who cut, ripped, and filled, there was no specialization between the work
groups, and the pace of work was still 'largely set internally from within
the group which was working on piece-rates' (1981:584; and see also chapter
4 below).
With hand coal-getting under either the bard and pillar or longwall
method of extraction, the collier or coalface work group was responsible
for the complete operation of winning the coal. The collier or, in the case
of the butty system, the contracting colliers, retained control in
determining how best to work the face and in which order to complete the
various tasks involved. The really significant contrast, as Daunton
suggests, was not between these two systems but rather between hand coal-
getting and machine mining and, specifically, the 'unit' or partially-
mechanized mining system introduced in the interwar period of the twentieth
century. Under this system, which involved the use of machinery for
undercutting the coal, the process of winning the coal was sub-divided.
Cutting, ripping, and filling were performed by different sets of workers,
working on three separate shifts in a twenty-four hour cycle of operations.
Vellisz (1953) suggests that the introduction of longwall mining was a
source of heightened tension between faceworkers and management because the
small, integrated unit of the stall was broken-up and the system entailed
more intensive managerial supervision and a loss of autonomy for the
worker. With pillar and stall working, close supervision of faceworkers was
certainly difficult because they were dispersed in their separate stalls.
But while colliers were brought together along a length of working face
under the longwall method, they still worked in their own 'place' at the
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face. They continued to determine how best to work the coal and, within the
constraints of the piecework system, set their own pace of work.
Commentators often suggest that the longwall method made supervision more
necessary because the face had to be kept in a straight line and carried
forward as regularly as possible. But this was perhaps more the case with
longwall retreating - a method that was only rarely employed in the British
industry. The layout of longwall faces advancing from the shaft actually
varied enormously. Sometimes the working face was advanced in a stepped
line; an arrangement which might fit in well with the determination of
employers to minimize 'oncost' expenditure on supervision.
Longwall mining may have placed the coalface deputy in a better position
to observe the men at work. But this alone was insufficient to enhance the
deputy's ability to cajole or entice the colliers to work more intensively.
Thus, in his description of mining in twentieth century County Durham, Dave
Douglass argues that even where longwall working had been introduced, and
whilst the deputy was always in or near the face, his powers of supervision
were no greater than they had been under bard and pillar working. At this
time, longwall teams in Durham worked under their elected leaders and would
refuse to accept supervision or advice from the deputies (1977:218-220).
This is not to suggest that the introduction of longwall mining was
unproblematical. In South Wales, for example, its extension in some parts
of the coalfield from the 1860s was a source of conflict between colliers
and management (see Vincent, 1900:186). Disputes centred on a number of
issues including safety and the revision of cutting rates and allowances.
Nevertheless, the significance of the transition to longwall mining - in
terms of the nature of supervisor-worker relations - was incommensurable
with the changes instigated by the introduction of machine mining in the
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interwar period of this century. Under the 'unit' system Of machine mining,
the discrete stalls of the unmechanized longwall method were displaced and
the coal was extracted along a continuous length of working face of a
hundred yards or more. The collier's work was sub-divided between three
separate shifts of cutting, ripping and filling performed consecutively in
a twenty-four hour cycle of operations.
No shift could begin until the previous one finished,
so that the deputy now became vital in co-ordinating
the operation as a whole. Instead of working in a
separate place, responsible for all three processes
in its own place, the miners were now limited to one
stage of the work which treated the whole face as a
single unit. The switch from pick-and-shovel to
mechanized work thus meant an assault upon the craft
status of the hewer, and the replacement of a vertical
by a horizontal division of labour. (Daunton, 1981:584)
The unit, or cycle, system of machine mining and its consequences for
supervisor-worker relationships are discussed in detail in chapters five
and six of this thesis. It is as well to point out at this juncture,
however, that the interwar period of the twentieth century also witnessed
significant changes in supervisor-worker relations in unnechanized pits; in
many instances, a managerial assault upon Job controls instigated in
conditions of failing profitability and facilitated by high and rising
levels of unemployment in the coalfields.
'Deadwork' at the Face
Available evidence suggests that the transition to longwall mining over the
nineteenth century did not radically transform the labour process of coal-
getting or the nature of supervisor-worker relations at the coalface. Many
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of the 'customs and traditions' established under an earlier method of coal
extraction were carried forward under the new system. These customary
practices, however, varied between (and often within) the coalfields and
continued to form the site of struggles between mining employers and
mineworkers. For example, in the organization of ancillary tasks - or
'deadwork' at the face - practices varied across the coalfields.
In his analysis of work organization in the British coalmining industry,
Rowe (1923) identified the greatest contrast as between arrangements in the
North East and in the Cumberland coalfield. The former displayed the most
finely articulated employment hierarchy below ground in the mines; the
latter, the least differentiated workforce. At the face in the North East:
the hewers, as a general rule, get the coal down and
fill it into tubs; brushing and ripping (i.e. taking up
the roof or floor to make room for further operations)
are done by another distinct grade, the timbering by
another, the putting by another, and the continuation of
the tram lines as the face recedes by yet another. (1923:57-8)
There were also distinct grades of labour for haulage, repair work on the
roads and maintenance, so that in the North East 'all the other duties were
performed by men who have specialized in that particular kind of work, and
we may repeat once more that in no other coalfield were there anything like
so many distinct grades of labour, even in 1914, and this would be even
more true thirty years ago' (Rowe, 1923:60). In Cumberland, in contrast,
the hewer worked with a learner to whom he paid a day-wage, and was
responsible for all the work at the face - cutting and filling the coal and
ancillary tasks. In this coalfield, there was no separate grade for hand-
putting with hewers responsible also for this work. Similarly in South
Vales, the collier was responsible for all the work in his 'place' and all
the repair work 'back to the parting' or gateway entrance to his stall.
One result of these variations in the structure of employment, as Daunton
suggests, was that while the hewer in the North East and collier in South
Wales (and, it might be added, hewer in Cumberland) were at the top of the
social hierarchy in their villages, 'the pitman in the north-east was
conscious of a more variegated pattern of income and privilege than his
peer in South Vales' (1981:585). There were also implications for
supervisor-worker relations at the face. In the North East, the hewer was
paid simply for winning the coal. Deputies were responsible for the
ancillary task of timbering at the face (Rowe, 1923:58) which emphasized
their 'servicing' role in relation to the hewers. The Welsh collier, in
contrast, spent around a third of his working day on tasks other than coal-
getting - for example, stonework and timbering (Bulman and Redmayne, 1951)
- and this 'deadwork' accounted for some 26 per cent of his earnings. Since
the deputies had to measure-up this deadwork and haggle over the payment,
there was a tension in the supervisor-worker relationship in South Wales
which the arrangements in the northern coalfield did not generate in the
same way (Daunton, 1981:585).
The Allocation of Working Places
A further dimension of the variegated patterns of work organization in the
British coalfields lay in the allocation of working places. In most
coalfields, employers insisted on their right to allocate labour to working
places at the face, and this formed a useful means for differentiating
colliers and penalizing those who were regarded as troublesome. The quality
and conditions of the collier's working place had an immediate bearing on
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his piecework earnings. While payment was generally made for work in an
'abnormal' or difficult working place, colliers had to bargain with
management over 'consideration' payments - possibly on an individual basis
- and over the definition of 'abnormal' working conditions.
For hewers in the North East, however, the 'cavilling system' meant that
the possibility of drawing an unfavourable working place was equalized. In
the northern mines, faceworkers drew lots each quarter to determine their
working place in the nine, and since this system protected them from the
discriminatory practices of mine managers and employers, it gave the
northern hewers a greater sense of freedom in production. Nevertheless, the
cavilling system came under periodic attack from mineowners, and the
details of the system varied between different companies within the
northern coalfield (see also Daunton, 1981). Employers complained that
output was lost each quarter, when the cavilling took place and the hewers
settled their new working places in the mine (Colliery Guardian,
13.10.1922: 912). Employers attempted to limit the size of the area
'cavilled' to a single seam, or single pit, while hewers sought to broaden
it as far as possible and to include all pits owned by a single company
within the particular cavilling system.
While in most other coalfields managements reserved the right to allocate
labour to working places, hewers in the Whitehaven pits in Cumberland had
also won the right to 'cavil' in the late nineteenth century (Colliery
Guardian, 16.11.1923:1240). From the early 1920s, however, the owners of
the Whitehaven pits sought to terminate the practice on the grounds that
output was lost each quarter under the cavilling system. The Company at
this time was attempting to introduce a wide range of new working
practices. In addition to the abolition of cavilling these included the
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introduction of a new shift system, more stringent penalties for the
production of 'dirty' coal, and more stringent regulations relating to
absenteeism with the Company declaring that it would dismiss men 'losing
two days in any week'. The Company's attempts to impose these new
conditions precipitated a three month strike in 1923, in which 'strong
patrols of police' were brought in to break-up the demonstrations of
striking miners (Colliery Guardian, 13.7.1923:91). The dispute was
eventually 'settled' through arbitration, with the award of Sir Lowes
Dickinson upholding the Company's right to 'work the pits by any system
they decide'. While the cavilling system was to have been terminated at the
end of 1924, however, the owners agreed after further negotiations that it
could be retained on the condition that the men 'cavilled' only three times
a year (instead of each quarter), and did so in holiday periods - to
prevent any loss of time and output to the Company (Colliery Guardian,
19.12.1924:1568).
LABOUR ORGANIZATION, WAGE REGULATION AND THE EIGHT HOUR WORKING DAY
Trade unionism in the British coalmining industry before the 1860s came in
'waves that advance and recede' (Arnot, 1949:46). In the 1860s, district
and county trade unions emerged in a number of coalfields, and in some
instances represented more permanent associations. But organization at pit
level was very uneven across the coalfields, the degree of centralized
authority conceded to the district union varied markedly, and a number of
the district associations that came into existence in the 1860s were
severely weakened or virtually disappeared in the Great Depression of the
1870s.	 Thus, in the period to the late nineteenth century, district and
county trade unions continued to lead a precarious existence which depended
in part on the distributional struggles of the industry's trade cycle (Fine
et al, 1982).
Throughout the nineteenth century, the growth of coal output was marked
by cyclical movements around an expansionary trend, reflecting in part the
level of activity in the wider economy. In periods of strong demand, coal
prices moved upwards and this encouraged the expansion of capacity and
entrance of new producers. Competition for labour tended to force wages
upwards, and it was in such periods that trade unions gained strength in
the struggle to maintain an upward pressure on wage rates. Employers would
generally respond, coming together in attempts to regulate competition for
labour and resist the men's efforts to secure wage increases and other
improvements in terms and conditions. It should be emphasized, however,
that, as alliances, district employer associations in many instances were
unstable in the period before the 1860s, with divisions of interest
prohibiting more than a short-lived association or one with limited and
specific objectives. The oversupply of coal, intensifying inter-district
competition over markets, and downward pressure on selling prices would
typically evoke the most coherent coordinated response from mineowners in a
particular locality or district; at least insofar as they were brought
together in their efforts to suppress resistance to wage reductions.
Profitability was highly dependent upon the relationship between wages and
selling prices because coalmining remained a labour-intensive process, and
wages formed up to 75 per cent of the industry's working costs.
During the 'coal famine' of the 1860s there was a temporary upsurge in
union membership across the coalfields. District and county trade unions
emerged as more permanent associations in some instances, and the Miners'
National Association was formed in 1863 (renamed the Miners' National Union
in 1875). This was a loose federation which possibly maintained its
continuity (into the 1890s) because it pursued fairly limited objectives,
mainly campaigning for legislative reform particularly in the areas of
health and safety. Negotiations over wages increasingly took place at a
district level and from the beginning of the 1870s, formal boards of
conciliation and arbitration were established in a number of coalfields,
Porter (1970) argues that these developments occurred because the district
and county unions concerned possessed insufficient strength to pursue a
more militant policy but enough to persuade the employers that conciliation
was needed, In practice, selling prices continued to be taken as the
principal factor determining wage movements, and the balance of forces was
such that arbitration awards consistently imposed wage reductions, even
before the fall in coal prices in the 'great depression' which set in from
1873.
From the mid-1870s, there was an institutional move towards selling-price
sliding scale wage agreements. Formally tying wages to movements in selling
prices, sliding scales ostensibly made adjustments automatic. A base year
for selling prices and wage rates (or standard) was chosen, and thereafter
changes in wage rates were calculated by reference to 'a given percentage
change for each change in selling price' (Porter, 1970: 466). But the
sliding scale system of wage regulation was never truly automatic.
Conflicts centred on the choice of base year and the rate at which wages
should vary with prices, and in practice a particular scale rarely lasted
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for more than two years (Church et al, 1986:700). The concept of the
standard rate must also be explained.
Under the sliding scale system, and also under the conciliation board
agreements introduced in the various districts from the late 1880s,
percentage wage increases and decreases were made to standard rates. But
this does not mean that there was a standard wage for different grades
which applied throughout a district, and to which percentage additions or
reductions were made. In most districts, the standard simply meant the
piecework price lists and the actual rates paid to day-wage workers at each
pit in the district at a given date, and was a 'most indefinite conception'
(Rowe, 1923:42). As has been seen, piecework price lists and daywage rates
were determined locally, at the level of the individual pit (or working
face within the mine), through a process of bargaining involving the
management and men. Either side might attempt to revise price lists as
geological and other conditions changed, and new lists were established for
new seams. Standard or basis wages were therefore not constant over time,
since the alteration of price lists could alter the collier's earnings, as
Indeed could changes in geological conditions or in the state of the trade
(with, for example, short-time working) independently from any change in
piecework price lists. In other words, 'not only are the district
percentage additions variables, but the basis rates to which they are
applied may be variables also' (Ibid:50).
The situation in the counties of Northumberland and Durham was slightly
different. In each county, Joint Committees comprising equal numbers of
representatives from the employer and union side had been established in
the early 1870s, and these Committees were authorized to settle all
questions affecting individual collieries (but not county-wide disputes).
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The 'County Average System' had been instituted under the Joint Committees;
intially in Durham in 1872, and revised in both counties in 1879. Definite
base rates for various types of work were established. General advances or
reductions were made in the usual way on this sum. But price lists for
hewing at the face, for example, in principle could not be altered unless
it could be shown by the employer or the men that the average earnings per
shift yielded by a particular list were either 5 per cent above or 5 per
cent below the County Average. In theory, this established a minimum base
rate, affording the northern hewers some protection from the adverse
effects of working in a difficult 'place', and from management attempts to
reduce earnings by a direct attack on piece rates. In practice, however,
individual employers would resort 'to every device by which in the past
they had evaded the general agreements', so that at times of intense price
competition in coal markets they would urge workers at their pits that 'a
local reduction could alone avert inevitable unemployment' (Velbourne,
1923:234).
Joint committees along the northern model were relatively rare in the
coal industry before the 1890s. Velbourne suggested that it was because the
county unions in the North East were 'unrivalled' in their 'organization,
stability and firm purpose' (1923:226) that they were able to secure
employer recognition and a formal role in the regulation of industrial
relations, and thereby advance the interests of their members. Burgess
(1975:188), in contrast argues that joint committees were confined to
districts where 'a class of miners' officials had emerged with sufficient
power and prestige to control the malcontents' within the rank and file.
From this perspective, the benefits of joint regulation accrued more or
less exclusively to the mineowners who had 'little to lose and much to gain
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from recognizing the miners' representatives and agreeing to bargain with
them'.	 :•^-`
Certainly in Durham the mineowners acknowledged the benefits of operating
through the union and, as Daunton suggests, there was an ambiguous relation
between the union and the men because the union was involved in maintaining
Joint agreements.
Part of the role of the Durham Miners' Association, in return
for recognition by the Durham Coal Owners' Association in the
formalization of industrial relations which emerged in the
early 1870s, was to discipline members into acceptance of
Joint agreements on wages and working practices. The
potentiality for disputes over the application of piece rates
or cavilling practices was great, and the northern owners
welcomed formal procedures in which the union was the sole
channel for grievances and the guarantor of acceptance
decisions. As the Durham Coal Owners' Association remarked in
1873, it "has, in many cases, been indebted to the attention
and energy of the Miners' Executive for the repression of
unlawful and vindictive action taken advisedly by local
members TM . The union might thus have an ambiguous relation
with its members, precisely over the operation of working
practices. (1981:596-7)
There were tensions between the union and rank and file in the North East,
and this is actually brought out in Velbourne's account (although he refers
to the 'indiscipline in the union' in the 1880s). But there were tensions
within the rank and file - if the term is applied to workers rather than
simply to union members - as, for example, between different grades. The
hewers dominated the lodges, and in turn the county unions, in the northern
coalfields in the 1870s and 1880s, and much of the 'unofficial' strike
action in the 1880s reflected the grievances of the putter and putter-hewer
grades. In any event, accounts which attempt to identify a uniform cleavage
-116-
across the industry - as, for example, between moderate union officials
holding back a militant rank and file (Burgess, 1975; Fisher and Spaven,
1978) - perhaps misrepresent the complex divisions within the mining
proletariat, arising from the variegated conditions of work, and the
influence of these divisions on the character of mining trade unionism.
Differences in working conditions and payment systems meant that the
interests of mineworkers did not automatically coincide. By virtue of
regional variations in work organization, miners attached different
priorities to different issues and this, as will be seen, presented
barriers to unity.
Selling price sliding scales were introduced in the 1870s, at a time when
coal prices were falling. Mineowners recouped price reductions by insisting
upon wage reductions, but since wages were settled on a district basis,
this fuelled cut-throat price (and hence wage) competition between
districts. Inter-district wage-cutting brought little relief to the coal
trade, which remained extremely turbulent for much of the 1880s, and much
misery to mining communities. Trade union membership declined from an
estimated peak of 50 per cent of the workforce in the mid-to-late 1860s, to
around 16 per cent in the 1870s and early 1880s - although with marked
regional variations (Church et al, 1986:689).
In the central coalfields of the Midlands and Yorkshire - which were
oriented towards inland or UK coal markets - district and county unions
attempted to renew and develop their organization in the 1880s and efforts
were made to coordinate	 activities. Initially, attempts were made to
maintain prices through an organized restriction of output and, as this
failed, the different unions extended (financial) support for strikes in
pursuit of wage claims (see Arnot, 1949). Assisted by the upturn in trade,
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the unions in the central coalfields secured a 40 per cent Increase in wage
rates over the period 1888-90, although as Williams (1972) points out, this
did not mean that earnings were necessarily increased by 40 per cent.
Buoyed by the initial success of the 'wages movement', the autonomous
unions involved agreed to form the Miners' Federation of Great Britain
()!FGB) in 1889. A loose-knit association, this included the county unions
of Yorkshire, Nottinghamshire, Derbyshire, Lancashire, Staffordshire,
Warwickshire, Leicestershire and North Vales. Conciliation boards had been
established in each of these districts in 1888, for the purposes of wage
regulation. These boards comprised equal numbers of employer and workmen's
representatives and an independent chairman, and met to determine
percentage additions or reductions to basis rates - with, in practice,
wages continuing to be dominated by movements in selling prices.
In the years between 1890 and 1893, coal prices fell dramatically. Wage
reductions were enforced in the North East, Scotland and South Vales, after
some lengthy strikes. In these districts, sliding scales remained in force.
Within the MFGB, there was a growing unity around the demand for a 'living
wage', and insistence that selling prices could no longer dictate wage
rates. Employers in the Federated area pressed for a 25 per cent reduction
in wages consequent upon the fall in selling prices. The miners resisted,
and there began the 'great lockout of 1893. After six weeks, the
disruption to industry prompted the Government to intervene and secure a
settlement. The miners would return to work at the old wage rates until the
beginning of February, 1894, when a Conciliation Board was to be
established to determine wage rates for the whole of the Federated area.
Historians are divided in their opinion as to the significance of the
struggle of 1893 and its outcome. Arnot (1949), the official historian of
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the miners' union, argued that the lockout ended in victory for the miners.
Through the unity in their new organization they had been able to realize
their goals as regards wage levels. Acknowledging that the Federated
districts succeeded in maintaining a nominal wage of 30 per cent above the
1888 level, whereas other coalfields experienced successive reductions,
Williams <1972) nevertheless argues that the lockout ended in defeat
because the MFGB failed to secure the demand for a minimum wage. Williams,
and also Porter (1973), argue that the establishment of a Conciliation
Board for the Federated Area was of no lasting benefit for the miners. The
principle that wages must follow prices was reasserted, while the insertion
of maximum and minimum levels between which nominal wages could fluctuate
ensured that the miners shared in all the misfortunes of the industry
without being able to reap the full advantage of periods of relative
prosperity. A more militant campaign would have brought higher wage
increases in the years after 1890s, but this was prohibited because the
miners' leaders had committed themselves once again to conciliation and
were thus 'obliged to defend the system' (1972:16).
But the MFGB was at an early stage in its development in the early 1890s.
While a majority of the autonomous county unions had been brought together
in the struggle to resist wage reductions, there were many divisions -
between different areas and grades. The MFGB was still not a national union
- Scotland and South Wales only affiliated after 1893 - while organization
was only built-up from the 1890s, with face and non-face workers included
In the same union in some instances for the first time. The MFGB became a
more cohesive body, capable of sustaining a national strike, as miners
found common issues around which they could unite. In the 1890s, however,
the northern county unions remained outside the Miners' Federation and
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opposed to its campaign for an eight hour working day for all underground
workers. To understand their opposition it is necessary to return to the
great diversity in the systems of work organization in the coal industry,
and to the particular arrangements in the North East.
Shift Patterns and Working Hours
Shift work in the coal industry was not an innovation of the twentieth
century, associated only with the use of mechanical coal-cutters and
conveyors at the face. But shift working in the nineteenth century was
qualitatively different from the three-shift cycle of operations associated
with the unit, or cycle, system of machine mining. Unmechanized mines might
put on two, or even three, coal-getting shifts. Mechanized mines in the
1920s and 1930s worked a three shift system, but coal was only wound to the
surface on one of these shifts.
The mineowner's motive for introducing additional coal-getting shifts was
to raise the utilization of the fixed capital sunk in the pits. Thus, in
his evidence to the Royal Commission on Coal Supplies in 1905, the
Inspector of Mines for the Yorkshire District argued that:
I think in all new and large collieries that will be the
system (ie double-shift working) 	
 because they are deep,
and the capital expended is so great, probably like half a
million to three-quarters of a million, that they must work
the machinery to the full extent in order to get the output
that would be necessary to pay a dividend on their capital.
But of course the depth and size of pits in the early twentieth century
coal industry varied enormously, while an alteration of working methods did
not follow automatically upon an increase in mine size, and across the
British coalfields there were marked variations in shift patterns.
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Evidence presented to the Departmental Committee on the eight hour
working day suggested that in the early twentieth century the two-shift
system was more or less universal in Northumberland and Durham and also
common in South Lancashire, while in West Lancashire the single-shift
system predominated. In the South Yorkshire coalfield, single shift working
was the general rule, although many of the larger pits were moving to the
double-shift system. The single shift system was universal in South Wales
and predominated in Western Scotland, although some 12 per cent of the
output of the Fifeshire coalfield came from pits working multiple shifts
(First and Final Reports of the Eight Hour Day Committee, P.P. 1907).
Pits in the northern coalfield had worked two coal-getting shifts since
the 1850s, when there had apparently been a reduction in the hewers'
working hours (Church et al, 1986:252-3). Two sets of hewers were employed
on the fore and back-shift respectively. Up until the legislation of 1872,
which restricted the hours of underground employment for boys under 16 to
54 a week, the hewer's shift in the North East averaged around 8 hours 12
minutes 'bank-to-bank', Or 7 hours and 15 minutes at the face (Daunton,
1981:587). After the legislation of 1872, which stimulated adjustments for
other grades of underground workers, hewers in the North East worked a 7
hour shift bank-to-bank, with approximately 5% hours spent on coal-getting
at the face (Velbourne, 1923:243). In practice, therefore, the hewer's
shift in the northern coalfield was under eight hours, and considerably
shorter than their counterparts in many other districts. At the opposite
extreme, colliers in South Vales worked a shift of 9 hours 45 minutes bank-
to-bank after the 1872 legislation, and eight hours at the face (Daunton,
1981: 588; Walters, 1975).
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In the northern coalfield, hewers on the fore-shift descended the shaft
at 4 a.m. and worked until they were relieved by their i narra' on the back-
shift which descended at 10 a.m. The 'narra relationship', with two hewers
partnered to work in the same place at the face but on the different
shifts, was 'of central importance, for the men usually divided their
earnings, and alternated between the fore- and back-shifts each week'
(Daunton, 1981: 587). It was an arrangement considered by many mining
engineers to be conducive to high output at the face, and by other
commentators to be important for safety in double-shifted pits.
The miner who knows that another - not his choice - will
work his stall on the succeeding shift, will not always
take pains to secure the place before leaving 	 Where
the heading and stall system is in vogue, pride of place
is lost when double shift comes in, unless the stall
holder is allowed by a set rule to choose the partner
who is to cross him on the other shift 	 Under such
conditions there will be no scamping of safety duties
and no unfair treatment of the working place. An ideal
arrangement is the pooling of earnings of both shifts,
so that there is , no wrong doing on the part of either.
(Colliery Guardian, 17.10.1924: 1003)
In the North East, the marra relationship was recognized in the cavilling
rules, so that the marra group cavilled for a new place at the sane time.
If one member of the marra partnership left, for any reason, the remaining
hewer had the right to choose his next partner (Daunton, 1981:587). Such a
relationship obviously could not develop in single-shift mines. Where it
did develop, however, it became difficult to alter, as in the case of the
North East (see below), and at the Whitehaven collieries in Cumberland
where one of the issues in the strike of 1923 was the management's decision
to move to a three-shift system and insistence that all three groups of
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hewers working in a place should 'throw in' (or share) their earnings
(Colliery Guardian, 8.6.1923:1435).
Hewers on the back-shift in the North East were wound to the surface from
4 p.m. They were followed on the night shift by the shifters and stonemen;
these grades forming some 14 per cent of the underground workforce and
working an eight hour shift. Putters and haulage workers, however, who
formed some 41 per cent of the workforce, worked a shift of around ten
hours, descending the shaft two hours after the hewers on the fore-shift,
and ascending immediately before the back-shift of hewers was wound-up.
Haulage workers, in other words, worked one long shift to the hewers' two.
In South Wales, in contrast, haulage workers worked the same long shift as
the piecework colliers (Daunton, 1981).
Hewers and maintenance workers in the northern coalfield, who formed a
majority within the underground workforce, had little to gain from the
campaign for an eight hour day pursued by the MFGB from its formation in
1889. The hewers possibly had much to lose. For while haulage workers stood
to benefit from a reduction in working hours, 'If they were given an eight
hour day, said both owners and men, the continuance of the two-shift system
would be impossible' (Welbourne, 1923: 244). Various ways to accommodate a
reduction in the haulage workers' shift were considered in the North East
over the late nineteenth century (Ibid; Daunton, 1981: 592-3). Pits might
work one shift of eight hours; an option that the owners were bound to
reject since this would reduce output and the use of the fixed capital
invested, and one which did not favour the hewers since it would increase
their working day. Pits might work two equal shifts of eight hours; but
again the hewers' shift would be lengthened. Or pits might work three
shifts of hewers descending in turn and 'waited on' by two shifts of boys.
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The last option was the one actually adopted when the eight hours Act
was passed and cane into force in 1910. It was also the option favoured by
the employers. Although the northern mineowners had been opposed to the
eight hours legislation, changes were impelled by its introduction and the
particular change secured promised to raise output and the utilization of
fixed capital investments.
	 But while the length of the hewers' shift
remained unchanged, the introduction of an additional (evening) shift
threatened disruption to the men's working, social and domestic life. As
Daunton has pointed out, the cavilling system was threatened as indeed was
the marra relationship - institutions which buttressed the hewers' autonomy
in production.
None of the options mooted prior to the introduction of the eight hours
Act had been satisfactory for the hewers; all implied some worsening of
terms and conditions. The northern county unions had therefore stuck out in
opposition to the MFGB's campaign for legislative change, and 	 the
Executive of the Miners' Federation declared in 1902 that 'we have learned
by experience during these fifteen years that the eight hours will never be
placed on the Statute Book of Great Britain while we have Durham and
Northumberland opposing us' (cited in Arnot, 1949:331). Hewers in the North
East were obviously open to the charge of putting their interests before
those of the haulage workers who worked excessive hours. But haulage
workers in the northern coalfield were likely to graduate at some point to
coal-getting at the face, and the dilemma was between a reduction in hours
for putters and boys and a deterioration in the terms and conditions
attached to the occupation to which they would progress.
Elsewhere in the industry, mineworkers stood to gain from a reduction in
the length of the working day, and most especially in Yorkshire, Lancashire
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and Cheshire, and in South Vales, where the hours of Colliers and other
underground grades in the very early twentieth century were considerably
longer than those of their counterparts in other areas (Church et al,
1986:257). The MFGB's campaign for an eight hour day here served as a
unifying force, a focus around which labour could organize in spite of the
diversity of working methods and underground work organization. The Eight
Hours Bill was eventually passed in 1908, and the Act came into force in
1910. The principal barrier to the inclusion of the northern miners was
dissolved, and the county unions of Northumberland and Durham joined the
MFGB in 1907-8, giving it a membership of over 600,000 in 1910 (Church et
al, 1986: 690). A more cohesive body, the Federation went on to campaign
for a national minimum wage and a national wage structure in place of
district level agreements and conciliation boards (which had displaced
sliding scales in most districts by the end of the nineteenth century). At
each turn, however, the miners encountered intense employer opposition.
Employer Organization and Responses to the Eight Hours Act
Many of the factors dividing mineworkers also applied to the mineowners.
Divergent geological and market conditions, and different methods of
working, differentiated the interests of mineowners and this had the most
significant implications for the development of a common employer policy.
Efforts on the part of mineowners to combine, on a formal or informal
basis, had a very long history, dating back for hundreds of years before
the nineteenth century (Lee, 1924; Church et al., 1986). Early efforts at
organization were in general purely local (although 'local' had a special
meaning in the case of the North East, which largely dominated the
principal, London market up until the mid-to-late eighteenth century), were
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directed towards specific aims and objectives, such as the regulation of
output and prices, and were often of short duration. Thus, the 'limitation
of the vend' in the North East was practised intermittently, under various
administrative or regulatory bodies, and eventually collapsed from the mid-
nineteenth century as the industry's expansion and intensifying inter-
district competition rendered local attempts to control selling prices
futile. Thereafter, district mineowners' associations were formed where
divisions could be overcome to advance common interests, and principally
the shared interest in the minimization of wage costs. The emergence of
more permanent and formally constituted district mineowners' associations
generally paralleled the growth of district and county trade unions.
The owners' national association - the Mining Association of Great
Britain (MAGB) - was originally formed in 1854, as a loose federation of
district	 associations
	 and	 individual	 mineowners.
	 The	 national
organization's activities were defined and circumscribed by its
constituents, the district associations, which were 'fiercely jealous of
their independence, in large part because their circumstances and therefore
interests were often distinctive - and could clash with each other and with
any attempt to impose a uniform national policy with respect to the
economics of the industry' (Supple, 1984:214). Thus, the MAGB was
originally formed when the state's interventions threatened local autonomy
in the utilization of labour. In 1842, legislation had been passed placing
restrictions on the employment below ground of women and very young
children, and from the 1850s governments introduced Bills proposing certain
uniform safety regulations. The MAGB's function - executed with the
assistance of the mineowners' representation in Parliament - was to resist
such intervention and to minimize the restrictions on labour utilization on
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behalf of its constituents. The principal purpose of the national
organization was therefore to oversee the passage and application oi
legislation impinging on the mineowners' affairs - safety regulations, but
also matters such as taxation, Railway Acts, workmen's compensation. And
since it was formed in defence of local autonomy, the MAGB was precluded
from intervening in the business affairs of its constituents; matters of
wage regulation, working hours and conditions remaining the preserve of the
district associations. This was the situation until the early twentieth
century when the defence of local autonomy increasingly required the
districts to operate through the national organization.
From the early twentieth century, the miners achieved a growing unity
around the demands for a reduction in working hours, a national minimum
wage, and a national wage structure. But the owners could unite only in
opposition to the miners' demands and to changes which in principle were in
their collective interest. A reduction in the length of the working day,
for example, was potentially a force for the progressive development of
(capitalist) production. Its potential was to seal-off the option of
relying upon crude methods of labour exploitation, thereby providing a
stimulus to the consoldidation of the industry's fragmented structure by
forcing employers to concentrate their attention on productivity-enhancing
changes in production. In practice, however, the effects of the legislation
were likely to be borne inequitably across the coalfields, because of
variations in geological conditions and because of the existing variegated
patterns of work organization. This is brought out in Daunton's (1981)
study, which contrasts	 the circumstances of employers in the great
northern and South Vales coalfields, and given some expression in the
mineowners' public protestations
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In various districts of the Kingdom working arrangements
have been entered into between the employers and the men,
some extending over a period of years, and the passing of
such a measure (ie the eight hours Bill) would so alter
the conditions under which those agreements were entered
into, as to necessitate rearrangements which would
inevitably cause serious friction and a dislocation of
trade. (MAGB, Executive Council Minutes, 15.3.1907)
There might be short-term disruption for all mineowners but, as will be
seen, different districts were also likely to be affected unevenly by the
legislation.	 The only basis for a common employer policy was one of
minimum concessions to the miners in order to retain maximum autonomy for
individual districts and colliery firms (see also Fine et al, 1982).
Through the Mining Association, the mineowners mounted a most strenuous
opposition to the eight hours Bill.
On the eve of the First World War, the coalfields of South Wales and the
North East together accounted for 40 per cent of aggregate British coal
output. It has generally been accepted that mineowners in these coalfields
faced similar competitive conditions; both coalfields were oriented towards
the export trade, producing 40 and 31 per cent of the coal exported from
Britain respectively. But geological conditions and structures of work
organization varied markedly in these two major exporting districts and, as
Daunton has argued, the social relationships created by these particular
methods of production 'became an independent factor in their own right'
(1981:596). Work relations impinged upon entrepreneurial decision-making
and shaped definitions as to what constituted best practice technology.
While hewers in the North East were opposed to the MFGB's eight hours
campaign, colliers and haulage workers in South Wales had a common interest
in a reduction in the length of the working day. They worked the same
length of shift which was over three hours longer, bank-to-bank, than the
northern hewer's shift at the beginning of the twentieth century, and a
reduction in hours could be effected without altering existing working
methods. But because the hours of coal-drawing were reduced with the
passage of the eight hours legislation, mineowners in South Vales pressed
for compensating changes. Initially they sought the introduction of double-
shift working in place of the existing single shift system. Failing this,
however, the owners in South Vales increasingly concentrated their efforts
on securing reductions in the basis wage.
South Vales colliers were opposed to the introduction of double-shift
working in the early twentieth century.
	 The move from a single to a
double-shift system presented a threat to the collier's safety, his control
over his place at the coalface and his piecework earnings. The colliers'
objections related in part to the nature of the South Wales coal seams
which were friable and liable to "squeeze", and many miners considered that
double-shift working would intensify dangers to life and limb (Colliery
Guardian, 21.3.1919:670). Colliers in South Vales had never 'shared' their
earnings; the arrangement of work meant that the 'marra relationship' of
the North East had never developed. Mineowners were now attempting to
introduce a system under which the collier's working place would be
occupied by another workman on another shift; an alien practice which
colliers viewed as ill-conducive to safety or practical working.
Northern hewers were far from keen on the shift from two coal-getting
shifts to three, and had in fact stopped work immediately upon the new
agreement coming into effect (Daunton:594). But the transition was secured
in many instances, and the northern coalmasters could report to the Sankey
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Commission of 1919 that the three-shift system was the 'acme of
efficiency', and that it was to be recommended in preference to any
extension of the hewers' working day (Sankey, Vo1.1: 295, QQ 7549-7584). As
Daunton suggests, it was probably easier for the northern mineowners to
secure such a change than it was for their counterparts in South Wales to
secure the introduction of double-shift working in an area where the
single-shift system had formerly been 'universal'.
Shift-work in South Vales in 1910 had all the terrors of
the unknown; in the north-east, it was an accepted part
of life and the marra relationship formed a close tie.
(Daunton, 1981:595)
Mineowners in South Wales did not force the issue of double-shift working
in 1910, and possibly because they were anxious to take advantage of the
temporary disruption to work elsewhere. They did attempt, however, to
reduce basis rates. They were unsympathetic to the miners' demands for a
revision of piece and day-rates following the reduction in the length of
the working day, and this bore most heavily on the day-wage workers who
were unable to make-up their earnings by increasing the intensity of their
work effort. Conflict 'between employers and workers was also heightened by
the owners' efforts to whittle away at allowances for work in 'abnormal'
places. If this initially appeared as an attractive option for employers, a
means whereby they could avert direct confrontation with the union and
reduce the basis wage by dealing with the men 'only as individuals'
(Jevons, 1915: 527), it must soon have seemed otherwise. The dispute over
payment for work in 'abnormal' places at the Cambrian Combine in 1910
spread across the South Wales coalfield, and was taken up by the MFGB in
the demand for a minimum wage which was pursued in the industry-wide
stoppage of 1912.
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The issue of double-shift working again became the focus of conflict in
South Vales in 1919. The Sankey Commission of that year conceded a one
hour reduction in the length of the working day, applicable across the
industry, and mineowners in South Vales pressed for a compensating change
in working methods. The matter was referred to a sub-committee of the South
Vales Conciliation Board and an agreement was reached whereby the double-
shift system could be introduced, but only by mutual agreement of the
management and men at the different collieries (Colliery Guardian,
20.6.1919:1491; 3.7.1919:30).
One of the South Vales miners' objections to the system had been that
men employed on the afternoon or second shift would lose a sixth of their
earnings, since the afternoon shift worked five days a week in contrast to
the morning shift's six. The union pressed for the payment of a 'bonus
turn' for double-shift pits, with an allowance on the piece-rate for men on
the second shift to compensate for their shorter working week. The owners
objected that no such additional payment had ever been made in the North
East, but acknowledged ,
 that in Yorkshire, Lancashire and other areas the
miners were demanding similar concessions in return for their agreement to
work multiple shifts (Colliery Guardian, 24.10.1919:1101). But while the
principle of a 'bonus turn' payment was conceded by the South Wales
Conciliation Board, disputes arose at a number of pits where the employers
were refusing to make such an award, and there was a series of local
disputes over the double-shift system through 1920 and 1921.
	 By the time
of the 1926 General Strike, however, the South Vales mineowners had
determined to act in concert on the matter. On the eve of the miners'
lockout, they gave notice that they would be terminating 'bonus turn'
payments and in future asserting their right to introduce double-shift
-131-
working at the face as and when they saw fit. A clause to this effect was
inserted in the district 'agreement' on which the Welsh miners returned to
work at the end of 1926 (Colliery Guardian, 3.7.1925:30; 3.12.1926:1229).
CONCLUSION
Considering the close proximity of the coalfields of Great
Britain, it is remarkable that so much variation should
. exist in the arrangements of labour and systems of working.
(Bulman and Rednayne, 1951 revised ed.:306)
Economic and social historians of late nineteenth and early twentieth
century British coalmining have emphasized the difficulties in regarding it
as an homogeneous industry. Geological conditions varied markedly between
and also within the different coalfields. Colliery companies raised
different types of coal for different economic uses and markets. Structures
of work organization were remarkably diverse even though the British
coalfields were at a similar stage of development in the period before
1913, at least in terns of the technology of coal extraction. These
variations in the arrangements of labour and systems of working partly
reflected the influence of divergent geological conditions. But as this
chapter has attempted to illustrate, they also reflected the outcome of
struggles between mineowners and mineworkers.
Analysing the British coal industry's mounting economic difficulties in
the years after the First World War, Court noted that divergent geological
and market conditions served to divide the interests of mineowners. He went
on to argue that the 'one great unifying factor in the coalfields....was
the labour question' (1945:6). Like many other commentators, Court
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considered that the unity and militancy of the miners - the labour
challenge serving to unite mineowners whose interests in many other
respects were dissimilar and sometimes opposed - required little
explanation. It sprang from the peculiarities and dangers of pit work and
from the isolation of mining communities, poorly integrated into the rest
of society. From this perspective, therefore, mining trade unionism from
the late nineteenth century onwards developed from and reflected the
interests of a workforce already united by a common experience of work,
social and cultural life.
In practice, however, and as this chapter has attempted to emphasize,
miners did not share a common experience of work. Variegated patterns of
work organization, different payment systems and systems of wage regulation
generated a diversity of interests. These divisions were complex, running
between different coalfields and grades as, for example, between
pieceworkers and daywage men under the sliding scale system of wage
regulation. Contributing to this differentiation was the butty or
subcontract system which is discussed in the following chapter, and which
could take a variety of forms and give rise to different sets of
relationships between members of contract teams working within the same
mine. Thus, the unity of the miners did not arise automatically from a
common experience of work and, indeed, was initially difficult to
establish.
In 1889, a majority of the autonomous district and county miners' trade
unions that had emerged as more permanent associations cane together to
form the Miners' Federation of Great Britain. A loose-knit association, the
MFGB initially had difficulty in pursuing a unified struggle, as for
example around the demand for an eight hour working day. County unions in
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the North East opposed the MFGB's policy and their opposition ., as has been
seen, related to the distinctive features of work organization in the
northern coalfields. Following the passage of the eight hours Bill, the
county unions of Northumberland and Durham Joined the MFGB. At local
levels, organization was built-up and extended as surface and non-face
workers were included within the affiliated unions. And it was in spite of
their heterogeneous work experiences and the immediacy of local grievances
and disputes that the miners were able to achieve a growing unity around
the demands for better health and safety provision, a national minimum wage
and a national wage structure.
Mineowners were forced to respond. But while the 'labour quesion' acted
as a unifying force, by virtue of their divergent circumstances and
interests the mineowners were able only to
	 ally	 around a policy
consolidating the lack of stimulus to change and restructuring in the
industry. The constitution and policies of the Mining Association - the
owners' national federation - were defined by the district employer
associations and in turn by their constituents. Policies had to accommodate
the circumstances of the different districts, where geological and market
conditions, systems of work organization and wage regulation varied. As the
example of the eight hours legislation illustrates, the effects of uniform
restrictions on labour utilization were likely to be borne unevenly across
the districts. Mineowners could not agree to make broad concessions to the
miners, and could forge their solidarity at a national level only around a
policy that would preserve maximum discretion in the areas of employment
and wage regulation for individual districts and firms. As the miners tried
to engage the MAGB in wage negotiations, the owners' representatives
retorted that the Association was not empowered to deal with such matters.
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National wage settlements would impinge unevenly across the coalfields,
while mineowners were determined to maintain the flexibility to sustain
profitability by lowering wage rates as market and geological conditions
changed.
The developing conflict in the industry was manifested by the national
strike of 1912. That the miners' were able to sustain a national strike is
evidence of the growing cohesion of the MFGB, and the dispute was settled
only after a Minimum Wage Act had been rushed through Parliament, The
miners' won the principle of a minimum wage, but since Joint Boards were
established under the Act to fix the actual rates on a district by district
basis, they had as yet to achieve a national minimum wage and national wage
structure. Continuing their campaign, the implications of the miners'
struggles over economic matters - improvements in wages and working hours -
began to extend into more advanced political issues.
During the period of the First World War, certain government controls
were imposed on the coal industry. Profit pool arrangements were introduced
which allowed cross-subsidy payments to take place between different
districts. Wage increases could thus be conceded on a national basis
without forcing particular sections of the industry to the point of
bankruptcy (for details, see Kirby, 1977). The miners pressed for the
extension of these controls, and in 1919 presented the explicit demand for
the nationalization of the industry. To these developments, the mineowners
responded by strengthening their own federal organization (Supple, 1984),
New powers were conceded to the (AGB but for the purposes of waging the
campaign against nationalization, securing the abolition of wartime
controls and limiting government 'interference', and reasserting the
discretion of districts to meet changing market conditions by exerting a
downward pressure on wage rates.
Reviewing the development of collective bargaining in Britain, Clegg
argued that the mineowners were flying against a broader trend in their
'passionate opposition to their national wage agreement which had been
imposed on them by the coal controller during the war' (1979:67). For
present purposes it is necessary simply to consider the implications for
the industry's development. Wage flexibility	 may have been the
precondition for the survival of particular sections of the industry where
the influences of geology, land ownership, and/or	 work organization
combined to inhibit amalgamations and mechanization. By the same token,
however, it dampened the forces for change and thus served to consolidate
the backward conditions within the industry.
CHAPTER FOUR: CONTRACT YORK AID THE BUTTY SYSTEN
INTRODUCTION
Capitalism in its early stages expands, and to some extent
operates, not so much by directly subordinating large
bodies of workers to employers, but by subcontracting
exploitation and management. The characteristic structure
of an archaic industry such as that of Britain in the early
nineteenth century is one in which all grades except the
lowest labourers contain men or women who have some sort of
'profit incentive' 	 I propose to call this phenomenon
'co-exploitation', insofar as it made many members of the
labour aristocracy into co-employers of their mates, and
their unskilled workers. (Hobsbawm, 1968:297-8)
Chapter three examined work organization in the British coalfields in the
period to 1913. Hand coal-getting remained the dominant method of coal
extraction in this period, with only some 8 per cent of British coal output
undercut mechanically on the eve of the First World War. Colliers retained
immediate control over the labour process. They performed, or at least
supervised the performance of, the complete operation of coal-getting which
entailed the separate processes of undercutting, ripping and filling the
coal into the tubs brought to the face by haulage hands. Paid on a piece-
rate system, they were subject to limited managerial supervision. They were
exacted to work by the form of their wage, with their earnings dependent
upon the amount of coal cut and filled multiplied by the job or piece-rate.
But they might contract to cut and deliver coal at a piece-rate for which
they undertook to engage and/or pay other workers from the total contract
earnings. The remuneration of the contracting colliers would be a
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piecewage, the amount of which varied inversely with the amount of fixed
wages paid to their assistants and directly with the speed of working.
Contracting colliers would therefore be under an incentive to ensure that
their assistants were kept fully-employed during the working day or shift.
The piece-rate system, which was widespread in British industry in the
mid-to-late nineteenth century, fostered the development of hierarchical
structures of oppression and inequality. Writers in the nineteenth century
developed elaborate typologies of such arrangements with, for example,
Schloss (1892) distinguishing between sub-contracting, labour sub-letting,
piece-master and piece-rate foremanship systems, and contract work or
inside contracting. Twentieth century comnentators, in contrast, have
tended to group these arrangements together as the techniques of 'pre-
scientific' management, although sometimes giving emphasis to one of two
different forms. Braverman (1974) highlighted the subletting of labour -
or what Marx referred to as the interposition of 'plundering parasites'
between the capitalist and the wage labourer (1976591) - and interpreted
this as the means by which early capitalists temporarily evaded the
responsibilities of management by buying labour in fixed quantities, rather
than attempting to control labour power. Hobsbawm (1968) and Melling (1980)
look at the piecenaster and internal subcontract systems, where employers
minimized the expense and avoided the difficulties of direct supervision by
off-loading the function of labour control onto workers under some sort of
incentive to maximize the effort of other workers. Hobsbawm terms such
arrangements 'co-exploitation'. But the term conveys a number of meanings,
and it is important to emphasize that systems of inside contracting
operated by placing the wage-labourer in command of the distribution of the
contract earnings of a larger work group.
These different arrangements have been interpreted in some accounts as
transitional forms of work organization, specific to the earliest stages of
industrial capitalism and predating the (inevitable) imposition of more
direct forms of managerial control characterized by the elaboration of
formal supervisory hierarchies (eg Braverman, 1974). But the history of
Britain's heavy staple industries defies any linear model of capitalist
development, and here subcontract systems were remarkably persistent (see,
for example, Lazonick, 1979, on the cotton industry). In the case of the
British coalmining industry, a variety of subcontracting and contracting
arrangements were practised in-the nineteenth century and survived - in
various guises - well into the twentieth century, alongside hand-hewing at
the face. These arrangements are often grouped together under the common
term of the 'butty system'. But they varied in form and could vary in
practice and hence 'miners attached different meanings to the common term
used for their description' (Goffee, 1981:479). Particular forms of
subcontracting, moreover, persisted or were adopted in some coalfields but
not in others in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.
In this chapter, three principal forms are distinguished although it must
be conceded that in detail, as in practice, there was some area of overlap
between these arrangements. The first section of the chapter looks at
contract work, or inside contracting, taken to be the 'more general form of
skilled workers hiring or paying their unskilled, or skilled workers being
paid by results while their helpers were paid on time' (Hobsbawm,
1968:300). In the coal industry, this arrangement was part and parcel of
the apprenticeship system and survived, with hand coal-getting, in many
districts into the interwar years of the present century. Learners worked
under the instruction of a qualified coal-getter and were paid a steadily
increasing day-wage either directly by the company, or indirectly from the
contract earnings collected by the collier. In some instances, however, the
collier worked with an adult male assistant, paying the latter some lesser
rate than his own and able to command the distribution of any additional
contract earnings derived from their joint efforts. Access to piecework
employment at the face was generally governed by age and also, in some
districts, by family or kinship connections. Hence a discussion of the
collier-assistant relationship necessitates a closer examination of the
role of the working class mining family in recruitment to the industry and
occupational status below ground, in the mines.
In some districts in the early nineteenth century, women and girls formed
part of the family-based work group in the mines; recruited by an adult
male relation who was a coal-getter and responsible for enlisting his own
auxiliary haulage workers. In this period, the collier might be recruited
at a piece-rate by the mineowner, or by a subcontractor known variously as
a chalter, charter master or butty. Discussed in the second section of the
chapter, this was the big butty system whereby the subcontractor undertook
to work a whole pit or group of pits in the same vicinity. The mineowner
or, in this period possibly the landowner, would engage an agent to deal
with sales and accounts, leaving the functions of labour management,
organization and oversight of production to the butty or charter-master.
The latter would undertake to extract and deliver coal at a piece-rate, or
- in some instances - to raise coal and sell it, paying a royalty or rent
to the landowner or landowner's agent. The butty's profit would largely be
derived from the difference between the price of labour paid by the
mineowner and that actually paid out to the workers he engaged, either at a
piece-rate for coal-getting or daywage for underground transport workers.
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But the butty or charter-master, who in all likelihood would have been an
ex-miner, was in effect a small-tine capitalist who supplied the working
capital - horses, tubs and tools - of the mine and the technical expertise
of mine working.
This system was largely confined to the first half of the nineteenth
century, when small-scale mining enterprise predominated. Mineowners were
able to minimize their capital expenditure, while butties were under an
incentive to minimize their costs by driving haulage workers - mainly
juveniles and young children - to overwork and exhaustion. Certain
legislative restrictions on the utilization of female and child labour, and
the introduction of a rudimentary code of safety regulations, contributed
to its decline from the mid-nineteenth century.	 The expansion of
production onto deeper coal measures and seams involved larger fixed
capital outlays, and mineowners were more inclined to appoint waged or
salaried officials to safeguard their investments. Charter-masters were
forced to join forces with other owners of capital or to accept some lesser
position in the mines as a , contracting foreman or simply as a piecework
coal-getter. Nevertheless, the big butty system survived in a few districts
into the 1870s, and at some pits in the Black Country it persisted in only
a very modified form into the first decade of the twentieth century.
With the increased scale of investment tied-up in deeper and larger pits,
mineowners engaged their own waged or salaried officials to coordinate and
oversee operations below ground. But it was found expedient in some
districts to retain a modified version of the butty system, in order to
maximize the intensity of work effort and output from individual stalls
within a mine. This was the little butty system, described in detail in the
third section of the chapter. Contracting colliers, stallmen, or butties,
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controlled the piecework contracts for coal-getting at the face, and were
generally selected by the mineowner or manager. In turn, they engaged or
selected the members of their contract team, and paid their assistants -
adult workers who might be qualified coal-getters in their own right - on a
daywage or piecework basis. In practice the system could vary enormously,
with some contract teams sharing their earnings and workload equally. But
it offered employers the means to differentially reward and penalize
operatives, and enabled them to circumvent the difficulties and expense of
direct supervision. For where some relatively privileged group of workers
retained control over the distribution of the contract earnings, they were
under an incentive to maximize the intensity of work effort of their
assistants and could use their position to differentially reward and
penalize the members of their contract team. And since the system could
divide workers, it could also inhibit a coherent challenge to its
perpetuation.
Generally associated with the coalfields of the Midlands, the little
butty system was also employed at pits in South Wales and in Lancashire in
the period before the First World Var. It persisted in some districts,
notably Nottinghamshire, into the interwar years of this century and was
adopted in the newly-developing Kent coalfield in the 1920s. So long as the
system brought short-term results for mineowners, it could discourage
investment in mechanization and technical change. In analysing its
persistence in certain localities,therefore, it is necessary to consider
the system's implications for workplace relations and labour solidarity and
also the nature of inter-capitalist competition in the interwar British
coal industry.
CONTRACT WORK Al]) FAXILY-BASED EMPLOYMENT II THE MIES
It will be recalled that in Finlay Gibson's classification of underground
labour (see chapter three), the haulage class - putters, fillers, framers
and hauliers - was sub-divided between (a) semi-skilled men who were
qualifying as coal-getters by working under their instruction at filling
the coal, and (b) semi-skilled men employed in driving the horses which
pulled the tubs from the face to the primary haulage system in the main
underground roads. Rowe (1923:. 61-70) gives particular examples of the
first sub-category. Thus in Lancashire, each collier 'works by himself, and
pays a day wage to a lad, or young man called a "filler", who assists him
generally'. In South Wales, the collier 'is assisted generally by a helper
or "butty", as in Lancashire.. .They are paid day wages by the collier'. And
in Lanarkshire, as a rule, 'each hewer works for himself, and is assisted
by a "drawer", who thus corresponds to the filler in Lancashire, or the
butty in South Wales'.
Through such arrangements the collier's skills were transmitted to
subsequent generations of coal-getters. In all coalfields, some form of
apprenticeship system operated with access to piece-work employment at the
face governed by 'age-linked milestones' although, as suggested in chapter
three, the nature and length of underground experience required before
graduation to the face varied. Promotion to the face for the "filler" or
"drawer" probably would not be automatic upon reaching a certain age, but
rather dependent upon an 'opening' arising for a skilled worker at the
particular pit. Thus, as Velbourne has reported in the case of the forth
East, a tension might be generated between coal-getters and putters where
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the latter's promotion to the face was blocked for some reason and the
younger men denied the terms and conditions of the piece-work coal-getters
(1923: 232-252). And in some circumstances, coal-getters worked with day
wage assistants who were adult males and unlikely to secure control over
the piece-work contracts. Such arrangements are considered later in this
chapter.
Access to piece-work employment at the face was governed by age and
possibly also by family background. Hence in Lanarkshire, the hewers'
drawers were 'sometimes boys, often boys working with their fathers' (Rowe,
1923: 67). In South Wales, the various grades of underground labour were
'as much an hereditary occupation as mining in general'. Thus:
....a timberer's son will often start as a collier's
helper, and then when he is about nineteen or twenty
years old, if he wishes to follow in his father's
footsteps, he will leave the face, and become a
timberer's assistant. (Rowe, 1923: 67).
Throughout the nineteenth century, coal mining in Britain was popularly
regarded as an 'hereditary closed shop' (Hair, 1955: 268), with entrance to
the industry restricted to Juveniles from mining families. Such a view
undoubtedly exaggerates the reality, since where labour was in demand mine
owners could and did recruit 'external' adult male workers who might, at
some stage, proceed to employment at the face. The period between 1830 and
1860, for example, was one of substantial 'external' recruitment, when the
industry's expansion was made possible by the movement of adult workers
engaged in other occupations into mining (Church et al, 1986: 224-234). But
in the rural coalfields of the mid-nineteenth century, recruitment and
training was organized on a family basis and even in the non-rural coal
mining districts, where the 'hereditary closed shop' principle was weaker,
the role of the family in the recruitment and division of labour below
ground cannot be underestimated.
Hall stresses the hereditary nature of coal mining employment and
occupation within the industry in her thesis which examines the period
between 1890 and 1914. She argues that in all districts it was 'still
common for the bay to receive a training in the skills of hewing from his
father or another family member, and to enter hewing as the "marrow' (mate)
of that family member' (1978: 22-23). In evidence to the Eight Hour Day
Committee, Parker Rhodes remarked upon the almost complete absence of
external recruitment to the industry in the first decade of the twentieth
century, although other witnesses noted that there were regional variations
in the extent of external recruitment and engagement of adult males from
other occupations ( cited in Church et al, 1986: 229).
But while adult male workers from other occupations were recruited to
coal mining, the available evidence suggests that except at times of very
high demand for labour, the ability of 'non-mining' Juveniles - other than
pauper apprentices in the early nineteenth century - to enter the industry
was slight. Since boys might be supervised by male family members other
than their fathers, and Juveniles from 'non-mining' families might enter
the industry if they had more distant kin in coal mining employment,
however, the possible network of recruitment was quite wide. The Children's
Employment Commission reported in 1842 that, 'the great body of the
Children and Young Persons employed in the mines are of the families of the
adult work people engaged in the pits, or belong to the poorest population
in the neighbourhood' (Report: 255). In isolated, rural mining areas the
established mining community may have been the only source of labour for
mineowners; the absence of alternative employment in such areas in turn
assuring them of a continuing supply of labour with colliers setting their
sons (and in this early period, daughters) to work from an early age to eek
out the household subsistence. But mineowners had other reasons to prefer
internal recruitment and to actively promote an early familiarity with
underground work.
Buddle - the pre-eminent mining engineer of the mid-nineteenth century -
testified that, 'Our peculiar race of pitmen...can only be kept up by
breeding' and that it 'never could be recruited from an adult population'
(cited in Flinn and Stoker, 1984: 339). Employers valued the early
'socialization' of mining children to the discipline of underground work in
the mines, and the skills thus acquired by workers who had commenced their
underground 'career' at a pitifully early age.
It was the experience colliers gained in distinguishing
between different qualities of coal in the near complete
darkness of underground working - an ability to sense or
feel by the way the mineral responded to a blow from the
pick, the nature of the 'metal'. This ability, put to the
service of sending up to the surface only coal of the
quality and size called for, could not be taught and could
be acquired only by long experience at the coalface.
(Flinn and Stoker, 1984: 339-344)
Colliers who commenced work below ground at an early age may have acquired
experience. But their health, physique, and life expectancy were all liable
to be distorted and diminished. Mineowners may have placed a premium on
skill and experience. But equally a regular supply of new recruits was
essential, given the industry's appalling health and safety record.
The arrangement of piece-work coal-getters working with an apprenticed
day wage assistant assured mineowners of a continuing supply of skilled
labour and also of a disciplined work-group at the face. The collier's
piece-rate might include the day wages of his assistant, or the latter
might be paid directly by the colliery company. In either case, the
collier's piece-work earnings would be dependent on his own and his
assistant's effort, and the day-wage worker would be encouraged to keep up
a good pace. If the collier intensified his own work-load, encouraging his
assistant also to work more intensively, the former would normally be able
to lay claim to any additional earnings. But it would be likely for him to
attempt to retain his assistant's 'goodwill' by paying him some share as a
bonus. Some writers have suggested that where this arrangement built upon
familial relationships, the younger workers would be protected from ill-use
and the 'harshness of the underground regime' softened (eg John, 1984).
Others have been less certain. Humphries, who has looked at the employment
of children below ground in the period to the mid-nineteenth century,
concludes that 'there are as many examples of parental affection and
protection as there are of child abuse' (1981: 13). The words of caution
Lewis Jones had Len's new-found pit friend utter in Cwraardy would suggest
that fathers might be as hard a task-master as any.
You want to watch your old man on pay-day. Tell him
straight from the beginning that if he want you to work
he have got to give you trumps 	 Fathers be the worst
butties going. They do think their own sons be bloody
slaves and do never think of trumping 'em. Oh, no. They
do pocket that their bloody selves and the old 'ooman
don't have a smell of it. (1979: 119)
But experiences would differ and Len is never actually heard to complain
about his own father's behaviour towards him.
The Employment of Vomen and Children in the Nines
Prior to the legislation of 1842, boys might start work underground at the
age of five or six. In some coalfields, women and girls were also employed
below ground; recruited, as a rule, by an adult male relation who was a
coal-getter and who was required to enlist his own ancillary haulage labour
and to pay these workers from his piece-work earnings. The 1841 Census and
the Children's Employment Commission of 1842 give some indication of the
numbers of women and girls employed below ground at this time. But there is
limited information as to the incidence and distribution of female
underground employment before the 1840s. Humphries, following Nef, argues
that female underground employment was a relatively modern phenomenon,
'produced by those same forces which led to the specialisation and wage
dependence of men, for those forces could not but affect the women of the
communities that were to become pit villages' (1981: 8). John, on the other
hand, argues convincingly that women had worked in coal 'mines' for
centuries, 'wives and daughters playing a vital role in the family economy,
helping husbands and brothers to extract coal from easily accessible
holes'. For John, therefore, female underground employment was associated
with pre-capitalist, family-based work groups, and the 'perpetuation of
pre-capitalist organisation and customs' under early mining capitalism
(1984: 20).
By the early nineteenth century, women and girls formed only a small
minority of the total underground labour force, were employed only in
certain coalfields and, within these, in some districts and not in others.
Total employment in coal mining in England, Wales and Scotland at the
beginning of the 1840s has been estimated at 150,000, of which between
5,000 and 6,000 were females (Hair, 1968). Flinn and Stoker estimate that
some 2,000 of these women and girls were employed in the eastern part of
the Scottish coalfields (1984: 334). The Children's Employment Commission
reported that women and girls were engaged below ground only in the
coalfields of Yorkshire, North Lancashire, South Wales and Eastern Scotland
(PP 1845, XXVII). Flinn and Stoker estimate that they represented about 20
per cent of the workforce in the Scottish districts, about 6 per cent in
Lancashire, and possibly less than 4 per cent in South Vales and Yorkshire.
In some coalfields, women had been employed below ground before the
nineteenth century but not thereafter. In the North East, for example, they
had been employed at some pits . up until the 1780s, and in Cumberland they
had formerly been employed as 'bearers, fillers, hookers of baskets,
clearers and as horse drivers'.
The reasons for the regional variations in female underground employment
have as yet to be satisfactorily established. In the eastern part of
Scotland women were engaged as 'bearers', carrying coal in wicker baskets
on their backs up winding staircases to the pit hills. John suggests that
this was associated with the 'system of slavery' imposed by the Act of 1606
which controlled the movement of hewers and bearers from one employer to
another and remained in force up until the end of the eighteenth century .
Originally designed to cope with a shortage of labour
during the expansion of the coal and salt trade, this
attempt to prevent owners appropriating miners meant
binding families for life.	 It ensured that 'wives,
daughters and sons went on from generation to generation
under the system which was the family doom'. (John, 1984:22)
But while female underground employment was common in the Firth of Forth
area, it was much rarer in other Scottish coal mining districts (Flinn and
Stoker, 1984: 335).
Humphries argues that women were generally proletarianised later and less
consistently than men, which resulted in 'significant regional variation in
the recourse to female labour' in the 1840s. She argues that the inclusion
of women in the underground labour force depended on a variety of local and
regional circumstances, including:
	 the relative importance of landowner/proprietors,
their political power, the degree of labour scarcity,
the availability of other employment including access
to land, and the resistance of the working class to the
imposition of capitalist relations of production. (1981:8)
John, in contrast, argues that female employment underground may have
peaked before the nineteenth century and offers some - albeit limited and
fragmentary - evidence of the factors leading to the exclusion of females
before the legislation of 1842. Here she includes innovations in
underground haulage, with adolescent males taking over jobs formerly
performed by women and children; the increased employment opportunities in
other industries by the early nineteenth century; and the higher wages paid
to hewers in the Korth East which 'acted as a deterrant since miners would
have been able to afford to engage older boys in place of females' (1984:
24-5).
In those districts where females were employed below ground, they were
generally engaged on the same kind of work.
They were primarily transport workers, that is they
moved the coal from the face to the horses, if horses
were used, otherwise to the bottom of the shaft. (Humphries:8)
Their main task was to work as drawers. This involved
pullying sledges or tubs along the pit floor or on
planks from the coal face to the bottom of the shaft. (John:20)
Women competed for these jobs with children, not men. Only very rarely were
women engaged as coal-getters or hewers; this work in most instances being
reserved for adult males. Where they did become hewers, a 'shortage of male
labour, rather than promotion, appears to have been the reason' (John)
1984: 34).
Whereas the use of female labour below ground was highly localized in the
1840s, the employment of boys was general. Boys undertook a variety of jobs
- operating trapdoors in ventilating courses, baling water, and driving
horses for all purposes - although most were in some way connected with
haulage (Flinn and Stoker, 1984: 336-7). Hence, boys, girls and women
filled the same sort of positions below ground, but whereas boys might
follow a customary apprenticeship and graduate, in their late teens, to
become coal-getters, women and girls would in general remain in the same
occupation throughout their working lives in the mines. The coal mining
workforce was thus divided into 'non-competing groups distinguished by age
and sex' (Humphries, 1981: 11).
Humphries argues that this division of labour developed from and was
sustained by the system of family-based employment, which in turn was based
upon the decentralized system of labour recruitment. Women and children
were engaged by their husbands, brothers or fathers. These adult male
workers were coal-getters and regarded as the principal operatives. They
were directly employed by the mineowner, agent or manager and paid on a
piece-rate for which they undertook to enlist and pay ancillary labour for
face and haulage work. Some female workers, however, were employed directly
by the colliery company or owner's agent, even if these represented a very
small proportion of the total. And while 'most female workers were hired by
the colliers and paid by them', it was not invariably the case that the
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collier who engaged them was also a relative. Thus in Scotland, the hewer
'generally engaged two bearers and perhaps shared a third 'fremit s (non-
relative) with a fellow worker' (John, 22). Likewise in the case of boys
who might be orphaned or a younger sibling and hence a potential recruit
for a non-related coal-getter at the face, such as an unmarried hewer who
had no immediate younger, male kin.
Mineowners secured a number of benefits from this decentralized system of
labour recruitment. They did not have to find and hire the entire labour
force, and their involvement in labour management was minimized since,
'Production was maintained by fixing a piece-rate that would allow miners
to get their customary subsistence if they worked hard and drove their
assistants to similar heroic efforts' (Humphries, 1981:12). Where the
arrangement was underpinned by familial authority relationships, discipline
may have been further enhanced. Owners could also claim to have no
involvement in the employment of females and children. This was
particularly convenient at the time of the publication of the Report of the
Children's Employment Commission. While the details of conditions in the
mines and, in particular, of semi-clad women working alongside men
underground, provoked the wrath of Victorian morality, mineowners could
claim that:
Each collier employs whoever he likes... I exercise
no control over them. I merely pay the men for the
coal which they bring to the bank. (PP, %VII, 1842: 236; cited in
Humphries, p.13)
But owners and their agents evidently were interested in recruitment and
the composition of their workforce. They were anxious to get boys from
mining families started in the pits at as early an age as possible. Buddle,
for example, opined that unless boys were initiated into pit-work by the
age of thirteen or fourteen, 'they will never become colliers' (Flinn and
Stoker, 1984: 339). Some employers admitted to preferring girls as they
'found them cheaper, less ambitious and more reliable than boys' (John,
1984: 42). And in some thin seam pits, the cramped conditions and
inadequate investment in underground haulage necessitated the use of child
labour on transport work.
Women and children were employed on the lowest status, lowest paid work
below ground. Innovations in underground haulage over the early nineteenth
century - the progression from sledges drawn by workers, through wooden
'rolley ways' to iron-railed tramways drawn by horses - had tended to see
adolescent males displace female and child labour.
Apart from a few female horse-drivers in the Cumberland
pits, adults did not do this job which became the
prerogative of boys aged between fourteen and seventeen.
Such a sexual division of labour may have arisen because
the work was envisaged as part of the apprenticeship of
the future miner. Since women did not graduate to being
hewers such a job would not have been seen as a necessary
stage in a training process. (John, 1984: 23)
But the pace of change in haulage techniques was slow and uneven. Horses
were capable of drawing heavier loads than humans and therefore of moving a
greater quantity of coal to the shaft bottom during the day or shift. But
they represented an expensive investment for the proprietor and were
costly to replace in the event of an accident, whereas workers bore the
cost of injury and loss of life themselves. Innovation in the methods of
underground transport in some pits and localities could thus force a
competitive response elsewhere involving the more abject exploitation of
female and child labour.
In any event, the unevenness in production technique and in the use of
female and child labour across the coalfields, meant that there could be no
'progressive' employer response to the Mines and Collieries Bill of 1842
which proposed the prohibition of female employment and employment of boys
under 12 years of age below ground in mines. While a small minority of
mineowners did support the Bill, possibly seeking to steal a march on their
competitors who employed women underground workers, the majority were
vehemently opposed. Where women were employed, owners would be forced to
train and recruit substitute male workers with, more generally, the
elimination of child labour forcing employers to invest in new methods of
underground transport. In the North East, where many pits were relatively
advanced in terms of haulage systems and female employment had by this time
declined, the use of boys as putters at the face was still widespread. The
most strenuous opposition to the 1842 Bill came from the northern owners
who were well-represented in the House of Lords because a number of the
largest northern pits were owned and operated by landowners (Humphries,
1981: 24; see also John).
The origins of the Bill, and the alliances developed in its support,
remain a matter of intense debate (1). Passed as the Mines and Quarries Act
of 1842, it prohibited the underground employment of women and children
under ten years of age - the reduction in the age limit on boys entering
the mines having been secured by the mineowners at the Committee Stage.
Colliers who had formerly employed wives and daughters as their ancillary
helpers were forced to recruit older boys and to share their earnings with
non-related workers. Women obviously experienced a more immediate
dislocation and loss of 'independent' income, and John reports the dire
circumstances of those female workers who had been engaged by non-related
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male workers in the mines and who were in turn supporting other dependent
relatives (1984: 51).
In some coalfields, women continued to be engaged at the surface as pit-
brow workers through the nineteenth and into the twentieth century. Again
this was low status, low waged work and involved physically strenuous
tasks such as pushing tubs from the pit shaft to the sorting screens. Work
on the latter was subject to intensive managerial supervision, with pit-
brow women workers liable to be the victims of sexual harassment.
You were placed at equal distances down the belt and
daren't move, even if there was a drip straight down
on your head. If you kept moving, they'd put a box
round your legs. You daren't talk to one another, or
you'd be sent home. There was a glass ceiling over the
belts. The boss used to lie on the glass on his stomach,
looking through a hole to see what you were doing. Oh
God! He was awful 	 He'd shout through the hole, 'Off
wi'em 'om'. That's the way he spoke. Then there was no
pay, so we used to get thumped when we got home...
(Pit brow woman worker, born late 1890s,cited in Forman,1979:40)
Boys under ten years continued to be employed below ground up until the
legislation of 1872 which restricted the age of recruiment to 12. The age
limit was raised to 13 years in 1900.
THE CHARTER-MASTER OR BIG BUTT! SYSTEX
Colliers in the early nineteenth century may have been engaged directly by
the mineowner or owner's agent, or by a subcontractor variously known as a
charter-master, chalter or "[putty. Under this version of the butty system
the contractor undertook to work a whole pit or, in partnership with
another such individual, a group of pits in the same vicinity. This is in
contrast with the little butty system, which in some coalfields persisted
into the twentieth century, and under which the contractor's sphere of
control was confined to one or two stalls within the same mine with perhaps
10 to 20 workmen under his command. The charter-master or butty of the
earlier period might have up to 100 workers in his charge. But there again,
since in this period many pits were very small-scale ventures, he might
employ no more than thirty to forty mineworkers.
The reign of the charter-master or big butty has been located in the very
'adolescence of industrial society', pre-dating the development - even in
rudimentary form	 of a professional managerial class, and when
accumulation was largely dependent upon the immoderate proglongation of
working hours (Taylor, 1960). By virtue of the uneven development of the
British coalfields, however, this period has no uniformity or clearly-
defined time boundaries. In the early nineteenth century, the big butty
system was known in the Yorkshire coalfield, in the Midlands, North Wales
and in South Wales at the pits of the ironmasters (Flinn and Stoker, 1984:
55-7; Church et al, 1986: 418). In the East and West Midlands, it persisted
into the 1870s and at a few pits in the Black Country, into the first
decade of the twentieth century (Royal Commission on Mines, 1909). In the
North East, where a professional managerial cadre had come into existence
by the early nineteenth century, the charter-master system was occasionally
reintroduced to alleviate crises of management of a 'peculiar and
transitory kind' (Taylor, 1960:233).
Taylor's analysis of conditions in the Black Country gives some insight
into the forces serving to support the big butty system. The 'development'
of this coalfield in the early nineteenth century took place in fits and
starts, according to the state of the coal trade. Various factors combined
to foster the proliferation of very small-scale mining ventures; the ease
of working the coal, the prevailing system of land-ownership and
fragmentation of indigeneous capital. Operating in an environment of
'fierce and unremitting competition', such enterprise enjoyed sporadic
periods of success interspersed with much leaner times. Available labour in
this 'frontier territory' was both 'undisciplined and restless' and
frequently in scarce supply. In these circumstances, mineowners turned to
the 'forceful' approach of the subcontractor to alleviate their managerial
and labour problems, and the system recommended itself not least because
the butty-man was not retained as a permanent official - representing a
fixed overhead charge. The butty contracted to raise a given quantity of
coal at a piece-rate, or price agreed with the owner, recruited and paid
labour to complete the work. ,
 His income represented the difference between
the prices received from the owner and his own costs. He was therefore
under an incentive to extract the greatest possible amount of labour from
the workers he employed within the shortest possible period of time - which
for the miners meant long hours and overwork.
The charter-master or big butty system may have evolved from the
'collective contract' of the eighteenth century, described by Ashton and
Sykes (1929) who identify its operation in Shropshire. Gangs of workers,
Joined in a relationship of 'co-partnership', worked shallow levels or
drifts under a piecework contract negotiated with the land or mineowner.
The formalization of contracts, mineowner's preference for dealing with one
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man rather than a labour force, and for dealing with a man who could exert
discipline over the gang,
	 may all	 have contributed to the
transmogrification of the 'collective contract'. By the early nineteenth
century, the term butty was generally associated with structures of
inequality and oppression (although there were always regional variations
in its interpretation).
The butty-men of the early nineteenth century were generally miners or
ex-miners who had accumulated some limited amount of capital (Church et al,
1986:417).	 Hence, in addition to their role in labour management, they
generally supplied some or all •of the working capital of the mine - tools,
timber, tubs, candles, ropes, horses and even tram rails. Butties supplied
working capital, an 'expertise' in labour management, and assumed
responsibility for the organization and coordination of underground
operations. Mineowners or, in this period possibly landowners working the
coal seams as an extension of their agricultural estates, would generally
undertake to supply the fixed capital in the form of the shaft, drainage,
ventilation and winding equipment. The work of shaft-sinking, or the
excavation of drift entrances in the case of shallow mines, may have been
performed by specialist gangs working under contract. By the late
nineteenth century, it was often undertaken by firms specializing in mine
construction. In some instances in the early part of the century, however,
butty-men undertook to complete the initial development work; that is, to
open-up shallow pits and drift mines in addition to their contract for
cutting, hauling and winding the coal to the surface, proping roofs,
filling goafs and so on (Flinn and Stoker, 1984:55-7).
Butties might contract to enlist labour in the first instance, or simply
to pay workers, 'either by the piece, in the case of pickmen working at the
face, or by the day, in that of bandsmen or hauliers' (Taylor, 1960: 218).
Subcontracting was associated with various harsh and despotic practices
designed to retain labour - payment by truck, long pays forcing worker
indebtedness, and so on - although butties certainly did not hold a
monopoly on such arrangements, the efficacy of which often depended upon
the connivance and support of colliery proprietors. Mineowners exercised
some control over the butties' activities through the contracts negotiated
between the two parties. Within a particular locality, the form of the
contract between the mineowner (or landowner) and butty might be quite
standardized. But over the industry as a whole, there were marked
variations in the division of responsibilites and this suggests that the
charter-master system itself was an adaptable and varied arrangement. In
general, contracts were of relatively short duration, enabling the
mineowner to offset the risks of market fluctuations. But again, there were
significant variations.
The butty might undertake to raise a given quantity of coal at an agreed
price, or to raise coal by the ton at an agreed piece-rate. In either case,
the butty's profit would largely be derived from the difference between the
contract price and his own expenditure - on labour and materials. And since
his income depended upon his ability to minimize costs, he would be under
an incentive to 'drive' or 'sweat' workers who, in any case, would be
forced to work long hours to achieve even a meagre subsistence given that
their wage rates were likely to be some way below the price of labour paid
by the mineowner. Butties often engaged supervisory assistants - 'doggies'
or 'corporals' - to oversee the mineworkers and, in particular, the day-
wage haulage workers. The system might obviously involve much brutality and
physical degradation. But the experiences of the mineworkers could differ.
Thus, Griffin quotes a Nottinghamshire miner, recalling his experiences in
the 1830s and 40s. This witness argued that 'A few of the butties...were
humane and kind, but others were most cruel and brutish'. Some of their
supervisory assistants he described as, 'slave drivers' who would 'arm
themselves with a stick or thong, fix themselves in some convenient spot,
and as a lad.. .came by with his wagon, which he had to push, would strike
him on the back..' (1971: 43).
In some instances, butties would undertake to extract the coal, raise it
to the surface and sell it, paying a royalty or rent to the landowner
(Flinn and Stoker, 1984: 56-7). Here the contractor or partnership of
contractors virtually became the mineowners. The landowner would supply the
fixed capital of the mine, the butties undertaking to provide the working
capital including labour. But the contractors would be obliged to maintain
the fixed capital stock, or to reinvest some part of their profit in the
repair of air and water courses, and they would undertake to drive new
levels and fill old pits. Examples of this type of arrangement have been
identified in the Yorkshire coalfield in the late eighteenth century and
here the contracts were of relatively lengthy duration - eight, ten or even
twelve years (Ibid).
The subcontract system might resolve the land- or mineowner's immediate
difficulties, with the butty providing working capital, an expertise in
mine working and a self-interested dexterity in labour supervision. But the
butty's interest in maximizing short-term gain might operate to the
mineowner's long-term disadvantage; if, for example, the butty's decision
to work the most easily accessible seams gave rise to subsequent problems
of subsidence and flooding. Mineowners could limit the butty's discretion
principally through two means; firstly, by attaching various terms and
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conditions to the contract negotiated with the subcontractor, and secondly
by appointing salaried or waged officials to enforce these terns and
conditions. Landowners generally engaged an agent, steward or bailiff to
manage their estate. The land agent would be charged with the
responsibility for arranging the terms and conditions of the butty's
contract, and possibly also for organizing the sale of the coal raised, and
for keeping colliery accounts and record books. Sometimes specialist
mineral agents were appointed to organize the initial siting of pits and
opening-up of the underground works, and they would be expected to oversee
the activities of the subcontractors. In all probability the first
'viewers' were drawn from the ranks of the land and mineral agents.
Most commonly employed in the northern coalfield, the term 'viewer'
signified a technician and manager, standing between the mineowner and
mineworkers; an agent employed by the mineowner to direct mining
operations, rather than to participate directly in the supervision of
labour (see Flinn and Stoker, 1984:57-68). The term entered the glossary of
coalmining in the Northv East in the mid-to-late eighteenth century,
coinciding with the industry's expansion in that area from shallow and
easily accessible seams to deeper coal measures. This expansion could be
achieved only through the resolution of certain technical problems and
difficulties - relating to boring, shaft construction, pumping and winding.
Men who, through their position as agent or manager, had acquired a
knowledge of coalmining and who were also familiar with geology,
mathematics and the sciences, became vitally important to the coalmasters,
and their involvement in resolving the problems of deep-mining sustained
the rapid elevation in status and income of this managerial stratum. But
deep mining and the consequent expansion in mine size raised problems for
colliery capitalists other than those of a narrowly technical nature, and
the expanded scale of fixed capital investment involved also prompted
mineowners to tighten their control over the general running and direction
of the pits. Thus, while viewers were the forerunners of the professional
mining engineers of the mid-to-late nineteenth century, they undertook a
wide range of managerial functions.
The expression 'viewer' derived from the verb 'to view', or survey and
value coal-lands and collieries. While some of the largest northern pits
were owned and operated by landowners in the period before the 1870s, the
majority were worked on lease. Increasingly from the late eighteenth
century, as deeper pits were sunk, absorbing greater fixed capital
outlays, landowners withdrew from active involvement in colliery enterprise
to assume a rentier status. Acting on behalf of the landowner, a principal
function of the viewer was to evaluate the property, and on the strength of
this report attempt to attract capital to invest on the owner's estate. The
prospective mineowner would probably also engage the services of a viewer
to act on their behalf in the negotiations over the terms of the mineral
lease. 'Consultant' or 'check' viewers - the-elite of the viewer network -
often worked for a number of mineowners, landowners or landed colliery
proprietors; the apparent promiscuity of these agents possibly reflected
the coincidence of landowner and mineowner interests, in the early part of
the nineteenth century at least (see chapter 2).
Mineowners who engaged the services of a consultant viewer would expect
for their fee a regular report on the state of their pits, advice on
working methods, labour management, commerical policies and practices.
Viewers organized the initial development of mines and, within the terms of
the mineral lease, determined such matters as the location of shafts,
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layout of surface and underground works. Their employment - which was
becoming more common in areas beyond the North East by the mid-nineteenth
century - would therefore restrict the discretion of subcontractors, since
it would be the viewer who determined matters such as the order in which
seams were to be worked. Viewers were also responsible for keeping colliery
accounts and record books, which represented one means of exercising
surveillance over under-officials, although generally such day-to-day
administrative work would be allocated to the head or resident viewer - a
full-tine mine manager, rather than a part-time consultant.
Thus in the North East by the early nineteenth century, and consequent
upon the working of deeper seams, expansion in mine size, and increasing
scale of investment involved in colliery enterprise, a stratum of
professional mine management had emerged. At larger pits, a well-defined
hierarchy of directly-employed managerial and supervisory officials had
been developed to execute decisions made centrally. At the top was the
consultant or check-viewer, generally engaged on a part-tine basis and
whose commission related to the annual output or profits of the mineowner's
pit or group of pits. Consultant viewers inspected underground works and
had an extensive knowledge of minework (a few had started their careers as
mineworkers). But they were not engaged in physical work or employed to
directly supervise the performance of work. They were not participant
supervisors, like the butty-men of the Black Country whose income in some
cases may not have been much above that of the workers they recruited and
paid. Consultant viewers were hired by mineowners for their knowledge of
mining practice and expertise in a wide range of areas pertaining to the
organization of production for profit. They undertook commissions to view
properties in the Korth East, in other British coalfields and abroad, and
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found an expanding market for their services with the expansion of mining
onto deeper seams in areas beyond the northern coalfield from the 1830s and
1840s. Some of these men amassed considerable wealth from their consultancy
work and went on to become mineowners in their own right, or at least co-
owners in a mining partnership.
The leading check-viewers of the early nineteenth century ran informal
'schools', taking on as apprentices would-be viewers from the North East
and other mining areas. Such 'schools' were more akin to small businesses,
since apprentices and assistants undertook the work on the commissions
secured by the check-viewer. Graduates went on to become head-viewers at
one or other of the larger pits in the North East, or larger pits elsewhere
in the British industry. Head viewers were full-time mine managers and
supervised the work of assistant or under-viewers, in charge of a
particular department such as maintenance, or the work of a particular
shift. Reporting to the under-viewers were the overmen or onlookers -
supervisory workers, employed on a daywage or on a weekly wage and in
charge of a particular area of the pit. They allocated timber and
materials, supervised the underground transport workers and measured-up the
work performed by putters, brushers, rippers, and timberers.
Such an advanced managerial hierarchy was uncommon outside the North East
in the period before the mid-nineteenth century. Elsewhere mine managers
(variously known as grieves, stewards, bailiffs, oversmen) may have been
employed to supervise underground operations, or mineowners would act as
their own mine manager and be assisted by one or two supervisory agents, or
labour management would be subcontracted to a butty or charter-master. The
average size and depth of pits in the North East was very much greater than
that of any other British coalfield in this early period, and the structure
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and training of mine management apparently more sophisticated.
Nevertheless, Taylor (1960) has identified instances where northern
coalmasters had cause to reintroduce the butty system, albeit on a
temporary basis. Admittedly, most of these examples are confined to the
' late eighteenth and very early nineteenth centuries. But it would appear
that under the short-term pressure of rising working costs - wages, but
also timber, livestock and so on - mineowners were advised by their viewers
to replace the permanent staff of under-officials by contractors. This was
either to cut overhead costs, or because the under-officials could not be
effectively motivated to control pit expenditure and, in one case, because
the under-officials had been identified as the perpetrators of 'several
things which have the appearance of rogery', such as the 'fiddling' of pit
bills (1960:223).
Viewers and mining engineers staffed the Mines Inspectorate, a government
agency originally established by legislation in 1850. Appointed to prevent
dangerous mining practice, the Inspectors were given feeble legal powers to
execute their duties. Their influence, such as it was in the period before
the 1870s, was exerted through reports, published annually, on the
different mining regions. And these show that while the Inspectors were
concerned for the mineworkers' health and safety, they were equally anxious
to promote effective labour utilization in the coal industry. Practices
such as payment by truck, and the payment of wages at ale houses, for
example, were criticized primarily for promoting drunkenness and
absenteeism, or for failing to promote discipline in the mines. From the
outset, the Inspectors were highly critical of the butty system. They
argued that it militated against safe and economical working.
Under this system, supervision by the coalnaster or his
"bailiff" is lax and irregular, and by degrees the abutty"
becomes almost the sole controller of the colliery and of
those who work therein. He is unwilling to incur any outlay
in building ventilating furnaces, in making or enlarging
airways, or in erecting the needful doors and stoppings; and,
consequently, the pits
	 are indifferently aired. He allows
the shafts and tramroads to get out of repair; he thinks
iron "guide rods" and wooden "conductors" in pits are quite
superfluous; tools, timber and other materials are by him
grudgingly supplied; suggested ameliorations are objected to;
his contract being terminable at short notice, he has no
abiding interest in the mine; he feels no intense anxiety
or definite responsibility concerning the safety and comfort
of the workpeople; 	 • (Inspector of Mines, Report, 1851:12;
cited in A.Griffin, 1971: 29-30)
Contrasting the 'scientific' training and aptitude of viewers and mining
engineers with the purely practical expertise of butty-men, the Mines
Inspectors argued that the subcontract system could only result in the
'unskilful' working of mines. But the fact that a pit might be 'exploited
for its choicest pickings rather than its fullest yield' (Ibid) reflected
more upon the butty-man's short-term contract and his skill in promoting
his own interest. Mining engineers were urging a transition to salaried
management. But as Taylor's analysis of the northern coalfield shows, the
direct employment of under-officials was no automatic guarantee that the
mineowner's interests would prevail.
Since the butty-man's income represented the difference between the
prices received from the mineowner and his own expenditure, he was under an
incentive to 'sweat' or overwork employees and ignore basic safety
precautions. Such conditions of labour utilization obviously did involve a
profligate use of labourers' lives. But there again, deep mining in the
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North East had introduced fresh hazards for the mineworkers. The
establishment of the Mines Inspectorate in 1850 owed much to the adverse
publicity that the industry had received following a series of underground
explosions at northern collieries. And since the northern pits were
relatively large-scale ventures, these disasters had aroused public
attention because they had resulted in large-scale loss of life.
The Mines Inspectors were highly critical of the big-butty or charter-
master system. Up until the 1870s, however, their powers to outlaw its use
were limited. Legislative changes from the 1870s may have had some effect.
Under the Coal Mines Regulation Act of 1872, the owners of pits employing
over thirty men were statutorily obliged to engage a trained and
certificated manager, capable of drafting and enforcing safety regulations.
The legislation, for which the Miners' National Association had campaigned,
thus provided an 'impetus towards centralization of managerial control'
(Church et al, 1986:420). The Mines Regulation Act of 1887 required
mineowners to appoint underground deputies, or examiners, whose function
nominally was to assist the certificated manager in the enforcement of
safety regulations. But small-scale pits - where the big butty system was
most likely to be retained - were excluded from the provisions of the
various safety Acts, and there was ample scope for evasion. Referring to
the high accident rate in the Black Country, the Royal Commission on Mines
reported in 1909 that:
Although the evils of the system have been reduced by
legislation 	 they are by no means eradicated in the
Black Country 	 Charter Masters often have relatives
working for them, and sometimes appoint a son or brother
to act as a 'doggy' and make the examination under
General Rule 4, which they are disqualified by the Act
from making themselves. It is more difficult to get at
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the facts respecting accidents in Charter Masters' pits
than in others, the workmen seeming unwilling or afraid
to give information.
Legislation did have some impact on labour utilization and management (see
below). But a powerful force behind the demise of the big butty system was
also the industry's expansion onto deeper coal measures and seams. This was
financed by ploughing back profits and by the formation of partnerships
(and subsequently joint stock companies) in place of individual
proprietorships. The increased scale of fixed capital investment prompted
mineowners to take measures to safeguard their properties, and insist that
pits were worked in their interests alone. To retain their former
independence, butties would be forced to join forces with other owners of
capital and establish themselves as mineowners - an option that may have
been open only to the partnerships or 'firms' of subcontractors. Otherwise,
they might quit the industry to become storekeepers or publicans. Or they
might be forced to accept a lesser sphere of influence and work under the
direction of the full-tine colliery officials appointed by the mineowner.
THE LITTLE BUTTY SYSTEM
Church et al (1986: 272-3) identify a change in the methods employed to
maintain discipline in the mines in most coalfields over the period 1830-
70. The trend was away from a dependence upon crude physical discipline and
was prompted partly by legislative changes. By prohibiting the use of child
labour below ground, the Act of 1842 decreased the scope for harsher
regimes including corporal punishment. Terminating the ability to rely upon
the 'cheap labour' of women and very young children for underground
transport work, the Act may again have had some force in undermining the
conditions in which the big butty system flourished. The strength of demand
for labour, which continued through the 'coal famine' of the 1860s, and the
emergence of more permanent county and district miners' unions, also
diminished the efficacy of earlier methods of recruiting, retaining and
disciplining labour.
From the 1860s, colliers in some mining districts secured reductions in
the length of their working day through local action and agreements (Ibid:
253). The Coal Mines Regulation Act of 1872 prohibited the employment below
ground of boys under 12 years of age, and restricted the hours of work of
boys under 16 to no more than ten a day (and 54 in a week). The
legislation, which had knock-on effects for other grades, may have
encouraged employers to consider ways of intensifying the hours of work.
The Act of 1872 also obliged mineowners to appoint certificated mine
managers. While larger firms in the Midlands and elsewhere had already
moved to the direct employment of mine managers, responsible for the
general oversight of underground operations (Griffin, 1971:40-3), the Act
underpinned the trend towards the centralization of managerial control and
diminution of the subcontractor's authority. Nevertheless, modified
versions of the subcontract system were compatible with the employment of
certificated mine managers, and consistent with employer efforts to
maximize the intensity of work effort.
Where formerly employed, the big butty system was on the decline from the
mid-nineteenth century, along with the associated practices of payment by
truck and retention of labour through credit (or worker indebtedness).
Discipline, especially in the areas of work attendance and quality of
output, was increasingly maintained by managerial staffs employed directly
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by the colliery company and charged with the responisibility for enforcing
company rules. Some owners in the Midlands continued to rely on the butties
to organize production at their pits into the 1870s. But larger firms -
such as the Butterley Company in the East Midlands - now engaged viewers on
a permanent, or full-time, basis to supervise the development of the pits
and under-managers (or under-viewers) to ensure that production was
organized and conducted in accordance with the viewer's instructions
(A.Griffin, 1971: 31-2). At the Butterley Company, however, and elsewhere
in the East and West Midlands, a system of contracting was retained in
order to maintain labour discipline and maximize output from individual
stalls.
Thus the little butty, contracting collier or stallman of the late
nineteenth century worked a single stall or, possibly, a single district
within the mine, had generally no more than 10 or 20 workmen under his
command, and was obliged to accept the general oversight of the company's
underground officials. Initially, however, there was a degree of overlap
with the big butty system of the earlier period. The butty undertook to
complete all the work in a stall, or given length of face; to get the coal
and deliver it into tubs, set and draw the timber and complete the blasting
where necessary. He negotiated an overall contract price with the
proprietor or colliery officials, but then hired and paid labour to
complete the work, 'according to an agreement in which the proprietor had
no part' (Church et al, 1986: 419). The butty would also undertake to
provide candles, gunpowder, timber and tools at a price agreed in the
initial contract. But the legislation of 1887 obliged owners to provide
tools, rails, safety lamps and explosives centrally while the various Mines
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Acts forced proprietors to admit their position as employer and to at least
register contractors' assistants on the colliery books (C.Griffin, 1969).
Subsequently, pressure from the unions forced owners to negotiate minimum
rates for stallmen and other grades of face-workers.
By the 1890s therefore, and as a general rule, butties or stallmen were
engaged to maintain discipline at the face, but not to recruit labour in
the first instance (A.Griffin, 1971; C.Griffin, 1969). The formal authority
to hire and fire workers had been centralized under the control of owners
and their salaried officials, although cases continued to appear in the
courts where neither contractor nor owner would admit liability as the
employer of a particular workman or group of workmen (Colliery Guardian,
Vol LXXXIV, 10.10.1902: 787). Butties or stallmen undertook to complete all
the work in a given length of face at a piece-rate, and to pay their
assistants minimum shift rates Cat least) from the total contract earnings.
The piece-rate would normally yield the stallman's average earnings if he
worked hard and/or encouraged his assistants to do likewise. Stallmen would
normally retain control over the distribution of any additional earnings
arising from the intensified effort of the work-group as a whole. If wage-
rates were depressed, stallnen would be forced to intensify the work-load
to maintain their earnings while the 'fillers' in their charge, paid on a
day-wage basis, would have to work harder but without any financial
compensation. If the pit was on short-tine working, the stallmen might lay-
off their assistants and perform much of the work themselves in order to
maintain their earnings (Bulman and Redmayne, 1951).
The operation of the little butty system is normally associated with the
coalfields of the Midlands. But it was also employed at some pits in South
Vales, in Yorkshire, Lancashire and in some Scottish mining districts in
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the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries (Rowe,1923; Challinor,
1972). Since longwall mining predominated in the Midlands, the butty system
has often been viewed as a form of work organization dictated by that
method of coal extraction (Ashton and Sykes, 1929; Humphries, 1981; Taylor,
1960). With longwall mining, the supervision of coal-getting became more
necessary since the face had to be advanced in as straight a line as
possible. Supervision was facilitated to the extent that workers were
concentrated on a continuous length of working face, in comparison with the
isolated stalls of bord and pillar working (see chapter 3). In the
Midlands, the stalls along the longwall face were quite large, with the
gateways set possibly 40 or 50 yards apart. Each stall would be 'let' to
one or two stallmen, or butties, who would in turn direct the activities of
one or two 'pikemen' or 'holers' who undercut the coal along the length of
the face, and two or three 'loaders' or fillers who filled the coal into
the tubs and pushed these to the gateway for the haulage hands to remove.
Bulman and Redmayne argued that:
This division of labour 	 is highly spoken of, and
certainly seems better adapted to effective and continuous
kirving, and to getting as much round coal as possible,
than where one man is kirving, getting and filling in 5 or
6 yards of face independently of what his neighbours are
doing, his only interest being to fill as many tubs as he
can for himself during the five or six hours he is in the
face. (1951: 229)
Nevertheless it was the stallmen, who Bulman and Redmayne identified as the
'most experienced colliers', who directed the workmen, set the pace of
work, and coordinated the activities of the work-group which performed the
complete operation of coal-getting. The deputy's supervisory role was
limited. Indeed, one of the attractions of the butty system for mineowners
was that it obviated the necessity of employing supervisory staff to
oversee face-work and hence kept on-costs to a minimum. Equally, it
provided a buffer between the mineworkers and mine management, since it was
the stallman who was obliged to maintain discipline. Having been assigned
his stall, or length of working face, the butty's form of remuneration
provided a 'self-acting stimulus' (Schloss, 1892: 82) to ensure that
operations were completed promptly and that each member of the work-group
fulfilled his allotted task. In the case of holers, it might be Just such
task or stint work; these members of the work-group paid by the yard, but
having a definite length of face to undercut in their shift to attain their
daily, or average earnings.
Longwall mining was increasingly adopted in other British coalfields over
the nineteenth century; the pace of the transition from bord and pillar to
longwall working accelerating in the period from the 1860s. As suggested in
chapter three, the diffusion of the longwall technique in part reflected
the efforts of mineowners to raise the overall productivity of the
underground workforce by reducing the amount of 'oncost' labour employed in
road building and repair work. Employers were no doubt concerned to
maintain or increase the intensity of work effort at the coalface. But
there is little evidence to suggest that the extension of longwall mining
to other British coalfields was accompanied by the re-arrangement of labour
along the Midlands' model.
In other areas stalls were often much shorter, with the collier and his
assistant, or two colliers sharing their earnings, working in a space of 8
or 10 yards between the gateways and responsible for all the work in their
'place'. Of course some of these arrangements might operate very much like
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the little butty system, although on a smaller scale and with the collier's
authority over his assistant generally buttressed by an age differential.
Where these small-scale work groups were strung out along a length of
coalface, the deputy or pit official might be assigned a more active role,
and charged with the responsibility for ensuring a regular advance of the
working face. His ability to dictate the pace of work, however, would be
dependent upon the operation of job controls with, in most instances,
colliers resenting any managerial intervention in their work. In these
circumstances, employer attempts to maintain or increase the intensity of
work effort would probably focus on the negotiation of a suitably stringent
piecework price list for coalgetting under the new method of extraction.
Contract work in the British coal industry was not confined to coal-
getting at the face or, for that matter, to pits working longwall. In the
northern coalfields, a version of the butty system had long been employed
on drift work (Colliery Guardian, 30.7.1920: 321). Elsewhere, development
(or 'heading') work might be performed under contract, with a skilled
workman undertaking to drive new roadways and to pay the labour necessary
from the total contract earnings (Goffee, 1981). In some Scottish mining
districts, brushing and other repair and i deadwork' tasks were organized on
a gang or contract system (Colliery Guardian, 17.9.1920:819). At some
collieries in Nottinghamshire, haulage work was performed on a contract
basis with the 'getter out by contract' undertaking to haul coal from the
face to the pit-bottom at a piece-rate, engaging the necessary labour and
'corporals' to oversee the work. But this arrangement appears to have been
abandoned by the early twentieth century, with haulage hands engaged
directly by the company on a day-wage basis (A.Griffin, 1971: 32).
Inter- and Intra-Coalfield Variations
Across the coalfields of the Midlands and, indeed between different pits in
the same mining district, the details of the little butty system varied in
a number of respects; size of contract, ratio of butties to other workmen,
division of labour within the coal-face work-group. The stalls were
generally smaller in Cannock Chase, Nottinghamshire and Leicestershire,
than in Warwickshire, North Staffordshire and Derbyshire with, in the
former group, usually no more than 6 to 8 workmen employed in a 'place'.
Rowe (1923: 63-4) outlines the usual method of working in these districts
in 1913. In North Staffordshire, three or four 'contracting colliers'
shared equally and paid two assistants on day-rates. In Warwickshire, four
'stallmen' employed four assistants on day-wages. One or two stallmen
shared equally in Cannock Chase, employing three or four others on day-
rates. In Nottinghamshire, each stall was 'let' to a pair of butties who
employed, or rather paid, a similar number of day-wage assistants.
Alan Griffin argues that in the East Midlands, the extension of the
little butty system in the late nineteenth century was accompanied by an
'anachronistic relaxation of the division of labour' (1971: 118). Whereas
the big butty of an earlier period had employed certain grades on piece or
'stint' work to perform specialist operations at the face, the butty or
stallman and his assistants now performed all the coal-face operations as a
team, with the exception of holing. Rowe argued, however, that as a general
rule under the butty system in the Midlands, 'each man of the gang tends to
do certain particular Jobs; for instance, the least experienced men would
be mainly engaged in filling the coal into tubs, while timbering would
probably be done by the stallmen themselves' (1923:65). Bulman and Redmayne
detail arrangements at the face in the thick-coal seam of South
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Staffordshire. Contractors or stallmen undertook to extract and deliver
coal into tubs at an agreed piece-rate, with heading work paid at a
separate piece-price. The stallmen supervised the work of coal-getting, set
the timber and ensured that a regular supply of tubs to and from the face
was maintained. They paid a day-rate to one or two 'pikemen' who got the
coal and, in the absence of the stallmen, set the timber and otherwise
performed their duties. Two or three loaders were engaged on day-rates to
fill tubs with coal and, if sufficiently experienced, sometimes helped out
with holing and getting the coal down. Repairers were also engaged on a
yardage rate to lower the floor and strip the roof.
Within the butty-team, therefore, some men were always training as coal-
getters although they were not automatically guaranteed a future position
as a stallman, controlling the distribution of contract earnings. Up until
the early twentieth century at least, it was generally the case that the
mineowners and their officials selected the butty-men who controlled the
piecework contracts for coal-getting. As in the allocation of working
places at the face, therefc&e, the butty system offered mineowners and
their officials the opportunity to extend privileges to favoured workmen
and to discriminate against those regarded as troublesome.
One of the most detailed accounts of the little butty system is given by
Gof fee (1981), and relates to its operation at the Snowdown Colliery in
Kent in the interwar period of the twentieth century. This analysis
indicates the great variation in arrangements that might be found even
within the pits of a single company. In the process, it suggests some of
the reasons for the persistence of the subcontract system, although care
must obviously be taken in any attempt to generalize from Goffee's account.
It relates to the specific circumstances of one firm in the Kent coalfield
in the particular context of the interwar years.
The Kent coalfield was developed from the early twentieth century, by
which time mechanical coal-cutters could be purchased as standardized
hardware (from US manufacturers) or as tailor-made items of capital
equipment from British machine-manufacturing firms (see chapter 5). Gof fee
suggests that the owners of the Snowdown Colliery eschewed investment in
coal-cutting machinery because of certain financial and technical
considerations and because in the short-term productivity growth could be
maintained through other means. High levels of capital expenditure were
required to sink the shafts, open-out the workings and equip the pits in
the first instance. The owners' immediate concern was therefore to produce
'as much coal as possible at minimum extra cost'. According to Gof fee,
geological conditions also rendered the installation of coal-cutters an
'extremely hazardous and expensive investment'. By employing butty-men, who
possessed certain technical skills and considerable experience, the
mineowners could realise their immediate aims, 'without the costs of either
mechanization or an extensive managerial hierarchy' (1981: 492). The system
'worked' for a period, although the levels of labour productivity attained
in the 1920s and early 1930s also reflected the fact that the most easily
worked seams were being attacked.
The labour employed at Snowdown in the 1920s and 30s was largely migrant;
expelled from the depressed coalfields of the North, Lancashire and South
Wales. In this context, the butty-system obviated certain problems of
labour management for the proprietors who were faced with a heterogeneous
workforce - one coning to the coalfield with a variety of work and cultural
experiences - although, of course, the cosmopolitan character of the
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workforce may equally have facilitated the introduction of subcontracting.
And as Gof fee indicates, this heterogeneity was then heightened, rather
than diminished, through work experience under the butty system which gave
rise to a variety of work-group relationships and interests. Butties were
engaged on coal-face and heading, or development, work at Snowdown. The
size of contract teams varied with, in particular, the manner in which coal
was transported from the face. On longwall faces served by mechanical
conveyors, twelve to twenty men were employed on each of the two coaling
shifts and five to six others on the night, or maintenance, shift. A head
butty-man was present on each of the shifts and, beneath him, a 'chargeman'
for every three or four coal-face workers. This type of contract therefore
involved, 'perhaps three butty-men and thirty-five miners but half a dozen
s chargemen' would also be employed and were themselves regarded as
intermediaries between the butties and the ordinary miners' (p 482), In the
stalls, or 'headings', there were four men per coaling shift, one or two of
whom were butties, and two men were employed on the ripping shift, one also
being a butty.
Formal authority to hire and fire workers, and to allocate labour to
work-places, rested with the manager and his overmen and deputies. In
practice, however, butties often had considerable influence in the
selection of their workmen and those controlling more than one contract and
who were on good terns with management could 'influence whether or not men
were signed on by the colliery company'. If the butties controlled the
distribution of contract earnings, they were able to favour certain workers
and to discipline others. The exercise of 'discretion' in this way enabled
butty-men to attract and retain a regular group of men, and to engage those
regarded as the 'better' workers, Mineworkers who held no regular position
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with a particular butty and who had to apply daily for work, were known as
'market men'. A pool of 'excess' labour could be 'used to depress wage-
rates: and it reinforced the disciplinary powers of the butties, who would
quickly return a man to the market if he failed to exert himself to their
satisfaction' (see also A.R.Griffin, 1971, and Krieger, 1984, on similar
practices in the East )tidlands).
Butties controlling more than one contract might not be obliged to engage
in physical work in order to earn a comfortable living. Those with only a
single contract were more likely to undertake certain tasks such as holing,
or timber-setting, or even filling. In every case, however, 'the butties
held a supervisory role, controlling the pace, coordinating operations and
ultimately taking responsibility for the production of the gang'
(Goffee:483). To fulfill these duties adequately required skill and
experience. Butties collected the contract earnings, and paid out the
minimum rates to their 'subordinate' workers. Butties would normally lay
claim to a differential above the workmen and chargehands and might also
retain control over the distribution of any 'surplus'. But this was not
invariably the case, and there might be an informal agreement between the
members of the butty-team to share contract earnings equally.
Most men had to fight for their wages in the yard. I
never did. ..I got in wi . a group - three 'Lancs' and
a Kent lad - and we all worked together, and no-one
had more than the other. (cited in Gof fee, 1981: 486)
Similarly, in other coalfields where the little butty system was employed
there might in practice be a variety of arrangements in and between
different pits; in terms of the distribution of the work-load between
members of the contract team, and in terns of the distribution of contract
earnings. Thus, while the system operated on a structure of inequality and
privilege, the particular experiences of the workmen might differ. Butties
might be regarded by their fellow workmen as 'idle men' who only appeared
at the pit 'to pay out on a Friday', or as skilled men who deserved their
higher income by virtue of their responibilities and experience. Gof fee
reports the different experiences of workers at the Snowdown Colliery, and
the different ways in which they interpreted the butty system. Some miners
argued that if the 'butty-men took a larger share then they had earned it
through their superior skill and expertise'. It was a fair reward for their
'leadership' and 'responsibilities'. But others regarded the butties as the
'bosses men' who paid their workers insufficient wages whilst keeping the
major share of earnings for themselves.
Labour Organization and the Butty System
In the various histories of mining trade unionism, the butty system is
generally damned as an alien form of work organization, antipathetic to the
culture and egalitarianism of the mineworkers on whom it was imposed by
mineowners and their under-officials. Its decline is thus seen as
inevitable, or attributed unproblematically to successful class struggle,
organized and articulated through the miners' trade unions (eg
J.E.Williams, 1962; and also Dennis, Henriques and Slaughter, 1956). But by
extending incentives and privileges to a substantial group of workers, and
affording the scope for a variety of individual experiences, the butty
system tended to generate a diversity of interests. Hence in those
coalfields where it was practised, the movement for its abolition could
become the focus of conflicts within the miners' unions. The trajectory of
these local disputes, however, has to be analysed against the backdrop of
broader economic and political developments.
According to Colin Griffin (1969), the Leicestershire Miners' Association
had secured an end to the inequality of earnings distribution under the
butty system by the end of the nineteenth century. In that coalfield,
agreement was reached with the mineowners' association on the introduction
of an 'all-throw-in' system whereby all the men working in a stall shared
the contract earnings equally. In Nottinghamshire, opposition to the butty
system gained its greatest coherence in the years immediately preceding and
during the First World War whew, across the coalfields, labour organization
was gaining strenth. In 1918, the Nottinghamshire Miners' Association
reached agreement with the owners' association on the introduction of an
'all-throw-in' system, under which all adult workers in a stall would share
their earnings equally. At some pits, however, where the butty-men were
prominent in the local union organization, the 'agreement was not
implemented, or was implemented only for a short time' (A.Griffin, 1971:
192). And in Derbyshire, where the County union had secured an 'all-throw-
in' agreement, a test case was brought to the courts at the beginning of
1919 because individual pits were reverting to (or retaining) elements of
the butty system (Colliery Guardian, 24.2.1919:485).
Output and employment in Iottinghanshire - the largest of these three
mining districts - had expanded rapidly from the late 1880s. From the late
nineteenth century the coalfield maintained a positive rate of growth of
labour productivity, at a time when output per man-year was falling in the
British coal industry as a whole (Church et al, 1986:774). The
Nottinghamshire coalfield's achievements partly reflected favourable
geological conditions, but also the gradual concentration of output on new,
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large-scale mines, sunk in the Mansfield area in the years immediately
preceding and succeeding the First World War. The structure of work
organization may also have played its part. Certainly the Nottinghamshire
coalmasters were quick to express their dissatisfaction with the 'all-
throw-in' arrangement. Leading mining engineers, who were either employed
by or part-owners of the largest colliery companies, alleged that the
abolition of the butty-system had contributed to a deterioration of work
effort and discipline (Colliery Guardian, 28.5.1920:1503; 17.12.1920:1750).
What is notable, however, is that many employers subsequently attempted to
revive elements of the butty system rather than experimenting with new
forms of labour control or new production methods.
The 'all-throw-in' arrangement had caused some discontent amongst the
former stallmen and contracting colliers. In the Mansfield area of the
coalfield, a group describing themselves as the 'more skilled labour'
organized a petition to register their 'entire disapproval of the
intolerable conditions under which the competent miner on the coal face is
working' (cited in Colliery ' Guardian, 28.5.1920:1503). Their aim was to
persuade their fellow unionists to modify the new, 'all-throw-in' system
and re-instate an earnings differential.
We have no wish to debar any competent or capable man
from enjoying the full fruits of his labour, but we do
consider that the incompetent and incapable man should
not share in earnings which he is not justly entitled to.
We therefore ask you to support and help establish a
system which enables all competent and capable men to share
equally of the earnings of any stall or contract. Also we
protest against the proposed ballot re. all throw in and
day work, seeing that we do not believe in either; and,
further, we strongly object to boys, surfacemen, banksmen
etc., having a voice in determining the conditions under
which the coalface men shall work.
The petitioners argued that they were not supporting a return to the 'old
butty system'. By this they meant a system in which some two or three
workmen who 'either from personal association with the powers that be or
bribery and not necessarily because of their working ability were allowed
to employ from three to twelve other men, working with and under them', and
the choice of butty was a matter left 'absolutely to perhaps one official
at the colliery'. Rather, the petitioners claimed, they were simply making
an 'honest effort to place the skilled miner in the same position as
skilled men in other trades' - by excluding from the equal division of
earnings 'those at the one end who are either aged, physically deficient,
or to whom any ambition is dead; and at the other end, only those who are
serving an apprenticeship, in the application both of their strength and of
their mind'.
Whatever the propriety of the petitioners' cause, it meshed with the
efforts of some mineowners to rescind the 'all-throw-in' agreement and
reinstate a version of the former butty system. The employer attack on the
'throw in' agreement became more vigorous after the industry-wide lockout
of 1921. At the beginning of that year, and in the context of a slump in
export markets, government controls on the coal industry introduced during
the First World War were abandoned. The mineowners pressed for wage
reductions and a return to district wage settlements. After a three month
stoppage, the owners secured a return to work essentially on their terms.
Wages were to be settled on a district basis, although in accordance with a
national formula, and related to profits in the different districts. Wage
reductions were imposed and although these were most severe in the export-
-oriented coalfields, in the inland districts of the Midlands and South
Yorkshire earnings fell by around 16 per cent (Supple, 1987:164).
Under the national formula governing district wage settlements, standard
wage rates had to be established - equivalent to the basis rates paid to
different grades in March 1921, and the percentage additions payable in
July, 1914. Standard wage rates were deducted as costs in the ascertainment
of profits in the different districts. Minimum wage rates were set, so that
wages were not to fall below 20 per cent of the standard rates agreed in
each district for different grades. Following the introduction of the
national wage agreement of 1921, mineowners in Nottinghamshire and also in
Derbyshire signalled their intention to pay the contractors' - or skilled
rate - only to 'those who are recognized by colliery companies as
contractors or butties' (Colliery Guardian, 30.12.1921:1795).
Officially, the Nottinghamshire Miners' Association (NMA) was committed
to upholding the 'all-throw-in' agreement. But the union was increasingly
Incapacitated. Ending the 1921 lockout heavily in debt, the IMA had
imposed substantial levies on its members and reduced benefits, and
membership declined from the early 1920s (Griffin and Griffin, 1977). The
NMA was attempting to enforce the 'all-throw-in' agreement in the face of
employer efforts to re-establish elements of the butty system. But
divisions within the union on the issue had surfaced before the 1921
lockout, and these were exacerbated by the reductions imposed under the new
wage agreement. While delegates from a number of lodges were urging the
leadership to take a firm stance against the butty system, elsewhere in the
coalfield new organizations were emerging in opposition to the PIMA and the
wider Miners' Federation, and were explicitly declaring support for the
privileges of butty-men.
Important developments in this respect took place at the new, large-scale
pits sunk under Sherwood Forest in the years between 1919 and 1925. The
firms involved (which included the Bolsover Colliery Co. Ltd and Barber
Walker & Co.) were evidently attempting to stamp a particular imprint upon
labour relations and the character of union representation. As part and
parcel of the initial development work, they built extensive housing,
organized the provision of welfare amenities, and constructed entire
model' villages around the works. Welfarism on this scale was praised by
the Samuel Commission of 1925-6, but damned by other contemporary observers
as the imposition of a 'new industrial feudalism' (cited in Supple, 1987:
184). Employer support for the butty system at these pits of course may, in
the first instance, have simply represented an attempt to recruit and
retain a core of workers with particular technical and behavioural skills.
And since the workforce recruited to these new mines was largely
cosmopolitan, active opposition to the system had less chance of emerging.
But at some pits - and notably those of the Bolsover and Barber Walker
companies - the butty system quickly became associated with the recruiting
activities of the British Workers' League (BWL).
.Butty-men and contractors at these pits began to organize committees to
represent their particular interests, although whether such committees were
inspired by, or rather attracted attention from the BWL is unclear (see
Griffin and Griffin, 1977). There is scant evidence to suggest that the
companies concerned formally extended recognition to these sectional
organizations in the period before 1926. But the suspicion articulated by
activists within the NWA was that members of the BWL were given
'preferential treatment, and.... made "butties" in the best stalls' (cited
in Colliery Guardian, 20.4.1923:949).
By 1923, the NMA was in a 'disorganised state' (Ibid). The leadership was
under pressure from some sections to take firm action on the issues of non-
unionism in the coalfield and the steady reinstatement of the butty system.
But members involved in the re-institution of the butty system - in its
various guises - and with other grievances outstanding, may have been
prepared to quit the NMA if it pursued a firm stance on the matter. In any
event, with union officials equivocating on the precise definition of the
butty system, delegates from some lodges warned of the 'real danger of a
definite split' in the NMA (Ibid). This, of course, was actually postponed
until the General Strike and miners' lockout of 1926. The events
precipitating the formation of the breakaway 'Spencer', or purportedly non-
political Nottingham and District Miners' Industrial Union, apparently took
place at the Bolsover pits. Four months into the lockout, the BWL-inspired
(or associated) butties' organization met with the company management and
agreed terns for the resumption of production. Immediately, other companies
in Nottinghamshire and also in Derbyshire opened their pits on the sane
terns, and since firms were recruiting non-unionists and 'strangers', there
began a steady return to work (see Griffin and Griffin, 1977).
A variety of butty systems were practised at Nottinghamshire pits in the
1920s. These ranged from the 'old' system, with one or two men controlling
the selection of contract teams and distribution of contract earnings and
able to reward and penalize other workers for compliance in fulfilling
butty-dictated work 'stints', to modified . 'throw-in' arrangements
resurrecting a differential between members of the sane work group. Given
these permutations, it is perhaps hazardous to generalize on the
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implications for workplace relations, work effort and .productivity.
Nevertheless, Krieger (1984) suggests that unemployment in the coalfield in
the 1920s and 1930s buttressed the butty-men's authority in production, and
since mineworkers could secure regular employment only by complying with
the dictates of the butties, the system operated to sustain high levels of
work effort and the relatively high level of labour productivity of the
Nottinghamshire coalfield. Krieger argues that output per manshift was
higher in Nottinghamshire than in neighbouring Yorkshire, and that this
cannot be attributed to geological conditions which he suggests were more
favourable in the Yorkshire coalfield. He suggests that Nottinghamshire's
superior performance owed much to the butty system which was not employed
in the Yorkshire coalfield in the interwar years (pp91-2).
There are problems with this account, however, and not least because
available details on labour productivity in Yorkshire relate to the whole
county which actually embraced two distinct mining districts. In South
Yorkshire,	 geological	 conditions	 were	 extremely	 good.	 As	 in
Nottinghamshire, productivity increases had been secured from the early
twentieth century through the gradual concentration of output on large-
scale pits. Vest Yorkshire was an older district where the best coal
reserves had long since been exhausted. Production had moved onto thinner
coal seams, while little had been achieved in terms of the concentration of
output on fewer and better mines. It is therefore difficult to establish
whether output per manshift in Nottinghamshire was significantly higher
than in the South Yorkshire coalfield. But it is clear that the rate of
growth of productivity in Nottinghamshire in the 1930s was associated with
the more intensive application of mechanical coal-cutters and face
conveyors, .rather than simply with work intensification under the butty
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system. The proportion of output cut mechanically rose from 27 to 70 per
cent between 1929 and 1938. In South Yorkshire only 56 per cent of output
was cut mechanically at the end of the interwar period. Both coalfields
enjoyed the benefit of relatively favourable market conditions, however, so
that while the level of mechanization in Nottinghamshire fell behind that
of some exporting districts - notably Northumberland - pits were able to
operate nearer to capacity in the 1930s (although, even in Nottinghamshire,
productivity growth was constrained by surplus capacity in the industry).
It could be argued that because mineowners in Nottinghamshire were able
to secure the re-introduction of the butty-system (and wage cuts) in the
early 1920s, the incentive to apply machinery more intensively in this
period was weakened. But obviously the conditions of competition were also
a factor, and in the early 1920s levels of mechanization were extremely low
in most British coalfields and certainly in those districts which were,
like Nottinghamshire, oriented towards inland UK markets. In any event, the
introduction of coalface machinery in Nottinghamshire eventually displaced
the butty system. Where coal was undercut mechanically and loaded (by hand)
onto mechanical conveyors at the face, an 'all-throw-in' agreement was re-
instated (Griffin, 1971: 192-3).
At the Snowdown colliery in Kent, the butty system persisted alongside
hand-hewing at the face into the late 1930s, and the rate of growth of
productivity - at Snowdown and in the Kent coalfield as a whole -
deteriorated after the early 1930s, Here, a variety of factors would appear
to have combined to militate against modernization, although these included
labour relations and the influence of the butty system. Production in the
Kent coalfield was actually coming on stream in the 1920s, when output and
employment were falling in other British coalfields. Kent absorbed labour
-188-
expelled from the depressed coalfields of the north of England and South
Wales, and workers coming to the pits were in a weak position to bargain
over the terms and conditions of employment. Work experiences under the
butty system inhibited the development of labour solidarity at pit level,
and a coherent opposition to subcontracting failed to emerge. Goffee notes
that at Snowdown 'the range of subcontracting arrangements and differing
impact of the system, even amongst those employed on the same contract,
made a common response unlikely since there was no foundation of a common
experience' <1981:488). The men were divided, but there was no simple
cleavage between butty-men and other grades. Rather, 'the system splintered
the workforce into numerous small, mutually competitive sects'. During the
1920s and 1930s, there was only one pit-wide strike at Snowdown, apparently
in response to the company's proposal to cut shift rates. Conflict was
expressed, but through small-scale stoppages of short duration, and through
a rapid turnover of labour which in turn undermined the men's ability to
act collectively.
While labour relations did not constitute an effective force for change,
the owners of the Snowdown pit were not coerced into modernization (as an
alternative to bankruptcy) by the pressures of inter-capitalist
competition. Indeed, it is a reflection upon the technological backwardness
of the British industry that the Kent coalfield was able to 'develop' in
the interwar period with, essentially, the production methods of an earlier
era (although conveyors were employed on some faces). Certainly at Snowdown
increases in labour productivity were secured in the period to the early
1930s. But this owed in large measure to the fact that the pits were
working the most easily accessible coal reserves. In the absence of
technical innovation, productivity fell as production was forced onto more
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difficult seams. In the context of a changing external labour market, the
employers also encountered recruitment difficulties from the late 1930s and
were forced to revise existing practices. The butty system was abandoned as
the pit 'officials' were given an enhanced role in the organization and
supervision of work. New payment systems were introduced on faces where the
coal was hand-filled onto mechanical conveyors, in an attempt to hike-up
the intensity of work effort. But coal-cutting machinery was not introduced
and across the Kent coalfield, hand-hewing at the face predominated
throughout the interwar period. In 1938, only 10 per cent of the
coalfield's output was undercut mechanically (Annual Report, Secretary for
Mines, 1938).
CONCLUSION
In no other industry is expenditure on supervision so low,
relative to wages cost, as in coal-mining; yet in no other
industry is supervision more difficult to apply, nor any
in which it is more necessary.
(Sam Mayor, machine manufacturer and mining engineer, 1924)
Systems of subcontracting, inside contracting, and piece-rate foremanship
were employed in a wide range of British industries in the nineteenth
century. Fostered by the piece-rate system, these arrangements enabled
capitalists to minimize their involvement in labour recruitment and labour
management by delegating these to some operative, head worker or attendant
engaged at a piece-rate for which the latter undertook to enlist and pay
assistants, helpers or subordinates. Such arrangements have been identified
as transitional forms of work organization, specific to the earliest stages
of industrial capitalism, and destined to be displaced as capitalists
assumed the 'essential function of management' - control over the labour
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process (Braverman, 1974). But they were remarkably adaptable, and in
Britain's export-oriented staple industries they were also remarkably
persistent.
In the case of coalmining, the big butty system was on the decline from
the middle of the nineteenth century. The increasing scale of capital
investment involved in sinking deeper and larger pits prompted mineowners
to secure tighter control over the use of their properties. Officials
engaged directly by the owner, partnership or company were made responsible
for the general oversight of underground operations. This centralization of
management control was encouraged by the various safety Acts introduced
from the final quarter of the nineteenth century. The Miners' National
Association and, subsequently, the Miners' Federation of Great Britain,
campaigned for improved health and safety provision, although pressure for
legislative change also came from outside the coal industry. And while
mineowners were concerned to safeguard their properties, they displayed a
casual respect for the health and well-being of their employees. They were
opposed to uniform restrictions on labour utilization and the safety Acts
that were passed were very often much weakened versions of the provisions
originally proposed (see chapter six).
While the big butty system survived in only a few localities beyond the
1870s, the modified form of piece-rate foremanship - or the little butty
system - was retained in a number of districts and notably the coalfields
of the Midlands. The system offered employers a means of maintaining work
effort and discipline in individual stalls, or working places at the
coalface, in conditions in which the direct supervision of labour through
an extensive managerial hierarchy would have been difficult and costly to
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impose. Alongside the little butty system, and often indistinguishable from
it, was the analagous form of groups of piecework colliers (or stallmen)
jointly employing (or at least paying) daywage assistants, and the more
general form of colliers working with a single assistant, possibly a
relative and probably a learner or apprentice.
Each of the above arrangements afforded the scope for inequality in the
division of contract earnings and bullying in the performance of work.
Actual experiences varied, however, and arrangements classified as the
little butty system might embrace an extreme inequality in the division of
earnings and examples where the work group shared the work and remuneration
equally. Relationships between butty-men and management could vary, even
within the confines of a single mine, and butties retaining control over
the division of contract earnings in turn might be forced to extend some of
their privileges to others employed on the sane contract, in order to
motivate their 'subordinates' and retain a regular group of trusted
workers. These variations are to some extent reflected in the different
meanings attached to the term 'butty' in different coalfields and over time
- friend, mate or partner, 'parasite' or overseer.
Versions of the little butty system persisted in some districts and
localities into the 1920s and 1930s, alongside hand-hewing at the face. In
an attempt to account for the survival of ostensibly archaic forms of work
organization, this chapter has drawn attention to local circumstances, the
nature of changes introduced elsewhere in the industry and the pace of
innovation, and the broader pattern of industrial conflict in interwar
British coalmining.
	 Mechanization, which forms the subject of chapter
five, was a protracted and uneven process in the British industry.
Geological conditions, the uneven effects of the royalty system, and
divergent structures of work organization, combined in different ways to
affect the suitability of mining districts (and pits within them) for
technical innovation. To allow for these variations, mineowners adhered to
the policy of resisting national wage settlements and uniform provisions
relating to labour utilization. In the 1920s, the owners secured a return
to district wage settlements, wage reductions and an extension of working
hours. The effect was to consolidate the backward conditions of the
industry, by supporting the survival of small mines and unmechanized pits.
Thus, production in the newly 'developing' Kent coalfield could cone on
stream in the interwar years with the technology and structures of work
organization of an earlier era.
In conclusion, it should be emphasized that subcontracting was not
invariably displaced by the transition to 'machine mining'. In the interwar
years, only the process of undercutting the coal was mechanized. Other
tasks continued to be performed manually. But the partially-mechanized
mining system involved the imposition of a new and extreme horizontal
division of labour at the face. The work was sub-divided and narrowly-
defined tasks were arranged in rigid sequence over three separate shifts in
a twenty-four hour cycle of operations. The new system of work organization
created fresh problems of labour management for employers, and these are
discussed more fully in chapter five. Briefly, the rigid work sequence and
interdependence of tasks created the need for greater coordination of the
production process and greater coercion of miners now performing a single
aspect of the work. With hand coal-getting, there may have been some
division of labour within the work group, but the arrangement was flexible.
Skills were retained within the coalface work group which performed the
complete operation of coal-getting on the sane shift, and workers could
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interchange while aspects of the work could be left unfinished at the end
of a shift. Such flexibility was lost with the 'unit' or partially-
mechanized mining system, and in an attempt to evade the new stresses and
strains placed on the management organization (and the implications for
overhead costs), employers in some instances reverted to the subcontract
system. Examples of this have been identified in some Scottish mining
districts in the years immediately preceding the First World War (Campbell,
1984).
CHAPTER FIVE: NECHAIIZATION IN THE INTERWAR BRITISH COAL INDUSTRY
IITRODUCT ION
Two characteristics of coalmining in Britain on the eve of the First World
War were stressed in chapter three; the extreme labour intensity of coal
production and the heterogeneity of work organization across the British
coalfields. In neither respect did the interwar years witness dramatic
changes, in spite of the extension of 'machine mining' in this period. The
production process was only partially-mechanized. Machines were introduced
for coal-cutting, and mechanical conveyors were installed to transport the
coal from the face to subsidiary haulage routes. But the coal continued to
be hand-filled, while road building, road maintenance, and other
underground operations remained labour-intensive processes. Mechanization
was a slow and uneven process in the British industry, and throughout the
interwar years systems of hand working and partially-mechanized mining co-
existed - quite often within the same mine.
This chapter looks at the mechanized longwall mining system that was
established as the dominant system of machine mining in the British
industry in the interwar years. The system entailed an extreme horizontal
division of labour and a three-shift cycle of coal-getting operations. The
chapter considers the implications for the collier's skills and control
over the pace of work. It goes on to examine the uneven pace of
mechanization, and the influence of regional and intra-regional variations
in the organization of production on employer policies and practices at the
level of organized collective action.
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TECHNICAL INNOVATION AT THE FACE
Nethod of Extraction
The different systems of coal extraction employed in the British coal
industry in the period to 1913 have been examined in chapter three. These
divide into two principal types - bord and pillar and longwall mining -
although numerous modifications and hybrid versions of these were
practised, with different techniques sometimes employed within a single
mine. Bord and pillar working' involved two separate extractive operations.
In 1830, most coal in Britain was won from one or other version of this
system. But longwall mining, or the continuous extraction of coal along a
broad coal face of tens (and later, a hundred or more) yards, was extended
from this period, with the pace of the transition to the longwall system
accelerating in the years between 1860 and 1880 (Church et al, 1986: 336).
Geological conditions in part account for the extension of the longwall
system in Britain. With bard and pillar working, headings were driven into
the coal to lay-out the area to be worked in advance. These parallel roads,
driven outwards from the shaft pillar to the boundary, were connected at
intervals by roads driven at right angles, with the coal initially
extracted along the lines of the roadways and the solid pillars of coal
subsequently worked-off in 'slices'. But the slow rate of advance by
'narrow work', and of pillar extraction, 'often resulted in excessive crush
over the workings, a low percentage of extraction, difficulties in
ventilation and increased deadwork' (Reid Report, 1945: 39). While the
headings were driven in solid coal, they had also to act as haulage routes.
Hence, with the working of thinner seams at a greater depth from the
surface over the late nineteenth century, much stonework and ripping was
required to ensure that the roads were of a sufficient size to allow trams
or tubs to pass. This meant rising costs, with a smaller proportion of the
underground workforce actually engaged in coal-getting.
The longwall method might offset this cost, reducing the amount of road-
building necessary. It was the method of longwall advancing, with the coal
worked outwards from the shaft pillar, which was employed in the British
industry. With this technique, tramroads to the face could be kept short,
while profitable coal-getting could begin with the minimum of delay after
capital had been committed to opening-up a pit. Nevertheless, the tramroads
to the face had to be constructed in the goaf and this work, together with
the excavation of material for packing, absorbed a considerable amount of
'indirect' labour.
The extension of longwall mining over the interwar period of the
twentieth century was associated with the application of mechanical coal-
cutters and conveyors at the face. By the end of the Second World War, 74
per cent of British collieries employed the longwall system and 90 per cent
of British coal was got from longwall faces advancing from the shaft (Reid
Report, 1945: 42; Supple, 1987: 30). It is important to emphasize, however,
that unmechanized and mechanized longwall mining were radically different.
	
longwall as it was understood in the century before
1913 differed from the method described as longwall in
the mid-twentieth century - whereby the coal was got in
straight strips a hundred metres or more wide. Nineteenth
century longwall mining generally involved the coal-face
advancing in a stepped line, or fanning out from the bottom,
to form a series of well-defined working places which were
the province of one or two hewers and the putters who
removed the coal from the face. (Church et al, 1986: 328-9)
Of course, the size of stalls (individual working places) varied between
districts and coalfields pre-Mechanization, as did the complement of the
coal-face work group (see chapter four). But the work group performed the
complete operation of coal-getting - undercutting (or holing) the coal and
filling it out on the sane coaling shift - and retained immediate control
over the pace of work.
Holing by hand was an arduous Job. For some commentators (eg Stewart,
1935:35), it was also the most skilled element in the operation of coal-
getting. This part of the work was mechanized in the inter-war period.
Mechanical coal-cutters were a labour-saving technical innovation. Working
with machinery, three or four men could perform in their shift the work of
fifteen or more hand-holing colliers without exerting any additional
effort. Coal-cutting machines were developed from the 1860s. In the British
industry, however, their practical application before the twentieth century
was extremely limited. In 1900, only 1.5 per cent of British coal output
was cut mechanically. In the same year, a quarter of the output of the US
bituminous coal industry was undercut by machinery and American writers
have commented on the slow pace of technical innovation in that country (eg
Dix, 1979: 165).
Coal-cutting machines were principally adapted for longwall applications
in Britain. In order to maximize the use of machine capacity in a working
shift, coal-cutters were employed to undercut a continuous length of
working face. With their introduction therefore, the small, self-contained
stalls of hand coal-getting were displaced, and a length of face - of 100,
150 or 200 yards - was worked as a single 'unit'. The work was only
partially-mechanized. The coal continued to be blasted-off the face and
filled, by hand, into tubs or onto a conveyor. Changes in the social
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organization of production, considered in the following section of this
chapter, were designed to bring workers at the face to work with the
strength and regularity of the machinery; that is, to raise the intensity
of labour, or secure the expenditure of more labour during a given period
of time without any increase in the numbers employed. A more intensive
division of labour was imposed, and faceworkers were concentrated into
large collectivities with 40 to 50 men employed on a single 'unit' of
mechanized longwall face. Power-loading equipment was introduced after the
Second World War, to 'replace the large body of men employed in the
laborious and tedious job of hand-filling' (Anderson and Thorpe, 1967;
776). This phase of coal-face mechanization, however, is beyond the scope
of the present study.
Coal-cutting Xachinery
The development of a mechanical substitute for the hand-holing collier was
dependent upon innovations in the generation of power and its transmission
below-ground in mines. Steam power had been employed from the early
nineteenth century, for pumping and haulage. But it was difficult to use at
any great distance from the shaft, and presented an enormous safety hazard.
Compressed air, introduced from the 1850s, offered an effective supply of
power underground since it 'allowed transmission into a mine in any
direction and for almost any distance' and, in contrast with steam, 'heat,
moisture, and condensation were non-existent' (Church et al, 1986; 344).
The more general use of compressed air over the period 1850-80 stimulated
the design and development of commercial coal-cutters. These initiatives
were invigorated with the introduction of electricity for power purposes
from the 1880s.
Electricity was a more powerful motive force than compressed air. But its
use introduced new safety hazards in coal mining. Between 1908 and 1914,
there were seven major colliery disasters in the British industry,
involving the loss of 1277 lives (Nelson, 1939: 559). Official clearance
had been given to the use of electricity underground in 1905, following a
Home Office investigation. In that year, a code of Special Regulations had
been established to regulate the use of the new power supply. These
regulations were updated in 1913, but thereafter remained in force
substantially unaltered through the inter-war period. According to the
official statistics, electricity caused a further 224 deaths in the
industry between 1926 and 1936 - 'due to shock, fire, or the ignition of
fire-damp' (Nelson, 1939: 605). The total number of lives lost as a result
of accidents below-ground in mines governed by the Coal Mines Acts in these
ten years was thus brought to 8,656.
Electricity steadily displaced compressed air as the motive power for
coal-face machinery over the inter-war period, although compressed air
continued to be used in those mines and districts where the emission of
fire-damp reached such a level as to prohibit the use of electricity, and
to drive coal-cutting machines of the percussive type. These machines
differed in their design and action from rotary coal-cutters (bar, disc and
chain), While the latter actually undercut the coal, percussive machines
reproduced mechanically the action of the miner using a hand-pick for
holing, and broke-up the coal through a series of rapid blows. Percussive
machines were lightweight and portable and hence might be hand-held, or
attached to a fixed column around which they were rotated. They were mainly
used for 'heading' or 'narrow work' in bord and pillar workings, and to
advance the loading roads with longwall mining. But they were less powerful
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than machines of the rotary type, possessing an annual output capacity of
2,500 tons in comparison with the 11,000 tons of the disc-type of machines
in use at the beginning of this century (Church et al, 1986: 349).
Nevertheless, percussive machines accounted for 37 per cent (1,882) of the
total 5,073 coal-cutting machines in use in the British industry in 1920;
this proportion falling to 18 per cent (1398) of the total 7,729 machines
in use by 1938 M.
Three principal types of rotary coal-cutting machines were employed in
the British industry; bar, disc and chain coal-cutters. These machines
operated on the same general principle, combining a penetrative function
with the turning action of sharp pointed tools or picks to undercut the
seam. Each consisted of a cutting tool mounted on a moveable base, and in
longwall workings the whole apparatus was hauled along at a steady pace
(normally by rope haulage) to undercut the face (Shepherd and Withers,
1960: 29). While percussive drills might be hand-held and operated by the
collier to get the coal before filling it into tubs, with the introduction
of larger and heavier rotary coal-cutters the work was sub-divided and the
new grade of machine operator created.
Lighter and more portable than machines of the disc-type, bar coal-
cutters could be employed for longwall applications and for heading or
narrow work. But these machines gave rise to mechanical and clearance
difficulties and were outclassed by the disc-type in hard holings. The disc
machine achieved an early popularity in the British industry, with the
majority of the rotary coal-cutters in use in the period before 1913 of
this type. Although stronger than the bar machine, the disc-type could
only be used for longwall working, and to make a relatively shallow depth
of undercut, while it was unsuitable where the floor was undulating, or
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where the coal was liable to collapse onto the disc, thereby trapping it.
These limitations proved increasingly restrictive with attempts to undercut
to greater depths and, with the availability of an alternative, more
productive design, colliery firms increasingly turned to machines of the
chain type from the 1920s.
TABLE 5.1. PATTERN OF ROTARY COAL-CUTTERS IN USE IN BRITAIN, 1900-38
Disc Bar Chain Total
1900 160 16 4 180
1910 930 333 134 1397
1920 1254 700 1216 3170
1930 572 566 4132 5270
1938 140 186 6005 6331
(Anderson and Thorpe, 1967; 779; H.M. Inspector of Mines, Report, 1938)
The chain machine could be employed for longwall and for heading (or
narrow) work. Its cutting tool consisted of a projecting arm or jib,
carrying an endless chain armed with picks. Prototype chain coal-cutters
had been developed in Britain from the 1860s although, as indicated above,
their use was limited before the First World War. Early designs had proved
unsatisfactory, with the chain liable to break under presssure or to be
buried under the weight of coal. Mining companies and engineering firms
involved in machine production had in turn concentrated on making
improvements to the disc-type of coal-cutter.
In the United States, in contrast, machine manufacturers had concentrated
almost exclusively on the chain design from the 1870s, developing it to a
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high level of productive efficiency and adapting it 'to suit different
conditions as they were encountered' (Reid Report, 1945: 40). From the
early twentieth century, and with increasing success during the First World
War, US machine manufacturers had attempted to penetrate the British
market. Features of the chain machine, as developed in the US, now began to
recommend it to British mining companies. With continuing improvements, the
chain coal-cutter was established as the most popular type in this country
by the 1920s; recognition of its 'overwhelming superiority' deriving from
its greater increase in productivity over the period in comparison with the
bar and disc types of coal-cutter (Evans and Fine, 1980: 10).
The early success of US machine manufacturing firms - in the development
of the chain coal-cutter and in terms of their export performance - has
been attributed to industrial organization in that country (Anderson and
Thorpe, 1967; Shepherd and Withers, 1960; Hibberd, 1955). From the outset,
the manufacture of coal-cutting equipment was organized as a specialist
branch of engineering with a number of dominant firms soon emerging. These
companies worked in collaboration with mining concerns. They employed
specialist technical staff, with experience in coal mining, and laid out
their works for the exclusive production of coal-cutting machinery. In
Britain, in contrast, in the period before 1913, mining companies ordered
machines to their particular specification from generalist engineering
firms 'not necessarily connected with mining and whose concern began and
ended with the construction of the machine' (Anderson and Thorpe, 1967:
779). While the limited size of the domestic market must obviously have
inhibited specialization, the fragmented structure of production on the
machine manufacturing side, with engineering firms building prototypes and
'one-offs', resulted not only in some peculiar end products, but also
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relatively high unit costs. The experience of US competition during the
First World War, however, prompted some reorganization, with a number of
larger, specialized machine manufacturing firms emerging in Britain from
the beginning of the inter-war period. Initially copying and developing US
designs, firms such as Anderson and Boyes, Ma yor and Coulson, and Diamond,
thereafter developed links with mining companies and collaborated with
mining engineers in product design and innovation. These firms were able to
expand through the development of the domestic market and through exports,
with the manufacture of mining equipment coming to represent an important
sector of UK engineering. Nevertheless, the Technical Advisory Committee
appointed by the Ministry of Fuel and Power (hereafter, the Reid Committee)
could identify significant scope for economies through the standardization
of coal-cutting machines and parts in its Report, published in 1945.
While British machine manufacturing firms concentrated on the production
of chain coal-cutters for longwall applications in the inter-war period,
their counterparts in the United States had developed this design
principally for bord and pIllar (or room and pillar as this system was
known in North America) working. The room and pillar method was almost
universally adopted in the US industry in the nineteenth century, or pre-
mechnization, with geological conditions in that country tending to
maintain its productivity advantage over the unmechanized longwall system.
Seams were generally thicker (516 foot on average), at a shallower distance
from the surface and less faulted than those worked in Britain in the late
nineteenth century (Anglo-American Council on Productivity, 1951: 29).
Thereafter, the advantage of the room and pillar method was sustained with
the development of machinery which made possible the 'rapid development of
headings, and the extraction of pillars soon after they had been formed'
(Reid Report, 1945: 40). These were shortwall and arcwall coal-cutters.
The former performed a function somewhere between that of a longwall
cutter and a heading machine, which is to say it 'cuts a short longwall
face or a wide heading' (Shepherd and Withers, 1960: 86). Arcwall and
shearing machines could be arranged to cut in planes other than the
horizontal. They were principally chain-type coal-cutters, but adapted to
operate head-on to the face. The arcwall was developed for cutting in the
'narrow' of room and pillar work. It cut a semi-circle with its jib, the
machinery remaining stationary during this process, so that the width of
the heading that could be cut from one position was limited. Such machines
were only employed on a limited scale in the British coal industry,
although they were adopted at some collieries in the inter-war period for
driving the headings (or stables) at either end of longwall faces.
Face Conveyors
Mechanical coal-cutters displaced the hand-holing collier. The coal-cutting
machines in use in the British industry at the beginning of this century
could undercut at a rate some two to three times faster than the collier
using a hand pick (Church et al, 1986: 348) and considerable improvements
in machine capacity were made over the inter-war period (Royal Commission
on Safety, 1938). But the coal had still to be blasted-off the face and
filled, by hand, into tubs brought to the face by haulage workers. In order
to attain the maximum utilization of machine capacity, therefore, various
changes were introduced to accelerate the rate at which coal was 'cleared'
and transported away from the face to the underground haulage routes.
Mechanical face conveyors, employed to transport the coal from the face
to the gate- or loading-roads, were introduced in the British industry from
the early twentieth century. Before the First World War, however, their
practical application was limited with only 377 conveyors in use at the
face in 1913. There were various models - shaker, scraper and belt-type
conveyors - although these operated on the same general principle. The
conveyor was erected in a track running along the length of a working face,
and was driven by pulleys or rollers at the discharging end. Coal was
shovelled onto it by the faceworkers, transported along the face and
discharged into the gate-road or into tubs via a gate-end conveyor. The
belt-type conveyor proved to be the most popular model, so that by the
1930s the 'classic longwall installation consisted of a chain machine and
belt-type face conveyor on a single or double unit' (Anderson and Thorpe,
1967: 780).
Mining companies initially viewed the face conveyor as reinforcing and
extending the advantages of the longwall method; reducing the number of
gate-roads that had to be built to give access to and from the face and,
with this, reducing the ratio of indirect to direct workers engaged at the
face. In thin seams, in particular, worked on the longwall method, there
was little space to push tubs along the face to the collier's working
place. Gate-roads therefore had to be built at frequent intervals so that
the output from the stalls could be filled into tubs and removed by haulage
workers. With conveyors, however, 'instead of having a gate road to shoot
in every 10 or 12 yards, you have a gate road perhaps every 180 yards'
(Eight Hours Day Committee, 1907, Q. 17050). But while the costs of
building and maintaining roadways might be reduced, it remained essential
to pack the goaf behind the advancing longwall face, and this work absorbed
much material and 'unproductive' labour (Ma yor, 1924: 1510-11).
Conveyors also served to increase the productivity of direct workers, or
to increase the amount of productive labour time devoted to the operation
of coal-filling. They reduced the amount of 'casting' or 'boxing'
necessary, since the coal had no longer to be shovelled along the face to
the gate-roads in thin seams. Moreover:
	
the filler, instead of lifting the coals into a tub,
has only to lift the coals into troughs - a maximum height
of 18 in. This means that the output per filler per shift
should be greatly increased: in the case of a seam 3 ft.
thick, where fillers in the ordinary longwall method can
fill six tons per shift, there is no reason why with
conveyors the output should not be at least 10 tons per
filling shift. For the sane output, therefore, from a
given face a reduction of 40 per cent. in the number of
fillers can be effected. (Colliery Guardian, 1.1.1926:35)
Conveyors were adopted in some mines and districts where the coal continued
to be undercut by hand. From the 1920s, however, mining engineers stressed
that where the coal was cut by machinery, the installation of conveyors was
essential to secure the maximum utilization of the coal-cutting equipment.
The application of power to the conveying of coal at and
in the vicinity of the coal face may be described as
technically and economically essential to intensive machine
mining in which the productive effort is concentrated and
large outputs are obtained from comparatively small areas.
That the difficulties of dealing with the output from coal
cutters without any radical change in the methods of loading
the coal and delivering it to the mechanical haulage are
practically insuperable is becoming more widely recognised.
(Mayor, 1926: 901-03)
Mechanical conveyors in conjunction with work reorganization at the face
served to accelerate the rate at which coal could be 	 'cleared' and
transported away from the face to the underground haulage routes. But the
rate at which coal could be transported along secondary and primary haulage
routes to the shaft might also act as a brake on productivity at the face
and, in the British coal industry in the interwar period, the methods of
transporting coal underground were primitive, having changed little from
those considered to be 'best practice' in the late nineteenth century
(Reid Report, 1945: 65). Haulage techniques in Britain and on the Continent
are considered in the final section of this chapter.
THE SOCIAL REORGANIZATION OF PRODUCTION
Mechanization involved expenditure on coal-cutting machinery, power
generation and its transmission below ground, and supporting equipment.
With this increased capital outlay, firms claimed greater control over the
use of their expensive investments, supplementing the 'rights of property'
with the 'right to manage' . (Melling, 1980:19651 _MinIng engineers advised
that the 'success' of coal-cutting machinery 'did not... altogether depend
upon the number of yards cut on certain days, but on producing a constant
and regular output' and that this could 'only be brought about by everthing
being done systematically' (Royal Commission on Coal Supplies, 1901-05:
341). The machines had to be kept going at full capacity and their costs
covered by a 'sufficiently' large increase in productivity. In other words,
colliers could not be allowed to enjoy the benefits of machinery in the
form of less back-breaking work. Rather, they had to be induced to put 'the
same energy' (if not more) that they had formerly expended on hand-holing
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into the work of 'breaking down and filling the coal away' (Simpson, 1921:
449). Towards this end, managements and their technical advisers
experimented with new work arrangements at the face in the period to the
early 1920s.
Longwall mining afforded the potential to maximize the machine time
actually devoted to undercutting in a working shift, or to minimize the
time lost in 'flitting' the machines from one short face (or pillar) across
the roadways to another. With this priority, the size of the stalls in
longwall workings was initially enlarged, although with the 'long face'
system - employed at a number of mines where machines had been installed in
the period before the First World War - the coal-cutters were used to
undercut a number of such lengths of working face in sequence, and were
still 'flitted from end to end of the face round the roads' (Ridsdale,
1925:21). Machine operators were paid by the yardage of face undercut and
simply progressed along the face, undercutting the maximum length possible
in their working shift. Machine operators worked on the same shift, or on
one overlapping with the colliers who, in addition to filling the coal into
tubs, night still be required to complete 'deadwork' tasks - timbering and
packing the goaf.
But the long face system did not survive on any scale much beyond the
mid-1920s. Aside from the machine time lost in 'flitting', the sub-division
of the collier's work had created a 'perpetual problem of organisation' for
management or, more accurately, for subordinate officials (Colliery
Guardian, 31.8.1923:525). Colliers had constantly to be re-deployed along
the face by the deputies and in accordance with the rate of progress of the
machine operators. Any delay in 'clearing' the face brought the machines to
a standstill while if, as was often found in practice, 'the front end of
the face is ready to be cut again before the machine has finished cutting
at the far end' (Ridsdale, 1925:21), colliers were left 'under-employed'
during their working shift.
By the early 1920s, mining engineers were emphasizing the distinction
between mechanical coal-cutting and machine mining 'proper'. Typified by
the long face system, mechanical coal-cutting represented the use of
machinery 'merely as a makeshift or as a counterpoise to manual labour'
(Colliery Guardian, 3.10.1924:882). With machine mining, in contrast,
management addressed the process of coal-getting as a whole, constructing a
'co-ordinated system' in which the 'primary process' of undercutting 'was
not dissociated from the ancillary services upon which the effective
application of machinery at the coal face depends' (Mayor, 1924:1510).
Defined as the 'application of machinery in systematic conformity with a
pre-determined mining policy', machine mining in effect represented an
extension of managerial control over the preparation and planning of work
and over the use of the new technology, with this control employed to
direct and increase the productive effect of labour.
The 'Unit System', or Intensive Machine Mining
For the industry's technical experts, machine mining meant the 'unit
system'. By the early 1920s, they were reporting that it was 'beyond doubt'
that the 'coal-cutters producing the largest outputs in relation to the
thickness of the seam are those which are employed on the unit system and
are "non-flitters" (Colliery Guardian, 31.8.1923:525). Later known as the
i longwall method' (Trist and Bamforth, 1951), or 'conventional machine
mining' (Goldthorpe, 1959), the unit system had largely displaced the 'long
-211-
face' method by the mid-1920s, and thereafter became established as the
dominant system of machine mining in the British industry in the interwar
period. It involved the 'standardisation of method' and 'specialisation of
labour' (Mayor, 1926:903), or the imposition of a more intensive division
of labour at the coal face and creation of a large-scale production system,
organized and directed by management.
In contrast with the long face method, management now planned 'every
detail of the scheme of operation in advance' so that 'organisation is
built up at the beginning once and for all' and, in theory at least, had
thereafter 'only to be maintained on established lines' by subordinate
officials (Colliery Guardian, 31.8.1923:525). The collier's 'complete job'
was broken down into a series of narrowly-defined tasks. These tasks were
arranged by management in rigid sequence over three separate shifts. Coal-
cutting and coal-filling were organized on two separate shifts, with other
preparatory and 'deadwork' tasks arranged on a third shift and so that
'work at a machine face (became) a twenty-four hour cycle of three
operations in unending succession' (Manley, 1947:12). Within each shift,
however, there was an increased division of labour and workers were
confined to the performance of a single - or at least simplified - task.
The working face was divided into a series of 'units' (see figure 5.3
below), each one organized on similar principles and of such length that it
could 'with certainty' be undercut by a single coal-cutting machine to a
specified depth within the time limits of a single working shift. In this
way, machine time was used more intensively with the elimination of the
process of 'flitting', and a greater priority was given to the rate of
advance of the face - or depth of cut - rather than simply to the length of
face undercut. Machine time was used more intensively and labour was
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arranged accordingly. In contrast with the long face method, each machine
crew was now assigned a 'definitely specified task to be performed within
specified limits of time and to be repeated at regular intervals', or once
in every period of 24 hours. Similarly, all other tasks involved in the
extraction of coal - drilling, shotfiring, filling out the coal, ripping
the roadways, timbering and packing - were 'so organised that they too
(could be) regularly completed in a given tine', the face advanced each day
a distance equal to the depth of the cut and a large output of coal
regularly extracted from a relatively concentrated working area (Colliery
Guardian, 31.8.1923:525).
A single face-unit would be between 100 and 120 yards in length,
depending upon the thickness of the seam, with a three foot seam undercut
to a depth of, perhaps, five foot.
	 the coal-cutter allotted to the face cuts across
it every day during one cutting shift, all other work
being arranged accordingly so that the face advances
one complete cut per 24 hours, and the output per day
from each unit only varies within very narrow limits.
Conveyors may or may not be in use, but each machine
is responsible for its individual face, which must be
only of such length that it can be cut within the time
allotted to cutting. . . (Ibid)
A double face-unit was 'a pair of such faces in line to right and left of a
central loading road to which the output of both faces is delivered'. The
length and depth of the cut established the volume of coal to be extracted
from each face-unit each day. In the case of a double face-unit, this might
be 200 to 250 tons. To obtain this output, however, effort had to be
'concentrated'; labour organized into large work collectivities and brought
to work with the strength and regularity of machinery.
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In place of the collier and his assistant, or small coalface work team
of hand coal-getting, a 'cycle group' was created as the basic production
unit within the mine. Some 40 to 50 workers might be employed at a double
face-unit, or whatever complement would ensure that each task was completed
to time and each man kept 'fully employed' during his working shift. The
members of the 'cycle group' were divided by time - working on three
separate shifts in the 24 hour period - - and by task, with an array of
specialized jobs created from the collier's craft job and performed in
accordance with management's 'pre-arranged timetable'.
The 24 hour cycle of operations commenced with the cutting shift, which
was usually performed at night. A machine crew would comprise four men,
each of whom had his own, narrowly-defined task to execute. The first man
worked in advance of the coal-cutting machine, taking out the timber props
supporting the face to allow the machine to pass. The second man (or 'the
cutter') steered the machine, and had to ensure that an even cut was made
along the lenghth of the face. The third followed behind to clear the
i gummings s , or coal left between the undercut and the floor, and the fourth
re-set the timber props. Machine men were exposed to fresh health hazards
in their work since the operation of the coal-cutter created a 'fantastic
din' and filled the confined space at the face with 'a dense cloud of black
dust' (Manley, 1947;12).
The machine crew was followed by the 'belt-men' who also worked on the
night shift and whose job was to move the face conveyor out of its old
track and into a new position alongside the freshly-cut face. Up to four
men would be employed on this work; two on belt-breaking and two on belt-
building. The work was physically demanding and awkward. The belt ran in a
metal trough which had to be dismantled into sections and reconstructed on
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the other side of the timber props supporting the face. Set at intervals of
a yard, these props formed a 'thick forest of obstruction' (Ibid).
At the start of the morning shift, the borers came on to drill holes at
ten yard intervals along the face, just below the roof, in preparation for
the shotfirer. The shots were fired singly, bringing down the coal at
particular spots, thereby making it easier for the colliers to 'break into'
the face. The bulk of faceworkers were now confined to filling the coal,
with the 'fillers' representing some 50 per cent of the complement of the
'cycle group'. This work was performed on the morning shift. Twenty men
would be employed on a double face-unit; ten on each half-length of face. A
common practice was for this length to be divided again so that each man
had an equal portion of face (8 to 10 yards) to 'clear' in his shift. The
fillers had to extract the coal from this length of face, going back to the
depth of the cut. They used a hand pick (or in some districts, a pneumatic
pick), to break into the coal and a shovel to load it onto the moving
conveyor belt. In some districts, the fillers were still required to set
props to secure each yard of face that had been 'cleared'. Their work was
arduous and monotonous and in thin seams had to be performed in a crouching
position. In contrast with hand coal-getting, fillers en a zeclanized face
worked under more intensive managerial surveillance since it was vital for
the face to be completely cleared of coal in the filling shift if the
machine operators were to begin their work promptly at the start of the
next cycle of operations (see below).
While the fillers were at work, other grades performed a variety of
ancillary tasks. Conveyor attendants kept the belts working and ensured
that the coal passed from the face, via the gate-conveyor, to the tubs. Men
at the loading end in the gate roads moved the empty tubs into position and
off again after they had been filled from the gate-conveyor. Others were in
charge of the putter engine which drove the conveyor belt. Haulage workers
moved the tubs to and from the main haulage routes. These different
operations were going on as 'part of the business of coal extraction while
the colliers are at work at the face; they are units in a human machine
which dovetails in with the mechanical contrivances to form one integrated
whole' (Manley, 1947:16).
On the third or afternoon shift, the rippers came on to extend and pack
the gate roads in line with the advance of the face. Prior to the
introduction of coal face machinery, this operation would have been
performed by a separate group of workers, normally on a separate shift, and
the work was little changed by the new arrangements at the face. It
remained a 'complete Job in itself, seen by the group within the compass of
one shift' (Trist and Bamforth, 1951:17). The rippers were followed by the
timber-drawers whose 'business is to withdraw all the back timber; that is,
to get the props and chocks which have been left supporting the roof as the
face has moved forward' (Manley, 1947:16). The chocks were arranged in a
double row behind the conveyor. The timber-drawer removed the back row
first and built a new row Just behind the conveyor track. The work was
dangerous - 'infinitely more so than in a hand-getting section' (Ibid)
since with the increase in the length of the working face, there was a
tremendous weight bearing down on the props. Assuming that the operation
was completed successfully, however, the face was prepared for the cutting
shift to begin again and commence the cycle of operations following in its
wake.
Skills, Autonomy, and the Intensification of Work
The introduction of coal-face machinery and increased division of labour
under the unit system effectively de-skilled the collier, undermined his
autonomy and control over work. This at least has been the verdict of most
academic commentators (eg Goldthorpe,1959; Daunton,1981; Burns et a1,1983;
Campbell, 1984). In the interwar years, mining engineers and other
interested parties were also quick to point out that mechanization 'almost
invariably produced a degradation of skill' (Gemmell, 1921:1607); that it
was displacing the 'skilled hewer as an important grade of labour' in the
coal industry (Hilton et al, 1935:44); and that in mining, 'as indeed in
every industry, mechanisation tends to negative craftsmanship' (Fox-Allin,
1949:107).
More recently, however, Penn and Simpson have offered an alternative
interpretation. They argue that a 'whole array of specialised skilled jobs
were created out of the traditional craft job of the collier' and that,
while 'the collier may have lost some of his skills in terms of his
traditional role, it would appear that overall more skills were required in
the new system' (1986:343-4). This is a curious conclusion. Penn and
Simpson attempt to evaluate the skills demanded by the new, specialized job
roles. But they could perhaps be criticized for failing to address the
central issues of job autonomy, and structure of control within the labour
process.
Certainly new grades of underground labour were created with machine
mining, and some new skills were required in production. Mechanical and
electrical fitters were required to maintain the coal-face machinery,
supporting equipment and power supply. But maintenance workers formed a
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small proportion of the total employed at or in the vicinity of the face.
Hence, in summarizing the changes in the composition of coal mining
employment brought about by mechanization, the Royal Commission on Safety
reported in 1938 that:
—.instead of the general skilled craftsman of the past,
who might properly be described as "the complete collier"
there are to-day broadly two kinds of colliery workers at
the face - (i) mechanics and the like semi-specialized
colliery craftsmen and, (ii) a substantial proportion of
workmen who, highly adept though many of them are, are
primarily manual labourers. (Report, 1938:46).
An array of specialized jobs were created from the collier's traditional
craft job, including that of machine operator or 'cutter'. 	 Penn and
Simpson argue that this was a 'skilled and often dangerous job' (p.343).
Other writers have agreed that to guide the cutting-machine and ensure an
even undercut required 'rather more "engineering" skill than other coal-
face tasks'. But the contrast was drawn with tasks such as belt-breaking,
belt-building, and filling which principally demanded an input of physical
effort (Trist and Bamforth, 1951:16). And mining engineers in the interwar
period contrasted the 'craft knowledge' and 'special skill' of the
'complete collier' with the 'limited capability required for driving coal-
cutters' (Nicholls, 1944-5:288), emphasizing as one of the advantages of
machine mining the fact that the 'machine man could be more quickly trained
than the hand hewer' (Simpson,1921:450).
Xining engineers advised that 'too much stress cannot be laid on the
value of a well-trained crew of attendants for each machine'. But they were
to a large extent concerned that machine operators should acquire the
behavioural skills of cooperation and obedience, arguing that 'their
training should be something like that of a well-drilled gun squad, each
man practised in his own special duties and working in full conjunction
with the other' (Bulman, 1921:1659-60). This concern followed from the
creation of a large-scale and more integrated production process involving
the use of expensive equipment and groups of specialized and interdependent
workers. Under the unit system, a definite length of face had to be
undercut to a specified depth in the time allotted to cutting if succeeding
shifts were not to be held-up and the 24 hour cycle of operations
disrupted.
Prior to the introduction of machinery and the unit system of machine
mining, the 'complete collier' worked in a self-contained stall or working
place at the face. With his helper, or assistants, he performed the entire
operation of coal-getting (and, possibly, all 'deadwork' tasks); cutting,
ripping and filling the coal out in the same coaling shift. Certainly the
degree of technical, or 'genuine' skill (Burgess, 1983:5) required varied -
as, for example, with the hardness or degree of faulting of the coal seams.
And the collier's skill was in part socially constructed, through the rules
and regulations governing access to piecework employment at the face (see
chapter three). But the collier (or work group) performed a complex set of
operations under variable geological conditions, and his piecework earnings
were dependent upon his skill, dexterity and also his physical strength.
And it was in large measure because of the nature of coalface work that
managements were unable to prescribe tasks in detail or closely monitor the
performance of work, although of course other relevant factors included the
physical conditions in which mining took place and job controls imposed by
faceworkers to prohibit interference from pit officials.
Of course, the autonomy enjoyed by the collier was not inviolable, and
was neither uniform between different coalfields nor over time (see chapter
three). A significant proportion of faceworkers, moreover, had been subject
to direction from the butty-man, collier, or senior member of the work
group (see chapter four). The transition from bard and pillar to longwall
mining had brought certain changes, although the colliers retained
considerable autonomy - determining how best to work the face, in which
sequence to perform the various tasks involved - while day-wage men worked
in a group which took (or in which some members took) these decisions and
retained immediate control over the pace of work.
With machine mining under the unit system, in contrast, the working face
was treated as an undifferentiated 'production unit'. Colliers lost their
control of an individual working place; they 'no longer work in isolation,
but are grouped' (Mavor,1924:1510). The work was sub-divided
	 into
discrete tasks performed on separate and consecutive shifts - so that
management alone could view the labour process as a whole.
	 the getting of coal by hand, with all the cutting,
shovelling, ripping, packing, drawing off, etc., was
a craft, an art, while now all the jobs are specialised
and have become monotonous. There are cutters, who are
cutting the coal-face by machine, and borers, and shot-
firers, and fillers, and beltmen or pan-turners, etc.
The collier of to-day in a mechanised colliery is doing
practically nothing but shovelling - shovelling all the
time...(Zweig,1948:21)
Penn and Simpson might object that such an account underestimates the
'skills and complexities of underground work'; that the job of filling (to
which the bulk of faceworkers were now confined) entailed 'much more than
shovelling coal "per se"; that while it demanded physical strength, it
also demanded experience of geological conditions to be performed
effectivly and with safety (p.343). But experience and skill are not the
same thing. Experience may produce dexterity in task performance and
provide some safeguard for workers performing routine jobs in hazardous
conditions. Skill, on the other hand, usually denotes versatile competence
and job autonomy, with the latter a function of the worker's control over
the conceptual aspects of production.
The craftsman collier possessed a 'wealth of native knowledge', and
mining engineers were often effusive in their praise of his multifarious
capabilities. But they also argued that the 'trouble is that such a workman
too often does not fit into the 'chain' (Greenwel1,1933;302), because he
performed a complex set of tasks under variable conditions, retained
immediate control over work and the scope to act on his own inititiative in
production, determining the pace at which he worked during his shift.
Through the division of the collier's 'complete task' into a series of
discrete and simplified jobs, management enhanced its control over labour.
The content of the specialized job roles could be defined with greater
precision; workers instructed as to what they should - or not - be doing in
their working shift. Mayor, the machine manufacturer, described the
benefits (to management) of the unit system in this way. He argued that the
detailed division of labour closed the gap between mining operations and
'the work carried on in factories and workshops', and noted the potential
which it gave for raising the intensity of labour.
	 the special difficulties and vicissitudes to which
mining is subject are mostly amenable to a considerable
degree of control by methods appropriate to the conditions.
Intensive mining facilitates control of the physical
conditions and further it facilitates control and increases
the productive effect of labour. Intensive mining on the
unit system implies a considerable amount of standardisation
of method, a daily cycle of operations at each unit of coal
face is established and several clearly defined operations
are repeated in the sane sequence day after day by men whose
labour is specialised, and the work becomes comparable with
some repetitive processes in workshops. These conditions
render practicable the application to mining organisation
and operations of the principles that in recent years have
so greatly increased the productivity of labour in other
industries - notably in engineering. (1926:903)
Eroding the collier's control over work, job fragmentation and redesign -
elements of the classic 'Tayloiist' approach to work reorganization - were
significant because they formed the basis for the intensification of
labour. That is to say, the 'porosity' of the working day could be reduced
by re-allocating to labour simplified tasks, parts of the complete
operation of winning the coal. Workers had no longer to prepare the work or
switch between different tasks in its execution. Hence periods of
'unproductive' labour time could be minimized as managements attempted to
impose new, and exacting work schedules at the face.
Of course, the substitution of machinery for undercutting and increased
division of labour under the unit system (with the separation of
preparatory and production tasks) did not eradicate the potential for
worker resistance to intensification. But there again, labour market
conditions in the interwar years bolstered management's advantage in this
process and mineworkers, their representatives - and many colliery
officials - reported that with mechanization the work had been 'speeded-
up'.
It is often thought that the development of mechanized
mining has lightened the physical burdens of the miner,
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and it is true that to-day mechanical coal-cutters and
conveyors do much of the heavy work which was formerly
done by manual labour. But in mining, as in other industries,
the machines are employed to the best advantage only when
they are working at full capacity and without stopping; the
men have to keep pace with the machines and consequently
there has, been a great speeding-up of the work and an
increased strain on the men. Imagine a coal-cutting machine
and a conveyor underground. The machine cuts the coal at
lightning speed and the conveyor brings it out to the
waggons in an endless stream; to feed the conveyor adequately
the men have to work at the highest possible pressure and
without a moment's respite. This is a big strain on their
nerves, which is increased by the noise in which the work
is done... (Jones, 1936:21)
The division of labour alone could not ensure labour's compliance with new
effort standards at the face. Yet by virtue of the interdependence of the
specialized job roles in the unit or cycle system it became essential that
workers did comply with management's pre-determined work schedule and
complete their allotted tasks to tine. Hence, while with hand coal-getting
the 'rate of production was to some extent a matter for the individual
miner', with machine mining there 'developed the need for closer
supervision of the rate and amount of work done' (Royal Commission on
Safety, 1938:183).
Firms had to develop the function of supervision, deploying staff to
maintain a new discipline at the face and ensure that tasks were completed
promptly. This was an assault on the collier's 'independence' and one
which was bitterly resented. The craftsman collier, who to an extent had
been 'his own master' in his stall or working place, now found himself
subordinatated as 'a cog in the machine' (Greenwell, 1933:302); a 'link in
a chain of producers and must conform to the routine of the mine'
(Mitchell, 1933:78); a 'partner in a team which is usually big, of twenty
or thirty or even one hundred men, who must collectively clear the face by
a given time, so that the belt can be turned and moved forward, towards the
receding face' (Zweig, 1948:22).
Supervision and Payment Systems
The Royal Commission on Safety reported in 1938 that mechanization had
created the need for a 'far more intensive and continuous supervision over
the progress of work in each district than was required in hand mining'
(Report:48). Mining engineers stressed the same point and in the interwar
years urged that 'outputs, such as thoroughly Justify the use of mechanical
conveyors, can be obtained only by the most carefully thought-out
organization and skilled and constant supervision' (Clive, 1929-30:311; see
also Mayor, 1924; Barraclough, 1927-8; Newsy, 1929-30; Tyson, 1930).
Mechanization and the unit or cycle system of machine mining created a
two-fold need for supervision; in terms of both the coordination of the
production process and the control - or surveillance and coercion - of
labour. The collier's 'complete task' had been fragmented into a series of
narrowly-defined tasks arranged in rigid sequence over three separate
shifts. Labour was specialized, with workers confined to the performance of
a discrete part of the process of coal extraction, and it now fell to
management to integrate these interdependent tasks and shifts into a
coordinated system. The cycle system of production also 'developed the
need' for closer supervision of the performance and pace of work at the
face.
With hand coal-getting, the collier worked in a self-contained stall or
place and bore the consequences of any delay in his work in the form of
reduced earnings. Other coal-getters would be little affected, working in
their self-contained stall or working place. But mechanization involved a
'regular cycle of intensive operations', with 40 to 50 workers and the mine
owner's expensive coal face equipment deployed at each unit-face. While a
'well-organised machine face set a definite pace of the cycle of operations
that must follow in its sequence' (Colliery Guardian, 9.2.1923:346),
equally it demanded the 'rigid adherence to timetable' (Moonie, 1936-
7:247). Tasks and shifts were interdependent, no shift could begin until
work on the preceding one had been completed, and the creation of this
large-scale, differentiated and rigidly-sequenced work system had created
the potential for large-scale disruption and failure in production (Trist
and Bamforth,1951). Workers on each shift had an allotted task which they
had to complete in a specified time, and delays on any one shift could have
a knock-on effect through the cycle as a whole, rendering men and machinery
on succeeding shifts 'idle' with, possibly, the loss of a day's output of
200 to 250 tons.
The cycle system involved tight work schedules and new output norms.
Interwar commentators reported that it had forced mineowners to abandon
their old 'laissez faire' attitude to labour management and to 'operate
their mines by means of factory methods'.
Machinery...does not permit of leisure on'the Job
itself, for almost the whole merit of a conveyor
system, in either a factory or a mine, is that it
connotes a constantly moving cycle with which the
human element must comply. (Greenwell, 1933:303)
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Managements were attempting to simulate a 'conveyor system' or assembly-
line, and workers had to be brought to comply with the new work rhythmns
which meant an attack on job controls, the erosion of the collier's former
autonomy, and imposition of a new, managerially-inspired work discipline.
In part this involved the introduction of new rules and regulations
concerning, for example, attendance and penalties for absenteeism. It also
implied an increase in direct supervision at the face and coercion.
Colliers had to be brought to commence work promptly at the start of their
shift, complete their 'allotted work to time-table', with any 'lagging
behind at once corrected' (Newey, 1929-30:384). Management now determined
when the men could rest and take a break for their 'snap', and when they
had completed their 'stint', so that as Mitchell (1933:77) described it, on
the filling shift there could be 'no quitting of the job so long as the
conveyor can gobble up more coal'.
Machine mining created the need for greater supervision in the form of
coercion, and many writers have suggested that the colliery deputy - as
first-line supervisor - was cast in the role of 'agent of change' in this
process, and was charged with the responsibility for imposing and
maintaining the new work discipline at the face (eg Goldthorpe, 1959:219).
The changes in the deputies' role and responsibilities over the interwar
period are considered in detail in chapter six. It is pertinent to note
here, however, that the Coal Mines Act of 1911 restricted the part that
deputies could (legally) play in coercion, since it charged them with
certain defined responsiblities for safety in the mines, and 'in general
debarred (them) from doing anything else except such shot-firing and
measurement of work as will not interfere with the thorough performance of
their safety duties' (Royal Commission on Safety, Report, 1938:48).
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In practice, of course, the statute might only be 'honoured in the
breach', as the Secretary at the Mines Department argued in 1936 <Royal
Commission on Safety, Evidence:7, Q33). And to circumvent the legislative
constraints there had also been 'a tendency in mechanized mines to appoint
officials, without safety duties, to look after production' (Royal
Commission on Safety, Report:183). These were the colliery overmen who
occupied a position in the managerial hierarchy between the manager (or
under-manager) and the deputy. Throughout the inter-war period, the
qualifications for this position and the duties involved remained undefined
in the legislation regulating safety standards in the mines. This meant
that overmen could be employed exclusively 'on production' and, by virtue
of their rank, override considerations of safety in the interests of
output.
The increase in supervision brought about with mechanization is stressed
in the literature of the interwar period - in official enquiries and
reports, trade and technical journals, and in the commentaries of working
miners and ex-miners (on the latter, see Field, 1981). But it is not
actually expressed in the available statistics on the number of officials
employed below ground. Between 1913 and 1924, there was a small increase in
the number of deputies and overmen employed, and of these officials as a
proportion of the total underground labour force (from 3.5% to 4%, Royal
Commission on Safety,Report:51). But these figures relate to the industry
as a whole and since less than 25 per cent of British coal output was cut
mechanically in 1924, this suggests a general increase across mechanized
and unmechanized mines and prompted by safety legislation <with deputies
increasing from 2.8 to 3.1% of the total underground in this period) as
direct supervision - at least in comparison with hand-
increase in supervision might be expressed more in the
well as by changes in managerial practice. Supple presents figures for the
period 1921-31, calculated from the annual Censuses, which indicate that:
...while the proportion of miners who were returned as
'subordinate superintending staff' rose from 5.1 to 5.3
per cent in Nottinghamshire, it was stable at 5.1 per
cent in Northumberland and actually fell in every other
major district (most strikingly in Glamorgan and
Monmouthshire - from 3.3 and 3.5 to 2.7 and 3.0 per cent).
(1987:441)
But the data are at least consistent with the claim made by many mining
engineers that while mechanization 'necessitates closer supervision than on
hand-worked faces,... owing .to the concentration of output such close
supervision can be effected at a reduced cost per ton' (Barraclough, 1927-
8:194; see also Mayor, 1924). Faceworkers formed a declining proportion of
the total underground labour force in the industry as
interwar period, and in mechanized mines they were also
within the mine, or grouped along a continuous length
which facilitated
working. And the
a whole over the
more concentrated
of working face,
changed role of underground officials than in the actual numbers employed,
which would of course imply that the deputies were unable to perform their
statutory safety duties (see chapter six).
Nethertheless, underground conditions still prohibited the continuity of
surveillance that might have been feasible in a factory, while even in the
latter the cost-effectiveness of constant and uninterrupted supervision had
to be set against the expense of employing large numbers of supervisory
staff. Mineowners in general displayed a reluctance to adopt any measure
that would add to their overheads, and it is likely that practices varied
between firms. lewey reported that at pits in his charge, 'we have a deputy
and a shot-firer on each getting shift and a deputy on the afternoon or
repair shift, whilst each of the two main districts has an overman on all
three shifts' (1929-30384). But such arrangements may not have been
universal.
Constant and uninterrupted supervision could not be maintained even in
the best-staffed mines, however, while workers were unlikely to be
persuaded to comply with the new rhythms of production without some sort of
'positive' incentive. Firms continued to rely heavily on the piecework
payment system, although arrangements had to be modified with the
transition from hand coal-getting to machine mining. With the former,
colliers were paid according to the rates for particular jobs stipulated in
the composite piecework price lists (see chapter three), and their payment
might include the day-rate of their helper or assistant. With the
introduction of machinery and sub-division of the work, price lists were
disaggregated as piecework was extended so that most of the new job roles
(and a far higher proportion of faceworkers) were paid on some sort of
output-related wage incentive scheme.
....even though we were all so interdependent, each operation
was still separate, and paid for on a separate contract - the
colliers for so much coal filled, the cutters for so much coal
cut, the borers for so many holes bored, and the packers for
so many yards packed and waste removed. (Gormley, 1982:28)
New patterns of differentiation were therefore nurtured under the unit or
cycle system of production, in spite of the sub-division and
'homogenization' of labour.
Technical innovation and work reorganization at the face occasioned the
revision of piecework price lists and bargaining groups. For some
commentators - and notably Sam Ma yor, who was no doubt influenced by his
knowledge of developments in the engineering sector - work reorganization
also offered firms the opportunity to establish rate-setting on a more
'scientific' basis. Mayor argued that the standardization of work and
routinization of jobs made it possible for firms to apply work-study
techniques. In this way, they would be able to establish the parameters of
a 'standard day's work in each operation concerned in the cycle' rather
than allowing such standards to be determined through 'guesswork' - that
is, through the process of bargaining between management and men (1924;
1510-11). Mayor envisaged the introduction of some sort of premium bonus
scheme. Workers would be paid a basis wage if they achieved the 'standard
job time' and a bonus for 'performance in excess', with bonus rates for the
additional output (or effort) already prescribed through the work study
exercise.
Other mining engineers displayed an interest in work study techniques
(for example, Moss, 1935-6; Barraclough, 1927-8). They argued that such
techniques could be used to reduce job times and accelerate the flow of
work to and from the face. But colliery companies in practice displayed
little commitment to reducing the delays that were caused by ineffective
methods of underground haualage, or to raising 'productive' labour time by
investing in underground transport facilities for mineworkers who often had
to walk long distances to reach their working place at the face (see
below). In mechanized mines, the piecework payment systems that were
introduced were rather less elaborate than those proposed by Mayor, and
continued to relate output and earnings directly. And whatever 'scientific'
principles managements applied to the process of rate-fixing, it remained
within the scope of collective bargaining with managers and workers
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pitching their respective, 'subjective' Judgements on the contours of a
'standard day's work'.
Mineowners frequently complained that the colliers brought their old
'habits' to the process of rate-fixing in mechanized mines, and tried to
'keep down the standard output' when machines were under trial (Colliery
Guardian, 2.10.1925:806). They complained that the men tried to maintain
the 'old rates' under the new conditions (or attempted to maintain their
earnings and/or secure some share of the productivity gains), and argued
that piece-rate reductions were justified since the higher output obtained
was due to their investment . in coal-face machinery (Colliery Guardian,
15.2.1924:413). Certainly the revision of piece-rates with the introduction
of machinery formed the focus of disputes, with owners attempting to reduce
rates and/or intensify work and colliers attempting to prevent overwork or
secure some share of the productivity gains in the form of higher earnings.
But work reorganization gave managements something of an advantage in this
process, since many workers were thrust into new Job roles for which there
were no 'customary' effort standards.
The difficulty in some districts of fixing new contract
rates for machine-mined coal can be appreciated to some
extent, for in most cases the men have but a faint idea
of the output they can produce under the new conditions
until a trial has been made. Even then, it is a fact
that 	 the results obtained until all the men become
proficient at their new work are often far from good,
and the men look with apprehension on the new figures
suggested. (Newey, 1929-30:385)
In the late 1920s and 1930s, mass unemployment in the coalfields and
weakened labour organization tipped the balance more obviously in the
employers' favour.
If conflict occurred over the revision of piece-rates, a more intractable
problem for employers lay in determining the form of piece-rate scheme to
be applied in the case of men hand-loading coal onto mechanical conveyors.
In mechanized mines, the bulk of the coalface labour force was employed on
the filling shift. The work was physically demanding and monotonous, and
was often performed in very cramped conditions. The face had to be
'cleared' by the end of the shift if subsequent operations were not to be
delayed, while work on the filling shift was often impeded by the breakdown
of the conveyor belt. Often a tonnage payment was established. The output
from each face-unit would be wound to the surface and weighed, and the
earnings divided equally between the gang of 20 to 30 men - basically an
'all-throw-in' arrangement. But this could be the basis of tension where
the men (or a proportion of them) had formerly been employed as colliers
and paid on an individual piecework system, and there was a more obvious
conflict between management and workers over the 'stint' or amount of work
to be completed during the shift.
The problem for employers was one of motivating workers to work hard at
an arduous and essentially routine Job. Mining engineers suggested the
value of cultivating a 'team spirit' on conveyor faces, so that men would
be 'positively motivated' to work hard and reach - or surpass -
management's output targets. The proposed means of achieving such a state
of affairs included the 'careful selection of sets of men' (Tyson,
1930:2068); careful selection of officials, with men 'chosen who can instil
and maintain the team spirit in the men under their charge' (Barraclough,
192?-8:194); and, in the spirit of the 'human relations in industry'
movement, acceptance of 'self-discipline' on the part of management, who
should be 'willing to listen to any grievance of the men, and, should this
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prove legitimate, take immediate steps to rectify it' (Newey; 1929-30:385).
But managers often professed to be baffled by what they described as the
'psychology of group work', and complained that on conveyor faces 'the
productive effort is too often reduced to the level of the less energetic
members of the group'.
A few would think they were doing all the work, and, on
the whole there would be evidence of distrust, Jealousy
and lack of efficiency. The average efficiency of the
workers would, sooner or later, naturally rate itself
to that of the most inefficient man in the stall. This
might result in a demand for a higher getting rate or
trouble with the union, due to men not making wages.
(Wightman, 1933:495-6)
Such behaviour, of course, might be taken as evidence of a 'team spirit';
the collective imposition of effort controls by the fillers in an attempt
to prohibit overwork. But it was clearly not the kind of 'team spirit'
demanded by management, and hence in an attempt to stimulate work effort
(by exciting competition between the men), some firms switched to a yardage
payment, with each filler paid according to the number of yards of face
which he had stripped in his working shift: This might be effective,
insofar as it induced workers to clear as many yards as possible. But some
managers complained that 'unless strict supervision was exercised, some of
the coal might be flung in the gob instead of on to the conveyor' (Ibid).
With either a yardage or a tonnage payment, however, piecework tended to
be transformed into a flat-rate system under the cycle system of
production. This was because the work of the different shifts had to be
'balanced' in order to maintain the continuity of the cycle of operations
as a whole (Zweig, 1948:78). The ability of employers to enforce a
particular definition of the 'stint' <for particular tasks and for the
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unit-face as a whole) and to raise it with improvements in machine
capacity, was no doubt enhanced in the interwar years - and from the
period after 1926 in particular - by conditions in the external labour
market, low wage-rates and weakened labour organization at pit level. A
third of the industry's workforce was unemployed in the early 1930s, and
while employer practices did vary, firms could always 	 eschew a more
sophisticated approach to labour management and fall back on the threat of
dismissal.
"There are two sorts of discipline. One which was in
in practice in the old days, based on the fact that
two men waited for one Job. If a man dared to open
his mouth in criticism of anything in the pit, he was
told briefly and simply, 'Get out', and in the pit-bottom
itself there were men already waiting and eager to replace
him". (Overman, interviewed by Zweig, 1948:16)
Unemployment in the coalfields buttressed managerial authority in
production. At the same time, it contributed to the downward pressure on
wage rates and thus formed the context in which unmechanized mines could
remain in competition. With persistent surplus capacity in the late 1920s
and 1930s, short-time working was prevalent in the coal industry. Many
mechanized mines were unable to operate at capacity. Hence, while
managements may have been able to secure the intensification of labour,
with individual faces kept employed at full capacity, overall productivity
would have been affected as workers elsewhere in the pit were laid off, and
expensive coal-cutting equipment left under-utilized.
INDUSTRIAL CONFLICT AND INDUSTRIAL CHANGE
In 1913, 8 per cent of British coal output was cut mechanically. By 1927
the proportion had risen, but to just 23 per cent. Within the British
industry there were marked regional (and intra-regional) variations in the
pace of mechanization. Scotland established an early lead. In 1913, 22 per
cent of Scottish coal output was cut mechanically and by 1927 the
proportion had risen to 56 per cent. While the pace of mechanization varied
across the Scottish coalfields, Northumberland was the only English
district that could rival the Scottish total in 1927. In that year, 42 per
cent of Northumberland's output was got with the use of coal-face
machinery. Production in Scotland and Northumberland was oriented towards
the export trade, but this was also the case for Durham and South Wales. In
Durham, which accounted for approximately 70 per cent of output in the
North East, only 18 per cent of production was cut mechanically in 1927,
and in South Wales the figure was a mere 7 per cent. In Lancashire and
Cheshire, South Yorkshire, and Nottinghamshire - districts principally
oriented towards inland UK markets - the proportion of output cut
mechanically in 1927 was 16, 11, and 22 per cent respectively.
In the British coal industry in 1927, hand coal-getting remained the
predominant method of coal extraction in all but the Scottish coalfields.
The position was rather different on the Continent. In the Ruhr, which
accounted for the vast bulk of Germany's coal output, 66 per cent of
production was won mechanically in 1926. By the end of the 1920s the
proportion had risen to over 90 per cent, and in the Belgian coal industry
had reached 89 per cent (PEP, 1936:154). Even at the end Of the interwar
period, 40 per cent of British coal output was undercut manually.
Students of the British coal industry have discussed its failure to keep
abreast with international competitors in the application of new extractive
technologies in terms of poor entrepreneurial performance, and in terms of
worker resistance to innovation. Chapter two looked at the principal
positions in the debate on entrepreneurial performance in interwar British
coalmining, and suggested that these explanations for the industry's
decline were not entirely convincing. Analyses attributing the industry's
technical backwardness to labour militancy and worker resistance to change
can also be located within broader theoretical perspectives on the nature
of the firm and operation of the capitalist economy.
Burns et al (1984), for example, adopt an orthodox labour process
perspective; that is to say, 	 one over-emphasizing the capital-labour
relation. They argue that while new techniques of coal extraction had long
been available to British mineowners, their 'diffusion and more intensive
application throughout the industry occurred during the period after the
General Strike when the miners were weakest' "(1984:8). There is, however,
little evidence to support this assertion, and in this section it will be
argued that the defeat of the miners in 1926 had deleterious implications
for the reorganization and modernization of the interwar coal industry. The
mineowners' collective position and interventions in their struggles with
the mineworkers will be related to the extreme diversity in the conditions
of production across the industry. This diversity reflected the interplay
of geological and market conditions, the uneven effects of the royalty
system (see chapter two), and the outcome of struggles between employers
and workers which developed unevenly between and within the different
coalfields,
Regional Differences
Scotland established an early lead in the application of mechanical coal-
cutters. By 1910, 14 per cent of Scottish output was cut mechanically and
the figure was higher for Lanarkshire, the largest of the Scottish
coalfields (Campbell, 1984). Scotland exported approximately 30 per cent of
its coal output and faced intensifying international competition from the
early twentieth century. But thicker seams in the Scottish coalfields were
nearing exhaustion, and the working of thinner seams meant deteriorating
labour productivity and rising labour costs in the absence of technical
innovation. With the working of thinner seams, longwall mining had been
adopted more widely in the Scottish coalfields. And in evidence to the
Royal Commission on Coal Supplies (1901-05), mining engineers reported that
for many companies mechanical coal-cutting had now become an 'absolute
necessity' (ev. George Gibb:335).
Campbell (1984) has looked at union responses to mechanization in
Lanarkshire in the period before the First World Var. Union officials
identified a number of interrelated problems: the danger that employers
would substitute cheaper, unskilled labour for the skilled hewers currently
employed at the face; the new safety hazards created by the use of
machinery and increased use of electricity below ground in the mines; the
dangers of overwork, since some employers were attempting to enforce a ten-
hour day for machine men (prior to the legislation of 1908), with obvious
implications for those men and boys employed on filling. Acknowledging that
mechanization created new problems and exacerbated existing threats to
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jobs, earnings, and safety, the Lanarkshire Miners' Union nevertheless
'accepted it as the only competitive way of exploiting the declining
coalfield's remaining thin seams' (Campbell:41).
There were numerous disputes across the coalfield connected with the
introduction of machinery. But these focused on the revision of shift
rates, with the men attempting to enforce union policy and ensure that
basis rates were not reduced with the reorganization of production. Such
disputes therefore represented the 'negotiated acceptance of machinery by
the miners and their union' (Ibid). And mining engineers reported that
where employers had been able to get 'better rates' for hand-holing, they
had been able to temporarily evade investment in coal-cutting machinery
(Royal Commission on Coal Supplies: 335). Union officials in Lanarkshire
were anxious to avert rate-cutting with the introduction of machinery, and
thereby protect jobs and earnings for skilled hewers. But they were also
aware that many of the problems created with the introduction of coal-face
machinery could be addressed only through industry-wide action - as, for
example, to secure protective safety legislation.
Mechanization was forced upon the Scottish coalmasters as the only
alternative to bankruptcy, and the unions accepted it as the alternative to
unemployment and lower earnings. By 1927, 56 per cent of output was cut
mechanically, and by the end of the interwar period the figure had risen to
over 80 per cent. But average mine size in Scotland remained far below that
for the British industry as a whole, and Fine et al (1985) relate this to
the pattern of land ownership and configuration of relations between
landowners and mineowners. By virtue of poor geological conditions and
intensifying competition in export markets, Scottish mineowners were forced
to invest in new production techniques. By the same token, however, they
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were ill-placed to resist the landowners' demands for higher royalty
payments, and royalties per ton in Scotland were amongst the highest for
the British industry. The concentrated pattern of land ownership gave
landowners the upper hand in negotiations, enabling them to restrict the
expansion of mines - or ensure the extraction of coal (and hence royalties)
from their particular estate alone (Ibid:296).
Geological conditions were very different in South Wales (although varied
across the South Wales coalfield). The average width of seams worked in the
mid-1920s was 53 inches, which compared with 39 inches in Scotland, and an
average of 49.5 inches for the British industry as a whole (Ibid:295).
Moreover, in the South Wales steam coalfield, which accounted for the bulk
of exports from South Wales:
The seams were naturally so intersected with 'slips and breaks'
that under-cutting was practically unknown. Only a small part
of the labour of a steam coal collier consisted in getting or
loosening the coal from its natural bed.
(H.Bramwell, ev.to
 Royal Commission on Coal Supplies, 1901-05)
Because of the limited amount of hand-holing required, coal-cutting
machinery did not present the immediate advantage that it did for Scottish
mineowners, while the occurrence of 'slips and breaks' also made the
installation of coal-cutting equipment difficult.
But geological conditions do not provide a sufficient explanation for the
low levels of mechanization in South Wales. Conditions were different in
the western, anthracite area of the coalfield, where mechanization was also
retarded, and the largest firm operating in the steam coalfield - the
Powell Duffryn Steam Coal Co. Ltd. - was notable for its early application
of mechanical coal-cutters and face conveyors (Hann, 1922; Boyns, 1987).
Royalty payments per ton of coal extracted were higher in South Wales than
for any other coalfield <Fine et al:296). Unusually for South Wales and,
indeed, for the British industry, the Powell Duffryn Company owned the
freehold to a large acreage of its surface mineral land and underlying
minerals (Stock Exchange Year Book, 1914; see also Boyns, 1987). The firm,
in other words, was part-owner of the minerals it worked, and this would
appear to be of extreme significance in the pattern of its development.
Powell Duffryn's mining operations in South Wales were concentrated on a
geographically compact area of the steam coalfield. In this area, the
Company pursued a policy of opening new, large-scale pits, which were
equipped with the latest technologies (Boyns, 1987), closing down older
workings as these became relatively unproductive. This was in marked
contrast to the steam coalfield's second largest company - the Cambrian
Combine - which expanded through the acquisition of other companies. The
firm's subsidiaries owned pits scattered across the coalfield, and in the
1920s little attempt was made to 'rationalize' these operations, while
investment in new production techniques was limited (Ibid). In 1935, the
re-formed Powell Duffryn Associated Collieries acquired the Cambrian's
surviving operations, and subsequently closed many of these mines.
Aspects of the prevailing structure of work organization in South Wales
might appear to complicate the introduction of machine mining; in
particular, the single shift system. Mineowners had pressed for the
introduction of a double-shift system in 1910, when the eight hours Act
came into force (see chapter three). The employers renewed their efforts in
1919, when the working day was reduced to 7 hours by the award of the
Sankey Commission. Clearly, double-shift working was secured at some mines;
the issue of a 'bonus turn' payment for the afternoon or night shift was
central at several pits. Moreover, some commentators attributed the
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coalfield's rising accident rate to the extension of double-shift working
from the early 1920s, although the Inspector of Mines also related this to
the reduction of working hours. Because mineowners were refusing to revise
shift payments, colliers were forced to intensify their work to maintain
their earnings, and the Inspector attributed the rising accident rate to
the 'speeding-up' of work (Colliery Guardian, 17.10.1924:1003). But it is
also apparent that double-shift working had not been generally extended
across the steam coalfield, since employers continued to complain of worker
resistance to the change.
A principal objection to double-shift working was that it increased the
risk of underground accidents, given the peculiar geological conditions of
the steam coalfield. The colliers argued that because seams were friable
and liable to 'squeeze', the mines had to be allowed to 'cool' - with seams
left to settle - at the end of a working shift (cited in Colliery Guardian,
21.2.1919:670). But the fear that double-shift working would increase the
risk of death or injury appears to have been most acute where mines still
employed the pillar-and-stall system. Before the First World War, longwall
mining had only been generally extended across the western, anthracite area
of the coalfield. Mining engineers argued that pillar-and-stall working was
retained in the steam coalfield because the seams were 'fairly thick, and
did not possess roofs suitable for longwall, nor was there sufficient
rubbish for packing' (Royal Commission on Coal Supplies, 1901-5:307). With
the pillar-and-stall method, colliers worked in relative isolation. And it
was because of this, according to one observer, that the men would only
accept the double-shift system if they were allowed to choose the partner
who was to work in their stall on the second shift. Only in these
circumstances could they be assured that the face would be left in a
-242-
condition that would allow them to recommence work without the crippling
fear of being buried by a collapse of the roof (cited in Colliery Guardian,
17.10.1924:1003). Objections to double-shift working could therefore be
lessened by allowing the colliers to 'cross-marrow' in pillar-and-stall
layouts, or by moving to the longwall system because here the men were
grouped and could collectively take measures to lessen the risk of
accidents. Thus, 'double shift work can only always be satisfactory among
miners on a longwall face, such as the Barry system, or where conveyors are
at work' (Ibid).
Longwall mining was employed more widely in the steam coalfield from
1914, and its extension was associated in part with the introduction of
mechanical conveyors. While coal-cutters were only employed on a limited
scale, South Wales accounted for 40 per cent of all face conveyors in use
in the British industry in 1921. On the other hand, only 12-14 per cent of
pits in South Vales employed face conveyors in the 1920s, There is no
evidence of worker resistance to the installation of conveyors (or, for
that matter, coal-cutting machinery). Indeed, A.J.Cook, then the Rhondda
miners' agent, actively campaigned for the widespread adoption of
mechanical cutters and conveyors, which he argued would raise productivity
and allow collieries to lower their selling prices without further resort
to a reduction in the miners' wages (cited in Colliery Guardian,
9.2.1923:344). And since the arduous job of filling formed a large part of
the steam coal collier's labour, it is perhaps not surprising that the
availability of mechanical conveyors aroused more interest than worker
hostility.
There were disputes at pit level connected with the introduction of
conveyors. As in Scotland, however, these revolved around the conditions of
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accepting innovation rather than innovation per se. The men's concerns
centred on the issues of job loss (in a context of deteriorating markets),
safety at work (with, in particular, a concern to restrict the length of
conveyor faces to no more than 100 yards, and ensure that adequate exits -
or escape routes - were built and maintained), the revision of piecework
price lists and rates for filling 'large' coal. Through the South Vales
Miners' Federation, the miners urged the mineowners' association to agree
to the formation of a joint sub-committee of the Joint Standing Disputes
Committee, so that agreement could be reached on the 'conditions of
employment where conveyors and coal-cutters are in use' (Colliery Guardian,
17.7.1923:406). The sub-committee was established in 1923 and continued to
meet regularly up until the eve of the General Strike, at which point the
mineowners announced they were withdrawing from all joint agreements
relating to working methods and the use of coal-face machinery (Colliery
Guardian, 3.7.1925:30),
In Northumberland and Durham, shift patterns had been altered in 1910.
Existing arrangements had to be changed in order to comply with the eight
hours legislation (see chapter three). The northern owners had opposed the
eight hours Act, which reduced the excessively long hours of haulage
workers and boys. But consequent upon the legislation coning into force,
they had secured a third hewer's shift which greatly increased the
utilization of their fixed capital investments. Shift patterns in the North
East were apparently more suited to the mechanized mining system than, for
example, those in South Wales, easing the transition to the new methods of
working. But in the interwar years, developments in Northumberland and in
Durham stood in sharp contrast. Fifteen per cent of Northumberland's output
was cut mechanically in 1914. By 1927 the proportion had risen to 42 per
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cent, and by 1938 to over 90 per cent. In Durham at the end of the interwar
period, only 42 per cent of coal was cut mechanically.
Like Scotland, Northumberland was working progressively thinner (and
harder) seams, and the high costs of hand-hewing may have combined with the
coalfield's exposure to intensifying international competition to compel
the early and sustained application of machinery (although slightly less
than 50 per cent of pits employed coal-cutting equipment at the end of the
1920s). Durham had formerly enjoyed the benefit of better geological
conditions. But here too, by the early twentieth century, the thickest and
most easily worked reserves were nearing exhaustion, and many pits were
progressing onto thinner seams. Royalty payments per ton of coal extracted
were above the average for the British industry in Northumberland, but
significantly below the level of payments in Durham where royalties per ton
were only just below payments in Scotland. Patterns of land ownership may
therefore have been significant in explaining the divergent paths followed
in the two northern counties, but further research is needed to ascertain
precisely how the land-mine ownership relation affected the reorganization
of production.
As mining progressed onto thinner seams in Durham, the longwall method of .
extraction tended to displace bard and pillar working. Some firms
complained that the men were prejudiced against the new method of
extraction. Difficulties arose because of the 'necessity for the "cross-
marrowing" of larger sets of men', because the longwall system was
unfamiliar and the hewers had difficulty in achieving their normal shift
earnings and, related to the last point, because the change in the method
of extraction was the occasion for the re-negotiation of piecework price
lists (Colliery Guardian, 5.6.1925:1381). There is scant evidence to
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suggest, however, that the hewers' dislike of the new system actually
prohibited determined managements from securing the transition, or
comparable adjustments.
Thus, in an interesting example the management of one colliery evaded the
possibility of disruption by developing 'the bord-and-pillar system to meet
their requirements in opening out several thin seams as the thicker ones
became worked out' (Ibid). A new method of working was introduced, with
percussive machines used for coal-getting in the bord-and-pillar layout.
Each stall, or working place, was cavilled to a set of 6 men who 'come in
two at a time on three shifts!. Each pair was responsible for all the work
in the place, including the timbering and repair work which had formerly
been performed by separate grades, and while one hewer was drilling one
side of the stall, the other filled the coal that had been ripped-down on
the other side. One advantage of this system, as the management pointed
out, was that coal-getting took place on three consecutive shifts. With
mechanized longwall mining, the coal was only wound to the surface on one
of the three shifts. But percussive machines - which accounted for two-
thirds of all machines in use in Durham in the mid-1920s - were less
powerful than chain coal-cutters, and by the end of the interwar period it
would appear that mechanized longwall mining had largely displaced other
systems of machine mining in mechanized pits in Durham.
In Nottinghamshire, as in the Midlands more generally, features of the
established structure of work and underground employment would appear to be
well-suited to the introduction of mechanized mining. Longwall mining had
been employed throughout the nineteenth century, and stalls were generally
much larger than in those districts adopting this system from the end of
the nineteenth century. In many districts, there was already a well-defined
division of labour within the coalface work group, with some men confined
to filling the coal out and under instruction from a stallman or butty. But
in Nottinghamshire, the issue dominating industrial relations in the early
1920s was not the introduction of coalface machinery but rather the
employers' attempts to reinstate the butty system - or to rescind the 'all-
throw-in' agreement (see chapter four). 	 Increasingly divided, the
Nottinghamshire Miners' Association was unable to uphold the 'all-throw-in'
agreement, and a similar arrangement was only re-established as individual
pits moved towards the use of mechanical coal-cutters and conveyors.
Wages and Hours: The Struggles of 1921 and 1926
The foregoing survey of developments in the different coalfields offers
litttle evidence to support the view that worker resistance to the
introduction of machinery delayed mechanization.	 Existing structures of
work organization could complicate the transition to machine mining, as for
example where serial changes in working practices were involved. But
conflicts between mineowners and mineworkers developed unevenly, could
revolve around the failure to innovate, while the failure to innovate can
be related in specific instances at least in part to the employers' ability
to secure work intensification without mechanization, and/ or to hold down
basis rates (particularly where unemployment was rising in the coalfields).
The uneven pace of mechanization - as between and within different
coalfields - cannot be analysed simply in terms of labour relations.
Geological conditions complicated the suitability of different mining
districts for mechanization, while the mineowner's incentive to invest in
new production technologies was contingent upon the terms of the mineral
lease, and scope for renegotiation - in turn conditioned by specific and
general economic conditions.
Since the incentive to invest in specific regions and localities was
obviously weakened, however, this had knock-on effects for the industry as
a whole, dampening the coercive force of competition. And because the
extreme diversity in the organization of work that had marked the industry
before the First World War was heightened by the very uneven process of
mechanization, mineowners were ill-equipped to form any (constructive)
common policy in relation to the reorganization and modernization of
production. That the mineowners' outlook, 'as far as their business affairs
were concerned.. .was highly individualistic' (Supple, 1987:410), owed to
the fact that they operated in different markets and organized production
processes under varying sets of conditions. Similarly, the solidarity
forged by the mineowners in their determined opposition to the demands of
the Miners' Federation reflected the interest that was shared in
maintaining maximum individual discretion in the areas of wage and
employment regulation,	 in order to accommodate widely divergent
circumstances.
From the early twentieth century, and in spite of their very varied
experiences of work, the miners had achieved a growing unity around the
demands for a national wage structure, shorter hours, and improved health
and safety provision. The miners were pressing for general increases in
wages, a general reduction in hours, and uniform health and safety
regulations, and their unity was a force for change in the industry. During
the period of the First World War, the miners pressed for the extension of
government controls and in 1919 they presented the explicit demand for the
nationalization of the industry. If for most miners nationalization was
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seen as the only means to achieve the reorganization of their industry and
improved wages and conditions, for some it represented a first step on the
road to socialism. Faced with the threat of a national miners' strike, and
possibly much wider supportive action, the government appointed the Sankey
Commission to enquire into the miners demands - which included a 30 per
cent wage increase, a six hour day, and public ownership of the coal
industry. The Commission recommended that these demands should be met
(although sanctioning only a 20 per cent increase in earnings and a 7 hour
working day in the first instance). But the government rejected
nationalization, when the threat of industrial action had passed, and
proffered as an alternative the formation of a Miners' Welfare Fund (see
Kirby, 1977).
In March, 1921, five months earlier than planned, the government returned
control of the industry to the mineowners. The immediate context was a
slump in the export trade (export prices had been guaranteed under wartime
controls), and the immediate result was a three month stoppage of work in
the industry. The mineowners pressed for wage cuts and a return to district
wage settlements. Additions to basis rates were thereafter related to
profits in the different districts, under a national formula which was
finally jettisoned at the end of the General Strike and miners' lockout of
1926. Rejecting the recommendations for the reorganization of the industry
suggested by the Samuel Commission of 1925-6, the mineowners pressed for
wage reductions and an extension of working hours. The miners resisted, but
were defeated after a seven month lockout. With their defeat, parties in
support of active government involvement in the reorganization of the
industry were also overwhelmed (Fine et al, 1985). The mineowners won an
increase in the length of the working day (raised to eight hours by
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legislation in 1927), wage reductions and the abolition of the national
formula dictating minimum wage rates.	 Wage reductions varied in their
severity across the industry, but on average the miner's yearly earnings in
1928 were 15 per cent lower than immediately before the General Strike, and
25 per cent lower than the peak year of 1920 (Heinemann, 194442).
The miners were at their weakest after the General Strike. But there is
little evidence to support the claim that this facilitated the diffusion
and more intensive application of coalface machinery 'throughout the
industry' (cf,Burns et al, op cit). Certainly the proportion of aggregate
British coal output cut mechanically rose between 1927 and 1938, from 23 to
59 per cent. But the British industry still lagged behind international
competitors in the application of new extractive technologies. In 1935, 45
per cent of British output was undercut manually, whereas hand-holing had
virtually disappeared on the Continent. In that year, mechanized coal-
getting accounted for 97 per cent of output in the German coal industry, 98
per cent in Belgium, and 88 per cent in France (ILO, 1938:196).
In Durham and South Wales, the British coal industry's principal
exporting districts, levels of mechanization remained low - even by British
standards. In Durham, only 42 per cent of output was cut mechanically in
1938 and 25 per cent conveyed mechanically from the coalface. In South
Vales, the figures were 26 and 45 per cent. After the General Strike and
lockout of 1926, miners had returned to work under the terms of new
district	 agreements,	 each of	 which contained some 	 'individual
characteristic'. In South Wales, the mineowners inserted a clause
stipulating that 'where they, in their discretion think fit' they would be
'at liberty to introduce machinery and any method of working,
notwithstanding that the same may involve a change in the system of
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working' (Colliery Guardian, 17.12.1926:1361). Clearly this assertion of
managerial prerogative was insufficient to achieve the widespread
application of new production technologies. In 1938, only 28 per cent of
pits in the coalfield employed coal-cutters at the face, and only 29 per
cent had adopted mechanical conveyors (see table 5.2).
In South Wales, the proportion of firms using machinery increased between
1927 and 1938, but this reflected the fall in the number of pits in
operation in the coalfield. There was no significant increase in the number
of mines using machinery for coal-getting. As table 5.2 suggests, this
pattern was repeated in most of the principal coalfields. In the period
after 1926, therefore 'the increase in the use of cutters tended to be
achieved by their extension within mines rather than by the widespread
conversion of hand-getting mines to machine cutting' (Supple, 1987:383). In
the British industry as a whole, and in most of the principal coalfields -
Nottinghamshire, together with the smaller districts of Leicestershire and
Warwickshire, forming an exception - large numbers of unmechanized pits
remained in competition at the end of the interwar period. Since wage
reductions and the extension of working hours were the preconditions for
the survival of small mines and unmechanized pits, the defeat of the miners
helped to sustain the industry's existing fragmented structure of
production.
The British industry achieved only piecemeal changes to its existing
organizational and technical structure. Combined with adverse conditions in
domestic and export markets, this led to the creation of mass unemployment
in the coalfields. Unemployment contributed to the downward pressure on
wage rates, and in unmechanized mines there was a speed-up of work
TABLE 5,2, MECHANIZATION IN BRITISH MINES, SELECTED DISTRICTS, 1927 h 1938
Cutting	 Conveying
No,of mines	 No, of sines	 % of output	 No, of mines	 % of output
using machines cut by machine using conveyors conveyed
Great Britain
1927 2861 929 23 n/a n/a
1938 2125 927 59 680 54
Scotland
1927 506 270 56 n/a n/a
1938 426 238 80 126 58
Northumberland
1927 124 50 42 n/a n/a
1938 102 65 91 43 45
Durham
1927 277 99 18 n/a n/a
1938 247 93 42 67 25
South Wales & Monmouth
1927 639 110 7 n/a n/a
1938 424 118 26 123 45
Lancashire h Cheshire
1927 237 94 16 n/a n/a
1938 155 80 68 57 72
South Yorkshire
1927 143 52 11 n/a n/a
1938 121 67 56 57 62
Nottinghamshire
1927 46 30 22 n/a n/a
1938 46 41 70 36 82
North Derbyshire
1927 130 38 22 n/a n/a
1938 103 52 88 42 74
Leicestershire
1927 20 11 26 n/1 n/a
1938 19 12 84 12 71
Warwickshire
1927 25 13 24 n/a n/a
1938 21 13 69 12 69
Source: Annual Reports of the Secretary for Mines, Mines Department, Board of Trade
1927, 1938
as pieceworkers attempted to maintain subsistence earnings (see chapter 6).
Sales and output slumped, and with persistent excess capacity in the
industry in the late 1920s and 1930s, the rate of new pit development fell
considerably below the levels of the early 1920s. In the 1930s, the annual
level of capital investment (in plant and machinery) in the British coal
industry was some 60 below that of the period between 1919 and 1925 (t3.09
million as compared with t7.57 million in the earlier period - Supple,
1987:388).
PRODUCTIVITY OUTCOMES
Mechanization was a slow and uneven process in the British coal industry
and the results - in terns of productivity growth - were unimpressive.
Between 1913 and 1938, output per manshift (ONS) increased by just 13 per
cent. In the United States in the sane period, and while there had been a
significant reduction in working hours, OMS increased by 40 per cent. In
the Polish coal industry, the German Ruhr, and the Netherlands, increases
in OMS of 56, 64, and 101 per cent were attained respectively (Reid Report,
1945:141). Natural conditions were roughly equal in Britain, the Ruhr and
the Netherlands. Yet by 1936, OMS averaged 1.83 tonnes in the Netherlands,
1.69 tonnes in the Ruhr, and only 1.2 tonnes in Britain (Ashworth, 1986:4).
Between 1929 and 1936/7, the proportion of British coal output undercut
mechanically doubled. Output per manshift increased in this period by a
mere 8.4 per cent. In the German Ruhr in the same period, there had been
little increase in the level of face mechanization; even by 1929, over 90
per cent of output had been cut mechanically. And yet OMS in the Ruhr rose
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by 34.5 per cent in the 1930s (Supple, 1987:284). The superior performance
of the German industry owed in large measure to the concentration of output
on fewer, large-scale and more productive mines. Economies of scale were
secured, improvements in underground layout were made, and this facilitated
investment in more effective methods of transporting the coal from the face
to the shaft bottom, while more powerful winding equipment was installed in
German mines.
The Technical Advisory Committee appointed by the British Government in
1944 to investigate the British coal industry's technical condition, drew
attention to these sources of productivity growth in Germany. The Reid
Committee, as it is more commonly known, noted that other European
economies had improved their coal industries through a similar, sustained
programme of rationalization and investment. Comparing the British coal
industry's organization and technology most unfavourably with that of its
Continental (and US) rivals, the members of the Reid Committee reserved
some of their most scathing comments for British methods of underground
haulage (see below).
All the members of the Committee were mining engineers with senior
managerial experience in the coal industry. And by virtue of its
exclusively technical and managerial composition, the Committee's Report
was extremely influential - at least as far as British industrialists and
the financial press were concerned. Social scientists from the Tavistock
Institute of Human Relations
that the Reid Committee's
'shortcomings such as those
were less impressed. Trist and Bamforth argued
engineering bias had led it to focus on
of the haulage system' and to neglect other
proffered ancauses of low productivity in British coalmining. They
alternative account, stressing the 'connexion between the health and
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productivity of the miner and the social structure of the work system that
controls his relationships' (1951:10).
The Hunan Relations Perspective
The Tavistock's work on coalmining had been initiated soon after the
formation of the Institute in 1947 - the year in which the British coal
industry was nationalized. The newly-established National Coal Board
identified a series of labour management problems - absenteeism, labour
turnover, high levels of small-scale strikes of short duration - and in
addition the problem of relatively low productivity in British coalmining.
Addressing these phenomena, the Tavistock researchers suggested that low
productivity owed in large measure to the particular system of machine
mining that had been adopted in Britain in the interwar years - mechanized
longwall mining - and the social relationships fostered by work
organization under this system.
In an interim report, published in 1951, Trist and Bamforth identified
and contrasted two systems of work organization associated with the
different technologies of hand coal-getting and the mechanical cutting and
conveyance of coal from the face. Their empirical research centred on the
Durham coalfield, and this may in part explain their failure to emphasize
the variegated patterns of work organization in unmechanized mines across
the industry. Trist and Bamforth argued that, prior to the introduction of
coalface machinery, the system of work organization had been compatible
with the available technology and well-suited to the unique features of the
underground work situation. They suggested that this equilibrium had been
disrupted with the introduction of the longwall layout, detailed division
of labour and multi-shift work system adopted with the introduction of
mechanical coal-cutting in Britain.
Trist and Bamforth identified the mechanized longwall method as a
'technological system expressive of the prevailing outlook of mass-
production engineering and as a social structure consisting of the
occupational roles that have been institutionalized in its use' (1951:5).
Their critique of it resonates with more recent accounts of a 'crisis of
mass-production' confronting late twentieth century industrial capitalism,
and the disadvantages - for firms - of 'Taylorist' forms of work
organization (eg Piore and Sabel, 1984), Looking at the coal industry in
the 1950s, Trist and Bamforth argued that the work system created with
mechanization reflected a narrow engineering logic. The work had been
broken down into a standard series of elementary tasks, arranged in rigid
sequence over three separate shifts, and a large work collectivity
instituted in place of the small work group, comprising multi-skilled
craftsmen, of hand coal-getting. Tasks and shifts were technically
interdependent, and the successful completion of the cycle of coal-getting
demanded 'one hundred per cent performance' of each of the specialized
component tasks. But no attempt had been made to integrate the 'cycle
group' as a social unit. As a result, workers had been subjected to
psychological stress and strains, as had underground supervisory workers,
and labour productivity had consequently suffered.
The work system required a larger managerial input, as compared with hand
coal-getting, and colliery deputies had been made responsible for
maintaining the continuity of production. Yet, a host of changing
environmental conditions threatened disruption at any point in the 24 hour
cycle of production. Deputies had also to contend with mineworkers who, by
virtue of their values and traditions, resented close supervision and the
loss of their former autonomy. Supervisor-worker relationships were
therefore largely conflictual. Deputies had to deploy workers onto other
tasks in order to deal with emergencies as these arose, and to maintain the
continuity of production. But workers with narrowly-defined job roles would
only 'flex' onto other work after haggling over overtime payments, or
payment for 'bye-work'.
Faceworkers were confined to the performance of a narrowly-defined task,
and the prevailing work system failed to utilize their knowledge and
experience of underground work to the full. They were exposed to the
dangers of underground work, but could not take preventative action on
their own initiative which was an obvious source of stress. They performed
a fraction of the complete operation of coal-getting, and rarely met
underground with workers completing other stages of the production process
on other shifts. Under such circumstances, they had little commitment to
the successful completion of the cycle of operations as a whole, were
encouraged to pass-off 'bad work' as someone else's responsibility, and to
adapt to the disruptions that continuously occurred (possibly because of
delays on preceding shifts) by adjusting their own work rate downwards.
The content of the faceworker's job, Trist and Bamforth argued, failed to
engage him to the limits of his capabilities and restricted him to a level
of performance below his potentiality. These problems had existed in the
interwar years, but to an extent had been camouflaged by deleterious labour
market conditions. In the circumstances of the 1940s and 1950s, however,
workers were less inclined to tolerate bad working conditions and were more
willing to express their frustrations through, for example, voluntary
absenteeism. Trist and Bamforth concluded that a 'norm of low productivity'
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had been established in the mines as the only 'adaptive method of handling,
in the contingencies of the underground work situation, a complicated,
rigid, and large-scale work system, borrowed with too little modification
from an engineering culture appropriate to the radically different
situation of the factory' (1951:23; and cf Zweig, 1948, on 'the stint').
For the Tavistock researchers, therefore, patterns of conflict and low
productivity in the industry could be related directly to the particular
system of work organization adopted with mechanical coal-cutting. And
since, for these researchers, conflict emanated from a particular work
system rather than from the nature of the employment relationship, they
believed that work reorganization could bring management and worker
interests to more perfectly coincide
In developing their critique of the longwall method, the Tavistock group
had been influenced by experiments underway in the British coal industry
with alternative systems of machine mining. These included the mechanized
room and pillar system, which had long been employed in the United States
and which (according to Trist and Ramforth) involved a similar level and
type of technology to the longwall method, but a different system of work
organization. Trials had also been made with 'compositely' organized work
teams on longwall faces equipped with power-loading technology. With both
technologies, the work organization involved small work teams, the members
of which were responsible for a number of different tasks, while the work
group was not constrained by a rigid shift-system, but rather encouraged to
move from one phase of the cycle of coal-getting operations to the next as
the opportunity arose. The results of the NCB's experiments, in terms of
labour productivity, had been impressive, and the Tavistock group
attributed this to the new systems of work organization. They suggested
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that the new arrangements partly reproduced those of hand coal-getting,
gave the work group a measure of 'responsible autonomy', increased worker
job satisfaction and lowered levels of stress. Higher OHS was argued to be
the result of higher levels of work effort, and the latter proof of the
benefits accruing to workers from the new work arrangements.
The Engineering Perspective
The Tavistock's work on coalmining formed the basis from which the group
went on to develop the concept of the soda-technical system (see Trist et
al, 1963). Their analysis has been interpreted as 'an attack on the trained
incapacities of production engineers and as an advertisement for social
scientific consultants' (Rose, 1975:213). Suffice is to say that many of
the criticisms of the mechanized longwall system made by this group had
been made by mining engineers in the interwar period. For example, David
Gemmell, a Scottish mining engineer, in the 1920s was an outspoken critic
of the unit system, or mechanized longwall method employed in the British
coal industry. He argued that the extreme division of labour had lessened
workforce skills, increased the monotony of work, and generally diminished
the productivity of the machines by driving away 'men of the higher
standard of intelligence' (NAM 1921-2:190-5). Even the Colliery Guardian,
the mineowners' trade journal, reported that work organization under
mechanized longwall mining contrived towards the 'deadening of a man's
soul' (9.12.1921:1607). And the fresh problems of labour management created
with the sub-division of labour were discussed in management journals of
the period, which devoted some space to the panaceas proposed by, for
example, industrial psychologists (see chapter 6, pp.334-8).
The members of the Reid Committee, as suggested, were mining engineers
and had grappled with the problems of motivating workers to work hard at
routine (and physically strenuous) Jobs in the interwar years. It is not
surprising, therefore, that their Report, published in 1945, also addressed
these managerial difficulties. The Reid Committee compared the different
systems of machine mining employed in Britain, the United States and on the
Continent. Looking at the mechanized room and pillar system adopted in the
US bituminous coal industry, the Committee also suggested that this method
alleviated labour management problems for employers, at least in comparison
with the mechanized longwall method, and the arguments presented in support
of this conclusion were very similar to those of the Tavistock researchers.
With mechanized room and pillar mining, work groups were smaller, and
performed the tasks of cutting and loading on the same shift. The Reid
Committee suggested that workers were 'attracted by the greater variety of
work, and the greater skill required in its performance', with the small
size of work groups encouraging the development of a 'team spirit'
(1945:40). A cursory glance at the American literature, however, and in
particular at Carter Goodrich's study of work in US mines (1925), suggests
that the difference in the mineworkers' experience of machine mining in the
two countries was far less dramatic.
In any event, the purported connection between work organization, worker
motivation, and work effort stressed by the Tavistock group was not
isolated by the Reid Committee as the principal source of higher OHS under
the mechanized room and pillar system. The Committee argued that the
American system was more productive than the mechanized longwall method
employed in Britain not because workers worked harder, but rather because
the underground labour force was deployed more effectively. Mechanized room
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and pillar mining involved a lower ratio of 'indirect' labour (or
'unproductive' labour as the Reid Committee termed it) to direct production
workers. This was because roadways (or headings) were driven in solid coal
and did not absorb as much labour on maintenance as the method of longwall
advancing from the shaft, while other indirect tasks - such as 'packing the
goaf' - were also unnecessary. Hence the Reid Committee reported that:
The proportion of "productive workers" engaged in actual
coalgetting operations is increased and, as unproductive
labour is reduced to a minimum, a double advantage is
secured, and a high OHS achieved. (1945:40)
Moreover, since the system was not 'dependent upon the completion of
specific operations by the end of the shift, and the sane operations are
continued from one working shift to the next', the advantages of multiple-
shift coal-getting could be attained. Under the system of machine mining
adopted in Britain, only one cycle of coal-getting operations could be
completed in a 24 hour period, which meant lower utilization of the capital
invested.
A further benefit of the room and pillar system was that the area to be
worked was 'proven' in advance, so that faults and slips in the seams could
be detected before coal-getting commenced, and plans adjusted accordingly.
The incidence of 'bad conditions', in other words, could be better
predicted in comparison with longwall advancing where workers and deputies
had to deal with these contingencies as they arose. The method of longwall
retreating, whereby headings were initially driven outwards from the shaft
to the boundary to block out the coal into a series of wide pillars, or
longwall faces, which were then worked backwards towards the shaft, gave
many of the same advantages as room and pillar working. The ratio of
indirect to direct labour was reduced (in comparison with longwall
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advancing), because roads were driven in solid coal, road maintenance was
reduced, as was the 'deadwork' of packing the goaf with the roof allowed to
subside as the working face retreated. With longwall retreating, moreover,
it was possible to introduce double-shift coal-getting.
For all these reasons, the Reid Committee advised that henceforward in
the British industry, the mechanized room and pillar system 'must be given
first choice where natural conditions permit its application'. Longwall
retreating was to be regarded as a second best alternative, with longwall
advancing - the method which had been more or less universally adopted in
mechanized mines in Britain - considered to be the least desirable of the
three systems (Report: 45).
In the interwar period, many British mining engineers had been aware of
the superiority of the American system. Thus, while Gemmell argued that the
extreme division of labour under the unit system had degraded work and
skills, he focused his critique on other defects of mechanized longwall
advancing. He suggested that while the latter method had 'done so much to
Increase output', it now stood in the way of 'securing that further
increase which we all agree is essential', because double-shifting was•
impossible and hence 'capital sunk in the pit is employed for less than 40
hours per week on remunerative work' (cited in Colliery Guardian,
9.12.1921:1607; and see also Brass and Hesketh, 1926). Mayor, the machine
manufacturer, noted that the development of machines adapted to heading
work and pillar extraction (that is, arcwall coal cutters) had removed
earlier (technical) constraints to the adoption of the room and pillar
system under British geological conditions. And he reported that the rapid
development of headings made possible with arcwall cutters 'opened the way
to longwall retreating, which in many seams would enormously reduce the
cost of deadwork' (1924:1510).
The reasons why longwall advancing remained the dominant system of
machine mining in interwar Britain are difficult to establish with any
certainty. The Reid Committee suggested that it reflected the short-term
outlook of British mining companies; the great merit of longwall advancing
lying in the fact that profitable coal-getting could begin with the minimum
of delay once capital had been committed to opening-up a pit in the first
instance. But this hardly explains the reasons for the short-term outlook
of British mineowners.
The royalty system may again have been an important influence. Where
fixed or dead rents were levied mineowners had to make royalty payments
regardless of the tonnage of coal got out, and this encouraged the rapid
extraction of coal (see chapter two). Dead-rents, were common, although by
no means universal across the coalfields and, as a general rule, where
mines were able to mechanize they quickly adopted the most productive
technology (chain coal-cutters). But the royalty system could constrain the
pursuit of other productivity-enhancing changes; as, for example, in
Scotland where mines were quick to mechanize but where the industry was
unable to secure scale economies through amalgamations. Since the royalty
system could impede the most effective layout of mines, which in turn would
have implications for the method of coal extraction, it is possible that
the system's particular effects in certain localities had wider
ramifications, distorting the forces of competition, and that this combined
with
	
broader economic conditions in the industry to discourage the
transition to alternative systems of machine mining in the late 1920s and
1930s. Surplus capacity in the industry, for example, would have militated
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against the double-shifting of mechanized pits (since many pits were
operating below capacity), while unemployment and low wages may have
lessened the incentive to introduce systems economizing on 'indirect'
labour. Certainly labour market conditions can be identified as a factor in
the British industry's retention of archaic underground haulage systems.
Haulage Techniques
Analysing the origins of low productivity in the British coal industry, the
Tavistock researchers focused on levels of work effort at the face. But
other commentators drew attention to the limited investment in
productivity-enhancing technologies in British pits. Heinemann, for
example, noted that in the US the rate of growth of productivity had been
sustained through the application of power-loading equipment. Thus, while
in the US bituminous coal industry in 1942, 'no less than 45 per cent of
the output was loaded by machine, in Britain the power loader was
practically unknown and the old method of shovelling on to a conveyor
continued' (1947:71). She also followed the . Reid Committee in condemning
the antiquated and labour-intensive methods of underground haulage retained
in the British industry.
In European coal industries, mechanization at the face in the interwar
period was accompanied by investment in more effective methods of
transporting the coal from the face to the shaft bottom. In many British
mines, in contrast, haulage techniques remained much the same as those
identified as 'best practice' in the late nineteenth century. Even in the
1920s and 30s, various systems of rope haulage, hand-tramming and pony-
puttying were used on subsidiary roads, connecting the face with the main
haulage routes. On the Continent at this time, mechanical conveyors were
used to gather the output from working faces and transport it to the main
roads. Various rope haulage systems were used in the main (or primary)
haulage roads in British mines, Tubs were linked together into sets of 15
or 20 and hauled up the incline by ropes attached to stationary engines.
Such systems were 'manned by scores of haulage hands at different points'
(Manley, 1947:22). On the Continent at the end of the interwar period (and
also in the US), these methods were 'practically extinct', and rope haulage
systems had been displaced by the use of locomotives in the primary haulage
roads (Reid Report, 1945:68). British haulage methods were labour-intensive
and the work entailed was amongst the most 'brutal and limb-racking' in the
mines (Mitchell, 1933:89).
The Reid Committee concluded in 1945 that, 'no single operation
associated with coal production in Britain offers more scope for improved
efficiency than that of underground transport' (Report: 65). Twenty-five
per cent of underground workers in the British industry were employed on
haulage work, and the Committee estimated that the amount of coal handled
per haulage worker averaged 5 tons per shift. This compared with 20 to 25
tons in Holland, and 50 tons or more in the United States. British haulage
practice obviously contributed to the relatively low output per manshift,
and it was estimated that had Dutch haulage methods been employed, OMS for
underground workers in the British industry in 1939 would have been a third
higher than the level actually attained. Outdated haulage techniques in
British mines also acted as a 'brake on OMS at the coal-face', and set
limits on what it was considered worthwhile to equip the face to produce
(Reid Report: 66).
The Reid Committee suggested that mechanization in British mines had been
approached the wrong way round, or starting at the face, when the process
should have commenced from the shaft bottom (Report:37). Some mining
engineers had expressed a similar view in the 1920s and 1930s. Delineating
the constituents of a 'system of mechanical coal mining', for example,
Carson reported in 1926 that:
The success of the whole system depends on the efficiency
of the underground haulage, and for that reason the question
of the particular haulage system to be adopted is worthy of
careful consideration. It is no use introducing conveyors to
deliver 20 tons per hour if the haulage arrangements can deal
only with 10 or 15 tons. The defect, I fear, has been the
cause - not always recognised - of most failures to introduce
successfully conveyor systems. (1926:36)
Mayor (1924) made a similar point and pre-empted the Reid Committee in
concluding that an efficient underground haulage system could only be
attained through the planned layout and development of the underground
workings.
But in Britain, the location and underground layout of individual mines
had been influenced by other than technical considerations - that is to
say, by the terms of the mineral lease and compromises struck between the
mineowner and landowner(s). The uncertainties induced by the need to re-
negotiate mineral leases militated against the planned development of
pits, and planned underground layouts were essential for the reorganization
and modernization of underground haulage systems. And since the
productivity increases resulting from expenditure to enlarge pits, through
amalgamations, and improve underground haulage systems, might be
appropriated by the landowner through higher royalty payments, the
incentive to make such investments would be reduced. Combining with the
deleterious effects of the royalty system to sustain antiquated haulage
systems were low wages in the British industry and high levels of
-266-
unemployment. Heinemann noted that the lowering of real wages after 1926
had enabled the industry to 'stagger on without the major technical
reorganisation that was needed'. Methods of labour utilization, involving
long hours and back-breaking physical work, may have perpetuated the high
costs of reproducing labour power. But for individual employers this was of
little immediate concern when mass unemployment in the coalfields meant
that 'if the individual miner exhausted his strength after three shifts'
work in a week at (a) killing pace....there was always a reserve of trained
men anxious for a job' (1947:71).
CONCLUSIOI
This chapter has examined the partially-mechanized mining system introduced
in the British industry in the interwar years. In this period, only the
task of undercutting the coal was mechanized. Mechanical conveyors were
used to transport the coal from the face to the subsidiary haulage roads.
But coal was still loaded by hand, other underground tasks were performed
manually, and the methods of transporting coal from the face to the shaft
for winding to the surface remained much the sane as those employed in the
late nineteenth century.
In the British industry, chain coal-cutters were developed for longwall
applications. Efforts to maximize the utilization of the machinery centred
on undercutting a continuous length of working face during the course of a
single working shift. But other operations had to be arranged over two
subsequent shifts, so that only one cycle of coal-getting operations could
be completed every 24 hours. Cutting, filling, and repair work were now
performed on three separate shifts, and the work was broken down further so
that within each shift there was a more intensive division of labour.
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Colliers who had formerly been responsible for the complete operation of
coal-getting were now confined to the performance of an elementary task.
They were effectively deskilled and lost their immediate control over the
pace of work, while new demands were placed on the management organization.
Pit officials had to be deployed to coordinate the production process, and
also to supervise and coerce workers. The successful completion of the 24
hour cycle of coal-getting operations demanded the punctual performance of
each of the narrowly-defined component tasks.
Across the British industry, the transition from hand-holing to machine
cutting was extremely uneven. Geological conditions complicated the
suitability of different coalfields for mechanization, while the new work
system impinged in different ways on existing arrangements and work
practices. Conflicts between mineowners and landowners over the terns and
conditions of change also developed unevenly within and between the
different coalfields. An attempt has been made in this chapter to suggest
the ways in which geological and market conditions, economic and social
relations, could combine to promote or inhibit mechanization. But detailed
empirical research is required to compare the circumstances of different
districts and pits operating within them.
Mechanization was an uneven process, and the diversity in the structures
of work and underground employment that had characterized the industry in
the period before 1913 became even more pronounced in the interwar years.
Organizing production under divergent conditions, and controlling different
work systems, mineowners were unable to make broad concessions to the
mineworkers. They resisted government intervention, or at least attempts to
coordinate the reorganization of the industry and, with deteriorating
market conditions after the First World War, pressed for wage cuts and a
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return to district wage settlements. With the defeat of the miners in 1926,
the mineowners secured wage reductions and an extension of working hours.
The overall level of mechanization in the British industry increased, but
even at the end of the interwar period 40 per cent of output was undercut
manually while hand-holing had virtually disappeared in European coal
industries. And in the British industry, the increase in the level of
mechanization in the period after 1926 was achieved principally through the
more intensive application of machinery in mechanized pits. There was no
widespread conversion of hand-getting pits to machine cutting. The defeat
of the miners in 1926 thus consolidated the backward conditions in the
Industry. Wage cuts and the extension of working hours enabled small mines
and unmechanized pits to remain in competition - although the cartel
agreements established in the late 1920s and 1930s were also significant,
and were a response to the industry's inability to reorganize (see chapter
two).
With only piecemeal changes to the industry's organizational and
technical structure, and adverse conditions in domestic and international
markets, unemployment in the coalfields rose to unprecedented levels.
Across the industry, working conditions deteriorated. Low wages forced a
speed-up of work in unmechanized mines which, coupled with long hours,
exhausted the miners, diminished their productivity and shortened their
lives. The use of machinery heightened the risk of underground explosions
and of dust-related diseases. Yet the law on industrial safety laid down in
the period before the introduction of coalface machinery remained in force,
unanended, throughout the interwar years. Chapter six, which examines the
changing role of colliery deputies, shows how these officials were often
unable to perform their statutory safety duties because they were
increasingly obliged to act as production foremen at the face.
Work intensification in mechanized and unmechanized mines was secured at
the cost of the miners' health and safety. Individual firms could draw upon
the reserve of unemployed workers to replenish their labour force as miners
were maimed and injured, or forced to retire prematurely. But the cost to
the industry, and to the wider economy, was high. Over the interwar period,
the rate of fatal accidents in the mines increased, while the British
industry attained a rate of growth of labour productivity far below that of
its European and North American rivals.
CHAPTER SIX: COLLIERY DEPUTIES AND OVERMEN
This chapter examines the role and recruitment of underground supervisory
workers in the British coal industry. It focuses on the colliery deputies,
firemen and examiners, who were the first-line supervisors in the mines
(1). But it also considers the changing functions of colliery overmen, or
the officials who were immediately superior to the deputies in the
managerial hierarchy. The discussion is organized in three broad sections.
The first examines the role and responsibilities of colliery deputies in
the period to 1913, when hand coal-getting remained the dominant method of
coal extraction in the British industry. The second considers the attempts
to organize deputies from the beginning of this century, and employer
responses to the formation of independent trade unions representing
supervisory grades. The final section addresses the changes in work and
work relationships effected with the introduction of coal-face machinery,
and employer attempts to meet the need for close supervision at the face
developed with the transition to the partially-mechanized mining system.
SUPERVISORY YORKERS II THE COAL INDUSTRY PRE-MECHANIZATION
In spite of recent academic interest in the capitalist labour process, and
in the historical development of employer strategies of labour control,
supervisory grades - in coalmining as in other trades - remain relatively
under-researched (2). Supervisory workers occupied a critical position in
the structure of control, or the 'key points of day-to-day contact between
--
management and labor' (Spencer, 1975:178). They were directly responsible
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for implementing emloyer policies and for eliciting 'appropriate' forms of
employee work behaviour. At the same time, they were employees, recruited
from the ranks of the workers they supervised and subject to many of the
pressures experienced by the latter. As firms attempted to restructure work
and work relationships, in response to industrial conflict and the forces
. of competition, supervisory workers often became the object of struggles
between employers and workers with the former attempting to impose, and the
latter to resist, a fresh work discipline (see Melling, 1980). A problem
for employers in several sectors was therefore to maintain the loyalty of
their subordinate officers and steer them away from union involvement,
whilst at the same time ensuring that these grades implemented policies
that would alter their skills and autonomy as well as those of the workers
they supervised.
Obviously the paradoxes besetting foremen and supervisors varied, as did
their functions, between sectors as well as over time. In coalmining, the
position is complex by virtue of regional variations in work organization
and the uneven development of the industry. In general, under the system of
hand coal-getting, employers obviated the expense and difficulties of close
supervision at the face by relying upon indirect mechanisms of labour
control such as the piece-rate and subcontract systems. In some coalfields
therefore, butties performed functions undertaken by foremen and directly-
employed supervisory grades in other industries; hiring their day-wage
assistants, determining the distribution of earnings, and supervising their
subordinates at the face. But deputies, firemen and examiners (the
different titles reflecting regional variations in nomenclature) had a
coordinating role and had to ensure a regular supply of tubs and materials
to the face. This involved them in the direct control of haulage workers,
although in some coalfields in the period to the late nineteenth century,
this supervisory function would also be undertaken by butties or piece-rate
foremen.
Under the various Mines Acts, deputies were also charged with certain
statutory safety duties and principally the inspection of the working parts
of the mine prior to the start of each coal-getting shift. For some
commentators (Taylor, 1960; Griffin, 1971), these Acts were an important
stimulus to the development of 'modern management' in the mines. Their
passage was, although only in part, the result of pressure exerted by the
mineworkers' unions on the state for the regulation of health and safety
standards in the industry.
Mining Legislation and the Appointment of Safety Officers
Coalmining has always been one of the most dangerous occupations. In the
nineteenth century, the industry's health and safety record was appalling
with, for many years, 'more accidents reported in the mines than in all the
factories and workshops in the United Kingdom' (Arnot, 1953:23). On
average, four mineworkers were killed every day in the British coalfields
in the years between 1880 and 1910.
With the working of seams at a greater depth from the surface, and with
innovations such as the use of gunpowder for blasting the coal from the
face, the frequency of colliery disasters had risen steadily from the
beginning of the nineteenth century. Colliery capitalists were concerned to
protect their property, especially as larger fixed capital outlays were
required to work deeper seams. But they were engaged in production for
profit and in the nineteenth century relied upon methods of labour
utilization that caused the premature death of their employees. Coal
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production was a labour intensive process, competition over markets was
intense, and mineowners were vigorously opposed to legislation which
threatened their ability to drive down wages or prioritize output above the
mineworkers' health and safety. Pressure for safety legislation came from
outside the industry, and from within it as more permanent trade unions
were established. But Acts enforcing some minimal regulation on the mining
Industry were passed 'only in the teeth of bitter opposition from the coal-
owners' (Arnot, 1953: 40).
Legislation in 1850 empowered the Secretary of State at the Home
Department to appoint Inspectors of Mines, whose duties would include
underground inspection of the workings. But the Act did little more than
establish the principle of inspection. Only 4 Inspectors were appointed for
the whole of the industry in 1850, with the Inspectorate increased to 6 in
1852, and to 12 in 1855 - when the industry embraced over 3,000 mines.
Nevertheless the 1850 Act was described by Lord Londonderry - a Northern
landowner and colliery capitalist - as 'the most mischevious and unjust
measure that could possibly be imagined' (cited in Arnot: 40).
Legislation in 1855 introduced 7 General Rules governing coal (and
.metalliferous) mines, and the provision for Special Rules to be introduced
at individual mines. Penalties for the breach of the Act were introduced,
although these were of a 'double kind'. Mineowners were liable only to be
fined (up to £5) for failing to observe the safety regulations, while
mineworkers could be fined or imprisoned. Moreover, while the composition
and bias of Magistrates' Courts generally protected mineowners from any
further liabilities, the Special Rules could be constructed more or less as
employers chose and hence could be used as a further disciplinary sanction
against employees (see chapter three).
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The legislation enacted in the period to 1855 in effect did little to
improve safety and working conditions for mineworkers. The General
Regulations were few in number, the Inspectorate established to enforce
them was meagerly resourced, while colliery officials were often ignorant
of the regulations, incapable of applying them in the interests of safety,
or had as yet to be appointed (Arnot: 41). Where mineowners subcontracted
production and supervision to butty-men and charter-masters, for example,
the latter were under an incentive to minimize costs - such as timber for
the roads and face - and to maximize output regardless of the dangers to
which both they and their assistants were exposed.
The Coal Mines Regulation Act of 1872 ostensibly altered this situation.
The number of General Rules was increased to 31, including the provision
that in the future all mines, except those employing less than 30 workers
below ground, should be under the control and daily supervision of a duly
trained and certificated manager. Certificates of competency, awarded by
examination boards appointed by the Secretary of State and testifying to
candidates' technical training and not simply their practical experience,
were divided into two classes under the Act of 1887. Mine managers were
required to hold first class certificates, and to have had at least 5
years' practical experience in a mine. Under-managers were required to hold
second class certificates, awarded after an examination of a less-exacting
standard.
The 1887 Coal Mines Regulation Act introduced 8 new General Rules,
including the requirement that the owner, manager or agent of a mine
appoint at least one 'competent person' for safety duties; principally, the
inspection of the working parts of the mine before the start of each shift,
to 'ascertain the condition thereof so far as the presence of gas,
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ventilation, roof and sides, and general safety are concerned' (General
Rule 4, 50 & 51 Vict. c.58). The officials appointed for these duties were
the colliery firemen, examiners and deputies, the different terms
reflecting regional variations in nomenclature with the 'three names
meaning one and the same person in different parts of the country'
(W.Frowen, in evidence to the Sankey Commission, 1919, Vol.1, Q.4793).
Various writers have identified in the Acts of 1872 and 1887 a stimulus
to change 'in organizational and managerial institutions which the
technical and economic needs of the industry were already beginning to
demand' (Taylor, 1960: 231). Mineowners were forced to appoint salaried
officials, and the Acts made these officials statutorily responsible for
safety in the mines. The 'free reign' of the butty-men and charter-masters
had therefore to be curtailed, and many of the functions performed by these
men were usurped by management and/or reallocated between grades of
subordinate officers directly-employed by the company. Stipulating the
minimum qualifications for promotion to the position of colliery manager,
the Acts placed increasing weight on technical training as opposed to
practical, mining experience and, according to Taylor, gave vine management
a 'professional status'.
Certainly an immediate effect of the legislation was the formation of a
National Association of Colliery Managers - an organization which became a
focus for opposition to further regulation (Church et al, 1986:432). But
small mines - of which there were many in the industry - were excluded from
certain of the provisions of the legislation, while the wording of the Acts
provided ample scope for the evasion of their principles. Thus, the Royal
Commission on Mines reported in 1909 that although it was generally assumed
that the 1887 Act had established the principle of 'one mine, one manager',
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this was not in fact the case, section 21 providing only that daily
personal supervision shall be exercised either by the manager or under-
manager.
In practice, a manager or an under-manager often acts in
that capacity for more than one mine, which is apparent
from the fact that the number of mines at work under the
Coal Mines Regulation Acts is about 3,200 and the number
of managers and under-managers at present holding appoint-
ments is about 1,500 and 1,700 respectively.
(Royal Commission on Mines, Second Report, 1909: 36)
Hence, mines might be left in the overall charge of an under-manager or
even, on the back shift, the overman, and the overman had no statutory
responsibilities for safety, while the Mines Acts did not stipulate any
qualification for this class of official (see below). The overman's
responsibility was for production and even in the interwar period of this
century he might enjoy wide discretionary powers in the execution of his
duties.
Safety and Output: The Dual Responsibilities of Colliery Deputies
There is little information as to the numerical significance of colliery
firemen, examiners and deputies in the British coal industry in the late
nineteenth century. Evidently such officers were employed in some pits and
districts before the Act of 1887 which made their appointment a statutory
obligation. But practices would have varied enormously, by virtue of
regional variations in work organization.
The different job titles, used according to custom in the different
coalfields, reflected the original functions of these officials. Thus:
The title of 'fireman' is a survival from the time
When it was the practice to send someone in advance
of the workmen into the workings to render them fit
for work by burning off any firedamp that might have
accumulated there since the previous day.
(Royal Commission on Safety, Report, 1938: 181)
That of 'examiner' was derived from one of their chief duties, that is, to
examine the conditions of the workings. The term 'deputy', on the other
hand, gave more expression to their 'peculiar position in the mining
industry....between the mine owner or manager and the mine worker' (Frowen,
Sankey Evidence, 1919, Vo1.1: Q.4793). Firemen, examiners and deputies were
safety officers while they also occupied the lowest rank in the managerial
hierarchy. Significantly, the. Royal Commission on Safety, which reported at
the end of the 1930s, argued that the term 'deputy' was to be preferred
because 'that name most appropriately indicates the duties that should
devolve on the person who, in his own area, represents, or deputizes for,
the manager, under-manager, or overman as the case may be' (Report, 1938:
181).
Deputies were allotted 'districts' within the mine over which they
exercised a 'general supervision' (Royal Commission on Mines, Second
Report, 1909:39). Before 1911, there was no restriction in any part of the
country as to the duties which they could perform in addition to their
statutory safety duties. Thus, while the 1887 Act was primarily a safety
regulation, it 'gave the owners the power to use these officials for the
purpose of production which sometimes can only be done at the expense of
the miners' safety' (Stewart, 1935: 55). While in practice the deputies'
work might include a good deal more than simple inspection, the actual
content of their jobs would vary with 'the different systems or methods of
work prevailing in different parts of the country' (Frowen, Sankey
Evidence, Vol.1: Q.4793).
The execution of their safety duties was likely to involve them in a
certain amount of physical work. Hence in South Wales, the examiner had to
'see that everything is kept in repair...; he has to put up brattice-sheets
for the ventilation in the district he is in, and supposing he comes across
a damaged door, it would be his duty to assist in repairing that door, so
that ventilation could go on its proper course' (J.R.Powell, Monmouthshire
and South Wales Examiners' Association, in evidence to Royal Commission on
Mines, 1909: 52). And in some districts, the deputy had a definite role in
the division of labour. Thus, in Northumberland and Durham, where the
underground employment hierarchy was most finely articulated, deputies were
required to 'set most of the timber both at the working-face and on the
roadways' (Royal Commission on Mines, Second Report, 1909: 39). Elsewhere,
the collier or coal-face work group would be responsible for performing
this work.
But deputies were also production and labour superintendents, charged by
higher levels of management with the responsibility for maintaining
discipline in their particular district and for output maximization. They
had a coordinating role, and had to ensure the continuity of production by
maintaining a regular supply of tubs, timber, and materials to the face.
This would involve them in the direct control of haulage workers, unless
this funtion was performed by a butty or piece-rate foreman although the
subcontracting of haulage work was generally confined to the Midlands and
was a practice that had more or less been eliminated by the late nineteenth
century (Rowe, 1923; Griffin, 1971). Thus in Scotland, firemen were
reported to have 'other duties to perform than safety, such as clearing
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roads, putting up timber where repairs were needed, regulating the trams
and keeping the drawers going properly, and seeing that the work goes on
regularly' (J.Weir, on behalf of the Scottish Miners, Royal Commission on
Mines, Second Report, 1909:51). And with direct experience of the situation
in South Wales, Tom Richards, the miners' M.P., informed the Royal
Commission on Mines that it was 'sometimes the man who has the most
influence and command in getting hauliers to drive coal rapidly who has the
qualification which is looked upon with favour' by mineowners and
managements .(Second Report: 40). But of course the adequate supply of empty
tubs to the face, and their prompt removal after they had been filled, was
not simply the concern of management. Colliers were paid by the amount of
coal cut and filled and would be likely to complain if a shortage of
supplies interrupted their work. It is not surprising, therefore, 'to learn
that often haulage workers were bullied and harassed, and that they in turn
were often concerned with deceiving the deputy' (Goldthorpe, 1959:217).
Hand coal-getting remained the dominant method of coal extraction in the
period to 1913. While the powers of the charter-masters or big-butties had
gradually been circumscribed, mineowners continued to rely upon indirect
mechanisms of labour control at the face. Piecework colliers had
'functional autonomy' over their own skilled work, and hierarchical control
over their day-wage assistants. The deputies' role at the face was
restricted. They had to act in a 'service' capacity to the faceworkers,
ensuring that the latter were kept supplied with tubs, materials and timber
(Ibid: 216). Any attempt to overstep this mark, to execute other than their
'servicing' and safety duties and to interfere in the colliers' work, was
likely to be strenuously resisted by the piecework coal-getters. Yet, and
as suggested in chapter three, the degree of autonomy enjoyed by colliers
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was not uniform or constant. The amount of contact between faceworkers and
supervisors varied between coalfields and over time.
Campbell and Reid (1978) note the attempts by Scottish coal companies to
limit the collier's 'independence' by insisting upon more regular hours of
work over the late nineteenth century, and various witnesses before the
Royal Commission on Mines reported that the deputy had to keep 'the time of
every man and boy in his district' (J.R.Powell, South Vales, Second
Report:52; see also Parry Jones, 1925:50). Deputies might be responsible
for 'measuring-up deadwork' performed at the face - timbering, packing,
ripping the roof and floor - and haggling over the payment for coal-getting
in 'abnormal places', although these duties were more frequently allocated
to the deputy's immediate superior, the colliery overman, or to the
overman's superior, the under-manager of the mine. The potential for
conflict between supervisors and faceworkers would of course be influenced
by managerial practices and cost-cutting exercises, and by work
organization at the face. Hence it was reduced in the North East where
hewers were paid simply for getting and filling the coal, and increased in
other districts, and notably in South Wales where payment for 'deadwork'
represented some 23 per cent of the collier's earnings (see chapter 3). In
the North East, the cavilling system equalized the chances of 'drawing' an
unfavourable working place for the hewers. Elsewhere, however, deputies
were responsible for the allocation of working places at the face and
according to 'Dataller' this authority formed 'fruitful ground for bribery'
(1925:62-4).
For some writers (eg Wellisz, 1953), the transition from bord and pillar
to longwall mining in the late nineteenth century (or prior to the
introduction of mechanical coal-cutters and conveyors) involved an attack
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on the craft status and autonomy of the collier, a fundamental change in
the deputy's role and in the nature of supervisor-worker relations at the
face. Longwall mining involved the continuous extraction of coal along a
broad coal face. Its introduction has been argued to have involved the
reorganization of work, with the imposition of a more detailed division of
labour at the face and formation of larger work teams, and to have
facilitated (or demanded) more intensive managerial supervision of the
labour process, with deputies required to coordinate specialized job roles
and direct the pace of work. This interpretation has been examined
critically in chapters 3 and 4, and need not be pursued here other than to
stress that struggles over the control of work developed unevenly as
between (and within) the different coalfields.
In comparison with bord and pillar working (which embraced a great
variety of arrangements) the deputy might be required to play a greater
role in coordinating the work of different work teams (each performing the
complete operation of coal-getting), in order to ensure a regular advance
of the longwall face. But this function might be undertaken by the stallman
or contracting collier as, for example, in the Midlands where the working
face was divided into fairly lengthy units, stalls, or 'places'. And
longwall mining of the nineteenth century variety often meant that the face
was advanced in a stepped line, with colliers working in discrete 'stalls',
so that the deputy's role would still be limited. 	 In a purely technical
sense, longwall mining might place the deputy in a better position to
observe the faceworkers. But his ability to direct them, or to interfere in
their work, might still be restricted and not least by job controls.
Available statistical evidence does suggest an increase in the numerical
significance of supervisory workers - deputies and overmen - in the first
quarter of the twentieth century, or prior to the extension of machine
mining. Supervisory grades formed 3.4 per cent of the underground workforce
in 1905, and 3.5 per cent in 1913 (Royal Commission on Safety, Report,
1938:51). Over the same period, faceworkers declined slightly as a
proportion of the total employed below ground, from 57.8 to 53.9 per cent.
The upward trend in the employment of supervisory staff continued in the
period 1913 to 1924, although the figures supplied by the Samuel Commission
in 1925 make it difficult to ascertain the dimensions of this increase
since the sample population of mines surveyed had changed.
TABLE 6.1: Number of deputies and overmen, and supervisory staff as a
proportion of the total employed below ground, 1913-1924.
1913	 1924	 1924
(so far as particulars 	 (the same mines	 (all mines for
were supplied)
	
as 1913)	 which particulars
were supplied)
No.	 % of all	 No.	 % of all	 No.	 % of all
BIG	 B/G	 BIG
Deputies 19,946 2.8 24,589 3.1 28,756 3.1
Overmen 2,901 0.4 3,583 0.4 4,295 0.5
Source: Samuel Commission, 1925, Vol.3 Appendix 1. Table 13. Page 197.
The increase in the number of deputies employed was due in part to the
Mines Acts of 1887 and 1911, with the latter stipulating more precisely the
maximum size of the deputies' underground districts and hence compelling
some firms to augment the ranks of their subordinate superintending staff.
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But mineowners were not statutorily obliged to appoint overmen, and the
increase in this class of official therefore does suggest some 'autonomous'
development in managerial practice. There is some evidence to suggest that
larger firms, particularly in exporting coalfields, were attempting to
intensify labour and reduce costs through centralized, cost-accounting
techniques. Overmen were deployed to achieve performance targets in the
various underground districts, with these officials brought under tighter
managerial control and excited to reach - and surpass - targets in their
districts by incentive schemes (Jevons, 1920, and see below).
Such developments would have enhanced the scope for conflict between the
overmen and deputies, and between deputies and colliers if the former were
obliged - for example - to tighten-up on time-keeping at the face. But they
were uneven, and added to existing variations in the numerical significance
of supervisory workers which were in part a function of regional variations
In work organization. Thus, Ridley Wareham, the managing director of the
Ashington Collieries in the North East, chastised correspondents to the
firm's 'magazine' who had complained in the early 1920s that the company
was 'wasting money' on the employment of underground officials.
Our correspondents appeared to regard the officials
as a sort of military police. We may say at once that
we do not agree with that view. The main duty of the
officials in the pit is to help the men. They see that
the supply of tubs is regulated as well as possible.
They save waste on materials, and, above all, they
endeavour to make safety the first consideration. From
our personal knowledge we are satisfied that without
their help the present daily outputs would be quite
impossible. (Cited in Colliery Guardian, 6.1.1922: 44).
But across the North East in general, colliery deputies represented a
higher proportion of the underground labour force than in many other
coalfields. This was because the hewers were more specialized and the
deputies had a more prominent role to play in the coordination of
production. Distinct grades of labour were employed on 'deadwork' at the
face, including the deputies who had to set the timber props. 	 In 1907,
supervisory personnel formed 4.6 per cent of the underground labour force
in Northumberland, 5.0 per cent in Durham, 4.0 per cent in Scotland, 2.7
and 2.6 per cent respectively in South Wales and Yorkshire (Eight Hours Day
Committee, First Report, 1907, II, Table 1: 40-126).
Standards of Competence
The Coal Mines Regulation Act of 1887, placed upon employers the statutory
obligation to appoint 'competent persons' for safety duties below ground in
the mines. But the Act did not stipulate any qualifications for the
position of fireman, examiner and deputy, and did not restrict these
officials to the performance of safety duties. In practice, firemen and
deputies were the 'non-commissioned officers' of the mines. They were
recruited, by management, from the ranks of the mineworkers - often,
although by no means invariably, from the men at the face - to a position
at the bottom of the managerial hierarchy. They were the officials in
closest daily contact with the mineworkers and formed the 'chief connecting
link between the workmen and the senior officials of the mine' (Royal
Commission on Safety, Report, 1938: 181), and upon them were devolved
certain production duties over and beyond their statutory responsibilities
for safety. They had to maintain discipline in their district, apportion
supplies, and ensure the continuity of production.
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From its inception in 1889, the Miners' Federation campaigned for
Improved health and safety provision. In its submissions to various
inquiries and commissions, the MFGB emphasized the conflict between the
deputies' dual responsibilities - to management for output maximization and
to the men and in law for the safety of employees. Union officials
questioned the extent to which deputies were free to perform their
statutory responsibilities; for example, to insist that the face and roads
should be adequately timbered when their employer was attempting to
maximize output and minimize wage costs. The MFGB also questioned the
extent to which the men appointed as deputies were competent for the Job of
safety officer. Deputies were appointed by mineowners or their managers,
and the selection of these officials might reflect priorities other than
safety; for example, their loyalty to management and ability to 'drive'
hauliers rather than to test for gas. On the other hand, firms might
recruit men with little or no experience of underground work and simply to
comply with the wording of the law.
Inquests held after colliery accidents had occurred often portrayed
colliery officials in a less than favourable light, and revealed the way in
which safety considerations had been subordinated to the mineowner's
concern to maintain output and minimize expenditure in spite of the dangers
to the miners' lives. Through its officers, the MFGB had done much to
ensure that the causes of such disasters were ascertained, and the extent
of managerial negligence publicized. The Richards-Smith report into the
Whitehaven disaster in 1910, in which 136 were killed through an explosion
of firedamp, denounced the 'reckless indifference displayed generally by
the officials at this colliery to the danger of fire-damp and coal dust',
and noted that from the deputies' reports it was 'impossible for the
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Manager day by day to have correct knowledge as to the state of the
workings of the colliery' (cited in Arnot, 1953: 32). Other critics pointed
to the 'general loosenes of administration' in the mines, with deputies
afforded the scope to become petty tyrants in their district and to
discharge their production duties through 'bribery and the like' (Dataller,
1925: 62-3). But, as Parry Jones emphasized, senior officials had often
been successful in evading liability for deaths and injury at mines in
their charge by claiming before inquests that the responsibility lay with
incompetent	 or	 duplicitous	 under-officers	 (1925:	 50).	 'Loose
administration', moreover, reflected on the general managerial practice and
priorities of the firm and, as regards the Whitehaven colliery, the
Richards-Smith report concluded that general managerial practice 'appeared
to have been not how far can we keep the workings from any source of
danger, but how near can we approach that danger without a catastrophe'.
Owner and manager indifference to safety might be reflected in their
choice of men for the position of deputy. But even the most 'competent
persons' would have difficulty in enforcing safety regulations in the face
of employer hostility or, for that matter, opposition from the workmen.
While the Miners' Federation campaigned for tighter safety legislation, in
production it was not uncommon for colliers and deputies to collude in the
evasion of existing provisions. Colliers were paid by the amount of coal
cut and filled, and the piecework system placed them under an 'incentive'
to take risks, and this was especially the case when wage-rates were
depressed (Jones, 1936:20). Moreover, under the Mines Acts deputies were
required to report to management the names of men performing unsafe
practices, with senior officials reserving the right to take disciplinary
action. Colliers not unnaturally resented being 'spied on' and might make
the deputy's life hell if his reports caused them to be fined or penalised
in some other way (Frowen, Sankey Evidence, 1919, Vol.1: QQ. 5056-7).
Deputies had dual responsibilities, for output and for safety. To
discharge either effectively they had to maintain viable relations with the
workforce. According to Manley (1947), the deputy had to have a 'real flair
for controlling men'.
.„.unless he has it, his position is hopeless. And he
has to deal with men who can be pretty tough. They are
not the sort to be bullied, and he has to humour them
while at the same time making certain that his orders
are carried out. (p.30)
His chief resources might be a 'lifelong knowledge both of the processes
with which he worked and of the people who worked them' (Melling, 1980:
191). Thus, while colliers resented 'undue interference' in their work, and
deputies who simply reported 'bad practices' back to management, they had
an obvious interest in safety and would be more likely to respond to
instruction and advice from deputies who they considered to be experienced
workmen and who displayed a principal allegiance to the well-being of the
mineworkers. Such qualities, however, would not always be valued by mine
owners and management. Scottish mineowners claimed that they would not
appoint faceworkers to be firemen because they were too familiar with the
men and as a result were unable to impose discipline on them. In the
Scottish coalfields, firemen were generally recruited from the roadsmen or
'other persons who had not had the experience at the face'. But as
representatives of the Scottish miners' union pointed out, this was not
because of the calibre of such men, but rather 'because of their
cheapness'; the customary wage of roadsmen being considerably below that of
hewers at the face (Royal Commission on Mines, Second Report, 1909: 40).
The Miners' Federation campaigned for safety to be made a priority and
for legislation that would impose uniform standards on the industry.
Existing methods of labour utilization meant that the costs of reproducing
labour power were high; miners were exhausted by their work, exposed to
accident and injury, forced into premature retirement or to an early death.
But because structures of work organization varied across the coalfields
and uniform provisions were likely to impinge unevenly on different
sections of the industry, mineowners could unite only to oppose such
legislation, or to retain the maximum individual autonomy and employer
discretion to continue to exploit labour through existing, crude methods.
Deputies were caught between these conflicting forces and interests and,
for Parry Jones, this 'body of men' were 'deserving of far greater
sympathetic consideration than they actually receive'. They were, he
argued, subject to the 'continual buffeting of those three great forces:
the State through its Mines Inspector, the management through its chiefs,
and the general body of workmen through its organisation' (1925:50).
The Royal Conndssion on Mines and Coal Mines Act, 1911
The representative organizations of mineowners and mineworkers articulated
divergent conceptions of the deputy's role, and of the qualifications
necessary for the position, before the Royal Commission on Mines, appointed
in 1906. The rate of fatal accidents in British mines had fallen slightly
from the end of the nineteenth century - from 206 workers killed per
100,000 employed below ground in 1890, to 173.6 in 1913 - although the
absolute number of deaths and injury through accidents remained very high.
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Periodic disasters - such as that at the Whitehaven pit - forced the
dangers of this trade into the consciousness of the general public, while
the experience of foreign competition in export markets had stimulated a
broader discussion on the standards of British mine management. The Miners'
Federation had continued to campaign for higher safety standards, and three
of its executive officers were appointed as members of the Royal Commission
On Mines which was established to 'inquire into and report on certain
questions relating to the health and safety of miners, and the
administration of the Mines Acts'. Mineowners and government officials were
also appointed as Commissioners.
The Royal Commission sat for three years, and considered a wide range of
Issues pertaining to health and safety, including the qualifications and
role of colliery firemen, examiners and deputies. Witnesses called by the
MFGB argued that, in general, the standards of competence amongst this
class of official were too low. They argued that the job was concerned with
safety and hence that the men appointed to it should have considerable
knowledge of underground conditions and, in particular, practical
experience of work at the face. They furnished details of deputies who
lacked such experience, with many of these examples drawn from the Scottish
coalfields where, according to the Inspector of Mines, the 'duties of
firemen...are looked upon as a job for which anyone is good enough' (Royal
Commission on Mines, Second Report, 1909: 41). On behalf of the Lanarkshire
miners, Mr.Kelly reported that he had 'known of men filling the position of
fireman who had no experience whatever of work in a coal mine', and of one
man who had 'come from the surface and before he was three months in the
coal pit he got the position of fireman, and he had never previously been
down the coal pit' (Ibid).
Practices varied across the industry, however, as did the particular
experiences of mineworkers, and at least two representatives of the workmen
- one from Lanarkshire, the other from Durham - reported their high regard
for the deputies and belief that in general the 'best men' were appointed
to the post, although there were exceptions (Ibid:40). In Durham and
Northumberland, of course, deputies worked at the face and were recruited
to it - and thereafter to their position as under-official - after a
lengthy underground apprenticeship. Details of the work experience of
firemen in Lancashire and North Staffordshire, moreover, suggested that in
general these officials had been appointed after several years' experience
of underground work. Most had been colliers and, prior to their promotion
to the face, drawers or haulage hands.
But the length of underground work experience was no guarantee that the
deputies' reports would be taken seriously by higher levels of management.
And it was not necessarily a sufficient qualification for the performance
of safety duties. Thus, evidence presented to the Commission suggested that
a significant number of deputies had worked below ground for too many
years, their eyesight having deteriorated to such an extent that they were
incapable of making routine tests to detect the presence of gas (Ibid: 48-
9). Mineowners might appoint older men in order to retain the services of
younger, and less physically-exhausted workers for coal-getting at the
face, and the Inspector of Mines for the East Scotland District reported
that 'he had known of cases in which old men - over 70 years of age - had
been appointed firemen though they were physically incapable for the work'
(Ibid:41). Deputies were required to make reports of their inspections, and
so that senior officials were kept informed of underground conditions. But
the Commissioners heard evidence of deputies who were illiterate, or who
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could only sign their name, and where the fireman 'put his cross down and
the overman signed the name for him' (Ibid: 46).
Details were also furnished of men who had been appointed as deputies but
who did not 'even know the rules.. .applicable to their duties' (Ibid: 40),
and there was evidence that a significant proportion of officials had not
been trained in modern techniques for testing for gas (p.45). Such evidence
was used in support of the miners' demand that, in addition to a minimum
number of years of practical underground experience, candidates for the
position of . fireman, examiner and deputy should possess a certificate of
competency testifying to their general qualifications and technical
training.
Representatives of mineowners and managers, on the other hand, were
adamant that the deputies currently in post were 'thoroughly competent for
their duties' (p.42). Opposed to any limitation of their managerial
prerogative and freedom to select men who they considered 'fit' for office,
they argued that a 'certificate of qualification was neither necessary nor
desirable'. The qualifications necessary for a fireman or deputy, they
maintained, 'both as regards practical experience and knowledge and moral
character cannot be tested by any system of examination, but they can only
be ascertained satisfactorily from the personal observation and enquiries
of higher officials'.
Mineowners maintained that the chief qualifications for the position of
fireman, examiner and deputy were practical experience and the ability to
control men. They objected that a theoretical examination would deter
'practical men' from coming forward for promotion, while men who were
technically competent did not necessarily make suitable firemen. Thus,
Mr.Madew stated that there were 17 men holding second class certificates of
-292-
competency at his pits. Some of these men were employed as datallers,
others as stallmen, but 'they were not fitted to be firemen as they had not
the practical experience necessary or the capacity for maintaining
discipline'	 (p.44) : Other witnesses argued that colliers did not
necessarily make suitable firemen - either because they were
'indisciplined' in their own work habits, or because they were incapable of
imposing discipline on others - and therefore objected to any rule that
would make work experience at the face a compulsory requirement for
candidates. One owner from Yorkshire, on the other hand, argued that 'some
of the best men' - or those most capable of maintaining discipline - 'would
be contractors', but that such men would not care for the position since
deputies were paid on a day-wage basis and hence did not have the scope to
increase their earnings by intensifying their own labour or that of their
day-wage assistants.
Such evidence revealed the objection to any legislative constraint on
managerial discretion, and a general reluctance to elevate the status of
deputies as safety officers, or the standards of technical competence among
subordinate colliery officials. The owners' position received some support
from the Mines Inspectorate (drawn from the ranks of mining engineers and
mine management), insofar as the latter considered certificates of
competency to be a superfluous requirement and that the 'responsibility for
appointing competent men should rest as at present with the management'.
But the Mines Inspectors did recommend some ruling as to the minimum length
of practical experience required before candidates could be appointed as
deputies, and also recommended that the status of such officials should be
elevated by raising their pay and conditions - so that the 'best men' would
be attracted to the job and tighter discipline maintained.
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The three Commissioners representing mineworkers were therefore outvoted
in their demand that deputies should hold certificates of competency. The
view of the majority, expressed in the Commission's report, was that while
'firemen and deputies would be the better for any theoretical
qualifications they may possess....the essential qualifications are a
thorough practical experience in the work they are called upon to undertake
or supervise, soundness of Judgement in dealing with emergencies, and
ability to control men' (p.46). In the view of the majority of the
Commissioners, such qualifications could only be ascertained by management
and hence the Report recommended that managerial discretion over
appointments should be maintained. Certain (minimal) qualifications for the
position were suggested. Candidates should be at least 25 years old before
promotion, have had at least 5 years' practical underground work
experience, with at least 2 years' work experience at the face. They should
possess a certificate testifying to their ability to detect gas, and that
their eyesight was adequate to perform such tests. As regards the duties of
firemen and deputies, the Commissioners noted that 'their functions are
liable to be interpreted in a wider sense in some districts than in
others'.
The arrangements made at some mines admit of the firemen
devoting their time exclusively to questions connected
with the safety of the mine, but in others it appears that
their duties extend to other matters connected with the
general working of the mine. (Second Report: 56)
The Report concluded that, where practicable, the firemen and deputies
should give their whole time and attention to duties immediately concerned
with safety and that, in the interests of discipline, they should be
involved in the organization and supervision of the men rather than in the
manual work of production. But the Commissioners felt unable to recommend
any definite rule on this matter.
The Coal Mines Act of 1911 translated many of the Commissioners'
recommendations into law and, on the last point, ostensibly went a 'good
deal further', It stipulated that firemen and deputies should devote the
whole of their working time to their statutory safety duties, but also
provided for a range of exemptions from this rule. Small mines, employing
less than 30 people below ground, were excluded, as were mines in the North
East where deputies could still be employed on timbering at the face.
Applicable to the industry as a whole, deputies could also be employed to
'measure-up deadwork' performed at the face, provided that this did not
prevent them from conducting their safety duties in a thorough manner.
Section 64 of the Act, and Rule 50 of the General Regulations codified in
1913, limited the maximum size of the deputy's underground district to that
which it was possible to thoroughly inspect within a period of two hours.
Section 15(1) set out the qualifications for the post, and added two
requirements to those recommended by the Royal Commission. The deputies'
were also to be examined on their ability to measure air in an air current,
and on the condition of their hearing, before they obtained a certificate.
The examination for the position of fireman and deputy was therefore
established primarily as a 'physical one', and its limitations were
addressed by the Holland Committee appointed by the Secretary for Mines in
the late 1920s. While deputies were to be tested for their ability to
measure an air current, this was not normally part of their statutory
duties. On the other hand, they were required to test the condition of
'roof and sides', with collapses at the face and in the roads one of the
principal causes of deaths and injury in the mines, while the deputies'
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examination did not provide for any test of candidates' ability to make
such checks. The Holland Committee pointed to anomalies in the deputy's
examination, and also to the failure of the Royal Commission and 1911 Act
to stipulate any qualifications for the deputy's immediate superior - the
colliery overman.
Deputies received their instructions from the overman, and the latter was
the official left in charge of the mine in the absence of the manager and
under-manager. In 1864, the Miners' National Association had petitioned
parliament demanding that, 'all agents, overmen, or chief managers of mines
be subjected to scientific examination, and that a certificate of
competency be given by some qualified person, 	 or Board of
Examiners...previous to any mine being placed in their charge' (cited in
Holland Committee, Report, 1930: 9). But the Acts of 1872 and 1887 had made
no specific reference to colliery overmen, and the 1911 Act made a similar
omission, so that these officials 	 remained free from any statutory
responsibility for safety.
The General Regulations under the 1911 Act went to arbitration in 1913,
and at this juncture the Miners' Federation demanded that men appointed to
the position of overman should be required to hold at least second-class
certificates of competency. A rule stipulating that overmen should possess
the second-class - or under-manager's - certificate was inserted, but the
fireman's certificate was allowed as an alternative. Since the minimum age
for promotion to this position was set at 23, with 3 years' practical
experience below ground, men were appointed with less underground work
experience and no greater technical training than the deputies who they
supervised, and who were defined as production officials with no statutory
responsibility for the safety of employees. The position in Britain, on the
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eve of the First World War, was therefore in many respects quite different
from that in the German coal industry where candidates for the position of
'steiger' - roughly equivalent to the overman in British mines - had to
undergo a formal , technical education and 'two gruelling years at the
Bergschule' before they were eligible for promotion (Spencer, 1975: 183).
In the British industry, the anomalies left by the 1911 Act became more
apparent with the introduction of coal-face machinery. But they were
evident long before the extension of machine mining. While deputies were
apparently confined to the performance of safety duties, the spirit of the
legislation was never fully-realized in practice, and their role in the
mines remained ambiguous.
I'll try to put it to you as plain as I can 	 Our
first duty was safety. That came first - to see that
the men were working in safe conditions. But it wasn't
so simple. You know that if you have a business it has
to make a profit. (Deputy, born 1890, cited in Forman, 1979:42)
The deputy was in charge of a district within the mine and, in the absence
of any further development in the managerial hierarchy, remained the 'only
feasible representative of managerial authority at the coalface' (Supple,
1987: 441). He had to 'keep things in order' and 'make the district pay'
(Forman: 42), and if overmen were employed he had to accept their
instructions, even if these overruled his decisions on the conditions of
the workings and because his superior officer's duties were defined in
terms of output maximization.
ORGAIIZING THE DEPUTIES
Pay and Conditions
The British coal industry continued to draw its officials 'from the ranks'
over the interwar period of this century with, according to Stewart, 'by
far the greater number of managers' - over 90 per cent in Scotland - 'drawn
directly from the ranks of the miners' in the 1930s (1935: 54). Government
enquiries became increasingly critical of this situation and of the entry
barriers into the managerial side of coal mining confronting 'men of
general education not already having family connections with it' (Samuel
Commission, Report, 1925: 190). But there were also barriers to promotion
for mineworkers, and having ambitions may have been insufficient to pass
through obstacles such as employer prejudice and nepotism and preference
for men who could maintain discipline, rather than those who had pursued
their education at night school or college.
Promotion to the first rung of the managerial hierarchy, moreover, was no
guarantee of further elevation, while the pay and conditions attached to
the job of fireman or deputy would have deterred many men from presenting
themselves as candidates.	 Deputies worked for longer hours than other
grades of underground workmen. The 1908 Act, which restricted the length of
the working day to 8 hours for miners, contained the provision that the
working shift of deputies, firemen and examiners could be extended to a
maximum of 9% hours. William Frowen, General Secretary of the General
Federation of Deputies' Associations formed in 1910, argued before the
Sankey Commission in 1919 that:
It is a matter of regret to us that a large number of
mine owners or mine managements have made this clause
fit so that the 9% hours has become the minimum, and
the maximum has gone to any time you may mention. (Vol.1:Q.4793)
And the Royal Commission on Mines reported in 1909 that 'we had evidence
from a number of witnesses to the effect that the firemen employed at many
collieries work as much as eleven or twelve hours a day, and in some cases
this limit is exceeded' (Second Report: 50). But obviously terms and
conditions varied, and in the North East deputies were reported to work an
average 71/2 hour shift, or half an hour longer than other workers at the
face (Sankey Evidence, 1919, Vol.1: QQ.4935-36).
Deputies were generally paid on a day-wage basis with, in some pits and a
minority of districts before 1913, these officials in receipt of a weekly-
wage. As with hours, there were regional variations in earnings. The Royal
Commission on Mines received evidence of the low wages paid to firemen and
deputies in a number of districts, and in the Scottish coalfields in
particular. A number of witnesses suggested that since the earnings of
these officials were below those of the piecework hewers who they
supervised, the best qualified men were not attracted to the job, while the
status of the firemen remained low and did not enable them to properly
maintain discipline (Second Report: 41).
But not all witnesses were convinced that higher pay would elevate the
deputy's status, or induce more suitable candidates to offer themselves for
promotion. R.A.S.Redmayne, for example, who was subsequently appointed
Chief Inspector of Mines, argued that while the deputies did not have the
scope of the piece-work coal-getter to increase their daily earnings (by
intensifying their effort), they did enjoy a greater security of employment
and a more regular income - the kind of benefits that might attract a
'steadier' and 'more reliable' candidate from management's point of view.
Speaking from my own practical experience I have found
that men have been ready to forego the possibility of
higher wages (piecework at coal hewing) in favour of
taking a deputy's job, because of its more congenial
work and possibly more regular employment. It approx-
imates nearer to a certain wage, and is not subject to
considerable variations, whereas the coal hewer's wage
is subject to considerable variation, especially if he
gets into a hard place or has a bad bargain, or whatever
it may be. (Second Report: 41).
The Lancashire deputy, cited by Forman, suggested that men with family
commitments were more likely to opt for the official's position as he
himself had done. He had six children and a wife to support - 'none of them
working' - and he had sought promotion at a time when the pits were 'doing
very badly', with short-time working prevalent in the industry while there
was 'no dole' (1979: 43-4). The advantage of the deputy's job, as this man
pointed out, was that it offered a 'guaranteed' working week; 'you had six
days guaranteed - you had to work them - but there was no short time at
all'. But not all deputies enjoyed the benefits of a weekly wage, and in
Lancashire the six-day working week for deputies had been won through the
activities of the deputies' union, rather than extended unilaterally by the
mineowners.
The advantage of a regular income, as against the potential of higher
earnings for piecework coal-getters, would vary with - amongst other
factors - the state of trade.
In peace-time when a collier may often, especially
in summer, be working three or four shifts in a week,
the deputy has a decided financial advantage for he
is sure of six days' pay, but in war-time when the
colliers' position is better in every way, it is hard
work to find good deputies, and only men who can see
well ahead will take the job. (Manley, 1947: 30)
Hence, difficultieS were encountered in the recruitment of deputies during
both World Wars and the years immediately preceding them. The Royal
Commission on Mines concluded in 1909 that 'pecuniary inducements' would to
a large extent regulate the calibre of candidates coming forward for
promotion, and noted that current wage levels were often insufficient to
attract the 'suitable' candidates for the job. The Commissioners
recommended that this matter should receive 'the serious consideration of
colliery owners' (Second Report: 46).
Deputies' Associations: Membership Growth to 1921
Pay and conditions formed the issues on which deputies began to organize in
district and county trade unions from the early twentieth century. Hence,
mineowners encountered pressure from 'above and below' to improve the pay
and status of their subordinate officials. The period, of course, was one
of union growth and of increasing labour militancy through British industry
more generally, and widening earnings differentials between deputies and
other grades in coal mining no doubt stimulated the efforts of supervisory
workers in this trade to organize as a separate bargaining unit.
Thus, in the Midlands from the early twentieth century, deputies attempted
to organize independently from the miners and from the associations
representing higher levels of mine management. The latter were often
hostile to the formation of separate organizations, representing the
Interests of supervisory grades, and this is made clear in England's (1963)
account of the Derbyshire Deputies' Association - which subsequently became
the National Association, representing deputies across the coalfields of
the Midlands. In certain other coalfields, however, and notably the North
East, deputies were recruited into the mineworkers' union - and this
situation was denounced by mineowners elsewhere in the industry, while
government officials on the Royal Commission on Mines urged that in the
interests of discipline it should be discouraged (Second Report:50).
Representatives of the early Derbyshire Association met with others from
Nottinghamshire, Durham, Northumberland, Lancashire and Cheshire, and North
Wales in 1910, and resolved to form a General - or national - Federation of
Deputies' Associations. At this time in these coalfields only 4,080 out of
the 11,300 deputies employed were in an association. In Derbyshire and
Nottinghamshire, only 250 out of a total 4,000 deputies employed had Joined
the union. The South Wales' Examiners' Association affiliated to the
General Federation in 1911, the year in which the Coal Mines Act was
passed, defining the deputy's role as that of safety officer. The
legislation, which elaborated the role and qualifications of firemen and
deputies, boosted the self-image of these workers and fuelled their demands
for pay levels commensurate with their responsibilities.
Since 1911 he has been placed by Act of Parliament in a
position dissimilar to any other person employed in the
industry; he has to carry out the Mines Acts and Regula-
tions, and see that others do the same;...
It may be said that the 1911 Act was a safety Act in
very deed, so far as the deputies were concerned, from
that date he became a certificated man with added duties
and far greater responsibilities.
(Frowen, Sankey Evidence, 1919, Vo1.1: Q.4793)
The Derbyshire Association of Deputies was renamed the National Association
in 1913, and reconstituted to represent the Midlands' districts. Membership
increased from 350 to 1,021 between 1912 and 1913, with the number of
branches rising from 10 to 30 (17 in Derbyshire, 6 in Nottinghamshire, and
7 in South Staffordshire and Cannock Chase).
The National Association campaigned for an 8 hour day for deputies, and
for pension schemes with this latter demand reflecting, possibly, the muted
managerial aspirations of its membership. The Association also campaigned
for deputies to be state employees, and for managers to be prevented from
'appointing' men to act as Deputies, who are not qualified to act, some
being under age, or not having had the necessary experience, and some not
holding a certificate' (England: 18). A further demand was for deputies to
be given 14 days' notice before dismissal by their employer, 'so that in
the event of any injustice being done to him, we can inquire into his case,
and perhaps prevent his removal'. In 1913, the National was registered
under the Trade Union Acts, and the first full-time official - a General
Secretary - was appointed.
Membership of the National Association had increased to 1,654 by 1916.
But while it had been in existence for 8 years, it still experienced 'great
difficulty in obtaining recognition from coal owners' and only one pit
agreement had been signed (England: 21). A breakthrough, however, came with
the state's assumption of control over the coal industry in the First World
War. With mounting unrest in the coal industry, the Coal Controller agreed
to meet with the deputies' associations and in 1917, awarded an advance to
these officials (which in the Midlands' area at least included the
provision for one week's paid holiday). Government intervention thus
nurtured the deputies' aspiration to be treated as a separate bargaining
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group, with terms and conditions distinct from those of the general body of
mineworkers. Membership of the National Association was boosted by these
developments, and reached 2,860 in 1918, by which time the National had
succeeded in 'making Agreements with the Coal Owners' Association in each
Wages' District' in the Midlands coalfield (England: 26). Under the
agreement reached with the Midland Counties Coal Owners' Association,
deputies were paid 8s 6d per day for a 'guaranteed six-days' week'; gained
8 days paid holiday, payment for overtime, sickness and accidents; and a
joint disputes committee was established. But these advances, which gave
the Midlands' deputies many significant benefits in comparison with
mineworkers, were not enjoyed by deputies throughout the industry and in
some coalfields - notably in Scotland - the officials' unions were still
struggling for employer recognition.
Meanwhile, the General Federation of Deputies' Associations had resolved
to affiliate with the TUC, and to campaign for an 8 hour day for deputies
throughout the industry, for these officials to be state employees, and for
a national board of appeal for those dismissed by their employers (see
below). In evidence to the Sankey Commission in 1919, the General Secretary
- William Frowen - claimed that the General Federation represented 20,000
of the 24,000 deputies employed in the British coal industry (Vo1.1:
Q.4793). This would appear to be something of an over-estimate, however,
and Frowen's figures were certainly questioned by representatives of the
MFGB on the Commission (Q,5044). According to England, the deputies'
associations were still very weak in certain districts, and were fighting
for recognition in the face not only of employer hostility, but also
opposition from other managerial associations and, in Scotland, from the
mineworkers' union.
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Employer Responses to the Organization of Supervisory Grades
Firemen, examiners and deputies occupied a 'peculiar position' in the
mining industry, standing between the mine owner or management and the
mineworker (Frowen, Sankey Evidence, Vol.1). They were the officials in
closest daily contact with the miners, and 'management experts' stressed
the 'paramount importance of a staff of loyal and capable overmen and
deputies' since these officials were 'in constant contact with the workmen
in a way that the manager cannot be' (Bulman,1920: 16). Supervisors were
the representatives of managerial authority in the workplace and were
expected to execute managerial ‘ instructions, while they were also employees
and subject to similar pressures experienced by the men in their command.
Managements demanded the loyalty of their under-officials. But in the
British coal industry employers were often reluctant to extend the material
rewards and benefits that would differentiate supervisors from other grades
of employees, and enlist their devotion to the company.
In the German coal industry of the Ruhr, firms had developed a variety of
means to secure the loyalties of their supervisory workers (see Spencer,
1975). Only candidates with appropriate political sympathies were promoted
to supervisory positions. Supervisory grades were paid well above the
average earnings of the workmen, and received certain fringe benefits such
as superior company housing, while the lengthy, formal training that they
were compelled to undergo was also regarded in part as a means through
which supervisors would be differentiated from the workmen, and their
attitudes and loyalties oriented towards the company.
In the British industry, in contrast, overmen and deputies were not
obliged to go through any formal technical training; mineowners insisting
that practical experience was sufficient for the duties performed by their
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subordinate officers. And successive Royal Commissions drew attention to
the relatively low pay and low status of firemen and deputies at the
average colliery, in spite of the responsibilities for safety devolved to
these workers by the 1911 Coal Mines Act. Managements demanded the devotion
of their supervisory staff and, writing in 1920, Bulman suggested that in
the past, 'they have been the pick of the mining community, capable men of
character and self-respect, and of special competency in practical mining
work, and distinguished, many of them, by a splendid sense of devotion to
duty'. Notwithstanding the problems with this summation, Bulman's account
does highlight the alarm with which owners and managements viewed
developments in the years immediately succeeding the First World War, when
labour militancy was at a height in Britain (3). Thus, he continued that in
recent years there had been 'symptoms of dissatisfaction and unrest' among
the deputies, and that this had arisen 'very naturally from the higher
wages earned by hewers and stonemen on piecework, by the disturbing effect
of recent legislation, and by the growing strength of the Miners' Union'
(p.16).
The unity and militancy of the miners' union was growing, and the MFGB
was pursuing the campaign for the nationalization of the coal industry.
Deputies were organizing and their unions were recruiting increasing
numbers, while - and most ominously for employers - the deputies'
associations were working closely with the mineworkers' unions on a number
of issues. Deputies had to be kept 'entirely independent of the Miners'
Union', Bulman insisted, for they were 'part of the official staff' of the
colliery and essential to its 'successful working', and therefore owners
would have to improve the pay and status of these officials in order to
steer them away from politically informed trade unionism. The Editor of the
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Colliery Guardian intimated similarly to his readers that the reward of
deputies had been 'niggardly', that many of them 'earn less in wages than
the boys', and that 'a real deal depends upon the way in which they are
treated now' (25.4.1919: 961),
But not all employers had passively witnessed the growth of trade
unionism among their supervisory grades. Thus, the complaint articulated by
representatives of the deputies' associations was that their members were
being forced into company unions, organized by senior management. The
annual report of the National Association of Deputies in the Midlands in
1916 suggested that:
One of our greatest dangers now against our immediate success
Is the action of the Management in offering to assist the Deputy
Into a Union of Deputies at his own particular Colliery. They
have never been interested in the Deputy until they see him begin
to organise into a very useful Union of his own..Yow it suddenly
occurs to the Management that it would be much better if he were
organised under the Manager's control. Organise, they say, make
the Manager the Vice-President, the Agent the President, the
Under-Manager the Secretary and Treasurer...If you have a dispute
a Committee chosen from amongst us can go into the matter, and
settle without interference. Thus saith the Manager. We ask you
seriously to contemplate what influence the Deputy would have in
settling the dispute to his....way of thinking, by a Committee
which included in its composition the Agent, Manager and Under-
Manager. Some have tried it for a year or so, but are sick of it.
They are coming back. Did wenot find at our very commencement,
we could not do any good for the Deputy while we had Under-
Managers with us? Beware of the wolf in sheep's clothing.
(cited in England: 22)
Thus, while mineowners were anxious to dissuade their deputies from Joining
with the mineworkers' union, in several districts they were equally
concerned to dissuade deputies from organizing in independent associations,
outside the control of colliery management.
Owners and managers attempted to head-off such a development either, as
in Scotland, by refusing to recognize the deputies' unions, or, as in
Yorkshire and elsewhere, by 'fostering private schemes with a condition
that no deputy should be a member of a Union' (England:24). Such schemes
might offer the inducements of higher wages and fringe benefits - better
housing, paid leave and sick pay - to men who remained loyal to the
company, or at least remained outside the deputies' association. Yorkshire
mineowners and employers in a number of Midlands' districts would appear to
have been particularly active in promoting 'tied schemes' in the 1920s. But
similar practices were reported elsewhere. For example, at a meeting of the
South Wales Colliery Officials' Union in 1919, it was claimed that 'the
owners encouraged disorganisation by giving higher wages to those outside
the Union, the object being to smash it' (cited in Colliery Guardian,
25.4.1919: 970).
The deputies' associations campaigned vigorously against suet employer
interference (4). The General Federation of Deputies' Associations pressed
for the right to form independent trade unions in its representations to
the Government in the years between 1919 and 1922. In this the Federation
was supported by the TUC and by the Miners' Federation (5). A deputation
from the MFGB, the Parliamentary Committee of the TUC, and other mining
organizations, met with the Home Secretary in February 1920, and Mr
Clarney, on behalf of the deputies', argued for:
....immediate steps to ensure coal owners of Great Britain
shall withdraw any scheme which prevents deputies, firemen
or examiners from enjoying the full privilege of trade
Unionists. (cited in Colliery Guardian, 6.2.1920:394)
Clarney stated that colliery owners were 'introducing benefit schemes, and
if a colliery deputy was a trade unionist he could not participate'. A
similar complaint was made to the Secretary for Mines in 1922, and in that
year the Trades Union Congress, meeting at Southport, described as
'insidious the attempts on the part of coal owners and other employers to
prevent trade union organisation amongst professional,
	 technical,
supervisory, clerical and other workers'. A resolution was passed
condemning the 'institution by employers of superannuation, pension, and
other benefit schemes the membership of which was conditional upon an
undertaking being given not to become or remain members of a recognised
bona-fide trade union' (cited in Colliery Guardian, 8.9.1922:586).
In the years immediately succeeding the First World War, such employer
practices were to an extent counter-productive. Membership of the deputies'
associations increased while the MFGB supported the deputies in their
demands, and relationships between the mineworkers' and deputies'
Federations became closer. In 1919, the MFGB claimed a 30 per cent advance
on standard wage rates, and a reduction in the length of the working day,
and the Deputies' Federation made similar demands before the Sankey
Commission of that year. Unlike the MFGB, however, the deputies did not
pursue industry-wide wage agreements, and their associations did not
formally unite around the demand for the nationalization of the industry.
The Sankey Award conceded a reduction in the length of the working day
for mineworkers (from 8 to 7 hours) and for firemen and deputies (from 9%
to 8 hours). Subsequently, the National (or Midlands) Association of
Deputies moved a resolution at a conference of the General Federation for
the latter body to apply for affiliation with the Miners' Federation. The
resolution was passed by 90 votes to 64, but according to England (1963:26)
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the application for affiliation with the MFGB was dropped . on receipt of a
letter - the contents of which remain obscure - from Frank Hodges of the
Miners' Federation. Evidently the moves to join with the mineworkers had
created certain tensions within the deputies' organization, and had tested
members' self-image and aspirations, their loyalties to colliery management
and/or fear of employer disapproval. In any event, the South Staffordshire
and Cannock Chase Deputies' Association broke from the National in 1919.
Union Membership Decline, 1921-1935
The 'peculiar position' of the deputies - between management and the
mineworker - was reflected in their attitudes towards trade unionism in
general, and towards unity with the mineworkers in particular, with the
latter displayed in their activities during the disputes of 1920, 1921 and
1926. Under the 1911 Act, deputies had certain statutory safety duties to
perform and their position in this respect was a factor in the efforts of
mineowners and mineworkers to enlist their loyalties and support. If the
deputies went on strike in support of the miners, the difficulties of the
mineowners in keeping the pits open - with the aid of scab labour - would
be considerably increased. In 1920, the deputies put forward a wage claim
in line with that demanded by the MFGB, and the Colliery Guardian ran an
article under the ominous headline, 'Deputies to Support Miners'
(27.8.1920: 596). With a stoppage of work imminent, a National Conference
of the Deputies' Federation was held to determine the action to be taken by
its members. The attention of delegates was drawn to a standing resolution
stipulating that, in the event of a dispute between the owners and workmen,
the pits would be kept open during negotiations for the performance of such
duties as pertained to the position of firemen, examiners and deputies.
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Some objection was raised to this, but one delegate countered that 'we are
citizens as well as trade unionists' (Ibid).
Frowen claimed, as General Secretary of the Deputies' Federation, to
speak on behalf of the vast majority of these officials in the early 1920s.
But a significant proportion of deputies were unorganized or organized in
employers' 'tied schemes', while most experienced contradictory pressures.
Their loyalties were strained between their own union, the miners with whom
they worked and from whose ranks they had risen, and their employers who
could determine their future employment prospects. Conscious of their role
and responsibilities, deputies were also often anxious to display to the
outside world that they were moderate and responsible men. Variations in
work organization and in employer practices often caused their loyalties to
be stretched in different ways across the coalfields as a whole. Thus,
while they ostensibly formed a more homogeneous group than the mineworkers,
their unions exhibited complex internal divisions and were never successful
in the interwar period in organizing all deputies employed in the coal
industry. In the miners lockout of 1921, for example, and as regards the
Midlands area alone, many deputies 'remained at work, whilst permission was
granted for safety men to work at certain pits' while at others 'a large
number of Deputies in the County were out for the whole period of 13 weeks'
(England: 27). And, following this dispute, the membership of the National
Association began to decline, as did that of the General Federation.
The position of the deputies in the Midlands area in the miners' lockout
and general strike of 1926 was 'very confusing' (England: 29). At some
pits, all the deputies were on strike, while at others they all remained at
work. Membership of the National Association fell, from 3,303 in 1921, to
2,139 at the beginning of 1926, and to 1,893 by the end of that year, while
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'to the everlasting shame of those concerned', many deputies joined with
the Spencer . (or purportedly non-political) Union (Ibid; and see chapter 4).
Membership of the National continued to decline over the late 1920s and
through the years of recession in the coal industry, with only 877 left in
the Midlands association in 1935. A similar membership decline 	 was
registered by the General Federation, with Frowen claiming in the mid-1930s
to represent between 14,000 and 15,000 deputies in the British coal
industry (Royal Commission on Safety, Evidence, 1938: QQ 15309-11).
Unemployment in the coalfields clearly took its toll, while employers in
the Midlands and in the Yorkshire coalfield initiated a more concerted
campaign to disorganize the deputies from 1926. While County Agreements
negotiated in 1918 remained in existence, 'conditions were now favourable
for the owners to break the negotiating power of the Association' (England:
30). Some firms offered 'private agreements', conditional upon the deputies
withdrawal from the union, while others allowed union membership but
withdrew from collective agreements covering the coalfield as a whole.
Some pits could have a private Union, some sold their
freedom for a blue suit (value £3) per year, others
were offered a small pension - anything to persuade
Deputies to become disorganised, and the membership
figures reveal how many fell for the bait. (England: 31)
Mineowners in the Midlands would appear to have been particularly assertive
in this respect, and the Royal Commission on Safety in the Mines, which
reported in 1938, noted and deprecated the attitude and practices of
'certain owners, especially in the Yorkshire and North Midlands coalfields,
in instituting schemes of employment for their deputies which, while
granting these officials certain benefits by way of special sickness pay
and pension rights, have the effect of excluding them from participating in
any collective organisation of their own' (Report: 202).
The Commissioners were also critical of the situation in the North East,
however, where deputies at some pits remained in the miners' union. Changes
in the organization of production over the interwar period were
transforming the deputy's role and the nature of supervisor-worker
relations at the coalface. The transition to machine mining expanded the
need for close supervision at the coalface, and pressure had been brought
to bear on deputies to concern themselves increasingly with discipline and
labour control, even though this elaboration of the deputy's role was in
breach of the 1911 Act. The Royal Commission on Safety in 1938 urged that
the legislation should be changed, so that deputies would legally be able
to undertake duties which in many pits had in practice been foisted on
them. In other words, the Commissioners considered that the needs of
production should be prioritized - over considerations of safety - and it
was from this perspective that they were highly critical of current
employment practices in the industry. They argued that deputies had not
been given a sufficiently authoritative status for the proper exercise of
their responsibilities, that their wages had generally been too low
relative to the earnings of the men they supervised, and that henceforward
terms and conditions would have to be improved to emphasize the rank and
managerial authority of the deputy - or to define the deputy unambiguously
as a production foreman (Report, 1938:201-2).
State Enploynent and Boards of Appeal
The Royal Commission on Safety, which reported at the end of the interwar
period, recommended that terms and conditions of employment for colliery
deputies should be improved and so that the status of these officials would
be elevated and they would be seen to have the necessary authority to
behave as production foremen at the face. For many years, however, the
deputies had campaigned through their associations to be made state
employees, and so that their authority in relation to higher levels of
management would be buttressed and they would be better placed to discharge
their principal responsibility for safety under the 1911 Act.
In 1911, and following the passage of this Act, the newly-formed General
Federation of Deputies' Associations had met with Winston Churchill, then
Home Secretary, and attempted to impress upon him that deputies should be
'state employed and controlled' (Frowen, Sankey Evidence, 1919, Vol.1:
Q.4857; see also England, 1963:15). The Federation continued to pursue this
demand through the period to the late 1920s. Frowen, the Federation's
General Secretary, had elaborated on its basis before the Sankey Commission
in 1919,
	 the deputy is between the mine owner and the workman.
At the same time, he is appointed and controlled and paid
by the mine owner. I certainly believe that this is a bad
omen for matters of safety. That is, so far as the owners
are concerned. (Vol.1: Q. 4854)
Deputies could be dismissed or denoted by their employer for failing to
priortize production over safety. If they were employed by the state,
Frowen argued, their job security and ability to perform their statutory
safety duties would be enhanced, since they would be responsible 'to a
public body' rather than to the mineowner.
The Miners' Federation supported the deputies in their demand to be state
employees. The MFGE's preferred position was for safety officers in the
mines to be elected through a ballot of the workforce. But if deputies were
employed by the state, employer discretion and ability to prioritize
production over the safety of mineworkers would be restricted, and the
deputies' demand was obviously in line with that of the MFGB's for the
nationalization of the industry. 	 Mine owners, however, were vigorously
opposed to the deputies' claim and succeeded in resisting it while the
industry remained under private ownership - in other words, for a further
28 years.
The General Federation of Deputies' Associations had affiliated to the
TUC in 1918, and in the following year a resolution was passed at the
annual Congress calling for colliery deputies to be made state employees
(Colliery Guardian, 5.9.1919:635). A deputation from the Parliamentary
Committee, the MFGB, and the General Federation of Deputies, presented this
demand to the Home Secretary in February, 1920. On behalf of the deputies,
Frowen also requested the establishment of an independent board of appeal
to investigate claims from firemen, examiners and deputies of unfair
dismissal -	 or for persuing their statutory responsibilities in
contradiction to managerial instruction (Colliery Guardian, 6.2.1920:394).
But these demands were rejected in 1920, and again in 1922 when the
Secretary for Mines stated that the Government was opposed to the creation
of a 'dual responsibility for safety in the mines'. Under the Mines Acts,
it was argued, colliery managers were responsible for the safety of
employees, and the government would not intervene to diminish this
responsibility - or, by implication, managerial authority.
After the miners' lockout in 1921, the Deputies' Federation ceased to act
with the MFGB in its representations to government. But the General
Federation continued to press for its members to be made state employees,
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and presented this demand before the Samuel Commission in 1925. But again
the deputies' were rebuffed, with the Commission's Report stating that:
The personal responsibility of the colliery manager,
implying his personal control, is and should remain
the corner-stone of the safety regulations. The
division of responsibility between him and a class
of independent deputies would be a step in the wrong
direction. (p.189)
The basis of the deputies' claim, of course, was that managers had dual
responsibilities - for output and for safety - and acting under pressure
from boards of directors were often compelled to prioritize the former.
Deputies were responsible for safety, and could also be prosecuted or fined
for failing to enforce the provisions of the Coal Mines Acts. But they were
employees of the company, and were liable to be dismissed or demoted for
failing to conform with its priorities, or for taking action in the
interests of safety which had the effect of retarding production.
Frowen submitted evidence on behalf of the General Federation of Deputies
to the Royal Commission on Safety, appointed in 1936. By this time, the
Federation had dropped the demand for deputies to be state employees, but
was continuing to insist on an independent, national board of appeal.
Frowen's evidence suggests that the piecemeal transition to machine mining
and worsening economic performance of the coal industry had exacerbated the
problems encountered by colliery deputies in fulfilling their statutory
safety duties. In contrast with his earlier submission to the Sankey
Commission, Frowen now identified the principal problem as managerial
pressure to maximize output and cut costs. Thus he argued that:
The whole cause for asking for a Board of Appeal is
because the managers as a whole have made so much of
the output side. They have moved the balance (between
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safety and output) and made it an unholy balance. I
want to say at once that this does not apply to every
manager, but it applies so much that we have tremendous
complaints from practically every coalfield.
(Minutes of Evidence, 1938: Q. 15498)
Representatives of the mineowners, however, were as vehemently opposed to
the creation of a board of appeal as they had formerly been to the
principle of state employment. They argued that the mine manager would be
placed in 'an intolerable position if his dismissal of a deputy on grounds
of incompetence could be called into question and possibly reversed'. They
claimed that the detrimental effect on discipline that would result from
such an incursion of managerial prerogative would be 'far more prejudicial
to safety generally than an occasional miscarriage of fair treatment'.
Mechanization in the interwar period introduced new safety hazards for
underground workers. For employers, it expanded the need to maintain
supervision at the face. These developments formed the substance of the
Royal Commission's investigations, and the Commissioners acknowledged that
deputies had been subjected to new pressures. The deputy's superior in the
mines, the colliery overman, was responsible for output maximization and
could override safety considerations. Deputies who objected to this order
of priorities might simply be ignored, or perhaps dismissed. Acknowledging
these difficulties, the Royal Commission in 1938 nevertheless ruled that
the employer's right to hire and fire must remain sacrosanct. The deputies'
demand for an independent board of appeal with the powers to reinstate
officials who had been unfairly dismissed was therefore rejected, and the
Commissioners would only concede that in certain circumstances a 'private
inquiry' might be conducted by the divisional inspector of mines, who could
'advise' mineowmers as to an appropriate course of action.
MECHANIZATION II THE MINES II THE IITERVAR TEARS
Re-defining the Deputy's Role
The twentieth century saw the gradual introduction of mechanization to the
production process of coalmining. The partially-mechanized mining system,
introduced in the interwar years, created fresh problems of labour
management for employers (see chapter 5). Under the unit system, or
mechanized longwall method, the collier's traditional craft job was
fragemented into a series of narrowly-defined job roles. Detailed tasks
were arranged in rigid sequence over three separate shifts, and a 24 hour
cycle of intensive operations was instituted at the face. The introduction
of coal-cutting machinery and increased division of labour under the unit
system de-skilled the colliers and eroded their self-discipline. It
expanded the need for supervision at the face, and management was forced to
assume the function of coordinating the collective labour process.
Mechanization also expanded the need for supervision in the sense of labour
control and coercion. Tasks and shifts were interdependent. No shift could
begin until work on the preceding one had been completed, while delays on
any one shift could have a magnified disruptive effect through the cycle of
coal-getting operations as a whole. Mechanization, 'with its regular cycle
of intensive operations', therefore 'developed the need for closer
supervision of the rate and amount of work done' (Royal Commission on
Safety, Report, 1938: 183).
Mechanization also introduced new safety hazards and developed the need
for increased supervision of the condition of the underground working area
of the mine. The more rapid rate of advance of the face increased the rate
at which fire-damp was emitted and made improved air flows essential, while
the increased use of electricity heightened the risk of explosions. In the
cramped conditions at the face, the introduction of machinery presented new
sources of accidents and injury. The increased volume of coal dust produced
by the machines exacerbated the risk of dust-related diseases and damage to
eyesight. The noise created by the machines made it more difficult for
workers to detect impending dangers, although this was essential if
catastrophes were to be averted.
Mechanization therefore expanded the need for supervision at the face,
from the point of view of production and of safety. Yet, available
statistical evidence does not lend support to the proposition that its
advance over the interwar period was matched by a very large increase in
the number of supervisory workers employed in the coal industry (cf
Goldthorpe, 1959). Evidence presented to the Samuel Commission in 1925
suggested that the number of supervisory workers employed in the industry,
and the relative importance of these grades as a proportion of the total
underground workforce, had increased over the first quarter of the
twentieth century. But this increase cannot be attributed simply to the use
of machinery, since 'it had gone a long way before the output from
mechanized mines represented as much as a quarter of the total' (Royal
Commission on Safety, Report, 1938: 51).
The Departmental Committee appointed by the Secretary for Mines to
'inquire into the qualifications and recruitment of officials' (hereafter,
the Holland Committee) estimated in 1930 that approximately 28,000 firemen,
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examiners and deputies were employed in the British coal industry. The
Samuel Commission's figures suggested a roughly equivalent number in 1924,
(although of course employment in the mines had fallen in the years between
1924 and 1928, as unemployment in the coalfields increased and short-time
working became prevalent). The Samuel Commission reported that 4,295
colliery overmen were employed in the industry in 1924. But neither the
Holland Committee nor the Royal Commission on Safety, which reported in
1938, supplied any statistical data on this particular grade.
Supple's figures, taken from the annual censuses and relating to the
period 1921-31, reveal the persistence of regional variations in the
numerical significance of supervisory officials. His figures embrace
deputies and overnen and suggest that the proportion of miners classed as
'subordinate superintending staff' had increased in Nottinghanshire (from
5.1 to 5.3 per cent), remained stable (at 5.1 per cent) in Northumberland,
but had actully fallen in most other major districts. This decline was most
dramatic in Glamorgan and Monnouthshire (from 3.3 and 3.4 to 2.7 and 3.0
per cent). But mechanization had made little progress in South Vales. In
1938 only 26 per cent of that coalfield's output was undercut by machinery,
and less than a third of pits employed mechanical coal-cutters and
conveyors.	 Between 1927 and 1938, the proportion of British coal output
cut mechanically increased from 23 to approximately 60 per cent, although
the increase was largely accounted for by an extension of machine mining in
mechanized pits rather than the conversion of hand-getting pits to machine
mining. Unfortunately, there are no published statistical data on the
employment of supervisory workers in the coal industry for the 1930s, let
alone data on the numerical significance of supervisory grades at the level
- of individual pits.
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The relevant literature of the interwar period is consistent in
reporting an increase in the volume of supervision at the face with the
introduction of machine mining, although for some mining engineers neither
the volume nor the calibre of supervision at the 'average' pit was
sufficient. These technical experts stressed that efficient organization
and supervision were the key ingredients for 'successful' machine mining -
defined in terms of output maximization (Ma yor, 1924; Bulman and Redmayne,
1951; Barraclough, 1927-8). But some engineers tried to encourage mine
owners by suggesting that machine mining facilitated close supervision and
hence could be imposed without drastically increasing overheads, or the
number of 'on-cost' supervisory officials employed. Giving evidence before
the Royal Commission on Safety, the various Inspectors of Mines summarized
the main changes in working methods since the 1911 Coal Mines Act in the
term 'concentration'.
This term generally implies the getting of a large output
from a comparatively short working face divided into units
of suitable length, each of which must produce a definite
quantity of coal daily. This is effected by the use of coal-
cutters and face conveyors together with, in many cases, gate
conveyors or gate-end loaders.
(Minutes of Evidence, 1938: 188) (6)
With machine mining, labour was concentrated within the mine, with up to
100 men employed (over the three shifts) on each unit of working face, and
in order to secure a large daily output from a relatively small working
area. As some commentators suggested, this meant that 'close supervision
can be effected at a reduced cost per ton' (Barraclough, 1927-8: 194; see
also Mayor, 1924).
Machine mining demanded closer supervision than on hand-worked faces. But
mineowners and managements were anxious to minimize overheads, particularly
when profits were squeezed and demand was depressed. One way in which this
dilemma could be resolved, and the expense of employing a new layer of
supervisory personnel obviated, was by delegating the function of labour
control to an existing staff of colliery deputies. Thus, while the 1911 Act
apparently confined deputies to the performance of statutory safety duties,
there is considerable evidence to support the view of the Permanent
Secretary at the Department of Mines that, by the mid-to-late 1930s, the
provisions of the Act were increasingly 'honoured in the breach' (Royal
Commission on Safety, Evidence, 1938: 7, Q33?).
Of course, the sentiment of the Act had not been fully translated into
practice at many mines, even before the extension of machine mining. Over
and beyond the various exemption clauses - applying to small mines, the
Northern coalfield, and the task of 'measuring-up' - deputies performed
certain production duties. They had a coordinating role, and had to ensure
a regular supply of tubs and materials to the face, which involved them in
the supervision of haulage workers, while they had to maintain discipline
in their district. But while Frowen complained to the Sankey Commission in
1919 that his members were often placed in an impossible position because
of the pressure from management and from mineworkers to neglect their
obligation to enforce safety regulations, by the mid-to-late 1930s he was
articulating a different problem. Pressure was exerted primarily by
management and not simply for deputies to subordinate safety considerations
to output, but to become actively involved in labour control at the face
and in the interests of increasing production. The deputies, Frowen
confirmed, were 'more speeded-up in their production than ever they have
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been'. They were not 'spending the time that they should be on safety'
because they were 'being forced on to output' (Royal Commission on Safety,
Evidence: QQ. 15701-2).
In this sense, then, many deputies had been 'functionally upgraded', or
thrust into a role where they had to be the collier's superior in more than
a formal sense, and had to 'constantly act as his superior' (Goldthorpe,
1959: 218). Various commentators suggested that, in the interwar period,
the deputy had become 'what amounts to a coal-face foreman' (Pick, 1946:
77) and, charged with the responsibility for imposing a fresh work
discipline, they were now more immediately identified by mineworkers as
part of management. With mechanical coal-cutting and the cycle system of
production, the scope for supervisor-worker conflict at the face was
greatly enhanced. Supervisors had to maintain the continuity of production
and ensure that a definite amount of work was completed on each shift,
while circumstances were continually arising underground tending towards
the disruption of output (Mitchell, 1933; Trist and Bamforth, 1951). This
must inevitably have produced stress and strain for the personnel involved,
and may in part account for the difficulties encountered by firms in the
1930s in attracting recruits for promotion to the position of fireman,
examiner or deputy (Royal Commission on Safety, Report, 1938).
But while deputies had been 'functionally upgraded' and had to supervise
the rate and amount of work done at the face, like the faceworkers they
experienced the 'speed-up' or intensification of work. And the available
evidence suggests that there had been no commensurate improvement in their
pay and conditions with their additional responsibilities; a discrepancy
which, according to the Royal Commission on Safety, did little to elevate
the status of deputies, or their authority in relation to mineworkers.
Moreover, the nature of their regrading clearly demonstrates the priorities
of mineowners and managements. The interests of production were pursued at
the expense of safety, and in spite of the additional dangers introduced
with coalface machinery. Thus, while the deputies were being 'forced on to
output', they also' complained of 'interference' from other officials and
from the colliery overmen in particular, since the latter were superior to
the deputies and were appointed with the unambiguous responsibility for
output maximization.
Colliery Overneu
Overmen occupied a position in the managerial hierarchy between the
firemen, examiners, or deputies, and the under-manager or manager of the
mine. While the term overman was usually employed, officials occupying such
an intermediate position were also known as overlooker, under-looker,
bailiff, or gaffer. The Coal Mines Act of 1911 had not specifically
referred to this class of official; according to the Holland Committee
because the overman's duties 'are largely production and not safety duties'
and had therefore been cOnsidered to be outside the proper scope of the
legislators. Thus while these officials might be left in charge of the mine
in the absence of the under-manager and manager, they had no statutory
responsibility for safety, and of all the general officials of the mine,
'the position of the person who is superior to the firemen, examiners and
deputies, but inferior to the under-manager (was) least defined' in mine
safety law (Holland Committee, Report, 1930: 67).
The position of colliery overman has been given prominence in analyses of
the transition to machine mining. For example, the Royal Commission on
Safety noted that mechanization expanded the need for close supervision at
-324-
the face and that deputies were constrained by the 1911 Act from
undertaking such work, and suggested that firms had sought to overcome this
problem by appointing overmen - or officials without statutory safety
duties - to 'look after production' (Report, 1938: 183). But colliery
overmen did not represent a new level in the managerial hierarchy, inserted
only with the introduction of coal-cutting machinery, and the available
statistical evidence suggests that the increase in the employment of this
class of official - as with the lower grade of deputy - occured in the
first quarter of the twentieth century. In 1913, approximately 3,000
overmen were employed in the British industry (representing 0.4 per cent of
the total employed below ground). By 1924, the number had risen to 4,295
and the proportion to 0.5 per cent of the total underground workforce
(Samuel Commission, 1919, Vol.3: 197).
The colliery overman was 'overseer of a fairly large area in a mine'
(Parry Jones, 1925: 51). He was generally appointed in charge of two or
more deputy's districts and was responsible for satisfactory working and
good discipline in that area' (Bulman and Rednayne, 1951: 72). Bulman and
Redmayne argued that such officials formed the 'backbone of colliery
underground management'. But mine managers were not legally obliged to
appoint such officials, and in small mines there may have been no
intermediary between the deputy and the manager. On the other hand, it was
common practice for larger mines to employ overmen (Royal Commission on
Safety, Evidence: Q.23880), and there may have been some specialization of
function with overmen appointed to take charge of different departments,
although this would also reflect regional variations in geological
conditions and in work organization.
...e.g. the master-shifter - as he is called in the Northern
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district - who supervises the shifters and stonemen, who do
the repairing and stonework, when the pit is not drawing
coals; and the master-wasteman, who is responsible for the
maintenance of the return airways. (Bulman, 1920: 15)
A back-overman may have been appointed to supervise work on the back-shift,
and would have been the official left in charge of the mine in the absence
of the manager or under-manager.
The overman was a production official, and had no statutory
responsibility for safety, even though he was often the official left in
charge of the mine when work was in progress and 'the directions which he
issues must necessarily involve safety measures' (Holland Committee, 1930:
103). One of his principal duties was to measure-up 'deadwork' at the face,
and haggle with the colliers over payment for work in 'abnormal' places.
But evidently the overman's powers and scope for the exercise of
independent initiative had been progressively circumscribed - in larger
collieries at least - from the beginning of this century. Jevons (1920)
describes how larger firms introduced centralized cost-accounting
techniques from the end of the nineteenth century, and were in this way
able to place overmen in competition to , maximize output and minimize
expenditure in their respective underground districts. Firms were better
placed to monitor the performance of different underground districts, while
they also offered incentives - 'a substantial cash prize in one
instance...but in any case first promotion' - to those officials who were
most resistant to the claims from the colliers and most successful in
minimizing deadwork payments (p.528).
In most coalfields it was customary for colliers to be paid an
'allowance' for coal-getting in an 'abnormal' place, or where geological
conditions made it difficult for them to make average earnings. In South
Wales, from the early twentieth century, firms attempted to reduce costs by
whittling-down	 these	 'consideration	 payments'.	 Mine	 owners	 were
experiencing	 intensified	 international	 competition,	 while	 labour
productivity in tlie coalfield was deteriorating and, as Jevons pointed out,
an attempt to cut costs by paring down consideration payments was a more
attractive option for employers than a direct assault on wage-rates. With
the latter, they would have to deal directly with organised labour, while
with the former they 'had to deal with the men only as individuals'
(p.527).
Some firms adopted the practice of simply setting a fixed maximum sum, so
that on 'measuring-up day' managers and under-officials could not exceed
this level and were forced to reject a proportion of claims from the
mineworkers. Overmen were compelled in consequence to rely on devices other
than financial incentives to get the work done.
Overmen in years gone by had a considerable amount of
authority over their respective areas. The enjoyed full
power to make a settlement when abnormality prevailed....
...Great changes have taken place in that respect. As
one rustic summarized: "The overman has been plucked of
so many feathers, power is only left him to grant 'tuppence'
per ton allowance and so much as he can deliver of his
'bloomin' cheek'". (Parry Jones, 1925: 51-2)
Colliers in turn were forced to work harder, 'sometimes beyond their
strength, when they found themselves in an abnormal place' (Arnot, 1953:
58-9).
The South Vales Miners Federation took up the issue of payments for work
in abnormal places, and backed a test case brought by a collier from
Ynysybwl against the Ocean Coal Company in 1907. The claim at court was for
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payment of an allowance on the grounds that such payments were customary.
But Judge Bryn Roberts ruled that allowances not specifically provided for
in the piecework price lists were mere gratuities and were not recoverable
at law. The decision, Jevons reported, precipitated the extension of this
method of cost-cutting to 'practically all the larger companies', while the
statutory reduction in the length of the working day in 1908 further
fuelled the owners' commitment to such practices. Determined to impose
their policies, the management of the Naval Colliery Company - in turn
owned by the Cambrian Combine - locked-out all 800 employees at their Ely
pit in 1910, when a section of the colliers refused to accept the company's
price for work in a new and particularly difficult seam. The dispute
spread, across the coalfield, and eventually to unite all mineworkers in
the demand for a minimum wage and the strike of 1912.
Nevertheless, the change in management organization and practice was a
continuing trend, and by the late 1930s Frowen was referring to colliery
overmen as 'officers of economy'. On behalf of the colliery deputies, he
submitted to the Royal Commission on Safety that overmen were 'next to the
under-manager, and they get their paper from head office of the costs and
all that kind of thing, and their whole time seems to be taken-up with that
side of mining' (Evidence, 1938: Q.15,511). Overmen were production
officials and were immediately above the deputies in the management
hierarchy, and aside from the changes in production methods, deteriorating
profitability in the industry over the 1920s and 30s provided the context
for increasing friction between the deputies and their immediate superiors.
Hence, Frowen's complaint that deputies were often unable to discharge
their statutory safety duties because of 'a number of conflicting
interests, and interferences by persons with no legal responsibility, whose
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chief concern is to maintain the output of coal or keep the working costs
down at times when it is almost a vital question for the deputy whether the
lives of the workmen are being endangered or not' (Ibid:p.554). A greater
expenditure on timber might be required, in the interests of safety. But
this would conflict with the overman's function of cost reduction. Deputies
were required to close-off an underground area if they considered it to be
unsafe. But this . would conflict with the overman's job of maintaining
output and Frowen complained that, 'we have had cases where a deputy has
withdrawn the men and marked the place off, and another official has pushed
the thing back and taken the men in again' (Ibid: Q. 15,554).
The Coal Mines Act, 1911, did not explicitly refer to the position of
overman and hence left this official without any statutory obligation for
the safety of employees. Only minimal qualifications were laid down for the
post after the General Regulations went to arbitration in 1913. Candidates
had to be at least 23 years of age, with at least 3 years' practical
underground work experience, and to be holders of a second-class
certificate of competency or a fireman's certificate. The Act left an
obvious anomaly, identified by successive government enquiries and
condemned by the Miners' Federation. Firemen were required to be at least
25 years of age, with a minimum of 5 years' underground work experience,
and hence might be better qualified - in terms of practical experience -
than their immediate superiors. A survey conducted by the Mines Department
in 1921 and embracing 85 per cent of UK mines, revealed that in the vast
majority of cases firemen and deputies were also better qualified in terms
of their formal,technical training. Thus, the survey revealed that 2,488
persons holding certificates of competency were employed in positions
inferior to that of under-manager at the mines surveyed. Of this total,
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only 754 were overmen. Since 2,827 overmen were employed at the mines
covered by the survey, this meant that less than 27 per cent of this class
of official were holders of first or second class certificates of
competency.
The Miners' Federation argued that since overmen were superior to the
firemen and deputies in the management hierarchy, they should possess a
superior qualification and at least a second-class (or under-manager's)
certificate. But mineowners protested that practical experience and the
ability to maintain discipline were sufficient qualifications for this
official, and that to insist upon a technical qualification would 'unduly
restrict the field from which the employer can make his choice and...tend
to the exclusion of the type of person who, though competent for the work
which devolves upon him, seldom possesses the necessary education to equip
him to undergo a searching examination test' (cited in Holland Committee,
Report, 1930: 68). Given that the 1911 Act stipulated that the examination
for the second class certificate should be suitable for the 'practical
working miner', the employers' position would appear to be extremely weak.
But while the MFGB argued that many miners who had passed the under-
managers examination found it impossible to secure promotion, the employers
maintained that this was because such men lacked the requisite skills for
the position of colliery overman.
The weak provisions of the 1911 Act obviously did offer employers maximum
scope in the selection of their subordinate officers, and allowed them to
select candidates who had displayed their loyalty to the company or, as
Frowen suggested, their ability to 'swear...and act the "rough" man' (Royal
Commission on Safety, Evidence, 1938: Q.15,547). And while many firms
declared that they chose their overmen from the 'crop' of the deputies, the
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position was evidently also used as a training ground for 'young men who had
been ordained for higher office - possibly by virtue of their familial
connection with colliery directors and senior management - but who lacked
the necessary underground work experience to qualify under the Mines Acts.
Noting this practice, the Holland Committee reported in 1930 that the
presence of such men was understandably resented by mineworkers and
deputies, and concluded that 'there would appear to be something
undesirable in a system which permits the appointment of persons to this
important post who have neither lengthy practical experience nor have given
proof of their technical knowledge' (Report: 70).
The MFGB campaigned for higher standards of technical competence
amongst colliery officials and so that underground staff would be compelled
and equipped to make safety a first consideration. The miners argued that
standards of training should be raised in line with technical progress in
the industry, with proper precautions taken to neutralize the additional
risks introduced with machine mining. But mechanization was a slow and
uneven process in the interwar British coalmining industry. Systems of hand
coal-getting and partially mechanized mining coexisted in the industry, and
even within the sane mine. As a consequence, mineowners were unable to make
concessions to the mineworkers. While the miners were pressing for improved
health and safety provision, the mineowners could only agree to legislation
that would accommodate the very different production processes they
controlled. In other words, the owners wanted minimal regulation in order
to retain maximum individual discretion.
Mechanization introduced new safety hazards and expanded the need for
close supervision at the face. Under the 1911 Act, deputies were defined as
safety officers and hence were not legally available to undertake the work
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of labour coercion. Reviewing developments in the interwar period, the
Royal Commission on Safety suggested that firms introducing coalface
machinery had attempted to circumvent the legislation by appointing
overmen, who had no statutory safety duties, to take charge of production.
The available statistical evidence, however, is too incomplete to identify
any increase in the number of colliery overmen employed in the industry, or
at mechanized pits. And, since the extension of machine mining coincided
with deteriorating trade conditions and the worsening economic performance
of the British coal industry, it is likely that many firms attempted to
meet the increased need for supervision at the face without increasing
overhead costs, or by augmenting the workload and responsibilities of their
existing supervisory staff.
Newey's description of arrangements at pits in his charge nevertheless
suggests that at least some companies were prepared to increase the numbers
of supervisors employed - deputies and overman - as well as the volume of
supervision experienced by faceworkers.
On faces of 100 yards or over we have a deputy and a shot-
firer on each getting shift and a deputy on the afternoon
or repair shift, whilst each of the two main districts has
an overman on all three shifts. We consider it most important
to have a capable overman on the afternoon shift, for it is
on that shift only that any lost ground can be made up 	
With machine mining it is of the utmost importance to get an
early start, and also to keep the conveyors running up to
time at the end of the shift, and with this object in view
arrangements were made for all deputies to change over at the
deputies' station in their district. (1929-30; 384)
But evidently such arrangements were not universal. Newey emphasised that
'continuous supervision' was vital for 'successful machine mining', and
argued that 'supervision must be such that strict discipline is always
observed'. But he suggested that this fact had not always been appreciated
by firms introducing machine mining, while the Commissioners in 1938 felt
it necessary in to devote a sub-section of their Report to the importance
of 'continuous supervision' - in the interests of output and of safety.
Some companies, therefore, may have concentrated supervision on the filling
shift, leaving machine operators and the repair shift unattended for much
of the tine.
Whatever the particular arrangements, the potential for conflict between
deputies, with safety responsibilities, and overmen was enhanced with the
introduction of mechanized longwall mining, as was management's ability to
monitor the performance of subordinate officials. Under the unit system, or
mechanized longwall method, the working face was divided into a series of
units of standard length. From each face-unit, management expected a
definite amount of coal to be drawn daily. The work was more standardized,
and supervisory officials were under pressure to ensure that the standard
daily output was obtained from their particular district, The Royal
Commission on Safety noted in their Report that, 'it is almost
inevitable...that the production official should tend at times to regard
the precautions of the deputy as a drag on the rate of output, and that
this attitude of the production official, whether expressed or implied,
should have a disturbing influence on the way the deputy does his work'
(p.183). And Frowen (7), on behalf of the lower class of officials, drew
attention to the 'harassing conditions under which the deputies work in
nearly all coalfields', and to the fact that 'In some pits the overmen
harass the deputy very much' (Evidence, 1938: QQ. 15,512, 15,547).
Man Management in the Mines
Machine mining heightened the friction between deputies and overmen, and
enlarged the scope for supervisor-worker conflict at the face (Goldthorpe,
1959; Wellisz, 1953). It involved a regular cycle of discrete, but
interdependent operations, organized over three separate shifts. A definite
amount of work had to be completed on each shift if the continuity of
production was to be maintained, and the standard daily output obtained
from each unit of working face. Overmen and deputies were charged with the
responsibility for ensuring . a successful outcome, and were therefore
compelled to impose a fresh work discipline on the men in their charge.
They had to restrict the collier's autonomy, exact him to work hard at a
detailed task and bring his behaviour to correspond with the dictates of a
large-scale and rigidly-sequenced work system, while the expanded scope for
supervisor-worker conflict introduced with this system was in turn a
potential threat to the continuity of production.
Throughout the interwar years, mining engineers stressed that effective
organization and supervision were the key ingredients for successful
machine mining; that the work had to be 'carefully systematised' and
employee behaviour brought to correspond. But they were generally reluctant
to offer any further advice on labour management, or on the means whereby
the worker could be brought to respond as a 'cog in a machine', a 'link in
a chain of producers'. 	 There were some exceptions, and some 'experts' who
urged that the expense of close and constant supervision might be offset if
workers were positively-motivated to work hard. Ma yor, for example, writing
in the early 1920s, favoured the introduction of new, management-designed
pay incentive schemes, on the principle that the rational, economistic
worker would trade in increased effort for the potential of higher
earnings, regardless of the monotony of the work, or of the rate-cutting
bias of premium bonus systems (1924: 1510-11).
From the late 1920s, other commentators began to stress the importance of
the 'human element' - and its general neglect by management in the coal
industry. Management control, they suggested, could not be sustained simply
on the basis of force or coercion. Firms had to nurture labour's
cooperation and to do so, they argued, demanded some understanding of the
psychology of the worker. The 'era of force', as one writer put it, had to
give way to one in which managerial power was sustained through accumulated
knowledge - of work and the worker - and in which the 'sympathetic handling
of labour' was acknowledged to be 'one of the most essential contributions
that can be made to the well-being of industry' (Wightman, 1933: 482). From
this perspective, supervisory staff were seen to occupy an important
position. Forming the chief connecting link between management and workers,
supervisors were identified as both instruments for securing uniform and
predictable employee behaviour, and as potential obstacles to this end.
Newey, for example, argued that for the 'successful accomplishment of
machine mining operations' strict discipline had always to be observed. The
Individual workman had to become an 'expert' at his own particular task,
had to be 'keen and willing to obey orders' and 'see that his work is well
done and to time'. But since management demanded that the men observe
strict discipline, they should discipline themselves and their under-
officials and deal with the men on a fair - or at least consistent - basis.
Officials had to maintain discipline, but they had to do so by applying
centrally-determined managerial rules consistently, since discipline meted-
out in an arbitrary or uncongenial way could only provoke grievances and
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dampen enthusiasm. Officials had to be prepared to explain the reasons for
their instructions, and deal with any grievances from 'one man, or the men
as a whole,.. .immediately and sympathetically', provided, of course, that
workers gave 'management the opportunity of doing so instead of pursuing
the old method of at once downing tools' (1929-30: 384-5).
A more elaborate exposition on rationalized, 'scientific' management was
given by Wightman, in a paper entitled 'The Psychology of Management' and
delivered to the South Staffordshire Branch of the National Association of
Colliery Managers in 1933. Wightman had evidently been exposed to the ideas
of C.S.Myers and the (early) work of the National Institute of Psychology,
and he cast supervisors in a dual role. They had to gather information on
the physiology of the worker, and on the most efficient methods of
performing discrete tasks, for subsequent use in job design, and be the
impartial executors of managerial rules and instructions in the workplace.
Faulty and overbearing supervision were identified as sources of distress
for workers, and hence as impediments to efficiency and high labour
productivity. Employers were advised that appropriate worker behaviour
could be moulded through a system of rewards and penalties, but that these
carrots and sticks had to be applied impartially by supervisory staff. The
supervisor, Wightman argued, had to be a 'good disciplinarian' which meant
governing with 'fairness, firmness, without fear or favour'. He had to act
'more the counsel and advocate...than the unsympathetic judge of the
worker', and above all had to 'avoid the tendency to have favourites' since
this was a source of irritation to workers and could only be
counterproductive to high morale and high effort in production.
Wightman's prescriptions were informed by the view of the individual
worker as an organism propelled by a range of, sometimes contradictory
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impulses, and whose behaviour could be tailored to the needs of modern
industry provided that management provided the right conditions and
appropriate forms of supervision. Management-worker conflict - expressed
overtly or in the form of sub-optimal productivity - were thus identified
as primarily the result of poor management and uncongenial supervision.
Notwithstanding the problems with this analysis, the gap between its
prognoses and actual management practice in the coal industry was evidently
wide. Thus, while Wightman's somewhat stunned audience professed that they
could see much sense in his ideas, they also agreed that labour management
in the coal industry was, in general, a rough and ready affair. There were,
one discussant argued, some 'good officials who know how to get the best
out of the workman', but others who 'owing to ignorance and other causes,
believed entirely in bullying tactics as an aid to efficiency' (p.492).
A similar view is suggested in the literature of the interwar period and
written from the 'worker's point of view', although admittedly some of the
contributors had been schooled in an approach not dissimilar from
Wightman's. Mitchell <1933), for example, argued that while the 'tactful
handling' of men was essential for the success of machine mining, it was
notable for its absence in the coal
or at least by crude and out-dated
while Mitchell had formerly been a
industry, where management by force -
methods - was the general rule. But
mineworker, he had followed his
career path and by the 1930s had been appointed as an investigator at the
NIIP. He believed that mechanization conferred benefits on mineowners and
mineworkers, but that the latter had so far been unable to appreciate this
because of the uncongenial supervision to which they had been subjected.
The industry's officials, according to Mitchell, were narrowly-trained
_technical specialists, ill-equipped to appreciate the human difficulties
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arising with technical innovation. Such problems, and conflictual
supervisor-worker relationships, were therefore largely transient and could
be rectified through the appointment officials and supervisory staff
trained in industrial psychology and labour management.
Such a view attained a certain popularity amongst colliery managers and
mining engineers from the end of the 1930s (see Parry, 1937-8; Nicholls,
1944-5), as unemployment fell with rearmament, workplace trade unionism
gained strenth, and the coal industry experienced increasing difficulties
in recruiting both workers and supervisory staff. And, following the
nationalization of the industry, the new Coal Board displayed more than a
passing interest in what by this time had become the more sociological
approach of the NIIP and 'human relations in industry' school (see
Goldthorpe, 1961). But the industrial psychologists of the interwar period
were concerned with problems of labour motivation and compliance, and while
their prescriptions may have struck a chord with some managements, for
many employers in the coal industry - as in British industry more generally
- the material and political context of the 1920s and 30s rendered them to
a large extent redundant.
Mechanization in the coal industry in the interwar period was a slow and
uneven process. Even on the eve of the Second World War, hand-holing
accounted for 40 per cent of the British industry's output, and nearly 50
per cent of the mines in competition in the industry were unmechanized (see
chapter 5). The number of mines in operation in the industry fell by about
30 per cent over the interwar years; from 2,600 in 1913 to 1,900 in 1938
(Supple, 1987:361). But this left the industry with an exceptionally large
number of productive units, so that little had been achieved in terms of
the concentration of output on large-scale, more productive mines. With
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only piecemeal changes to its organizational and technical structure, the
British industry became increasingly uncompetitive in international
markets, and this combined with adverse conditions in both export and
domestic UK markets to create mass unemployment in the coalfields. Labour
market conditions buttressed managerial authority in the workplace, and no
doubt enabled some firms to secure the reorganization of work and
Intensification of labour without the trouble or expense of employing more
supervisory staff, developing and deploying new procedures or securing
union agreement over their introduction. But labour market conditions, the
reduction in real wages and extension of working hours after 1926 also
provided the conditions in which small-scale and unmechanized mines could
survive the forces of competition.
'In recent years', one union official recorded in 1936, 'there has been
an immense speeding-up of the work underground, and nowadays the working
day is just one big effort to get as much coal as possible out' (Jones:
20). This intensification of effort, he argued was secured through pressure
from the underground supervisory staff who 'have to carry out the owners'
policy of maximum output at minimum cost', and also by low wage rates in
the coalfields which compelled men to 'exert themselves to the limits of
their capacity in an effort to obtain a better wage at the end of the
week'. These comments referred to conditions in both mechanized and
unmechanized pits, and conditions were propitious for employers to attack
job controls and the collier's autonomy without the use of machinery or any
increased division of labour at the face. Thus, Pick (1946) referred to the
way in which deputies were compelled to behave 'very strictly' in the
interwar years, and furnished examples from unmechanized pits, while Frowen
argued before the Royal Commission on Safety that, 'even in the hand-got
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areas to-day there is a speeding-up' (Evidence, 1938: Q.15,482). For all of
this, however, output in the British industry fell and the rate of growth
of productivity compared most unfavourably with that attained in rival
European and North American coal industries.
In unmechanized . mines, low wage rates compelled colliers to intensify
their work and take risks, while in mechanized mines deputies were forced
to rush through their safety duties in order to attend to production.
Hence, while the industry's safety record had shown some (modest)
improvement over the late nineteenth century, the rate of fatal accidents
and injuries actually increased over the interwar period of this century
(Royal Commission on Safety, Report: 65). Yet even these dismal statistics
do not bring out the actual cost for the miners' health and welfare, since
premature deaths, disease, failing eyesight and hearing, have to be
considered in addition to the rate of fatal accidents at work. The NFGB
continued to campaign for tighter regulations on the conduct of the
industry, but while this combined with pressure from other interests for an
improvement in the technical standards of mine management - in line with
(uneven) technical progress in the industry - the 1911 Act remained in
force, unamended throughout the entire interwar period.
Nine Safety Legislation
The Coal Nines Act of 1911 established minimum standards of training for
firemen, examiners and deputies, defined these officials as safety officers
and delineated certain examinations which they would legally be obliged to
perform during their working shift. The Act was passed when hand coal-
getting remained the predominant method of coal extraction in the British
coalfields. In spite of the introduction of coalface machinery during the
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interwar years, the new health and safety hazards introduced with
mechanization, and the changes in the organization of work which made new
demands on mine management, the 1911 Act remained in force unamended
throughout the period.
The legislation was reviewed at the end of the 1920s, when the Government
appointed the Holland Committee to 'inquire into the qualification and
recruitment of mine officials'. Although the Committee did not deal
directly with the introduction of machinery and changes in work
organization, it did identify serious anomalies in the 1911 Act and serious
fault with the existing fireman's certificate of qualification. The test
was 'no more than a physical one, together with ability to measure the
quantity of air in an air current, and to test for inflammable gas'
(Holland Report: 104). Changes were recommended, and principally that
candidates should be required to sit an oral and a written examination,
testing their technical knowledge on subjects including the detection of
gas, air measurement, principles and use of flame and electric safety
lamps, dangers of coal-dust, methods of supporting roof and sides, handling
of explosives, preparation and execution of shot-firing, and general
procedures for inspecting the underground workings.
The Committee also addressed the anomaly in existing safety legislation,
which did not define the duties of colliery overmen. It recommended that
men appointed to the position of overman should either possess the (new)
fireman's certificate and a greater length of practical underground
experience than deputies, or a more exacting qualification - the first or
second class manager's certificate. The Holland Committee also recommended
that overmen should be required, like the deputies, to make a statutory
report on the state of the pits at the end of their shift. They argued that
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it 'seems only logical that the official who may be in virtual charge of a
large area of a mine, or even the whole of the underground workings, should
be required to note, and to record, occurrences which may be dangerous or
which may be apprehensive of danger'.
The Holland Committee's recommendations were not implemented (8),
however, and a further review of mining safety legislation was delayed
until the end of the 1930s, The Royal Commission on Safety, which was
appointed in 1936, repeated the criticism of the existing fireman's
examination, and proposed that the Holland Committee's suggestions for a
more exacting test - for deputies and overmen - should be translated into
law. Addressing the changes in working methods in the interwar years, the
Commission noted the additional safety hazards introduced with the use of
coalface machinery, and also that work reorganization in mechanized mines
had created the need for more intensive managerial supervision of
faceworkers. Under the 1911 Act, deputies were not legally available to
maintain supervision - in the form of coercion - and the Commissioners
suggested that firms had attempted to circumvent this restriction by
appointing overmen to look after production. They condemned this 'evolution
in the form of dual control' - with safety and production (nominally)
divided between separate grades of officials - as prejudicial to safety and
also to maximum efficiency. Thus, they argued that the provisions of the
1911 Act had created serious and increasing difficulties, and were in
conflict with the 'exigencies of practical mining, especially in nines
where the successful application of intensive mechanization depends on the
uninterrupted regularity of the cycle of operations'.
The Royal Commission proposed that the 1911 Act should be amended to
allow deputies and firemen to (legally) combine production and safety
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duties.
His jurisdiction should extend to all the operations in
progress in his district, and, while it must of course
be an essential part of his work to see that such opera-
tions are conducted with due regard to the safety of the
district and of the persons employed therein, we see no
reason why his duties should be limited to safety or why
It should be assumed that there is some fundamental
difficulty which prevents the official who is most closely
and continuously in contact with the progress of work from
paying due regard to both the safety and the production
aspects of the art of mining, always assuming of course
that the scope of his work is so adjusted as to allow him
enough time for the supervision necessary to secure safety.
(Report: 184)
The Commissioners sought to justify their recommendations by arguing that
the safety and output of a district could not be divorced; that, in their
opinion, 'efficient management and safety go hand in hand'; and by alluding
to the position of mine managers who were legally responsible for the
safety of employees, but combined this responsibility with the business of
commercial coal production. Nevertheless, their proposed solution to the
tension between the demands of production and of safety can be interpreted
as simply perpetuating the view of the latter 'not as a first call upon the
industry, but as something to be set against the needs of production' (Fine
et al, 1982: 26).
Thus, witnesses representing the Miners' Federation had argued before the
Royal Commission that the 'purely safety' aspects of the deputy's job
should be emphasized, and so that safety considerations would be upheld by
'independent' officials even if these clashed with the objectives of other
staff, appointed to supervise production. Managers were responsible for the
safety of the mine under the legislation. But they were also the agents of
mine owners, charged with the responsibilty for profit maximization, and
under pressure from boards of directors had often been compelled to
prioritize output over safety considerations, Deputies had certain
statutory safety duties, but had frequently complained of their inability
to perform these duties because of their position, as company employees,
and because of interference from superior officials with no statutory
responsibility for safety. Before the Royal Commission, Frowen argued that
'Action taken by the deputy in the interests of safety may have the effect
of stopping or retarding the work of production', and hence that there had
been 'instances.. .where deputies had been dismissed, suspended or degraded
in consequence' (Report: 203), The Commissioners recommended that all
underground supervisory officials - including overmen - should be held
directly responsible for safety, with superior officials held responsible
in the event of accidents occurring after they had overruled the decisions
of a subordinate officer, But they would not concede the deputies' demand
for an independent board of appeal, or any system that would diminish the
ulitimate authority of management to determine priorities and hire and fire
staff.
Had the recommendations of the Royal Commission been translated into
legislation, the practical effect at many mechanized pits would simply have
been to legalize current practices. Many deputies had been 'forced on to
output', or compelled to neglect safety considerations, and the rate of
fatal accidents and injuries in the industry had risen steadily. But
practical effect to the Royal Commission's report and recommendations was
not given until after the Second World War and the nationalization of the
coalmining industry. The provisions of the Coal Mines' Act therefore
remained in force as the central piece of safety legislation in the coal
industry throughout the interwar period.
Table 6.2. Average Annual Death and Injury Rates, Per 100,000 Manshifts
Worked, 1922-1936
Killed	 Injured
1922 - 1926 0.40 65.1
1927 - 1931 0.43 69.3
1932 - 1936 0.44 65.6
Source: Royal Commission on Safety, Report, 1938:65
CONCLUSION
This chapter has examined the role and recruitment of underground
supervisory workers in the British coal industry. It has focused on the
colliery deputies (also known as firemen and examiners) who were at the
bottom of the managerial hierarchy. But it has also considered the position
of the colliery overman, the deputy's immediate superior in the mines.
Legislation in 1887 obliged mineowners to appoint 'competent persons' for
safety duties, and principally the inspection of the working parts of the
mine prior to the start of coal-getting shifts. The Coal Mines Act of 1911
stipulated a minimum standard of qualification for firemen, examiners and
deputies, and ostensibly confined these officials to the performance of
work connected with the implementation of safety regulations. The
legislation of 1911 had been drafted when hand coal-getting remained the
predominant technique of coal extraction in the British coal industry. The
Act remained in force as the principal piece of legislation regulating
health and safety standards in the mines throughout the interwar period,
and was only substantially amended after the Second World War. Yet
mechanization was gradually introduced in the interwar years, and brought
new health and safety hazards for underground workers.
In this period, the operation of under-cutting the coal was mechanized
and conveyors were installed to transport the coal from the face to
subsidiary haulage routes. The introduction of coalface machinery and
increased use of electricity in the mines added to the risks of underground
explosions, and exacerbated the conditions which caused diseases such as
pneumoconiosis and nystagmus - affecting the lungs and eyes respectively.
Mechanization added to the already substantial health and safety hazards in
the mines, while the reorganization of work that accompanied the use of
coalface machinery created the need for management involvement in the
coordination of the production process and control over the pace and
performance of work. Under the 1911 Act, deputies were confined to safety
work. But there is considerable evidence to suggest that in many mechanized
pits, they were increasingly 'forced onto output'. Overmen, who had no
statutory responsibility for safety, were appointed to supervise production
and could over-ride the deputies' instructions.
Mechanization was a slow and uneven process in the interwar British coal
industry. In 1938, only 60 per cent of aggregate output was cut
mechanically, although the proportion varied across the coalfields from 90
per cent in Northumberland to 26 per cent in South Wales. The British
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industry lagged behind its principal international competitors in the
application of new production technologies. The results of mechanization
in terms of productivity growth - were unimpressive, and interwar
commentators and official enquiries suggested that this owed in part to
the failure of employers to appreciate that the new production techniques
required properly trained men and officials to get the best results (eg
Reid Report, 1945:5-6). But the recruitment and training of colliery
officials was regulated by legislation, and while the miners pressed for
more exacting standards - in the interests of health and safety at work -
the mineowners were vigorously opposed to change.
The piecemeal introduction of mechanization in the interwar period
reproduced and reinforced variations in the organization of work and
structures of underground employment across the British coal industry.
Mineowners could not agree to more stringent safety regulations because
they controlled very different work processes. Small mines and unmechanized
pits had been able to survive because mineowners secured wage cuts and an
extension of working hours in 1926. Miners were forced to work at an
exacting pace, in order to maintain their earnings, and to ignore basic
safety precautions, and clearly more stringent 	 health and safety
regulations would have restricted the owners from minimizing expenditure
and maximizing output at such pits. Legislation impinged on local working
practices; for example, in the North East where the deputies set the timber
at the face. In 1938, the Royal Commission on Safety urged that the
deputy's role should be to 'instruct, direct, and supervise the manual work
of others, not to do it himself' (Report: 186). But mineowners in the North
East were fiercely opposed to this suggestion, since such a ruling would
have forced	 unmechanized pits (which predominated in Durham) to alter
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existing practices and employment structures. The Mining Association
rejected the recommendations of the Holland Committee, which in 1930 had
pressed for a higher standard of examination for overmen and deputies, and
opposed many of the recommendations of the Royal Commission on Safety in
1938.
Mechanization in the interwar period was therefore introduced under the
existing provisions of the 1911 Coal Mines Act. The rate of fatal accidents
and injuries in the industry, which had shown a modest improvement in the
years immediately before the First World War, rose over the interwar
period. Work intensification and the extension of working hours caused the
premature death of miners and the misery of injury, disease and exhaustion.
The cost was borne immediately by the miners, but also by the mining
industry which used labour ineffectively and consumed labourer's lives in
the most profligate manner.
CHAPTER SEVEN: LABOUR UTILIZATION AID XANAGEMENT II THE BRITISH COAL
INDUSTRY, 1900-40
This thesis examined the utilization and management of labour in the
British coalmining industry in the years between 1900 and 1940. The inquiry
straddled two periods of contrasting fortunes for the coal industry. Output
and employment increased rapidly over the nineteenth and very early years
of the twentieth century. Expansion was facilitated by the opening-up of
large export markets in Europe and, on the eve of the First World War, the
British industry shipped abroad a third of its output of 287 million tons.
Dominating the international coal trade in the early twentieth century,
the British industry slipped from international pre-eminence in the years
after 1913. In the interwar period it was characterized by shrinking export
markets, high levels of unemployment, and bitter industrial strife. In
spite of intensifying international competition, the industry failed to
reconstruct. There was a failure to concentrate output on large-scale, more
productive mines, while the British industry also fell behind its European
and North American rivals in the application of new extractive
technologies. Productivity growth was relatively slow. Output per manshift
rose by only 13 per cent between 1913 and 1938. This compared with
increases of 56, 64, and 101 per cent in the coal industries of Poland,
Germany, and the Netherlands.
Coalmining was not the only great export-oriented sector of the
nineteenth century British economy to experience a loss of overseas markets
and acute economic difficulties in the twentieth century. Economic
historians have discussed the relative decline of Britain's staple
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industries in terms of the efficiency of management decision-making - the
failure or success of the nation's entrepreneurs. Entrepreneurial
performance has been assessed by different criteria. Chapter two of the
thesis outlined the different theoretical perspectives informing these
analyses.
Neoclassical economic historians have conceptualized entrepreneurial
success in terms of 'constrained optimization', or the minimization of
costs subject to given technical and market constraints. /nstitutionalists,
in contrast, crediting (some) social agencies with a creative role in the
process of economic development, have defined successful entrepreneurial
activity as the supersession of prevailing constraints on profitability.
Developing the second approach, Elbaum and Lazonick have argued that
British economic decline in the twentieth century owed much to the
inability of the nation's industrialists to transform their socio-economic
environment in response to the rise of corporate capitalism abroad. They
contend that British managers were unsuccessful entrepreneurs because they
were constrained by the economic institutions laid down in the nineteenth
century heyday of British competitive capitalism - structures of industrial
organization, enterprise management, and industrial relations.
Elbaum and Lazonick's empirical research centres on the British iron and
steel and cotton industries. But they argue that their analysis has a
broader application and provides the conceptual apparatus that can make
sense of the difficulties encountered by other staple sectors - including
coalmining - and of British industry more generally. There are problems
with their analytical approach, however, and most particularly the
treatment of institutions in isolation from the social relations impacting
upon them. Elbaum and Lazonick suggest that in Britain, the institutions of
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the nineteenth century became a given constraint for successive generations
of industrial capitalists, while abroad managements had considerable scope
to re-fashion existing arrangements. But they offer little explanation as
to why this should have been so, and it is rather difficult to accept that
the institutions of the nineteenth century British economy have survived
intact up until the present day. Irrespective of the particular context to
which it is applied, what is missing from Elbaum and Lazonick's
institutional perspective is a theory of institutional change; a
perspective in which institutions are seen as the product of the complex
and contradictory interplay of social and economic forces.
In this thesis, the changing performance of the British coalmining
industry has been analysed in the context of its changing economic and
social structure. The particular focus has been the evolving pattern of
industrial relations. But as chapter two emphasized, the industry's uneven
development cannot be understood in terms of labour relations alone. Fine
et al. have addressed the changing relationship between landowners and
mineowners, the former retaining the ownership and control of coal
royalties in Britain up until 1938. They have shown how this relationship
was conducive to the industry's expansion in the nineteenth century, but
Increasingly impeded reorganization and development. Fine et al.'s work has
been summarized because it indicates that the diversity in work
organization and labour relations that marked the British industry was in
part the product of the conflicts between landowners and mineowners, which
developed unevenly within and between the different coalfields and were
resolved in different ways. The structure of mine ownership, and
competitive relations between colliery firms must also be considered. In
this concluding chapter, some reference will be made to the interplay of
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relations between landowners, mineowners, and mineworkers, and the broader
economic and political context of the period.
The analysis of industrial relations began in chapter three by looking at
labour utilization in the coal industry in the period before the First
World War, and the links between work organization and labour organization.
Coal production remained a labour-intensive process. Mechanization had
largely been confined to mine construction and some surface operations.
Wages formed the largest element in working costs, and profitability was
highly dependent upon the relationship between wages and selling prices.
Negotiations over wages had been conducted increasingly at a district or
county level over the second half of the nineteenth century. Sliding scale
mechanisms of wage determination were gradually displaced by conciliation
boards from the 1880s, although conflict still centred on the rate at which
wages should fluctuate with selling prices.
Hand coal-getting predominated in all coalfields. At the coalface, the
collier or work group performed the complete operation of winning the coal,
which comprised the different tasks of undercutting, ripping and filling.
Colliers retained immediate control over the pace of work. Paid on a piece-
rate system they were subject to limited direct managerial supervision. The
experiences of other grades of underground and surface labour were often
quite different, however, and across the British industry structures of
work organization were remarkably diverse. Chapter three related regional
diversity in work organization to the influence of geological conditions,
and also the interplay of relations between workers, and between mineowners
and mineworkers.
Chapter four continued the discussion by looking at different forms of
subcontracting in the coal industry. The big butty system, whereby
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mineowners (and sometimes landowners) sub-let the working of an entire pit,
or even a group of pits, to a contractor or partnership of contractors, was
employed in a number of coalfields in the early nineteenth century. But in
most areas it was on the decline from the 1860s. Legislation from the 1870s
obliged all but the very smallest pits to appoint resident, full-time
managers who were qualified mining engineers. Clearly some companies
interpreted the legislation very loosely, and appointed a qualified manager
to supervise a group of pits, with individual mines left in the day-to-day
charge of an overman, or onlooker. But in some areas, even larger companies
with a relatively well-developed hierarchy of managerial and technical
staff, continued to employ a form of subcontracting - the little butty
system. Stalls, or sections of the working face, were sub-let to butty-men
or contracting colliers who engaged (or selected) and paid other workers.
In practice, the arrangement could vary enormously. Even within a single
mine there might be work teams which shared the work and earnings equally,
and others in which the ganger or butty-man controlled the distribution of
the piecework earnings over and beyond the payment of minimum shift rates.
Work organization and working practices varied in the different
coalfields. As chapter three argued, miners were divided in complex ways by
their different experiences of work, and unity was difficult to establish.
District and county trade unions had emerged as more permanent associations
in many coalfields by the 1880s, and a majority of these autonomous
associations cane together to form the Miners' Federation of Great Britain
in 1889. A loose-knit association, the MFGB could not command general
support in the wages struggles of the early 1890s. Its policies were
opposed by the county unions in the North East where sliding scales
remained in force, and where distinctive working practices were at the
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heart of the northern hewers' opposition to the MFGB's campaign for a
general reduction in working hours. But organization was gradually built-up
at local levels, and in spite of the opposition from the northern unions,
and from the mineowners, the MFGB was eventually successful in securing the
introduction of legislation limiting the working day to eight hours. The
county unions of Northumberland and Durham joined the Federation in 1908,
after the passage of the eight hours Bill and, as a more cohesive body, the
MFGB went on to campaign for a national minimum wage. .
Mineowners had combined to form a national association - the Mining
Association of Great Britain - as early as the mid-nineteenth century. But
this was a loose federation of district employer associations and
individual mineowners, and its activities were defined and circumscribed by
its constituents. Mineowners were divided by many of the factors applying
to the mineworkers. Geological conditions varied between, and within, the
different coalfields which were oriented towards different product markets,
and systems of work organization were also varied. These conditions meant
that the owners were likely to be differentially affected by uniform
restrictions on labour utilization. The example of the eight hours
legislation cited in chapter three illustrates the point. In the North
East, existing arrangements had to be altered to comply with the
legislation which came into force in 1910. The changes secured benefitted
the owners, who were able to introduce an additional coal-getting shift and
thus maximize the utilization of their fixed capital investments. In South
Wales, in contrast, where colliers had formerly worked a single, very long
shift, hours of coal-drawing were reduced and the owners pressed for
compensating wage cuts.
From the early twentieth century, the miners achieved a degree of unity
around the demands for better health and safety provision, a national
minimum wage and a national wage structure. But because profitability was
likely to be differentially affected, the owners could not agree to concede
reforms. Any common employer policy had to accommodate regional variations
in geological and working conditions, and hence the mineowners could
organize their collective strength only in opposition to the miners'
demands. The owners united to preserve maximum discretion in wage and
employment regulation at local levels, and to maintain the flexibility of
responding to changing economic conditions by cutting wage rates. This had
a profound and negative impact on the industry's long-term development,
reinforcing other factors that were operating to discourage reorganization
and modernization.
The diversity in working practices and conditions that marked the
industry in the period before the First World War was heightened, rather
than diminished, in the interwar years because the transition from hand-
getting to mechanical-cutting was very uneven within and between the
different mining districts. Chapter five looked at the general features of
the partially-mechanized mining system introduced in this period. Coal-
cutting machines were developed for longwall applications in the British
industry. With the use of machines to undercut the coal, the longwall
method of extraction (advancing from the face) which had been an enormously
varied arrangement, was developed into a more standardized system of
working. A single working shift was set aside for the operation of cutting,
and so that the machines could be used to continuously undercut a face of
up to 200 yards. Other operations were organized over two further shifts.
With this system, the cycle of coal-getting operations could be completed
only once in every period of 24 hours.
Workers were grouped into large work teams, but the work was sub-divided
and arranged over three shifts. Within each shift, there was a more
intensive division of labour. Colliers formerly responsible for all the
operations connected with coal-getting were confined to the performance of
a narrowly-defined task. They were effectively de-skilled and lost their
immediate control over the pace of work. The new division of labour made
greater demands on the management organization. Pit officials had to be
deployed to coordinate the production process, and to coerce and pace
workers performing discrete but interdependent tasks.
The transition from hand coal-getting to mechanical-cutting was slow in
the British industry and took place very unevenly. At the level of
individual mining districts, and of pits within them, geological and market
conditions, conflicts between mine and landowners, and between employers
and workers, combined in different ways to promote or inhibit change.
Chapter five explored the particular circumstances of a number of
coalfields, but emphasized that there were intra-regional variations in the
pace of mechanization. It stressed that factors inhibiting investment in
any particular area had wider implications, dampening the force of
competition across the industry. And because piecemeal mechanization
combined with deteriorating market conditions to increase unemployment,
there was a downward pressure on wage rates which in turn supported the
survival of unmechanized mines. This combination of conditions is perhaps
Illustrated by the example of the small Kent coalfield where production
came on stream in the 1920s, but where hand-hewing and the little butty
system survived into the late 1930s.
Throughout the interwar period, systems of hand-getting and partially-
mechanized mining coexisted in the industry. Chapter six argued that it was
in large part because of the industry's unevenness that the mineowners were
unable to agree to any reform of the law on industrial safety. The use of
machinery and of electricity in the mines introduced new safety hazards and
increased the production of coal-dust. More stringent controls on working
conditions were required to protect the miners from injury and dust-related
diseases. Yet the Mines Act of 1911, which had been framed in the era of
hand-getting, remained in force throughout the interwar period as the
principal piece of legislation regulating health and safety standards.
The 1911 Act stipulated the qualifications necessary for various grades
of production officials. It ostensibly confined colliery deputies, at the
bottom of the managerial hierarchy, to the performance of work connected
with the implementation of safety regulations. But it left various
loopholes, to accommodate regional variations in working practice - as, for
example, in the North East where deputies set the timber at the coalface -
and in the interwar years, firms made full use of these exemption clauses.
The use of machinery and new division of labour at the face in mechanized
pits created new demands on the management organization. It created the
need for greater coordination of the production process, and greater
coercion of workers. And while machinery also heightened health and safety
risks, deputies were often obliged to act as production rather than safety
officials, or to submit to the instructions of overmen appointed by senior
levels of management for the purposes of ensuring the continuity of
production. Overmen did not have a statutory responsibility for safety and,
as the deputy's immediate superior, could over-rule the latter's
instructions.
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In the interwar period, the rate of fatal accidents in coalmining
actually increased - having shown some improvement in the years immediately
before 1913. Safety legislation failed to advance with technical innovation
in the industry. But mechanization was an uneven process and in the
Interwar years working conditions deteriorated in unmechanized pits. Wages
were depressed and, in an effort to maintain their earnings, pieceworkers
were forced to intensify their work and take risks at the expense of their
health and safety.
Deputies were pressured by senior levels of management to prioritize
production over safety. Through their associations, they campaigned to be
made state employees and, failing this, for an independent appeals board to
investigate cases of unfair dismissal. The deputies were supported in these
demands by the Miners' Federation, but were unable to secure any improved
employment protection. From its inception, the MFGB had prioritized the
demand for improved health and safety provision. But mineowners were
unwilling to concede reforms because they controlled very different work
processes, and in the interwar period the miners were unsuccessful in their
struggles for improved conditions.
The Miners' Federation had to struggle to overcome divisions within its
membership but, from the early twentieth century, achieved a growing unity
around the demands for better safety provision, reduced working hours, and
national wage bargaining. The mineowners were unable to agree to broad
concessions. The implications of the miners' struggles over economic
matters began to extend into more advanced political issues. As early as
1894, a resolution had been introduced at the MFGB's annual conference in
favour of state ownership of the mines. But the proposal was not for
workers' control, or even joint control with the state and in any event
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could command limited support. The miners were divided at both the
political and economic levels. Even in the years immediately before the
First World War, the influence of the Liberal Party was still strong in
some mining districts, and the MFGB was in fact the last of the major
unions to affiliate to the Labour Party - in 1909 (see Gregory, 1968). But
nationalization moved further to the centre of the miners' agenda, and the
struggles and successes of the years during the First World War were of
crucial importance in this respect.
Government controls imposed in 1917 included profit-pooling arrangements
and allowed for cross-subsidy payments to be made between different mining
districts. This meant that flat-rate wage increases could be conceded on a
national basis without imposing an intolerable burden on profitability for
particular sections of the industry. The miners pressed for the extension
of government controls and, in 1919, presented the explicit demand for the
nationalization of the industry. By this time the miners were united in the
demand for nationalization because this was generally seen as the
precondition for better working conditions and a better standard of living.
For some miners, albeit a minority, it also represented a first step
towards the overthrow of capitalism. Unremarkably, the mineowners were
opposed to nationalization. They strengthened their own national
association in this period, conceding additional powers to the MAGB which
became a more centralized and bureaucratic body. The owners strengthened
their national organization in order to ward-off nationalization, and
secure an early termination of wartime government controls. Because of
their need for maximum individual discretion, they pressed for a return to
the structures of wage and employment regulation of the past.
The aftermath of the First World War was a period of political and
economic instability in Britain and internationally. In Britain, the Labour
Party had emerged as a major electoral force and the Liberal Party was on
the decline. But the Labour Party was still unable to command sufficient
support in Parliament to maintain a government. Its coalition with the
Liberals quickly collapsed in 1924. The British trade union movement had
emerged from the war years in a much strengthened position, and sections of
it were militant and combative. Nevertheless, the labour movement was
hardly a unified force, and in terms of their organization, cohesiveness,
militancy, and political consciousness, the miners represented a relatively
advanced section. The miners needed solidarity action to pursue their
demands and influence government economic policy. While they were able to
unite other groups of industrial workers around their struggles from time
to tine, support was by no means guaranteed. Rather it was conditional upon
the economic situation, cohesiveness and consciousness of other groups of
workers (see, for example, Wrigley, 1987; Skelley, ed., 1976).
There were divisions within the capitalist class; between sections
pressing for active government intervention to promote the restructuring of
private industry, and sections which were firmly anti-interventionist,
viewing government involvement as a prelude to public ownership. The
mineowners fell into the latter group. Because of the conditions under
which production was organized in coalmining and the constraints inhibiting
amalgamation and mechanization, the mineowners could not agree upon or
concede to schemes for the reorganization of the industry proposed by the
Liberal and Labour parties in the early-to-mid 1920s, And although the
mineowners initially supported proposals for the nationalization of mineral
royalties, they reversed their position after 1919 as this was seen as a
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hostage to fortune in the political climate of the times. The landowners
were of course behind the mineowners' anti-interventionist stance. The
interests of British finance capital also fell behind this line. The 'City'
was striving to restore its international role, and with its interests in
short-run capital movements it had to limit its commitment to long-term
finance for British industry. And because 'the City' also made its money
from government borrowing, it could not support government involement in
the reorganization of British industry	 (see Fine et al. 1985). In
retrospect, it can be seen that sections of British capital in favour of
government intervention achieved their prominence in the early-to-mid 1920s
when labour militancy was at a height, and when short-term economic and
ideological concessions had to be made to contain the miners.
At the end of the First World War, the miners were pressing for
nationalization and the mineowners for a return to the conditions of the
past. Governments in the period between 1919 and 1926 intervened
tactically, to appease the miners when this was expedient, but within an
overall commitment to private ownership. In 1919, when there was a threat
of a coal strike, and possibility of supportive active from the miners'
partners in the Triple Industrial Alliance - forged with the rail and
transport workers in 1913 - the government appointed the Sankey Commission
to investigate the miners' demands. A majority on the Commission proposed
that the mineral royalties and mines should be taken into public ownership.
The miners secured a wage increase, and a seven hour day, but the
government was able to reject nationalization and bury the Sankey Report as
the threat of industrial action passed.
In March, 1921, five months earlier than planned, the government returned
control of the coal industry to the mineowners. The immediate context was a
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slump in the export trade, and there was rising unemployment elsewhere in
the economy where the post-war boom had been eclipsed somewhat earlier.
Pressing for wage cuts and a return to district wage settlements, the
mineowners precipitated a three month stoppage of work in the coal
industry. Support from the miners' partners in the Triple Alliance
collapsed, with the aid of the government's activities, and the dispute
ended in the owners' favour. Between 1922 and 1924, the temporary
dislocation of coal production abroad artificially boosted the fortunes of
British coal exporters, and the miners secured a revision of the minimum
wage provisions in the terms of settlement of the 1921 agreement. But in
1925, the mineowners pressed for wage cuts, the abolition of the minimum
wage provisions of the settlements of 1921 and 1924, and an extension of
working hours. Under the threat of economy-wide industrial action ('Red
Friday', 31 July, 1925), the government intervened to offer a nine month
subsidy which was to last while a Royal Commission investigated the dispute
in the coal industry.
The Commission, chaired by the Liberal politician Sir Herbert Samuel,
made sweeping criticisms of the coal industry. It recommended a radical
reorganization of the industry's structure, arguing that this was the only
way in which the industry's international competitiveness would be secured
in the long-term. And, although it rejected nationalization, the Samuel
Commission recommended that legislative powers should be used to promote
amalgamations if reorganization was not pursued voluntarily. On the other
hand, it conceded a case for short-term wage cuts - although urging that
the national framework governing district wage settlements should be
retained (to limit inter-district wage-cutting) and dismissed the owners'
demand for a return to an eight hour working day as irrelevant to the
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predicament of British coalmining. Neither the miners nor the mineowners
could accept the Samuel Report. Insisting upon wage cuts and an extension
of working hours, the mineowners precipitated the General Strike of 1926,
the details of which are well-known.
Forced to surrender to the owners' terns in November, the miners were
defeated and their unity broken. The defeat of the miners was necessarily a
set-back for the wider labour movement, and trade union membership fell. If
British workers and their trade unions had simply constituted a constraint
on entrepreneurial initiative, inhibiting reorganization and re-equipment
through the exercise of job controls as is suggested in, for example,
Elbaum and Lazonick's analysis, then some acceleration in the diffusion of
new production techniques might have been expected to follow the events of
1926. But certainly in coalmining this was not the case. The proportion of
industry output undercut mechanically doubled between 1927 and 1938. But as
chapter five of the thesis noted, this increase owed largely to the more
intensive application of machinery within mechanized mines, and there was
no widespread conversion of hand-getting pits to mechanical cutting. Large
numbers of unmechanized pits remained in competition at the end of the
interwar period, accounting for 40 per cent of British coal output, while
hand-hewing had virtually disappeared in Continental coal industries. In
the British industry, the number of mines in operation fell by
approximately 30 per cent between 1913 and 1938, and the bulk of this
reduction occurred after 1926. But little was achieved in terns of the
concentration of production on large-scale, modern mines. Indeed, in those
districts where concentration was most noticeable - Nottinghamshire and
South Yorkshire - the most active period of structural change had been
before 1926, and over the industry as a whole the rate of new pit
development slowed to a trickle in the late 1920s and 1930s.
The defeat of the miners in 1926 ensured the defeat of those forces
acting to restructure the coal industry. Had the General Strike resulted in
a labour victory, the result would have been to force drastic government
intervention. Nationalization of the mines would have become the next
issue. But the defeat of the miners also meant the triumph of the anti-
interventionist wing of British capital (see Fine et al. 1985). With wage
cuts and the extension of working hours, the mineowners were able to
maintain profitability, while the coal industry staggered on without the
major reorganization that was required to restore its competitive position
internationally.
Kirby (1973) offers a different interpretation, and one that has been
examined critically in chapter two of this thesis. He argues that it was
government intervention in the 1930s that impeded the reorganization of the
coal industry because the different aims of government policy were
contradictory. Part one of the 1930 Coal Mines Act gave statutory support
to sales cartels organized on a district basis, while Part two built upon
the Samuel Commission's recommendations and established the Coal Mines
Reorganization Commission to promote amalgamations in the industry. But
Kirby's argument that cartellization necessarily defeats the forces for
reorganization is contradicted by the example of the German coal industry,
and his own detailed account provides evidence that Part two of the Coal
Mines Act had more or less failed before it was placed on the Statute Book.
The mineowners secured the imposition of such stringent conditions for the
confirmation of compulsory amalgamation schemes that the CMRC had virtually
no statutory powers (Kirby, 1977:131). The mineowners supported Part One of
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the Act, which gave statutory support to the voluntary cartel schemes they
had organized in the aftermath of the General Strike. And under these
schemes the mineowners 'got a new lease of life' (Heinemann, 1944:118)
because the profitability of existing capacity was maintained in conditions
constraining reorganization to reduce unit costs.
Mineowners used their collective power to secure statutory backing for
the voluntary marketing schemes organized in different districts over the
late 1920s, while individual firms sought their own solutions within the
particular constraints in which they operated. Over the 1920s and 1930s,
there were successive waves of merger activity. Large firms became
relatively more important. Amongst the largest were firms that did invest
in the reorganization of production,
	 and reorganized their internal
management structures along the lines of the modern capitalist corporation.
Others were more akin to holding companies which acquired large numbers of
relatively small scale pits, and were able to maintain prices without
reorganizing capacity where they controlled the supply of a particular type
of coal (as, for example, in the case of Amalagamated Anthracite). There
was also a considerable degree of diversification, into coal preparation
and coal-consuming industries. Vertical integration allowed mining
companies to appropriate profits from coalmining through their subsidiaries
- thereby avoiding the claims of the landowners, and the mineworkers whose
wages, under the district agreements from 1921 onwards, were related to the
profits on the sale of coal at the pithead. But low wages in the industry
and sales cartels also fostered the survival of large numbers of smaller -
and some very tiny - companies, and this was of little advantage to the
larger corporations. There were renewed pressures for change and in 1938
the coal royalties were nationalized - by a Conservative government.
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The nationalization of the mines followed, although not immediately. Coal
production was vital to the war economy. But there were output shortages
and increasing recruitment difficulties (with miners opting to enlist in
the army, rather than remaining in the industry). In spite of resistance
from the mineowners, who anticipated that greater regulation would lead to
public ownership, the government imposed certain wartime controls on the
coal industry. The Labour Party was committed to nationalization and, in
anticipation, the MFGB reorganized itself into the National Union of
Mineworkers (although in practice the union continued to operate very much
on a federal basis). In these circumstances, the mineowners were reluctant
to invest and coal output was drained from the industry's existing
capacity. The Reid Committee, appointed by the government in 1944, more or
less declared the coal industry bankrupt. The Committee recommended a major
programme of reorganization and re-equipment - the concentration of output
on large-scale pits, with improved layouts and underground haulage systems
- and that an effective national 'authority' would be required to ensure
that reorganization. The mineowners protested, offering their own scheme
for a single cartel, but with the Labour Party's electoral triumph in 1945,
nationalization became certain.
The reconstruction of the coal industry achieved under public ownership
is beyond the scope of the present study, although many of the themes and
preoccupations of the thesis continue to be relevant. Nationalization
overcame the problem of fragmented ownership, and facilitated many of the
reforms that had previously been frustrated, including improvements in the
areas of safety and welfare. Nevertheless, conflict over the control of
work, nature of supervision, payment systems, wages and working conditions,
did not disappear with the change of ownership. Under public ownership, the
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coal industry's expansion has been circumscribed by government policy,
while the miners ability to influence the industry's development has still
been contingent upon their ability to unite and to unite other sections of
the labour movement around their struggles.
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MOTES
Chapter Four: Contract York and the Butty-Systen
1. For contrasting accounts see Humphries, 1981, and Barrett and
McIntosh (1980).
Chapter Five: Mechanization in the Interwar British Coal Industry
1. The figures for percussive machines in use in 1938 include 'other
types', such as pneumatic picks. These were similar to percussive machines,
in that they might be hand-held and operated by the collier to break into
the coal before filling it. But those in use in the interwar years were
more powerful than the earlier percussive type employed in the British
industry and had been introduced from the Continent where they were quite
widely employed in the Ruhr and Dutch coalfields. In Britain, the US, and
Poland, however, pneumatic picks were employed only on a limited scale in
the interwar years. See Reid Report, 1945:47.
Chapter Six: Colliery Deputies and Overnen
1. In some districts, shot-firers were in fact the lowest rank in the
hierarchy of production officials.
2. Melling (1980) and Spencer (1975) make this point forcefully.
Exceptionally, Goldthorpe (1959, 1961) has studied supervisory-worker
relations in the British coalmining industry.
3. In the years immediately after the First World War, even the colliery
managers were becoming more assertive. The National Association of Colliery
Managers (NACM), formed in 1887, largely reiterated the Mining
Association's position on matters relating to industrial safety, the
training and recruitment of colliery officials. Carr-Saunders and Wilson
(1964) argued that NACM kept a low profile, confining its deliberations to
technical issues, because the mineowners would not tolerate their agents
voicing a (collective) opinion on matters with 'political' overtones - such
as the industry's structure and performance, and its industrial relations.
Also relevant, however, is the fact that NACM - or its constituent district
mine managers' associations - embraced within their membership men who were
company directors. In 1919, NACM and the various district associations were
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certainly vociferous opponents of nationalization. But these associations
were also expressing their members' discontent as regards salaries, hours
and conditions. The Scottish Mine Managers' Association rejected the
owners' pay offer in May, 1919; the Northern Colliery Officials'
Association advised the mineowners that managers were 'not satisfied with
their position' and wanted a 'good salary, reasonable hours, and a share in
profits'; and the retiring president of NACM stated that 'colliery managers
would have to move with the times, and take up more aggressive action in
their own defence, or otherwise...be left behind' (Colliery Guardian,
9.5.1919: 1099; 6.6.1919: 1359).
4. Although, having succeeded in negotiating a county agreement in 1918,
the then General Secretary of the National Association apparently 'assisted
with the negotiating of a private scheme on behalf of the Staveley
Collieries Deputies in 1920' - an action which England declared was 'most
difficult to understand' (1963:26).
5. Although the TUC's Disputes Committee at this time was dealing with
the issue in Scotland where both the miners' union and firemen's
association were attempting to recruit supervisory grades.
6. 'The modern tendency.... seems to be to pay less regard to securing
the maximum concentration of men and output on the longest workable faces,
and more regard to planning the most economic length of face in relation to
the amount of roadway making and maintenance required' (Reid Report: 42),
7. Frowen's evidence before the Sankey Commission in 1919, and again
before the Royal Commission on Safety in 1938, suggested that across the
coalfields the interests of overmen and deputies were deeply divided. In a
few districts, however, the two groups were organized within the same
association in the interwar years. In 1946, on the eve of the
nationalization of the coal industry, the National Federation of Firemen,
Examiners and Deputies was reconstituted as the National Association of
Colliery Overmen, Deputies and Shot-firers.
8. Certain of the Holland Committee's recommendations were given effect
in the 1930s. But these related to the qualifications for the position of
mine manager and under-manager, rather than to the training and duties of
overmen and deputies.
